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INTRODUCTION
Th eodicy and Ibn Taymiyya
Th e eminent Muslim jurist Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) is well known for 
polemic against all manner of rational thought, whether the Neoplatonic 
philosophy of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), the mystical speculation of Ibn ≠Arabī, 
or the Kalām theology of the Ash≠arīs and the Mu≠tazilīs. Furthermore, Ibn 
Taymiyya’s resolute adherence to the Qur±an, the Sunna and the Salaf (i.e. 
the pious early Muslims) is nearly legendary. Yet, scattered about in special-
ized studies are hints that there is more to the shaykh than polemics and 
unyielding literalism. While polemics and literalism are indeed prominent 
features of Ibn Taymiyya’s writing, it is growing ever more apparent that 
their import is not fully grasped without reference to a broader method and 
theological vision at work in his thought. Perhaps even more surprising is that 
Ibn Taymiyya shares with Ibn Sīnā and Ibn ≠Arabī, as well as with al-Ghazālī 
in his I!hyā± ≠ulūm al-dīn, a similar stance on one of the most fundamental 
questions of monotheistic theology, that of theodicy.
Th e term theodicy as used in modern western philosophy of religion indi-
cates the attempt to explain why a good, just and all-powerful God created a 
less than perfect world. Th e term is not indigenous to the Islamic tradition, 
and a major current within the tradition—the voluntarism of Ash≠arī Kalām 
theology—rejects the question of theodicy as meaningless. God’s unfettered 
will, suffi  ciency apart from the world, and exclusive power preclude asking 
why God does this or that. God is not limited by any necessity of reason, 
and His acts require no deliberation, rational motive or external cause. Th us, 
God’s creation of injustice, unbelief and other evils is not susceptible to any 
explanation except that God wills it.
Despite this, theodicy and its division into two basic kinds—the best-
of-all-possible-worlds theodicy, also known as optimism, and the free-will 
theodicy—prove useful as analytical shorthand for sorting through other 
theological currents in the Islamic tradition.1 Mu≠tazilī Kalām theology 
provides the primary instance of an Islamic free-will theodicy. While the 
1 I owe this conceptual distinction to Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the 
Goodness of God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 179, and passim.
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Mu≠tazilīs uphold God’s suffi  ciency apart from the world along with the 
Ash≠arīs, they also introduce purpose into God’s creation. Th ey explain that 
God creates human beings not out of His own need but for the benefi t of 
humans themselves, which is to work for reward in the retributive order of 
obligations that God has imposed. Within this order God must do what is 
best (a$sla$h) for all creatures in respect of religion, and, according to some 
Mu≠tazilīs, in mundane matters as well. Humans for their part have free 
will and create their own good and bad deeds apart from God’s control. 
God is therefore just to reward and punish. If God were the sole creator of 
all human acts, He would obviously be unjust to punish the unbelief and 
disobedience that He creates.
Optimism or the best-of-all-possible-worlds theodicy appears in more than 
one strand of the Islamic tradition. An early instance occurs in the Kalām 
theology of al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) for whom evil serves the peculiar func-
tion of proving the existence of God. God creates all things, including evil, 
in conformity to His wisdom, and, by virtue of evil’s opposition to good, evil 
shows the contingency of the creation and its need for the Creator. Evil is 
thus a tool of God’s wisdom to lead human beings to knowledge of God.2
While al-Māturīdi serves as the eponym for the important Māturīdī 
school of Kalām theology, Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037) and his doctrine of provi-
dence (≠ināya) provide the key conceptual resources for the development of 
optimism in the other major strands of the Islamic tradition. For Ibn Sīnā, 
providence means that the First (i.e. God) is the source of the best possible 
order: the First is “a cause in Itself of good and perfection inasmuch as that 
is possible (bi-!hasab al-imkān).”3 Similarly, the knowledge of the First neces-
sarily entails that the existence of everything is “according to the best order 
(≠alā a!hsan al-ni)zām).”4 Evil in Ibn Sīnā’s view does not truly exist. It is rather 
a privation of being or existence, and it is a necessary consequence of and a 
means to the greater good that God providentially wills in creation.5
2 J. Meric Pessagno, “Th e uses of Evil in Maturidian Th ought,” Studia Islamica 60 (1984): 
59–82.
3 Ibn Sīnā, Al-Shifā±: Al-Ilāhiyyāt (2), ed. Mu!hammad Yūsuf Mūsā, et al. (Cairo: Al-Hay±a 
al-≠āmma li-shu±ūn al-ma $tābi≠ al-amīriyya, 1380/1960), 415.
4 Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt (Ed. Sulaymān Dunyā. 3 vols. Cairo: Dār i!hyā± al-kutub 
al-≠arabiyya, 1366–67/1947–48), 3:206. Ibn Sīnā explains the providentially good ordering 
of the heavens and the earth in Al-Mabda± wa al-ma≠ād, ed. ≠Abd Allāh Nūrānī (Tehran: 
Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University—Tehran University, 1984), 88–90.
5 Ibn Sīnā, Al-Shifā±: Al-Ilāhiyyāt (2), 414–422. Mūnā A !hmad Mu !hammad Abū Zayd 
off ers a wide ranging overview of Ibn Sīnā’s thought on evil in Mafh ūm al-khayr wa al-sharr 
fī al-falsafa al-Islāmiyya: Dirāsa muqārana fī fi kr Ibn Sīnā (Beirut: Al-Mu±assasa al-jāmi≠iyya 
li-l-dirāsāt wa al-nashr wa al-tawzī≠, 1411/1991). See also Shams C. Inati, Th e Problem of 
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Optimism is also widespread in Sufi sm. Sufi s do not always speculate 
whether this world is the best possible, but they do typically affi  rm that God 
creates evil as an instrument of discipline on the spiritual path. Annemarie 
Schimmel sums up this perspective as follows: “Th e mystic can understand 
that God’s wrath is mercy in disguise, and that the pain and punishment 
that He infl icts upon those who love Him are necessary for their spiritual 
growth—just as bitter medicine is necessary for the sick.”6 In the more philo-
sophical vein of Sufi sm, which draws on Avicennan conceptual resources, 
al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) sparked a debate lasting eight centuries with the 
claim, “Th ere is nothing in possibility more wonderful than what is (laysa 
fī al-imkan abda≠ mimma kān),” and Ibn ≠Arabī (d. 638/1240) integrated 
optimism fully into his prodigious and infl uential mystical writings.7
Also ranking with Muslim optimists is Ibn Taymiyya, as well as his most 
illustrious student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350). Th is has gone 
almost completely unnoticed in basic works on Islamic philosophy and 
theology in western languages.8 Yet, observation of Ibn Taymiyya’s optimism 
is not new. Joseph Bell broke important ground on several aspects of the 
shaykh’s theodicy in his 1979 Love Th eory in Later (Hanbalite Islam, which 
I will review in Chapter Two below,9 and, 40 years earlier, Henri Laoust in 
Evil: Ibn Sînâ’s Th eodicy (Binghamton, NY: Global Publications, Institute of Global Cultural 
Studies, Binghamton University, 2000); Jean R. Michot, La destinée de l’homme selon Avi-
cenne (Louvain: Peeters, 1986), 61–66; and Marwan Rashed, “Th éodicée et approximation: 
Avicenne,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 10 (2000): 223–257.
6 Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill, NC: Th e University 
of North Carolina Press, 1975), 198. Louis Massignon provides evidence for the instrumen-
tal role of suff ering in Sufi sm in Th e Passion of al-Hallāj: Mystic and Martyr of Islam, trans. 
Herbert Mason (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 3:111–121.
7 On al-Ghazālī and the subsequent controversy, see Eric L. Ormsby, Th eodicy in Islamic 
Th ought: Th e Dispute over al-Ghazālī’s “Best of all Possible Worlds” (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1984). I survey Ormsby’s work at the end of Chapter Six. For a reminder that 
al-Ghazālī’s theological views are not easily harmonized into a coherent position, see Norman 
Calder’s review of Ormsby’s book in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and Afr ican Studies 
49 (1986): 211–2. For Ibn ≠Arabī see Ormsby, Th eodicy, 103–7, and more comprehensively, 
William C. Chittick, Th e Sufi  Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-≠Arabi’s Metaphysics of Imagination 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989), especially 289–301.
8 Th e sole mention of Ibn Taymiyya’s optimism that I have found in introductory works 
occurs in Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 113–4, 
who notes approvingly, although inaccurately in the case of the Māturīdīs, that “Ibn Taymīya 
reinstates into Muslim theology the doctrine of the purposiveness of the Divine behaviour, a 
doctrine so strenuously denied by Ash≠arism, Māturīdism and %Zāhirism as compromising the 
omnipotence of God’s will and His dissimilarity to His creation.” Unfortunately, Rahman 
does not explore the implications of this in Ibn Taymiyya’s theology further.
9 Joseph Normant Bell, Love Th eory in Later (Hanbalite Islam (Albany, NY: State University 
of New York Press, 1979), 46–91.
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his still unsurpassed 1939 Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Ta$kī-
d-Dīn A !hmad b. Taimīya concisely described the shaykh’s theodicy thus:
God is essentially providence. Evil is without real existence in the world. All 
that God has willed can only conform to a sovereign justice and an infi nite 
goodness, provided, however, that it is envisaged from the point of view of the 
totality and not from that of the fragmentary and imperfect knowledge that His 
creatures have of reality. . . . Ibn Taymiyya’s theodicy marks the advent in Sunnī 
dogmatics of an optimism of Platonic inspiration which will be more amply 
and more literarily developed in the oeuvre of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya.10
Unfortunately, Laoust says little more than this about Ibn Taymiyya’s theo-
dicy, and, buried away in Laoust’s encyclopedic tome, its signifi cance has 
not been recognized. Th e present study seeks to rectify this by drawing 
together Ibn Taymiyya’s thought on the sundry questions that come under 
the rubric of theodicy and expositing, analyzing and occasionally translating 
his theodicean writings. I also examine the shaykh’s intellectual context in 
order to shed light on his theodicy’s location in the wider Islamic tradition 
and trace precedents for his thought. A great deal more remains to be done 
in this regard, but the contextualizing work done here should be suffi  cient 
to show that Ibn Taymiyya articulates a best-of-all-possible-worlds theodicy 
over against traditional Ash≠arism and Mu≠tazilism that follows in the train 
of Ibn Sīnā, Ibn ≠Arabī and al-Ghazālī, whatever his diff erences with these 
renowned fi gures on other counts. Attention is given as well to the theologi-
cal method at work in Ibn Taymiyya’s theodicy, and more will be said about 
this at the end of this Introduction.
It becomes apparent in the course of this study that Laoust’s brief analysis 
of Ibn Taymiyya’s place in the Islamic tradition quoted above requires modifi -
cation and elaboration. As for the inspiration of Ibn Taymiyya’s theodicy, Ibn 
Sīnā is more proximate than Plato, although Plato certainly lies in the distant 
background. Additionally, inasmuch as al-Māturīdī and al-Ghazālī come 
earlier, Ibn Taymiyya does not mark the beginnings of optimism in Sunnī 
theology. Nonetheless, his theodicy might be original in another signifi cant 
respect. Th e shaykh combines a best-of-all-possible-worlds theodicy with a 
dynamic vision of God’s essence. Ibn Taymiyya’s God, who is perpetually 
active and creative from eternity, contrasts sharply with the ultimately time-
less and motionless God of not only Ibn Sīnā and his successors but also the 
10 Henri Laoust, Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Ta!kī-d-Dīn A!hmad b. Taimīya, 
canoniste !hanbalite né à (Harrān en 661/1262, mort à Damas en 728/1328 (Cairo: Imprimerie 
de l’institut français d’archéologie orientale, 1939), 169, cf. 515.
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Kalām theologians. It is because of the unique character of Ibn Taymiyya’s 
God as ever active in a temporal sense that I call his optimism “perpetual.” 
Th is will become readily apparent in Chapter Two below.
Ibn Taymiyya’s theodicy has not been without interest to later generations 
of Muslims. As Laoust correctly observes, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya provides 
a more fully developed optimism than does Ibn Taymiyya himself, although 
the disciple’s theodicy and its debt to his master have yet to be studied 
carefully.11 Perhaps more signifi cantly, Ibn Taymiyya is well known today 
as a major inspiration for contemporary Islamic resurgence, and it is com-
mon knowledge among students of modern Islam that the writings of the 
shaykh are important sources for the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
Wahhābī movement in Arabia and modernist reformers such as Rashīd Ri#dā 
(d. 1935).12 While modern Muslim interest in Ibn Taymiyya is oft en thought 
to be social and political, there is anecdotal evidence that it extends to 
theodicy as well. Th e direct infl uence of Ibn Taymiyya’s optimism is found 
in such diverse places as the work of the prominent Pakistani modernist 
Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988) and a detailed volume on good and evil published 
11 A major source for Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s theodicy is Shifā± al-≠alīl fī masā±il al-qa#dā± 
wa al-qadar wa al-!hikma wa al-ta≠līl, ed. al-Sayyid Mu!hammad al-Sayyid and Sa≠īd Ma!hmūd 
(Cairo: Dār al-(Hadīth, 1414/1994). Irmeli Perho, “Man Chooses his Destiny: Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya’s view on predestination,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 12 (2001): 61–70, 
provides access to the basic ideas found in the fi rst part of this work, but the scope of her 
article does not extend to the questions of wise purpose and causality in God’s will that are 
treated later in the book. Of the thirty chapters in Shifā± al-≠alīl, A. de Vlieger, Kitâb al qadr: 
Matériaux pour servir a l’étude de la doctrine de la prédestination dans la théologie musulmane 
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1903), 116–169, translates parts of Chapters 7–12 and 17, which deal 
primarily with divine determination. Also of interest on Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya are Bell, Love 
Th eory, 92–181; and Moshe Perlmann, “Ibn Qayyim and the Devil,” in Studi Orientalistici in 
onore di Giorgio Levi della Vida, vol. 2 (Rome: Istituto per l’oriente, 1956), 330–7.
12 For Ibn Taymiyya’s infl uence from his death through to early twentieth century Egyptian 
reform movements, see Laoust, Essai, 477–575; and Laoust, “L’infl uence d’Ibn-Taymiyya,” in 
Islam: Past Infl uence and Present Challenge, ed. Alford T. Welch and Pierre Cachia (Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979), 15–33. Ibn Taymiyya is seen widely today as the 
key inspiration for contemporary Islamic militancy, primarily because militants quote him as 
a key authority. However, accepting this linkage uncritically, as does Natana J. Delong-Bas, 
Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 247ff ., is anachronistic and distorts Ibn Taymiyya into a more militant fi gure 
than he was. For antidotes to this problem, see Emmanuel Sivan, “Ibn Taymiyya: Father of 
the Islamic Revolution: Medieval Th eology & Modern Politics,” Encounter 60.5 (May 1983): 
41–50; Johannes J.G. Jansen, “Ibn Taymiyyah and the Th irteenth Century: A Formative 
Period of Modern Muslim Radicalism,” Quaderni di Studi Arabi 5–6 (1987–8): 391–6; Paul 
L. Heck, “Jihad Revisited,” Journal of Religious Ethics 32 (2004): 95–128; and Yahya Michot, 
trans., Ibn Taymiyya: Mardin: Hégire, fuite du péché et «demeure de l’Islam» (Beirut: Dar 
Al-Bouraq, 1425/2004).
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in Egypt by Mu !hammad al-Sayyid al-Julaynad.13 It may well be that Ibn 
Taymiyya writings, as well as those of Ibn al-Qayyim, are nurturing a broad 
movement of optimism in modern Islamic discourse. However, it is beyond 
the scope of the present book to examine the degree to which this is so, 
especially as this merits a major inquiry in its own right. An important aim 
of the present study is to provide a far fi rmer foundation than has previously 
been available for research of that kind.
Ibn Taymiyya’s Th eodicean Writings
Ibn Taymiyya wrote voluminously and oft en polemically on a wide range of 
issues in an eff ort to purge Islam of various innovations that he perceived it 
to have suff ered and to illumine the pure religion of the Qur±an, the Sunna 
and the Salaf.14 His output as a scholar was complemented and shaped by 
13 For Fazlur Rahman see Note 8 above and his Revival and Reform in Islam: A Study 
of Islamic Fundamentalism (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2000), 148–156. Mu !hammad 
al-Sayyid al-Julaynad, Qa#diyyat al-khayr wa al-sharr fī al-fi kr al-islāmī: U$sūluha al-na)zariyya-
jawānibuhā al-ta$tbīqiyya, Dirāsa ≠ilmiyya li-mas±ūliyyat al-insān fī al-Islām, 2d Printing (Cairo: 
Ma$tba≠at al-(Halabī, 1981), provides a study of the Mu≠tazilī and Ash≠arī Kalām traditions 
on good and evil, evaluating both with the help of numerous references and borrowings 
from Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (e.g. 108–114, 134, 177–181, 205–213, 
234–242, 261–2, 278–9, 298–303, and 320–1). ≠Umar Sulaymān al-Ashqar, ≠Ālam al-jinn 
wa al-shayyā$tīn (Cairo: Bayt al-(Hikma, 1413/1992), 155–167, borrows directly from Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s Shifā± al-≠alīl to explain God’s wise purpose in the creation of Satan. Th is 
is translated as Umar Sulaiman al-Ashqar, Th e World of the Jinn and Devils, trans. Jamaal al-
Dīn M. Zarabozo, (Boulder, CO: Al-Basheer, 1998). Laoust, Essai, 515–6, observes that the 
modern Najdī scholar Sulaymān b. Sa!hmān (d. 1349/1930) adopts Ibn Taymiyya’s optimism 
but that Ibn ≠Abd al-Wahhāb is much more Ash≠arī. For the infl uence of Ibn Taymiyya’s notion 
of divine determination (qadar) on Mu!hammad Rashīd Ri#dā, see Christian van Nispen Tot 
Sevenaer, Activité Humaine et Agir de Dieu: Le Concept de ‘Sunan de Dieu’ dans le commentaire 
coranique du Manar (Beyouth: Dar el-Machreq, 1996), 264–5, 483–4.
14 A manuscript giving an extensive list of Ibn Taymiyya’s works has been attributed to Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya and printed as Asmā± mu±allafāt Ibn Taymiyya, ed. !Salā!h al-Dīn al-Munajjid 
(Damascus: Ma$tbū≠āt al-majma≠ al-≠ilmī al-≠arabī, 1953). Using an additional manuscript source, 
Mu!hammad ≠Uzayr Shams and ≠Alī b. Mu!hammad ≠Imrān have reedited this in Al-Jāmi ≠ li-sīrat 
Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymīyya (661–728) khilāl sab≠at qurūn, with an introduction by Bakr 
b. ≠Abd Allāh Abū Zayd (Mecca: Dār ≠ālam al-fawā±id, 1420/1999–2000), 220–249. Shams 
and ≠Imrān, Al-Jāmi ≠, 8–13, also reject Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s authorship and attribute it 
to another of Ibn Taymiyya’s close followers Ibn Rushayyiq (d. 749/1348–9) on the basis of 
two arguments. First, Ibn Taymiyya’s main biographer Mu!hammad b. A!hmad b. ≠Abd al-Hādī 
(d. 744/1343), Al-≠Uqūd al-durriyya min manāqib Shaykh al-Islām A !hmad b. Taymiyya 
(Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-≠ilmiyya, n.d.), 26–7, copied a page from the list’s preface, attributed 
it to Ibn Rushayyiq, and credited him with compiling a list. (Ibn ≠Abd al-Hādī, Al-≠Uqūd 
al-durriyya, 27–67, also provides a list of works, which has its own purposes and does not 
correspond exactly to that attributed to Ibn Rushayyiq.) Second, although Ibn Qayyim 
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his vocation as the most prominent religious activist in the Ba !hrī Mamlūk 
sultanate of Egypt and Syria. Th e shaykh called for jihad against Mongol 
incursions from the east that threatened Mamlūk sovereignty in Syria, and, 
while he may have been a Sufi  himself, he actively opposed Sufi  and popu-
lar religious practices that he believed were in violation of the sacred Law. 
Refusal to compromise on his allegedly anthropomorphic doctrine of God’s 
attributes brought him public trials, imprisonment and a seven-year stay in 
Egypt (705–712/1306–1313). Ibn Taymiyya spent his last two years of life 
(726–8/1326–8) incarcerated in the citadel of Damascus for his criticism 
of tomb visitation and the cult of saints.15
al-Jawziyya and Ibn Rushayyiq share the same kunya Abū ≠Abd Allāh, references to Abū 
≠Abd Allāh undertaking a compilation of Ibn Taymiyya’s works found in an account by his 
disciple Ibn Murrī (included in Shams and ≠Imrān, Al-Jāmi ≠, 97–104) fi t much better with 
what is otherwise known about Ibn Rushayyiq than with our information on Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya. Th ese arguments allow very likely, although perhaps not defi nitive, attribution 
of this list to Ibn Rushayyiq. Signifi cant lists of Ibn Taymiyya’s writings are also found in 
the biographies by !Salā !h al-Dīn Khalīl b. Aybak al-!Safadī (d. 764/1362), Kitāb al-wāfī bi-
l-wafayāt, vol. 7, ed. I !hsān ≠Abbās (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1969), 23–30; Mu!hammad 
b. Shākir al-Kutubī (d. 764/1362), Fawāt al-wafayyāt wa al-dhayl ≠alayhā, ed. I!hsān ≠Abbās 
(Beirut: Dār !Sādir, 1973), 1:75–80; and Ibn Rajab (d. 795/1393), Kitāb al-dhayl ≠alā $tabaqāt 
al-!hanābila, (Cairo: Ma$tba≠at al-sunna al-mu!hammadiyya, 1372/1953), 2:403–4. Ibn Rajab 
notes that it is impossible to account for everything Ibn Taymiyya wrote.
15 Shams and ≠Imrān, Al-Jāmi ≠, bring together the pre-modern biographies of Ibn Taymiyya, 
including those mentioned in the previous note. Available separately is a biography by Shams 
al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1347–8) in Caterina Bori, “A new source for the biography of Ibn 
Taymiyya,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and Afr ican Studies 67.3 (2004): 321–348, which 
contains both the Arabic and an English translation. For analysis of the Arabic biographies 
and chronicle reports concerning Ibn Taymiyya, see Donald P. Little, “Th e Historical and 
Historiographical Signifi cance of the Detention of Ibn Taymiyya,” International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 4 (1973): 311–327; and An Introduction to Mamlūk Historiography: 
An Analysis of Arabic Annalistic and Biographical Sources for the Reign of al-Malik an-Nā$sir 
Mu!hammad ibn Qalā±ūn, (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1970). Modern discussions of 
Ibn Taymiyya’s life include Caterina Bori, Ibn Taymiyya: una vita esemplare Analisi delle fonti 
classiche della sua biografi a, Supplemento N. 1., Rivista Degli Studi Orientali, Vol. 76 (Pisa/
Roma: Istituti Editoriali e Poligrafi ci Internazionali, 2003); and various works of Henri Laoust: 
Essai, 7–150; “La biographie d’Ibn Taimīya d’après Ibn Katīr,” Bulletin d’études orientales 9 
(1942–3): 115–162; “Le Hanbalisme sous les Mamlouks Bahrides (658–784/1260–1382),” 
Revue des études islamiques 28 (1960): 1–71; and “Ibn Taymiyya,” Th e Encyclopedia of Islam, 
New edition [hereaft er EI2] (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1954–2004), 3:951–5. Hasan Qasim Murad, 
“Ibn Taymiya on Trial: A Narrative Account of his Mi!han,” Islamic Studies 18 (1979): 1–32, 
focuses on the shaykh’s various trials. On the trials over anthropomorphism, see especially 
Sherman A. Jackson, “Ibn Taymiyyah on Trial in Damascus,” Journal of Semitic Studies 39 
(Spring 1994): 41–85. George Makdisi locates Ibn Taymiyya’s silsila in “Ibn Taimīya: A 
Sufi  of the Qādirīya Order,” American Journal of Arabic Studies 1 (1973): 118–129, and of 
related interest is George Makdisi, “Th e Hanbali School and Sufi sm,” Boletin de la Asocia-
cion Espanola de Orientalistas 15 (1979): 115–126, reprint as Part V in George Makdisi, 
Religion, Law and Learning in Classical Islam (Hampshire, UK: Variorum, 1991). Th ere 
is also substantial biographical material on Ibn Taymiyya in the introduction to Jean R. 
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Certain diffi  culties attend research in Ibn Taymiyya’s theodicean writings. 
He oft en presumes in the reader a substantial knowledge of the Islamic reli-
gious tradition, and, in comparison to the full didactic style of his disciple 
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Irmeli Perho aptly observes, “Ibn Taymiyya wrote 
very sparse prose and expressed his doctrinal views with a minimum of 
elaboration.”16 Th us, it is not always apparent what the shaykh intends to say. 
Moreover, he does not devote a single full and defi nitive work to theodicy. 
Instead, he deals with theodicean questions in fatwas, commentaries and 
refutations of widely varying length and completeness that, furthermore, 
approach the relevant issues from a number of diff erent angles. In view of 
the spare and diff use nature of Ibn Taymiyya’s refl ection on theodicy, I have 
ranged widely in the shaykh’s corpus in search of applicable texts in order to 
provide a reasonably full picture of his thought on the subject.
In order to facilitate further discussion and reference, the remainder of 
this section describes Ibn Taymiyya’s major theodicean texts located for this 
study. Th e texts are dated where possible. Numerous shorter writings and 
passages in larger works beyond those listed here will be introduced briefl y as 
they are employed in later chapters or cited only in the notes. Th e following 
section of this Introduction attends to the methodological issues involved in 
reconstructing the shaykh’s theodicy from these respective texts.17
Michot, Ibn Taymiyya: Lettre à un roi croisé (Al-Risâlat al-Qubru$siyya) (Louvain-la-Neuve: 
Bruylant-Academia, 1995); and in Abdul Hakim I. al-Matroudi, Th e (Hanbalī School of Law 
and Ibn Taymiyyah: Confl ict or Conciliation (London: Routledge, 2006), 13–30. Donald P. 
Little explores the possibility of analyzing Ibn Taymiyya’s psychology in “Did Ibn Taymiyya 
have a Screw Loose?” Studia Islamica 41 (1975): 93–111; and Yahya Michot seeks to explain 
Ibn Taymiyya’s life-long celibacy in “Un célibataire endurci et sa maman: Ibn Taymiyya 
(m. 728/1328) et les femmes,” Acta Orientalia Belgica 15 (2001): 165–190. Caterina Bori, 
“Ibn Taymiyya wa-jamā≠atu-hu: Authority, Confl ict and Consensus in Ibn Taymiyya’s Milieu,” 
forthcoming in Ibn Taymiyya and His Times, ed. Shahab Ahmed and Yossef Rapoport (Kara-
chi: Oxford University Press, 2007), provides valuable insight into the shaykh’s relations with 
his contemporary colleagues and followers. Bori also quotes statements by Ibn Taymiyya’s 
contemporaries that corroborate aspects of my characterization of the shaykh’s theological 
method described below in Chapter One. I am grateful to the author for sharing this article 
with me prior to publication.
16 Perho, “Man Chooses his Destiny,” 63. A.S. Tritton in Muslim Th eology (London: 
Luzac, 1947), 203, speaks of Ibn Taymiyya’s style less sympathetically, stating, “He was not 
a clear thinker.”
17 Shahab Ahmed faces a similar set of methodological issues when examining Ibn Tay-
miyya’s scattered statements on the Satanic verses in “Ibn Taymiyyah and the Satanic verses,” 
Studia Islamica 87 (1998): 67–124 (especially the comments on 74). Ahmed’s combination of 
translation, exposition and analysis provides a model of how these methodological diffi  culties 
may be overcome in order to make Ibn Taymiyya’s views accessible. 
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Texts relevant to this study have been identifi ed in three ways.18 Employed 
fi rst were major texts identifi ed in the secondary literature as touching on 
theodicy and related issues, most notably Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya 
[hereaft er Minhāj], Irāda and Abū Dharr, which are described below. Sec-
ond, the most comprehensive printed collection of the shaykh’s writings, the 
thirty-seven volume Majmū≠ fatāwā [hereaft er MF], was examined. Especially 
Volume Eight devoted to divine determination (qadar) and the matching 
index on qadar in Volume Th irty-Six turned up many texts and passages 
that have not been used in previous research.19 Th ese include the treatises 
Tadmuriyya, Kasb, Jabr, (Hasana and Fāti!ha described below. Th ird, a few 
more items of interest were found by consulting the tables of contents in 
many of the books and collections not found in MF. Th e treatise ≠Ādil, which 
will be noted below, was identifi ed in this way. No search was made among 
manuscripts because it appears that most of Ibn Taymiyya’s extant works 
have been published.20 However, there are some apparently lost works that 
18 Th is study cites works by Ibn Taymiyya with short titles (e.g. Irāda, Nubuwwāt, Dar ±) 
whose full references are located in the Bibliography under “Ibn Taymiyya’s Writings.” Th e 
full references of collections usually cited only by their abbreviations (e.g. MF, MRM, MRK) 
are also found there. Very short texts have not been given short titles and are cited only by 
their locations in the respective collections. No attempt has been made to undertake the 
enormous text critical task that awaits the fi eld of Ibn Taymiyya studies, but I have tried to 
use the best editions available to me. I employ the older and reasonably widespread Majmū≠ 
fatāwā [abbreviated MF] (several publishers) in 37 volumes as opposed to the newer, but not 
superior, Majmū≠at al-fatāwa in 20 volumes. Th e contents of the two collections are identi-
cal, but the pagination unfortunately diff ers. Collections and re-editions of Ibn Taymiyya’s 
works abound, but they oft en simply repackage—sometimes carelessly and usually without 
acknowledgement—various portions of MF. Th us, I make every eff ort to employ MF as the 
standard basis for citation. Many of Ibn Taymiyya’s works—especially his larger ones—are not 
found in MF. One requires special note. Minhāj, the fi ne critical edition of Ibn Taymiyya’s 
Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya, is not yet widely available in libraries or in the marketplace, 
whereas the old Būlāq edition (short title MinhājB) has been used almost universally for 
previous research. Th us, volume and page citations to Minhāj in the notes are followed by 
a slash and the equivalent volume and page reference in the old Būlāq edition in order to 
facilitate cross checking. Unfortunately, I have not had access to what Aron Zysow informs 
me is a promising new series of critical editions of Ibn Taymiyya’s writings: Āthār Shaykh 
al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya wa mā la!hiqahā min a≠māl (Makkah al-Mukarramah: Dār ≠Ālam al-
Fawā±id, 1422–/2002–), which has reached 12 volumes as of this writing.
19 Th e index on qadar is found in MF 36:142–153. 
20 An important listing of Ibn Taymiyya’s extant works remains Carl Brockelmann, 
Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur, revised ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill 1949), 2:125–7, with 
Supplement (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1938), 2:119–126. An Arabic translation of Brockelmann’s 
revised edition of Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur and the Supplement combined is 
found in Tārīkh al-adab al-≠arabī, trans. Ma!hmūd Fahmī (Hijāzī (Cairo: Al-Hay±a al-mi$sriyya 
al-≠āmma li-l-kitāb, 1995), 6:402–420. Brockelmann’s listing in English with many additions 
is found in Qamaruddin Khan, Th e Political Th ought of Ibn Taymiyya (India: Adam, 1988), 
186–198. Taking Brockelmann and Khan as rough guides, as well as indications in other 
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would probably have been of interest to this study, especially Ibn Taymiyya’s 
commentaries on the Mu!hassal and Arba≠īn of the Ash≠arī Kalām theologian 
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209).21 Apart from these lacunae, the body of 
texts identifi ed should constitute a suffi  ciently large and representative sample 
upon which to base this inquiry into Ibn Taymiyya’s theodicy.
Much of the fi rst and third volumes of the nine volume critical edition of 
Ibn Taymiyya’s Minhāj deals with theodicean issues. Minhāj is a refutation 
of Minhāj al-karāma, a tract of anti-Sunnī polemic composed by ≠Allāma 
Ibn al-Mu$tahhar al-(Hillī (d. 726/1325), a Twelver Shī≠ī scholar who lived 
in the Mongol Īlkhānid Empire of Iraq and Persia that rivaled the Mamlūk 
sultanate. Th e Īlkhānid ruler Oljeitu (d. 716/1316) converted from Sunn-
ism to Twelver Shī≠īsm in 709/1310, possibly through al-(Hillī’s eff orts, and 
al-(Hillī wrote Minhāj al-karāma at the ruler’s behest sometime thereaft er.22 
Th e date of Minhāj, Ibn Taymiyya’s response, is no earlier than 713/1313 
because it includes several mentions of Dar ± ta≠āru#d al-≠aql wa al-naql [here-
aft er Dar ±], a tome which its editor Mu!hammad Rashād Sālim has dated to 
secondary literature (e.g. Laoust, “Ibn Taymiyya,” EI2 3:953), it appears that most of Ibn 
Taymiyya’s extant works have been printed. Additionally, many available printed works have 
been collected onto a CD ROM produced in Jordan: Mu±allafāt al-shaykh wa tilmīdhihi 
Ibn al-Qayyim, CD ROM, Version 1.0 (Amman: Markaz al-turāth li-ab!hāth al- !hāsib al-ālī, 
1420/1999). Except as a guide to what is in print, this CD ROM is unfortunately of limited 
use because the introductions and scholarly apparatus of the sources have not been included. 
A number of treatises are in fact found on this CD ROM in more than one place, but there 
is no cross referencing system to make this readily apparent.
21 Fakhr al-Dīn Mu!hammad b. ≠Umar al-Kha$tīb al-Rāzī, Mu!ha$s$sal afk ār al-mutaqaddimīn 
wa al-muta±akhkhirīn min al-≠ulamā± wa al- !hukamā± wa al-mutakallimīn, ed. +Tāhā ≠Abd 
al-Ra±ūf Sa≠d (Cairo: Maktabat al-kulliyyāt al-azhariyya, n.d.); and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Al-
Arba≠īn fī u$sūl al-dīn, ed. A!hmad (Hijāzī al-Saqā (Cairo: Maktabat al-kulliyyāt al-azhariyya, 
n.d.). Ibn Taymiyya himself mentions that he wrote books on Mu!ha$s$sal and Arba≠īn in Qudra, 
MF 8:7. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (or rather, Ibn Rushayyiq), Asmā± mu±allafāt Ibn Taymiyya, 
19, says that Ibn Taymiyya’s work on Mu!ha$s$sal is one volume and the work on Arba≠īn is two 
volumes. Th ese two works are also noted by Ibn ≠Abd al-Hādī, Al-≠Uqūd al-durriyya, 37; Ibn 
Rajab, Kitāb al-dhayl, 2:403; al-!Safadī, Kitāb al-wāfī bi-l-wafayāt, 7:24; and al-Kutubī, Fawāt 
al-wafayyāt, 1:76. Brockelmann does not mention these two commentaries, and I have not 
seen any note of them elsewhere in the literature.
22 I cite Minhāj al-karāma as it is found in Ibn Taymiyya’s Minhāj. For an overview of this 
work, see Henri Laoust, “La critique du Sunnisme dans la doctrine d’Al-(Hillī,” Revue des études 
islamiques 34 (1966): 35–60. For manuscripts of Minhāj al-karāma, see Sabine Schmidtke, 
Th e Th eology of al-≠Allāma al-(Hillī (d. 726/1325) (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1991), 95. On al-
(Hillī’s relationship to Oljeitu, see Mu !hammad Rashād Sālim, MinhājA, Introduction 1:16, 
23; Schmidtke, Th eology, 23–31; and Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi ≠i Islam: Th e 
History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi ≠ism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), 92. 
Oljeitu is also known by his Muslim name, Khudābanda.
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sometime between 713/1313 and 717/1317.23 Given the great size of both 
Dar ± and Minhāj, it is likely that Minhāj was written well aft er 713/1313. 
Laoust speculates that it might have arisen from Ibn Taymiyya’s involvement 
in a confl ict over Shī≠ī policy in Mecca in 716/1317.24
Among the many domains in which al-(Hillī takes Sunnīs to task in Minhāj 
al-karāma is theodicy. Drawing on the Mu≠tazilī polemical tradition that 
had permeated Shī≠ī theology, he imputes Ash≠arī voluntarism to all Sunnīs 
and attacks this doctrine of God with numerous problems of moral evil.25 
23 In the introduction to the earlier incomplete critical edition MinhājA, 1:16, Mu#hammad 
Rashād Sālim notes that Minhāj mentions Dar ± several times. He also dates Dar ± and the 
subsequent Minhāj to as early as 710 AH. However, Sālim renders this date impossible in 
his introduction to Dar ±, 1:7–10, which was published later. Th ere he cites the report of 
Ibn ≠Abd al-Hādī, Al-≠Uqūd al-durriyya, 26, that Ibn Taymiyya wrote a volume answering a 
certain Kamāl al-Dīn b. Sharīsī’s response to Dar ±. Sālim reasons that Ibn Taymiyya wrote 
Dar ± no later than 717 AH because Ibn Sharīsī would have needed a bit of time to read 
Dar ± and write his response before his death in 718 AH. Sālim concludes that Ibn Taymiyya 
must have written Dar ± aft er returning to Syria in 712 AH based on the fact that he once 
mentions his sojourn in Egypt in the past tense. Sālim adds that it is more likely that Ibn 
Taymiyya wrote this long work during his later and calmer Syrian period than during his 
tumultuous life in Egypt. Ibn Taymiyya mentions having been in Egypt in Dar ±, 1:25. Also, 
several of Ibn Taymiyya’s major works can be safely dated later than 713/1313 because they 
contain references to Dar ±. Th ese include Man$tiqiyyīn, Jawāb, Awliyā± and Nubuwwāt (see 
Sālim in the Introduction to Dar ±, 1:6). Tarif Khalidi gives Dar ± the fl attering remark that 
it “will undoubtedly become a philosophical classic” in Arabic historical thought in the clas-
sical period (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 215 n. 65. Yahya Michot, 
“Vanités intellectuelles . . . L’impasse des rationalismes selon le Rejet de la contradiction d’Ibn 
Taymiyyah,” Oriente Moderno 19 (2000): 597–617, states with respect to Dar ±, “Th e quantity 
alone of [Ibn Taymiyya’s] references [to the philosophical tradition] already allow him to be 
considered as the most important reader of the falāsifah aft er Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in the 
Sunnī world” (599). In this article, Michot translates Dar ±, 1:156–170, as an illustration of the 
sophisticated and interdisciplinary nature of Ibn Taymiyya’s grasp of the Islamic intellectual 
tradition. Dar ± has been published previously in part as Bayān muwāfaqat $sarī!h al-ma≠qūl 
li- $sa !hī !h al-manqūl (Clarifi cation of the Agreement of Clear Reason with Correct Revealed 
Tradition) on the margin of Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya fī naq #d kalām al-
Shī ≠a wa al-Qadariyya [MinhājB], 4 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-≠ilmiyya, n.d.), reprint of 
1321/1903–4 Cairo (Būlāq) edition. Th is edition corresponds to Dar ±, 1:3–4:295.
24 Laoust, “Ibn Taymiyya,” EI2 3:952. In his earlier “La biographie,” 155, Laoust asserts 
that Minhāj could have been written no earlier than 1321 because the work to which it 
responds, the Minhāj al-Karāma of al- (Hillī, was only written in 1321. Th is is impossible 
because al-(Hillī wrote Minhāj al-Karāma for Oljeitu (i.e. Khudābanda) who had died fi ve 
years earlier in 716/1316.
25 On al- (Hillī’s Mu≠tazilism in theology, especially his view that God does the best (a$sla!h) 
in both religious and worldly matters and his notion of God’s compensation, see Schmidtke, 
Th eology, 109–116, and 117–124. See also the theological treatise, (Hasan b. Yûsuf b. ≠Alī 
ibnu ’l-Mu$tahhar al-(Hillī, Al-Bâb ’l-(Hâdî ≠Ashar: A Treatise on the Principles of Shî ≠ite Th eol-
ogy with Commentary by Miqdâd-l-Fâ#dil al-(Hillī, trans., William McElwee Miller (London: 
Th e Royal Asiatic Society, 1928). In Minhāj al-karāma, al-(Hillī sums up his moral charges 
against Sunnism as follows, “Most of the [Sunnīs] hold the doctrine that God—He is Mighty 
and Great—does bad deeds and that all kinds of disobedient acts, unbelief and corruption 
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For example, he charges that this God is unjust because He determines that 
some should not believe, does not create in them the power to believe, and 
then punishes them for not believing.26 Also, this God is foolish because 
He commands unbelievers to believe but does not will that they believe.27 
Unbelievers are actually obeying God because they are doing what God 
wills.28 Moreover, since the voluntarist Sunnī God does not act rationally for 
a purpose, He may even chastise the Prophet for obeying Him and reward 
Iblīs for disobeying Him.29
Ibn Taymiyya’s line-by-line refutation of al-(Hillī’s attack is rambling and 
repetitious, but the dominant strands of thought consistently follow the 
lines of a best-of-all-possible-worlds theodicy in which human accountability 
is somehow compatible with God’s determination of all things. First, the 
shaykh affi  rms that God acts on account of wise purposes, and he deals at 
length in Volume One of Minhāj with the peculiar problems of necessity 
and imperfection that subjection to rational purpose poses for God’s self-
suffi  ciency and freedom. Here he affi  rms that God has been perpetually 
creating for wise purposes from eternity. Second, and especially in Volume 
Th ree, Ibn Taymiyya distinguishes God’s will to create from God’s will of 
command, and he explains that God has a wise purpose in willing to cre-
ate some things that He prohibits. Th ird, the shaykh resists the charge that 
determinism obliterates human accountability. Human beings are the agents 
of their acts and therefore responsible for them even though God creates 
them. Th e details of these three lines of argument will be discussed below 
in Chapters Two, Th ree and Four, respectively.
Th e lengthy fatwa Irāda responds to an inquiry on whether the goodness 
of God’s will implies that He creates for a cause. Ibn Taymiyya opens the 
fatwa with a typology of views on causality and wise purpose in God’s will, 
but only at the end does he defend God’s rationality against the Ash≠arī 
objection that this implies need in God. In the intervening pages, he pres-
ents a typology of ways that evil (sharr) is attributed so as not to attribute 
it directly to God, an account of errors in divine creation and command, 
occur by God’s decree and determination. And that the human has no effi  cacy in that. And 
that God has no purpose in His acts, and that He does not do anything for the benefi t 
of servants. And that He wills acts of disobedience from the unbeliever and does not will 
obedience from him. Th is makes hideous things follow necessarily,” (as quoted in Minhāj, 
3:7–8/1:264–5).
26 Al-(Hillī, Minhāj al-karāma, as quoted in Minhāj, 3:20/1:267.
27 Al-(Hillī, Minhāj al-karāma, as quoted in Minhāj, 3:179/2:34.
28 Al-(Hillī, Minhāj al-karāma, as quoted in Minhāj, 3:154/2:28.
29 Al-(Hillī, Minhāj al-karāma, as quoted in Minhāj, 3:86/2:11.
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and a discussion of human agency that includes considerations of second-
ary causality.30 Th e opening lines of Irāda, apparently added by a copyist, 
tell us that Ibn Taymiyya received the request for this fatwa from Egypt in 
Shawwāl 714/January–February 1315. Presumably, the shaykh responded 
from Damascus soon thereaft er.31
Ibn Taymiyya’s Tadmuriyya creed is perhaps one of the shaykh’s most 
systematic, although not complete, presentations of doctrine.32 Th e fi rst part 
deals with God’s attributes while the second takes up God’s relationship to 
the world. Among other things, this latter part discusses secondary causal-
ity and God’s creation and command, and it sets out typologies of error on 
both questions.
Two medium-length fatwas deal with the apparent incompatibility of 
human accountability and divine compulsion ( jabr). In Kasb the inquirer 
asks whether humans have any effi  cacy (ta±thīr) in bringing their acts into 
existence. Th e questioner argues that if someone does have effi  cacy then he 
becomes an associate with the Creator in the creation of his act. Th is threatens 
the exclusivity of God’s creation. Conversely, if the human has no effi  cacy, 
this leads to divine compulsion, and there is no longer any basis for human 
accountability to the Law. Th e inquirer closes by asking for clarifi cation 
that will “release minds from this bond and heal hearts of this distressing 
disease.”33 Th e questioner in the second fatwa Jabr asks in poetic verse, “How 
is it that the servant chooses his acts, and the servant in acts is compelled?” 
Th e inquirer infers that one who is compelled is forced and such a person 
is excused. He ends by noting that he became ill with longing to come 
to see Ibn Taymiyya, but divine determinations (maqādīr) had prevented 
him.34 Jabr opens with a lengthy treatment of doctrine and error in God’s 
creation and God’s command. Th en, in both Kasb and Jabr, Ibn Taymiyya 
30 Irāda, MF 8:81–158.
31 Th is information is found only at the beginning of the versions of Irāda found in 
MRM 5:113–70 and MRK 1:318–86. For some reason the editors of MF did not see fi t 
to include it.
32 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:1–128. Ibn Taymiyya also tells us on the fi rst page that he wrote 
this treatise in response to a request for the contents of one of his teaching sessions. Henri 
Laoust, La profession de foi d’Ibn Taymiyya: Texte, traduction et commentaire de la Wāsi$tiyya 
(Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1986), 38–9, n. 4, calls this creed Ibn Taymiyya’s 
most methodological presentation of doctrine.
33 Kasb, MF 8:386–405 (inquiry on 386).
34 Jabr, MF 8:448–515 (inquiry on 448–9). Reading asqamanī (MFCD) in the last line 
of the poem instead of the indecipherable s-y-q-m-n (MF). In a third fatwa of this kind, 
Tā±iyya, MF 8:245–255, the inquirer, identifi ed as a scholar of the non-Muslim protected 
peoples (dhimmīs), wonders whether he is disobedient when the Lord has willed his unbelief. 
To this Ibn Taymiyya himself replies in poetic verse.
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attempts to maintain the compatibility of God’s determination (qadar) and 
human agency—focusing especially on the dynamics of secondary causality 
in Kasb—in order to retain human accountability. He explains that God 
has a wise purpose in the creation of all things, and, towards the ends of 
both fatwas, he gives brief typologies of the ways evil is attributed. Jabr also 
includes a typology of views on defi nitions of God’s justice.
Two major treatises deal extensively with God’s justice (≠adl ). Abū Dharr 
is a commentary on the divine saying ( !hadīth qudsī) found in the hadith col-
lection of Muslim, “O My servants! I have forbidden injustice to Myself.”35 At 
issue in the early part of this treatise is the confl ict between God’s freedom 
aff orded by voluntarism and the necessary obligation on God imposed by 
rational justice. Ibn Taymiyya seeks to avoid these two extremes by inter-
preting this hadith to mean that God’s justice is self-imposed rather than 
imposed by the necessity of independent reason.36 Th e treatise ≠Ādil gives 
two successive typologies of positions on God’s justice and then presents a 
discussion of evil and God’s punishment of bad deeds that focuses on the 
goodness of all that God creates. Th e treatise ends with a brief discussion and 
affi  rmation of al-Ghazālī’s claim that this is the best of all possible worlds.37 
Th e heading of ≠Ādil, apparently added by an early copyist, notes that this 
treatise is “among the things [Ibn Taymiyya] composed in his fi nal detention 
in the citadel in Damascus.”38 Th is dates it to the last two years of his life, 
sometime between 726/1326 and 728/1328.
(Hasana, an exegetical work on Q. 4:78–9 taking up nearly 200 pages in 
the printed edition, includes one of Ibn Taymiyya’s longest discussions of the 
problem of evil as he tries to resolve the contradiction between “Everything 
35 Muslim, 4674, Al-Birr wa al-$sila wa al-ādāb, Ta!hrīm al- )zulm. Additional locations of 
this hadith are mentioned in William A. Graham, Divine Word and Prophetic Word in Early 
Islam (Th e Hague: Mouton, 1977), 205–6. Due to the many diff erent hadith collections on 
the market, hadith reports are cited in this study only by the name of the collector (Bukhārī, 
Muslim, Ibn Māja, etc.) Hadith numbering follows the system of the ≠Ālamiyya company 
(tarqīm al-≠ālamiyya) used on the CD-ROM, Mawsū≠at al- !hadīth al-sharīf, Version 2.0 
(Cairo: Sakhr, 1997). To enable location of references in hadith collections not following this 
numbering system, the “Kitāb” and “Bāb” are given for the fi rst collection (usually Bukhārī or 
Muslim) in which the hadith has been found. Occasionally, I give the “Kitāb” and “Bāb” for 
a second collection if the hadith related by Ibn Taymiyya is not found in the fi rst collection 
in its entirety. Translations of hadith reports are my own. In the many cases where there are 
diff erences (usually slight) between the way a hadith appears in an authoritative collection 
and in Ibn Taymiyya’s writings, I follow Ibn Taymiyya’s text. It is beyond the scope of this 
study to note and trace textual variations in hadith reports.
36 Abū Dharr, MF 18:136–209.
37 ≠Ādil, JR 121–142.
38 ≠Ādil, JR 121.
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is from God” (Q. 4:78) and “Any evil thing that comes to you is from your-
self ” (Q. 4:79). How can everything be from God if some things, namely, 
evil things, come from the individual himself ? Ibn Taymiyya explains that 
everything God creates is good on account of His wise purpose, and he 
attempts to resolve the contradiction by locating the cause of evil in non-
existence (≠adam) and the failure of humans to do that for which they were 
created. Th e latter part of (Hasana builds on this interpretation by arguing 
that none should be worshipped but God and that intercession should be 
sought only from whomever God authorizes because God does no evil and 
He is the sole source of good.39
Fāti !ha, a commentary on the fi rst sura of the Qur±an, discusses the wor-
ship (≠ibāda) and asking for help (isti ≠āna) that derive from this sura’s fi ft h 
verse, “You alone we worship, and You alone we ask for help.” It also explores 
various metaphysical and ethical aspects of the relationship between God 
and His servants who were created to worship Him.40 As in (Hasana, this 
text attributes the cause of evil ultimately to nonexistence. Th e comparatively 
formal character of Fāti!ha’s presentation of evil and its other contents sug-
gests that it comes from late in Ibn Taymiyya’s life.
Method of Analysis and Presentation
A diachronic analysis of the major theodicean texts described above might 
provide clues to evolution in Ibn Taymiyya’s thought. It would especially 
clarify whether his use of the Avicennan concept of evil as nonexistence in 
(Hasana and Fāti !ha, but not in other texts, was a later development or just 
an irregularity of habit. Th ese kinds of questions can only be answered with 
certainty on the basis of a chronology of the relevant texts. However, most 
of the major treatises do not indicate their dates, and they do not mention 
other dateable works that would set a terminus a quo.41 I also have not found 
39 (Hasana, MF 14:229–425. An unnamed fatwa in MF 8:204–234 abridges (Hasana, MF 
14:294–361. Only the opening paragraph giving the inquiry and the fi nal paragraph of the 
fatwa are not found in (Hasana.
40 Fāti!ha, MF 14:4–36.
41 Ibn Taymiyya does mention Ma!habba and an unidentifi able Qā ≠ida kabīra in Fāti !ha, 
MF 14:14 and 27, respectively. Ma!habba itself contains no mention of datable works and 
cannot therefore be dated. Ibn Taymiyya occasionally indicates that he has dealt with 
something in another place, but this is a common feature in his writing that does not give 
signifi cant information.
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external evidence by which to date the remaining treatises. Moreover, even 
if the major theodicean treatises could be set into chronological sequence, 
there would remain the problem of integrating numerous shorter and date-
less writings into the scheme.
Since reliable diachronic analysis of these texts is not possible, some kind 
of synchronic analysis must be employed. A rigorously empirical methodol-
ogy might urge that at least the major theodicean treatises described above 
receive separate exposition and analysis. While a text-by-text analysis would 
respect the unique character of each treatise, it would entail extensive rep-
etition of similar ideas in scattered parts of the presentation and make the 
present work unwieldy. Even though the major theodicean texts described 
above have diverse points of departure, they usually broach several of the 
same theodicean issues and employ fairly consistent patterns of response. 
Ibn Taymiyya, for example, sets out similar three-fold typologies of views on 
God’s justice in ≠Ādil, Jabr and Abū Dharr.42 Two of the views on justice—the 
Ash≠arīs’ and his own—are contrasted in similar analyses in Minhāj43 and in 
his major work on prophecy Nubuwwāt.44 In another example, the shaykh 
presents a consistent three-fold typology on the attribution of evil in nine 
diff erent places including Irāda, Kasb, Jabr, Fāti!ha, (Hasana and Minhāj.45
Th is repetition of certain basic issues suggests a thematic presentation in 
which the material relevant to a particular idea or question is discussed in 
one place, drawing from both the major theodicean texts and from other 
shorter and scattered passages. Th is also permits direct comparison of diff er-
ing responses to similar questions. A thematic presentation, however, neces-
sarily obscures the unique character of each text. Occasional translation and 
the brief descriptions of the major texts given above compensate for this to 
some degree. A thematic presentation also risks imposing more coherence 
and consistency on the texts than they rightly bear. I try to mitigate these 
diffi  culties by pointing out inconsistencies where they occur. When diversity 
warrants, I also treat passages relevant to a particular question in succession 
instead of synthesizing them into one account.
Th e major questions related to theodicy are covered in Chapters Two 
through Six. Chapter Two deals with Ibn Taymiyya’s response to Ash≠arī 
42 ≠Ādil, JR 121–6,126–130; Jabr, MF 8:505–510; and Abū Dharr, MF 18:137–156.
43 Minhāj, 1:134–141/1:33–4, 1:451–4/1:125–6, 2:304–313/214–5, 3:20–3/267–8.
44 Nubuwwāt, 143–7.
45 Irāda, MF 8:93–7; Kasb, MF 8:400–1; Tā ≠a, MF 8:446–7; Jabr, MF 8:511–2; Fāti!ha, 
MF 14:21; (Hasana, MF 14:265–6; Th ulth, MF 17:94–6, 99; Minhāj, 3:142–5/2:25–6; and 
Minhāj, 5:408–411/3:102.
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challenges to wise purpose in God’s will. I begin with this issue for two 
reasons. First, establishing the very possibility of God’s rationality is key for 
theodicy in Ibn Taymiyya’s intellectual milieu of strong Ash≠arī voluntarism. 
Second, the shaykh himself devotes considerable attention to this issue very 
early in his major work Minhāj, and this is the question that prompts his 
important fatwa Irāda. Th e remaining four chapters examine major clus-
ters of ideas and rational diffi  culties in the relationship between God and 
humankind. Chapter Th ree surveys the varied terminology with which Ibn 
Taymiyya discusses God’s creation and God’s command and his suggestions 
as to the wise purpose that might be involved when the two confl ict. Chap-
ter Four investigates how the shaykh seeks to maintain the compatibility of 
God’s creation of human acts with human agency and accountability. Th is 
includes discussion of secondary causality. Chapter Five considers evil, look-
ing especially at the ends for which God wills it and its sources in human 
agents and nonexistence. Th e last chapter examines Ibn Taymiyya’s concept 
of God’s justice, and it closes with his view that God creates the best of all 
possible worlds.
It remains to say a few words about the fi rst chapter. In the course of 
preparing Chapters Two through Six, several things became apparent. First, 
worship and ethics hold a central place in Ibn Taymiyya’s thought and certain 
related epistemological claims recur oft en: reason knows what is benefi cial 
in ethics; the existence of God is known by both reason and the natural 
constitution ( fi $tra); the natural constitution knows that the proper human 
end is love and worship of God; and reason agrees with authoritative revealed 
tradition. At the very least, some attention to ethics seemed appropriate to 
assess the link, if any, between Ibn Taymiyya’s views on the moral quality 
of human acts and the goodness of God’s acts. Additionally, comments 
scattered in the theodicean writings on the rational and traditional bases 
for knowledge of God’s attributes, as well as arguments as to what the per-
fection of God entailed in His attributes and acts, suggested that a peculiar 
theological method was at work in the shaykh’s argumentation. However, 
these comments were too sparse within the theodicean writings themselves 
to draw any conclusions.
Th ese considerations led me to look beyond Ibn Taymiyya’s theodicean 
writings for material that might make sense of what I had found within 
them. Th e result is Chapter One, which introduces Ibn Taymiyya’s ethics, 
religious epistemology and theological methodology. Th is chapter is based 
on a less thorough investigation of the potentially relevant texts than the 
following fi ve chapters on issues pertaining to theodicy proper, and it is also 
more highly synthetic than later chapters in drawing from a sampling of the 
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shaykh’s works to exemplify a point. Nevertheless, Chapter One provides a 
plausible and reasonably well substantiated ethical and theological horizon 
against which to interpret Ibn Taymiyya’s theodicy. It also leads me to 
observe that his approach to theological questions is that of a jurist seeking 
the correct way to speak about God.
CHAPTER ONE
WORSHIP, RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY 
AND THEOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE
Ibn Taymiyya as a Th eological Jurist
Th ere has been no comprehensive study of Ibn Taymiyya’s theological meth-
odology, and his attitude toward reason in theological matters has not been 
well understood. Th e (Hanbalī legal school to which Ibn Taymiyya belonged 
was of two minds in preceding generations concerning rational argument in 
theology. On one side were the likes of al-Barbahārī (d. 329/941) and Ibn 
Qudāma (d. 620/1223) who completely opposed discussion of theological 
matters and permitted no more than repeating what was said about God in 
the data of revelation.1 On the other side were Abū Ya≠lā (d. 458/1066) and 
his disciple Ibn ≠Aqīl (d. 513/1119) who produced writings dealing with the 
principles of religion (u$sūl al-dīn), which were in content and structure not 
unlike Kalām works of the Ash≠arīs and Mu≠tazilīs.2 Even though Ibn ≠Aqīl 
was forced to recant for Mu≠tazilī sympathies, many of his theological views 
were adopted later by Ibn al-Jawzī (597/1201).3
Ibn Taymiyya is well known both for strict reliance on the Qur±an and 
the Sunna and for extensive polemic against Kalām theology, Aristotelian 
logic, Avicennan philosophy and the rationalizing mysticism of Ibn ≠Arabī. 
Th us, he may well appear to belong to the fi rst (Hanbalī current, having no 
theological position of his own except unrefl ective adherence to the texts. Th is 
1 See Muwaff aq al-Dīn Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisi, Ta!hrīm al-na)zar fī kutub al-kalām, ed. 
≠Abd al-Ra !hmān b. Mu !hammad Sa≠īd Dimashqiyya (Riyadh: Dār ≠ālam al-kutub, 1990); 
translated into English by George Makdisi, Ibn Qudāma’s Censure of Speculative Th eology 
(London: Luzac, 1962), in which Makdisi includes the Arabic text handwritten. For a general 
discussion of (Hanbalī attitudes toward Kalām, see Bell, Love Th eory, 49–54.
2 See Abū Ya≠lā Ibn al-Farrā±, Kitāb al-mu≠tamad fī u$sūl al-dīn, ed. Wadi Z. Haddad (Bei-
rut: Dar el-machreq, 1974); and George Makdisi, Ibn ≠Aqīl: Religion and Culture in Classical 
Islam (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), especially 85–9.
3 Merlin Swartz looks at the theological rationalism of Ibn al-Jawzī’s later years in A Medi-
eval Critique of Anthropomorphism: Ibn al-Jawzī’s Kitāb Akhbār a$s-!Sifāt: A Critical Edition of 
the Arabic Text with Translation, Introduction and Notes (Leiden: Brill, 2002). In this regard, 
see also ≠Abd al-Ra!hmān Ibn al-Jawzī, Th e Attributes of God (Daf ≠ Shubah al-Tashbīh bi-Akaff  
al-Tanzīh), trans. ≠Abdullāh bin (Hamīd ≠Alī (Bristol, UK: Amal Press, 2006).
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is indeed the way some have portrayed him. In the course of describing Ibn 
Taymiyya’s polemical agenda, Ignaz Goldziher notes that the shaykh “relied 
on the sunna and on the sunna alone.”4 More forcefully, Majid Fakhry uses 
the terms “slavish traditionalism,” “antirationalist polemics” and “misology” 
in describing Ibn Taymiyya’s place in the history of Islamic philosophy.5
Th is interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya is no longer sustainable. It is true 
that the shaykh vigorously maintains that all principles of religion have 
been revealed in the Qur±an and the Sunna.6 But an ardently anti-rational-
ist portrayal of Ibn Taymiyya fails to make sense of three other aspects of 
his writings. First, he frequently claims that knowledge derived from clear 
reason (al-≠aql al-$sarī!h or al-$sarī!h al-ma≠qūl ) agrees and corresponds with 
revealed tradition (naql or sam≠), the message of the prophets and the way 
of the Salaf.7 Further on below, I examine the roles that Ibn Taymiyya gives 
reason and its dynamic equivalent the natural constitution ( fi $tra) in acquiring 
knowledge of ethical value, God’s existence and God’s attributes. Th is will 
show clearly that his religious epistemology gives a more prominent role to 
reason than his reputation would suggest.8
Second, Ibn Taymiyya explicitly permits rational theological argument 
in Khaw $d, a fatwa written while in Egypt (705–712/1306–1313) whose 
importance is underlined by its later inclusion near the beginning of Dar ±.9 
4 Ignaz Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Th eology and Law, trans. Andras and Ruth 
Hamori (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 240.
5 Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, 2d ed. (New York, NY: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1983), 312–8. See also George Makdisi, “Ash≠arī and the Ash≠arites in Islamic 
Religious History,” Studia Islamica 17 (1962): 37–80, and 18 (1963): 19–39, reprint as Part 
I in Makdisi, Religion, Law and Learning in Classical Islam, who includes Ibn Taymiyya in 
the camp of anti-rationalist traditionalism which he believes to have been the main theologi-
cal current in medieval thought over against rationalist Ash≠arism. Later, Makdisi, “Ethics 
in Islamic Traditionalist Doctrine,” in Ethics in Islam, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (Malibu, 
CA: Undena, 1985), 47–63, reprint as Part IV in Makdisi, Religion, Law and Learning in 
Classical Islam, soft ens his thoroughly anti-rationalist view of traditionalism somewhat by 
recounting a number of Ibn Taymiyya’s theological arguments and positions. 
6 Dar ±, 1:27–8; Nubuwwāt, 58–9, 214–5; and Ma≠ārij, MF 19:155ff .
7 Nubuwwāt, 215, 239–240, 433; Jawāb, 4:395, 401; Istiqāma, 1:23; Minhāj, 1:300–
1/1:82; MF 5:172; MF 6:525; MF 6:580; MF 7:665; ≠Abd al-Qādir, MF 10:475; MF 12:47; 
MF 12:80–1; MF 12:229; ≠Alaq, MF 16:463; and ≠Imrān, MF 18:240.
8 See Michot, “Vanités intellectuelles” 597–602, for further discussion of Ibn Taymiyya’s 
unjustifi ed reputation as antagonistic to philosophical thinking.
9 Khaw #d appears in truncated form in MF 3:293–326 and apparently full form in Dar ±, 
1:25–78. References to Khaw#d hereaft er will be made only to Dar ±. At the point where he 
begins copying Khaw #d into Dar ±, Ibn Taymiyya notes that he wrote this fatwa in Egypt. In 
its intention to permit rational argument in theology, Ibn Taymiyya’s Khaw#d compares to 
al-Ash≠arī’s Risāla fī isti!hsān al-khaw#d fī ≠ilm al-kalām found in Richard J. McCarthy, Th e 
Th eology of al-Ash≠arī (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1953), 85–97 (Arabic) and 117–134 
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Th is text argues that it is not disliked (makrūh) to address people in their own 
terms as long as the proper meanings of words are ascertained. Hadith reports 
and the Qur±an may even be translated into other languages if necessary. In 
order to achieve clear communication one needs to know both the meanings 
of words used by the group addressed and the meanings of the terms used 
in the Qur±an and the Sunna. Also, Ibn Taymiyya explains, the Salaf did 
not reject Kalām terminology and argumentation as such. Th ey were aware 
that God Himself had propounded rational arguments, and they were open 
to non-quranic terminology so long as it carried meanings congruent with 
revelation. What the Salaf reproached in Kalām theology was using terms 
in the wrong senses and misconstruing the role of rational arguments.10 In 
other words Kalām theology went astray not in using reason as such but in 
holding erroneous doctrines and using reason incorrectly.
Th ird, some of my own previous research has made apparent that the 
shaykh attacks Kalām theology and Avicennan philosophy not because he 
opposes reason but because he articulates and defends a fundamentally diff er-
ent vision of God. In two earlier studies, one on the shaykh’s ≠Imrān, a hadith 
commentary on the creation of the world, and the other on Ikhtiyāriyya, a 
treatise on God’s voluntary attributes, I provide evidence that Ibn Taymiyya 
views God in His perfection and very essence as active, creative, willing 
and speaking from eternity. Whereas both the Kalām theologians and the 
philosophers locate the perfection of God’s essence in timeless eternity, Ibn 
Taymiyya locates it in personal and perpetual dynamism.11 Chapter Two 
(trans.). However, al-Ash≠arī does not draw Ibn Taymiyya’s distinction between analogical 
and a fortiori reasoning that will be explained below. Al-Ash≠arī implicitly accepts the former 
in theology, whereas Ibn Taymiyya does not.
10 Dar ±, 1:28, 43–6. For other discussions of Ibn Taymiyya’s adoption of theological dia-
lectic, see Bell, Love Th eory, 54–5; and Th omas F. Michel, A Muslim Th eologian’s Response to 
Christianity: Ibn Taymiyya’s Al-Jawab Al-Sahih (Delmar, NY: Caravan, 1984), 40–3. Bell and 
Michel both appear to be drawing on Khaw#d. However, I could not verify this because the 
printed editions they used were not available to me. Ibn Taymiyya also discusses translation 
of the Qur±an for the sake of non-Arabic speakers in Man$tiq, MF 4:117, explaining that it 
may be necessary to give similitudes (amthāl ) to convey the meaning and that this is in fact 
part of translation. In Bughya, 25, Ibn Taymiyya comments that one need only understand 
the technical terms of the philosophers to grasp their intentions. He adds that this is not 
only permissible but also good and sometimes obligatory.
11 Jon Hoover, “Perpetual Creativity in the Perfection of God: Ibn Taymiyya’s Hadith 
Commentary on God’s Creation of this World,” Journal of Islamic Studies 15:3 (Sept. 2004): 
287–329, which translates ≠Imrān, MF 18:210–243; and Jon Hoover, “God Acts by His Will 
and Power: Ibn Taymiyya’s Th eology of a Personal God in his Treatise on the Voluntary Attri-
butes,” forthcoming in Ibn Taymiyya and His Times, ed. Shahab Ahmed and Yossef Rapoport 
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), which analyzes Ikhtiyāriyya, MF 6:217–267.
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below surveys material from Minhāj and Irāda that further confi rms and 
elaborates this fi nding.
If Ibn Taymiyya is not an anti-rationalist polemist and unrefl ective lit-
eralist, what sort of theologian is he? Much work remains to be done on 
the shaykh’s writings before this question may be answered adequately, but 
there are important preliminary indications. In a study on a portion of Dar ± 
which treats Ibn Sīnā’s interpretation of prophetic imaginal discourse as a 
kind of pious fraud intended to motivate the intellectually inferior masses for 
their own benefi t, Yahya Michot characterizes Ibn Taymiyya’s hermeneutics 
as “literalist rationalism”.12 Michot elaborates that Ibn Taymiyya rejects the 
hermeneutics of both the philosophers and the Kalām theologians in order 
to uphold “the self-suffi  ciency of the religious rationality manifested in scrip-
tural literality and common faith, and its validity for all, the elite and the 
crowd.”13 Th e nature of this egalitarian “literalist rationalism” becomes clearer 
in an article by Shahab Ahmed on God’s protection (≠isma) of the Prophets 
in Ibn Taymiyya’s writings. Ahmed observes that the shaykh systematizes and 
reconstructs out of amorphous statements in the early authoritative sources 
what the Salaf apparently taught on the issue in question and explains “the 
rationale behind what they said, even if they did not say so themselves.”14 My 
studies on ≠Imrān and Ikhtiyāriyya identify a similar dynamic. I note that in 
≠Imrān Ibn Taymiyya “seeks to elucidate the rationality underlying the data 
on creation found in the Qur±ān and the Hadith” such that his theology may 
be described as philosophical.15 In my analysis of Ikhtiyāriyya, I call him an 
“apologist” seeking to elucidate and defend an “ordinary language” reading 
of the theological data of revealed tradition as rational and coherent.16
Th e present study of Ibn Taymiyya’s theodicean writings provides further 
evidence confi rming such characterizations of his intention. However, calling 
the shaykh an apologist or a philosophical theologian does not quite get to 
the root of what he is doing. Henri Laoust in his Essai suggests a diff erent 
point of departure. Laoust explains that Ibn Taymiyya’s theology is more of 
a moral theology than a theology devoted to knowing God in Himself (the 
traditional intention of Christian theology): “Th e doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya 
12 Yahya J. Michot, “A Mamlūk Th eologian’s Commentary on Avicenna’s Risāla A#d!hawiyya: 
Being a Translation of a Part of the Dar ± al-Ta≠āru#d of Ibn Taymiyya, With Introduction, 
Annotation, and Appendices” [Trans. of Dar ± 5:10–87], Journal of Islamic Studies 14 (2003): 
149–203 (Part I) and 309–363 (Part II).
13 Michot, “A Mamlūk Th eologian’s Commentary,” 171.
14 Ahmed, “Ibn Taymiyyah and the Satanic verses,” 112.
15 Hoover, “Perpetual Creativity,” 295.
16 Hoover, “God Acts by His Will and Power,” last paragraph of the article.
 theological jurisprudence 23
comes in fact to an ethic. Despite the importance that he grants to theol-
ogy, it is not the problem of knowledge of God which preoccupies him in 
the highest degree.”17 Instead, Laoust explains, at the core of Ibn Taymiyya’s 
thought is service (≠ibāda) to God, which is grounded in quranic verses 
such as, “I did not create the jinn and humankind except that they might 
serve ( ya≠būd ) Me” (Q. 51:56), and “Th ere is no god but I; so serve Me” 
(Q. 20:14). Th e goal of the whole ethical, juridical and political life is to 
deepen this service to God. For Laoust, “It thus appears that Ibn Taymiyya’s 
entire theology tends toward one sole aim: that of giving a foundation to his 
ethics, and consequently, to all his juridical and social philosophy.”18
While I will translate ≠ibāda as “worship,” Laoust reminds us with the 
translation “service” that the term in Ibn Taymiyya’s discourse encompasses 
not only ritual practice but also matters ethical, juridical, social and political. 
Th e worship of ≠ibāda draws together all domains of life under the rubric 
of religious practice devoted solely to God. Laoust also insightfully links 
Ibn Taymiyya’s theology to his ethics, but the idea that his theology aims 
to give a foundation to ethics or religious practice is open to more than one 
interpretation. It could mean no more than that theology constitutes the 
necessary ground for ethics insofar as theology speaks of the Creator God 
without whom creatures and their moral lives would cease to exist. Laoust 
seems to intend more, however, especially when he writes, “Ibn Taymiyya, 
who is a moralist and jurist more than a theologian, judges doctrines by their 
function and their value for action.”19 In this light Ibn Taymiyya’s theology 
becomes an instrumental and pragmatic eff ort to portray God in way that 
motivates worship and obedience to God.
Th ere is some truth in what Laoust asserts. Ibn Taymiyya oft en con-
cerns himself with the ethical implications of theological doctrines. Th is is 
especially apparent when he traces the sources of antinomian practices to 
extreme Ash≠arī views on God’s determination (qadar) and to Sufi  notions 
of annihilation ( fanā±) and the oneness of existence (wa!hdat al-wujūd). Yet, 
it is not entirely clear that Ibn Taymiyya’s interest in theology is strictly a 
function of its usefulness for inspiring human action. For example, ≠Imrān, the 
shaykh’s hadith commentary on the creation of the world mentioned above, is 
remarkably free of instrumentalized theology. Rather, Ibn Taymiyya’s single-
minded concern throughout is showing what reason and God’s  messengers 
17 Laoust, Essai, 177–8, 469–473 (quote on 469).
18 Laoust, Essai, 177.
19 Laoust, Essai, 158.
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indicate on the question of whether the world is eternal or created. Th e 
text defends and explains God’s perpetual creation of things in this world, 
but it shows very little concern for ethical repercussions of this doctrine.20 
A similar phenomenon is observable in Ikhtiyāriyya, the tract noted above 
that explicates the voluntary and perpetually active character of many of 
God’s attributes. Ibn Taymiyya does introduce the ethical imperative to call 
on God and seek help from Him alone toward the end of this text, but this 
is incidental to, and not a logical inference from, the central argument of 
the treatise.21
Even with respect to texts like Ikhtiyariyya and ≠Imrān, there remains an 
argument in Laoust’s defense: Ibn Taymiyya craft s a vision of God as active, 
personal and much more intimately involved in temporal and human aff airs 
than the God of Kalām theology and Avicennan philosophy in order to 
prompt more ready obedience to God’s law. Th ere is little doubt that part 
of the reason that Ibn Taymiyya took up his pen was to achieve such a goal. 
Nevertheless, without negating Laoust’s thesis or the presence of pragmatic 
and instrumental elements in Ibn Taymiyya’s theology, I propose that some-
thing more fundamental is driving his theological work. Th at is, the shaykh’s 
theology is not subservient to its functionality in achieving ethical or political 
aims in the fi rst instance. Rather, getting theological doctrine correct is an 
ethical and practical concern in its own right.
A passage translated by Fazlur Rahman and re-translated in part below 
provides the cue for this interpretation. Here Ibn Taymiyya draws into ques-
tion the commonplace division in medieval Islamic thought between the 
principles (u$sūl ) which deal with creedal matters and the branches ( furū≠) 
which cover practical obligations and prohibitions. He prefers instead to 
set theological questions and matters of action fi rmly on the same level 
and regard both sets of issues as practical (≠amalī). From this perspective, 
knowledge of God’s attributes is no diff erent from knowledge of the practical 
duties of Islam such as the Five Pillars. Likewise, denying the practical duties 
is just as much unbelief as denying the theological doctrines.
Issues of [theological] information (al-masā±il al-khabariyya) may be equivalent 
to practical issues (al-masā±il al-≠amaliyya) even though the former are called 
issues of the principles (u $sūl ) and the latter issues of the branches ( furū≠). 
20 Perhaps a minor exception may be seen in Ibn Taymiyya’s explanation that God set 
aside one day each week for gathered worship as a sign pointing to the fi rst week in which 
God created the world (≠Imrān, MF 18:230–231).
21 Ibn Taymiyya begins treating this ethical issue at Ikhtiyāriyya, MF 6:258. See Hoover, 
“God Acts by His Will and Power,” for further discussion.
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Th is designation [u $sūl and furū≠] is made up; a group of jurists and Kalām 
theologians came up with this division. . . . Th e truth of the matter is that what 
is of great importance in each of the two types [informational and practical] 
are the issues of the principles and that the fi ne points are the issues of the 
branches. So, knowing the obligatory quality of obligations such as the fi ve 
pillars of Islam and the forbidden nature of things forbidden manifestly and 
by abundant transmission is like knowing that God has power over everything 
and knows everything, that He is all-hearing and all-seeing, that the Qur±an 
is the speech of God, and such like from among manifest and abundantly 
transmitted propositions. Th erefore, one who denies those practical rulings 
about which there is consensus disbelieves in the same way as one who denies 
these [theological doctrines] disbelieves.22
With the basic equivalence of doctrinal and practical questions in mind, 
worship (≠ibāda) may now be seen to include not only ritual practice, ethics, 
jurisprudence and politics but also speaking correctly about God, which, as 
we will see by the end of this chapter, means speaking in a way that ascribes 
to God the highest perfection and praise. From this vantage point, Ibn 
Taymiyya’s theological discourse is not most fundamentally an ideological 
instrument to motivate action or an attempt to know God in Himself but 
a practical search to fi nd the most praiseworthy way to depict God. Put dif-
ferently, thinking and speaking well of God is part of the law (sharī ≠a), and 
the shaykh’s theology is an attempt to spell out that aspect of the law. As 
such, it is an exercise in jurisprudence ( fi qh), and, even though I have not 
found Ibn Taymiyya speaking in precisely such terms, his theology is perhaps 
more appropriately called theological fi qh. Ibn Taymiyya may thus be seen as 
a theological jurist responding to inquiries and challenges concerning what 
should rightly be said about God. Th e apologetic and philosophical quality 
of this fi qh arises inasmuch as he deems it permissible, constructive or even 
necessary to take up rational refl ection and argumentation in theological 
matters.
Th is chapter examines the methodology of Ibn Taymiyya’s theological 
fi qh in greater detail, as well as key elements of his ethics and theology that 
will prove helpful for making sense of his theodicy. Aft er fi rst elaborating 
the role that Ibn Taymiyya gives to worship in his religious vision, this chap-
ter turns to epistemological foundations for knowing that God exists and 
that He alone should be worshipped. It then examines how Ibn Taymiyya 
22 MF 6:56–7; translated in Rahman, Revival and Reform in Islam, 143. For further dis-
cussion of Ibn Taymiyya’s dissolution of the widespread distinction between u$sūl and furū≠, 
see al-Matroudi, Th e (Hanbalī School, 69–72.
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delineates what should be said about God’s attributes and acts so as to give 
God the highest praise.
Th e Centrality of Worshipping God Alone
An incident related by Ibn Taymiyya’s biographer Ibn ≠Abd al-Hādī (d. 
744/1343) points to the centrality of worship (≠ibāda) in his vision of Islam. 
In the year 707/1307, on Friday, 30 Rabī≠ al-Awwal, Ibn Taymiyya went to 
a mosque in Cairo for the noon prayer. Some people asked him to teach, 
but he said nothing. He only smiled and looked around. Th en someone 
quoted the quranic verse, “God made a covenant with those who were given 
the Scripture that you make it clear to the people and not conceal it” (Q. 
3:187). At that, Ibn Taymiyya got up, quoted the fi rst sura of the Qur±an, 
the Fāti!ha, and proceeded to speak on its fi ft h verse, “You alone we worship; 
You alone we ask for help,” and the meaning of worship and asking for help 
(isti ≠āna) until the mid-aft ernoon (≠a$sr) prayer call, a period of perhaps two 
or three hours.23 Since Ibn ≠Abd al-Hādī does not provide further details of 
Ibn Taymiyya’s long discourse, we can only imagine what he might have said. 
However, there is ample material in his oeuvre to elucidate his thought on 
worship.24 Th e discussion here is limited to writings on the Fāti!ha itself.
For Ibn Taymiyya, the Fāti!ha holds a privileged place in the quranic rev-
elation because God made its recitation a duty during what he considers the 
best of deeds, the ritual prayer ( $salāh). Furthermore, he sees the fi ft h verse 
“You alone we worship; You alone we ask for help” as both the summary 
of the Fāti!ha and the pivot between its two halves. “You alone we worship” 
ends the fi rst half of the sura, which is worship dedicated to God. “You 
alone we ask for help” begins the half of the Fāti !ha, which is dedicated to 
the worshipper himself and in which he asks for the help that God will 
provide. In this fashion, the fi ft h verse captures the two elements of worship 
23 Ibn ≠Abd al-Hādī, Al-≠Uqūd al-durriyya, 255.
24 In addition to the sources from which the following discussion is drawn, see especially 
≠Ubūdiyya, MF 10:149–236; Qudra, MF 8:39–57; Taw!hīd, MF 1:20–36; Shirk, MF 1:88–94; 
and the many selections pertaining to Ibn Taymiyya’s spirituality in the two series of transla-
tions by Yahya M. Michot, “Textes Spirituels d’Ibn Taymiyya,” Le Musulman (Paris), 11–29 
(1990–8), and “Pages spirituelles d’Ibn Taymiyya,” Action (Mauritius), 1999–2002. Full ref-
erences for some of these may be found in the Bibliography, and, as of December 2006, the 
texts could be accessed at http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/it/index.html. Also of interest 
for Ibn Taymiyya’s spirituality are Th . E. Homerin, “Ibn Taimīya’s Al-!Sūfīyah wa-al-fuqarā±,” 
Arabica 32 (1985): 219–244; and Th omas Michel, “Ibn Taymiyya’s Shar !h on the Futū!h al-
ghayb of ≠Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī,” Hamdard Islamicus, 4.2 (Summer 1981): 3–12.
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and supplication that characterize the whole sura. Here Ibn Taymiyya quotes 
a saying attributed to (Hasan al-Ba$srī to the eff ect that God summarized all 
the scriptures in the Qur±an; then, He summarized the Qur±an in the Mother 
of the Book, the Fāti!ha; and fi nally He summarized the Fāti!ha in its two 
phrases, “You alone we serve, You alone we ask for help.”25
Ibn Taymiyya also fi nds the senses of worship and asking for help grouped 
together elsewhere in the Qur±an and the Hadith just as they are in the Fāti!ha. 
He cites for example, “Worship Him, and trust completely in Him” (Q. 
11:123), “In Him I have completely trusted, and to Him I turn” (Q. 11:88), 
and, “In Him I have completely trusted, and to Him is my repentance” (Q. 
13:30). Turning to God (ināba) and going to God in repentance (tawba) 
are aspects of worship, and complete trust (tawakkul ) is related to asking for 
help. In the hadith, “O Lord, this is from You and for You,”26 Ibn Taymiyya 
interprets “for You (laka)” as worship and “from You (minka)” as complete 
trust and asking for help in the midst of whatever comes from God.27
In God’s relationship with humanity, worship is linked to God’s divinity 
(ulūhiyya or ilāhiyya) and asking for help to God’s lordship (rubūbiyya or 
rabbāniyya).28 Ibn Taymiyya observes that these respective senses of divinity 
and lordship are found in the locutions of prayer. Th e name God (Allāh), 
which has the same Arabic root (±-l-h) as ulūhiyya, is associated with wor-
ship, as in “God is greater (Allāhu akbar)” and “Praise be to God (al-!hamdu 
li-llāh),” while the name Lord (Rabb), which has the same root (r-b-b) as 
rubūbiyya, is linked with seeking help, as in “Our Lord, forgive us our sins” 
(Q. 3:147) and “Lord, forgive and be merciful; You are the best of the merci-
ful” (Q. 23:118).29 Th us, as illustrated in the following quotation, worship 
fl ows out of God’s divinity, and asking for help springs from His lordship.
[“You alone we worship; You alone we ask for help” (Q. 1:5)] is the elaboration 
of His saying, “Praise be to God, Lord of the worlds” (Q 1:2). Th is indicates 
that there is no object of worship except God and that no one other than Him 
has the right to be worshipped. His statement, “You alone we worship,” points 
to worship of Him by means of the love, fear, hope, command and  prohibition 
25 Manbijī, MF 2:455–6; Talbīs, 2:454; and Fāti!ha, MF 14:7.
26 Dārimī, 1864, Al-A #dā!hī, Al-Sunna fī al-a#d!hiyya.
27 Manbijī, MF 2:456; and Fāti!ha, MF 14:9.
28 Paralleling divinity and lordship in Ibn Taymiyya’s writings is a wide range of cognate 
terms including God’s command and creation and God’s legislative will and ontological will, 
respectively, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Th ree.
29 Manbijī, MF 2:456; and Fāti!ha, MF 14:12–3.
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that His divinity requires, and, “You alone we ask for help,” points to the 
complete trust, commitment, and submission that His lordship requires.30
For Ibn Taymiyya, asking for help signifi es absolute human dependence on 
the God who is the Lord of the worlds. Lordship indicates God’s creative 
and determining activity, and this lordship is exclusive. Creatures have 
absolutely no existence apart from God, and they may ask for help only 
from the source of their existence and trust in Him alone. Th e confession 
that God is the sole Creator and Lord of the universe is called taw!hīd al-
rubūbiyya or taw!hīd al-rabbāniyya. In like manner, worship indicates human 
devotion to God—turning to Him, loving Him, obeying Him, hoping in 
Him and fearing Him—and this is linked to God’s divinity (ulūhiyya). Th e 
divine is that which is loved and served as a god, and God’s divinity denotes 
His essential right to worship. Taw !hīd al-ulūhiyya or taw !hīd al-ilāhiyya is 
recognizing God as the only one with the right to divinity and turning to 
worship Him alone. Th is, as Ibn Taymiyya explains, is the meaning of the 
Islamic confession, “Th ere is no god but God.” Unifying all one’s energies in 
worship to God excludes any kind of shirk or associating partners with God 
and withholding from God the devotion that only He deserves.31
Ibn Taymiyya clarifi es the ultimate priority of God’s divinity over God’s 
lordship—and thus worship over asking for help—with the aid of Ibn Sīnā’s 
notions of fi nal and effi  cient causality. Ibn Sīnā regards the fi nal cause or telos 
(al-≠illa al-ghā±iyya) as the end for which something comes into existence, 
while the effi  cient cause (al-≠illa al-fā≠iliyya) is that which brings the thing 
into existence. Furthermore, the fi nal cause is an effi  cient cause in that it 
activates the operation of the effi  cient cause. Conversely, the fi nal cause is also 
the eff ect (ma≠lūl) of the effi  cient cause when it is realized in existence.32 Ibn 
Taymiyya applies this analysis to “You alone we worship; You alone we ask 
for help” by linking worship and divinity to fi nal causality on the one hand 
and asking for help and lordship to effi  cient causality on the other:
Th e God (al-ilāh) is the one worshipped (al-ma≠būd ) and asking for help is 
linked to His lordship. Th e Lord of the servants is He who lords over them. 
Th is entails that He is Creator of everything that is in them and from them. Th e 
divinity is the fi nal cause, and lordship is the effi  cient cause. Th e fi nal [cause] 
is that which is aimed at, and it is the effi  cient cause of the effi  cient cause. 
Th erefore, He made “You alone we worship” precede “You alone we ask for 
help.” Confessing the exclusiveness of the divinity (taw!hīd al-ilāhiyya) includes 
30 Shirk, MF 1:89.
31 Taw !hīd, MF 1:22–3; and Manbijī, MF 2:456–9. Cf. Fī Fu$sū$s, MF 2:404–6.
32 Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ishārāt, 3:30–3.
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confessing the exclusiveness of the lordship (taw!hī#d al-rubūbiyya). Included in 
worshipping only God is not confessing the lordship of any other.33
Th is text subordinates lordship to divinity such that divinity is both the 
fi nal cause, that is, the ultimate object of worship, and the effi  cient cause of 
confessing God’s lordship, which in turn is the effi  cient cause bringing all 
things into existence. Exclusive worship of God includes confessing God as 
the sole Creator. In a diff erent text, and as in the passage quoted above, Ibn 
Taymiyya observes that the Fāti !ha in “You alone we worship; You alone we 
ask for help” (Q. 1:5) puts the fi nal cause of worship before the effi  cient 
cause of asking for help because the fi nal cause should be the effi  cient cause 
of this effi  cient cause. Ideally speaking, worship activates and is the effi  cient 
cause of asking for help. Yet, Ibn Taymiyya observes, humans, out of their 
sense of profound neediness, typically confess God’s lordship and ask for 
His help much more than they worship Him. Th us, God raised up mes-
sengers to focus on calling humanity to worship God alone. Th en, when 
humans worship God, it will follow that they also confess His lordship and 
ask Him for help.34 Putting it diff erently, God should be worshipped, loved, 
and praised primarily for Himself in His divinity and only secondarily for 
what He does in His lordship.
With the priority of worship in Ibn Taymiyya’s thought fi rmly in view, we 
turn now to the epistemological foundations by which human beings know 
that God exists and should be their sole object of worship. Ibn Taymiyya 
bases his thought on quranic revelation, even if interpreting it philosophi-
cally, but he also makes the apologetic claim that independent reason agrees 
with revelation in providing the same information.
Th e Correspondence of Reason and Revelation
Ibn Taymiyya devotes his major work Dar ±, eleven volumes in the critical edi-
tion, to refutation of the rule established by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and others 
that rational arguments must be given precedence over traditional proofs in 
case of contradiction.35 Instead, the shaykh contends, there is no contradiction 
between reason and tradition. Two studies by Binyamin Abrahamov illustrate 
that it is not immediately obvious what Ibn  Taymiyya means by this. In a 
33 Talbīs, 2:454. Cf. ≠Ubūdiyya, MF 10:194.
34 Fāti!ha, MF 14:13–4
35 See especially Dar ±, 1:4–8.
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1992 article on Dar ±, Abrahamov notes that Ibn Taymiyya’s view appears 
to come very close to that of the philosopher Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198) in 
which revelation and reason are both true and do not contradict.36 Abraha-
mov concludes, however, that Ibn Taymiyya diff ers fundamentally from Ibn 
Rushd by confi ning himself to the terms and rational proofs found in the 
Qur±an and the Sunna. Reason does not disagree with revelation because it 
has no status apart from revelation.37
Later, Abrahamov explicitly rejects his former conclusion. In a 1998 
general study of reason and revelation in Islamic theology, he briefl y argues 
that for Ibn Taymiyya there are rational arguments arising from the human 
intellect independently of revelation, which are valid so long as they do not 
contradict revelation. Reason is thus an independent source for knowledge 
of God. Abrahamov does not present his case in detail, and he does not 
investigate the nature of the rational proofs in question, but what follows 
here supports his latter conclusion.38
Yahya Michot, in the introduction to his French translation of Ibn 
Taymiyya’s letter to the Syrian prince Abū al-Fidā± (d. 732/1331), conceives 
the matter somewhat diff erently. Drawing upon Dar ± and the letter to Abū 
al-Fidā±, Michot explains that for Ibn Taymiyya the Qur±an and the Sunna 
are the summit and peak where the two paths of reason and tradition come 
together and from where they depart. Whatever contradicts the Qur±an and 
the Sunna lies outside the pale of rationality. Th us, the proofs of reason, 
rightly exercised, lead to the same end as do the proofs of tradition, and 
they derive from the same source.39 A passage from Ibn Taymiyya’s letter 
36 In an earlier article in Arabic, ≠Abd al-Majīd al-!Saghīr elaborates similarities between 
Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Rushd, “Mawāqif rushdiyya li-Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya? Mulā!ha)zāt 
awwaliyya,” in Dirāsāt maghribiyya muhdāt ilā al-mufakkir al-maghribī Mu !hammad ≠Azīz 
al-Habbābī (Rabat: n.p., 1985), 93–117, 2d ed. (Rabat: n.p., 1987), 164–182.
37 Binyamin Abrahamov, “Ibn Taymiyya on the Agreement of Reason with Tradition,” Th e 
Muslim World 82:3–4 ( July–Oct. 1992): 256–273. Coming to much the same conclusion are 
Nicholas Heer, “Th e Priority of Reason in the Interpretation of Scripture: Ibn Taymīyah and 
the Mutakallimūn,” in Literary Heritage of Classical Islam: Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor 
of James A. Bellamy, ed. Mustansir Mir (Princeton, NJ: Th e Darwin Press, 1993), 181–195; 
and Mu!hammad al-Sayyid al-Julaynad, Al-Imām Ibn Taymiyya wa mawqifuhu min qa #diyyat 
al-ta±wīl (Cairo: Al-Hay±a al-≠āmma li-shu±ūn al-ma $tābi≠ al-amīriyya, 1393/1973), 347–355.
38 Binyamin Abrahamov, Islamic Th eology: Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 51.
39 Jean R. Michot, Ibn Taymiyya: Lettre à Abû l-Fidâ± (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut Orien-
taliste de l’Université Catholique de Louvain, 1994), 18. Information on Abū al-Fidā± and 
the dating of the letter to the later years of Ibn Taymiyya’s life is found on pp. 15–6. Laoust, 
Essai, 176–7, makes the same point less vividly: “Th e Law then is all reason. No opposition 
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illustrates how revelation and reason may be conceived as complementary 
paths to the same truth.
[Th e Salaf and their followers] knew that both revelational and rational proofs 
were true and that they entailed one another. Whoever gave rational and certain 
proofs (al-adilla al-≠aqliyya al-yaqīniyya) the complete inquiry due them knew 
that they agreed with what the messengers informed about and that they proved 
to them the necessity of believing the messengers in what they informed about. 
Whoever gave revelational proofs (al-adilla al-sam≠iyya) the understanding 
due them knew that God guided His servants in His Book to certain rational 
proofs by which are known the existence of the Creator, the subsistence of 
His attributes of perfection and His exoneration from imperfections and from 
anything being like Him in the attributes of perfection, and which prove His 
uniqueness, the uniqueness of His lordship, the uniqueness of His divinity, 
His power, His knowledge, His wisdom, His mercy, the truthfulness of His 
messengers, the obligation to obey them in what they obligate and command, 
and believing them in what they teach and inform about.40
According to this text, revelation reiterates the correct rational proofs per-
tinent to religion. As Ibn Taymiyya explains elsewhere, revelation contains 
both information (khabar) and rational proofs. Th e rational proofs are both 
revelational (shar≠ī) by virtue of being brought by God and His messengers 
and rational (≠aqlī) since they are judged true by reason. Th e shaykh also notes 
in the letter to Abū al-Fidā± and elsewhere that Kalām theologians, as well 
as philosophers—by whom he usually means the Aristotelian Neoplatonists 
al-Farābī (d. 339/950) and Ibn Sīnā—err when they confi ne revelation to 
the domain of information.41 To put the matter in another way, revelation 
embodies true rationality. Once one has access to revelation, one identifi es 
it immediately as identical to whatever truth one knew previously through 
reason. In this vein, Ibn Taymiyya observes that the truthfulness of the 
between revelation and reason should exist. Th e authentic scriptural tradition (naql $sa!hī!h) 
and proper reason (≠aql $sarī!h) are two manifestations of the one and same reality.”
40 “A Letter of Ibn Taymiyya to Abū l-Fidā±,” ed. Serajul Haque, in Documenta Islamica 
Inedita, ed. Johann W. Fück, 155–161 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1952), 159. Th is Arabic text 
is reprinted in Michot, Ibn Taymiyya: Lettre à Abû l-Fidâ±, 83–7. References are to Michot’s 
Arabic text following Haque’s pagination (cf. Michot’s French trans. on pp. 57–8).
41 Abū al-Fidā±, 160; Akmaliyya, MF 6:71; Ma≠ārij, MF 19:160; Dar ±, 1:28; and Jahd, 
9:242/Man$tiqiyyīn, 382. Michel, A Muslim Th eologian’s Response to Christianity, 15, misguid-
edly argues that the term falāsifa (philosophers) in Ibn Taymiyya’s writings refers mainly to 
the Aristotelian Neoplatonists al-Farābī and Ibn Sīnā and occasionally also to Ibn Rushd 
and Na $sīr al-Dīn al- +Tūsī while the term mutafalsifa (pseudo-philosophers) is reserved for 
al-Suhrawārdī and the Ishrāqī school. Wael B. Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logi-
cians (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1993), 4 n. 1, rightly explains that the terms falāsifa 
and mutafalsifa are in fact synonymous in referring to the wider philosophical tradition. Th e 
term mutafalsifa is not limited to the Ishrāqīs.
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prophets can be known only through reason.42 Conversely, the revelation 
immediately exposes irrational ideas for what they are.43
Ibn Taymiyya sets limits to what reason can know in theology and ethics. 
Revelation is required to know “the details of what [the prophets] informed 
concerning theological matters (al-umūr al-ilāhiyya), the angels, the Th rone, 
Paradise, the Fire and the details of what is commanded and prohibited.”44 
However, rational proofs, the best of which are found in the Qur±an, estab-
lish God’s existence, God’s attributes, and the obligation to believe and obey 
what God brings through His messengers.
On Knowing that God Exists and that He Alone should be Worshipped
Reason and the Law
Ibn Taymiyya reports that reason (≠aql ) has two meanings in the Islamic 
tradition. For A !hmad b. (Hanbal it is a potency (quwwa) and an instinct 
( gharīza) by which one reasons. For others, including Kalām theologians, 
reason is a body of necessary knowledge ( #darb min al-≠ulūm al- #darūriyya). 
Ibn Taymiyya says that both are true, and he compares ≠aql to the word ba$sar, 
which in Arabic may refer both to the faculty of sight and to the perception 
of seeing with this faculty.45
Th e shaykh explains that reason knows the foundational rules of thought: 
that like things are alike, that diff erent things are diff erent, and that two 
things cannot exist in the same place at the same time. For example, it is 
neither rational nor possible to combine black and white in one place at one 
time, and something cannot be simultaneously existent and nonexistent.46 
Without acknowledging the sources of his ideas, Ibn Taymiyya also affi  rms 
that reason knows metaphysical notions relating to effi  cient causality that 
42 Abū al-Fidā±, 160.
43 Michel, A Muslim Th eologian’s Response to Christianity, 129, makes much the same obser-
vation in discussing the epistemology of Ibn Taymiyya’s refutation of Christianity in Jawāb 
al-!Sa!hī!h: “[Ibn Taymiyya holds that] truth is unitary. Whatever has been truly revealed can 
never be contradicted by what is known through reason and sense perception, but can only 
be confi rmed by such information. Similarly whatever is correctly known from intellectual 
knowledge or from accurate sense perception must be confi rmed by revelation.” As Michel 
notes, the shaykh also holds sense perception to be a valid source of knowledge.
44 Furqān, MF 13:138.
45 Istiqāma, 2:161–2; and Bughya, 31–40, which gives a very detailed discussion of the 
meaning of ≠aql.
46 Qudra, MF 8:9; and Jawāb, 4:391, 396–7.
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are basic to Kalām theology and the philosophy of Ibn Sīnā. With Kalām 
theology, it is known by clear reason that an existent is either originated 
(mu!hdath) or eternal, either created or uncreated, and with Ibn Sīnā, it is 
known by clear reason that an existent is either necessary in itself (wājib 
bi-nafsihi) or not necessary by itself, either suffi  cient apart from another 
( ghanī ≠ammā siwāhu) or in need of another.47
With these metaphysical oppositions in place, the shaykh sets forth simple 
and direct cosmological arguments for God’s existence. Th e existence of the 
Creator is known necessarily by reason from the fact of created existence. It 
is commonsense that everything needs a cause and that all things must have 
an originator that is ultimately eternal and self-suffi  cient: “Th e originated 
being itself knows through clear reason that it has an originator.”48 Every 
creature is by its very existence a sign necessarily entailing the essence, unity 
and attributes of the Creator, and it is the way of the prophets to point to 
God by mentioning these signs.49 Th e existence of the Self-Suffi  cient and 
the Eternal Existent which is Necessary in Itself is known by “the necessity 
of reason ( #darūrat al-≠aql )” and from the need of every originated event 
for an originator (mu!hdith), as well as from the need of something possible 
(mumkin) for something else to give it existence (mūjid ).50
Ibn Taymiyya contrasts his straight-forward proofs for God’s existence 
from ≠aql with the Kalām method of rational inference (na)zar) which proves 
the existence of the Creator by indirect cosmological arguments appealing to 
the origination of accidents and the composition of bodies from atoms.51 He 
criticizes especially the Mu≠tazilīs and some Ash≠arī and (Hanbalī theologians 
for making na)zar the initial human obligation.52 He argues that this method, 
whose origins he traces to Jahm b. !Safwān (d. 128/745), is not a necessary 
basis for knowledge of God’s existence. Speculation of this sort leads to 
47 Minhāj, 2:116/1:175–6.
48 Nubuwwāt, 266.
49 Nubuwwāt, 260; and Jahd, MF 9:141–2, 144/Man$tiqiyyīn, 150, 153–4.
50 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:8–9; and Minhāj, 2:116/1:175–6.
51 For the details of these arguments, see Herbert A. Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation 
and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 134–153.
52 Ibn Taymiyya, Dar ±, 8:348–358, and Fi$tra, MRK 2:346–7, notes that al-Juwaynī, al-
Ghazālī, al-Rāzī and the (Hanbalīs Abū Ya≠lā b. al-Farrā± and Ibn ≠Aqīl all fi rst held to the 
obligation of na)zar and then later went back on its obligation. Geneviève Gobillot translates 
Ibn Taymiyya’s Fi $tra in “L’Épître du discours sur la fi $tra (Risāla fī-l-kalām ≠alā-l-fi $tra) de 
Taqī-l-Dīn A!hmad Ibn Taymīya (661/1262–728/1328),” Annales Islamologiques 20 (1984): 
29–53.
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error.53 He observes furthermore that not even the philosophers make their 
speculative methods an obligation since they do not regard their special 
knowledge to be available to the general populace.54 Rather, according to Ibn 
Taymiyya, God’s origination of the human being aft er it was nonexistent is 
known directly by all through reason apart from prophetic revelation even 
though the prophets and the Qur±an also use this form of proof.55
Beyond knowledge of God’s existence, Ibn Taymiyya believes that basic 
religious and ethical truths are also known by reason. Reason knows that 
the Creator must be the sole object of worship and that nothing may be 
associated with Him.56 Reason also knows which human actions are good 
(!hasan) and which are bad (qabī#h). Th is is because good and bad reduce to 
the diff erence between suitability, pleasure, profi t and benefi t for the agent 
on one hand and unsuitability, incompatibility, pain, harm and detriment on 
the other.57 In this regard, the shaykh notes the view of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī 
that reason knows whether an act is an attribute of perfection (kamāl ) or of 
imperfection (naq$s).58 Ibn Taymiyya rightly remarks that only later Kalām 
theologians use such terms and that al-Rāzī got this from the philosophers. 
Be that as it may, the shaykh reduces perfection and imperfection also to 
pleasure and pain and the suitable and incompatible:
Th e perfection that occurs to the human being through some acts goes back to 
agreement and opposition, which is pleasure and pain. Th e soul takes pleasure 
in what is a perfection for it, and it suff ers pain in the imperfection. So, perfec-
tion and imperfection go back to the suitable and the incompatible.59
Similarly, Ibn Taymiyya relates other value terms to suitability and pleasure: 
“It is known that knowledge, justice, truthfulness and benefi cence are suitable 
for humans and that they take pleasure in these. Moreover, their pleasure in 
these is greater than in anything else. Th is is what it means for an act to be 
good.”60 In like manner, the terms good deed (!hasana) and evil deed (sayyi±a) 
53 Nubuwwāt, 59–63ff ., and Dar ±, 7:141–10:318, which gives an extensive treatment of 
the Kalām theologians’ and philosophers’ means of knowing God’s existence.
54 Dar ±, 10:317.
55 Nubuwwāt, 71–2, 74.
56 Tawba, MF 11:682.
57 I!htijāj, MF 8:308–9; Man$tiqiyyīn, 422; Ta !hsīn al-≠aql, MF 8:434–5; and Nubuwwāt, 
139. Th ere are also partial analyses of Ibn Taymiyya’s theory of ethical value in Bell, Love 
Th eory, 88–91; and Makdisi, “Ethics in Islamic Traditionalist Doctrine,” 47–63. 
58 I!htijāj, MF 8:310. Al-Rāzī’s view is found in his Mu!ha$s$sal, 202.
59 I!htijāj, MF 8:310.
60 Man$tiqiyyīn, 424.
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are a matter of pleasure and pain.61 I have not found the shaykh defi ning 
good (khayr) and evil (sharr) directly, but in their contexts they also relate to 
benefi t (ma$sla!ha) and detriment (mafsada), profi t (naf ≠) and harm (#darar), 
respectively.62 Nor have I found Ibn Taymiyya claiming that khayr and sharr 
are known by reason, although there would be nothing to prevent him from 
doing so. Generally speaking, value terms in Ibn Taymiyya’s discourse reduce 
to considerations of benefi t and detriment. It is a special quality of human 
reason to know and seek profi t and to know and repel harm.63
Th e shaykh contrasts his theory of ethical value with the theories of 
the Mu≠tazilīs and the Ash≠arīs. What George Hourani calls the “rational 
objectivism” of the Mu≠tazilīs locates good and bad in objective qualities of 
acts themselves. An act is good or bad on account of an attribute essential 
to the act and necessarily concomitant with it. Th us, the value of this act is 
known by reason, and the function of God’s command and prohibition is 
not to assign values to acts but to unveil them. Moreover, a bad act deserves 
chastisement in the hereaft er even without the warning of a messenger. At the 
other end of the spectrum is Ash≠arī divine voluntarism or “theistic subjectiv-
ism” (Hourani) in which good and bad depend solely on God’s will. Acts are 
good or bad only because God commands or prohibits them. Th ere are no 
attributes in acts making them good or bad. Th eir value can be known only 
by revelation. Ibn Taymiyya claims polemically that the Ash≠arīs make God’s 
command wholly arbitrary and devoid of regard for human benefi t.64
As is already apparent, Ibn Taymiyya adopts a third view, a teleological or 
consequentialist ethic in which acts depend on their fi nal benefi t for their 
value. An act does not have an essential attribute ( $sifa dhātiyya) that makes 
it good or bad. Rather, something may be good, loved and profi table in some 
circumstances and bad, hated and harmful in others.65 Acts have attributes by 
61 I!htijāj, MF 8:309.
62 Irāda, MF 8:93–4; and (Hasana, MF 14:268–9. Cf. Fāti!ha, MF 14:20–1. In Ma≠ārij, 
MF 19:169, Ibn Taymiyya connects good (khayr) directly to profi t and benefi t: “Good, 
happiness, perfection and benefi t ($salā !h) consist in two kinds: in profi table knowledge and 
benefi cial deeds.”
63 Man$tiqiyyīn, 429; and I!htijāj, MF 8:311.
64 Ta!hsīn al-≠aql, MF 8:431–3; Tawba, MF 11:675–7; Th ulth, MF 17:198; and Minhāj, 
3:177–8/2:33–4. Cf. Nubuwwāt, 139–142. See also Majid Fakhry, Ethical Th eories in Islam, 
31–5 and 46–52; George F. Hourani, Islamic Rationalism: Th e Ethics of ≠Abd al-Jabbār 
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1971), 8–14; Richard M. Frank, “Moral Obligation in 
Classical Muslim Th eology,” Th e Journal of Religious Ethics 11.2 (1983): 204–223; Sophia 
Vasalou, “Equal Before the Law: Th e Evilness of Human and Divine Lies: ≠Abd al-Ğabbār’s 
Rational Ethics,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 13 (2003): 243–268, and Louis Gardet, Dieu 
et la destinée de l’homme (Paris: J. Vrin, 1967), 81–3.
65 Man$tiqiyyīn, 422.
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which they become good or bad, but these are accidental (≠āri#da) and must 
be considered in light of what is suitable (mulā±im) or unsuitable (munāfi r) 
to the agent.66 “Th e good [act] is that which procures what is loved, sought 
and intended for itself. Th e bad is that which procures what is hated and 
loathed.”67 Some things like eating meat that has not been ritually slaughtered 
may be bad in some circumstances and good in others.68
Ibn Taymiyya claims wide consensus for the proposition that good and 
bad defi ned in this teleological and benefi t-oriented manner are known 
rationally.69 Th is is in fact the case, especially among the philosophizing 
Ash≠arī Kalām theologians that dominate the later medieval period. With 
beginnings in al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) and clear formulation in al-Ghazālī 
(d. 505/1111), later Ash≠arīs interpret the Mu≠tazilī objectivist notions of 
good and bad in terms of profi t and harm, pleasure and pain, and suitability 
and unsuitability. Additionally, they hold that these eff ects are known by 
reason. However, later Ash≠arīs maintain that reason cannot know whether 
an act is praiseworthy or blameworthy and rewarded or punished. Th is can 
be known only through the Law.70 Ibn Taymiyya is not sympathetic to this 
Ash≠arī qualifi cation, and he unsuccessfully tries to reduce it also to a matter 
of profi t and harm. He argues, “In reality this controversy comes back to 
the suitable and the unsuitable, the profi table and the harmful. Blame and 
punishment are among the things that harm the servant and are unsuit-
able for him.”71 While it is intuitive that blame and punishment cause pain 
and harm, this does not address the question of whether one knows about 
blame and punishment—especially in the hereaft er—through reason. In a 
diff erent text, Ibn Taymiyya does say that the ultimate ends of acts can be 
known only through the revealed Law: “Knowledge of the end which is the 
consequence of acts, that is, happiness and unhappiness in the hereaft er, is 




69 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:115; Irāda, MF 8:90; I!htijāj, MF 8:309; and Man$tiqiyyīn, 422–3.
70 Al-Julaynad, Qa#diyyat al-khayr wa al-sharr, 252–8; Gardet, Dieu et la destinée de l’homme, 
82–3; Sherman A. Jackson, Islamic Law and the State: Th e Constitutional Jurisprudence of 
Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 23–32; and Felicitas Opwis, “Ma $sla !ha in 
Contemporary Islamic Legal Th eory,” Islamic Law and Society 12.2 (2005): 182–223, at 
188–189. See now Ayman Shihadeh, Th e Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (Leiden: 
Brill, 2006), 45–153, for a much more extensive and fi ner-grained discussion of the develop-
ment of teleological ethics in Ash≠arism culminating in al-Rāzī.
71 Minhāj, 3:29/1:269. Cf. Aqwam, MF 8:90; and I!htijāj, MF 8:309.
72 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:115.
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Th is brings us to the relationship of the Law to the good and bad that 
is known by reason. Ibn Taymiyya asserts that God’s command is directed 
toward the wise purpose (!hikma) and mercy of promoting human benefi t.73 
He writes, “[God] commanded and prohibited according to His knowledge 
of the benefi ts and detriments to servants in the command, the prohibition, 
the thing commanded and the thing forbidden.”74 Likewise, God raised up 
messengers to bring benefi ts and reduce detriments.75
Beyond this, the shaykh identifi es three types of divine command.76 In 
the fi rst, God’s command and prohibition confi rm that humans should do 
and not do what their reason already knows is good and bad, respectively.77 
One example of this is the quranic verse, “[God] commanded them to the 
right and prohibited them from the wrong, and He made agreeable things 
lawful for them and forbade disgusting things for them” (Q. 7:157). Ibn 
Taymiyya says that this indicates that these things are right or wrong, agree-
able or disgusting, apart from God’s command. Otherwise, the verse becomes 
tautologous: “He commanded them what He commanded them . . .”78
Ibn Taymiyya clarifi es that, in this fi rst type, God does not punish acts 
known to be bad until He sends a messenger. He bases this on quranic texts 
such as “We do not chastise until We raise up a messenger” (Q. 17:15) and 
“Your Lord never destroyed the towns until He raised up a messenger in their 
leading town reciting Our verses to them. We never destroyed the towns 
unless their people were unjust” (Q. 28:59).79 God fi rst sent messengers to 
condemn what was already known to be bad. Th is was followed by prohi-
bition and warning of chastisement.80 Th e shaykh observes that this diff ers 
from the Ash≠arīs for whom bad acts prior to revelation were as indiff erent 
as eating and drinking and that it also opposes the Mu≠tazilīs for whom bad 
acts are punished even apart from the warning of a messenger.81
In dealing with an objection that there is no meaning to a bad act that 
is not punished, Ibn Taymiyya draws a distinction between two kinds of 
73 Man$tiqiyyīn, 237.
74 Ta!hsīn al-≠aql, MF 8:434.
75 Minhāj, 3:84.
76 This three-fold typology occurs in Ta !hsīn al-≠aql, MF 8:434–6; and Thulth, MF 
17:201–3.
77 Ta!hsīn al-≠aql, MF 8:434–5.
78 Minhāj, 3:178–9/2:34.
79 Ta!hsīn al-≠aql, MF 8:435.
80 Tawba, MF 11:677–682.
81 Ta !hsīn al-≠aql, MF 8:435; Tawba, MF 11:680–1; MF 19:215; and Nubuwwāt, 240. 
Despite Ibn Taymiyya’s polemic, the later Mu≠tazilī Qur±an commentator al-Zamakhsharī 
holds an identical position. See al-Julaynad, Qa#diyyat al-khayr wa al-sharr, 247.
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‘bad’ and two kinds of ‘punishment’ (≠iqāb). First, bad means that the act 
is a cause of punishment of the kind that God deals out aft er a messenger’s 
warning. Second, bad means blameworthy, imperfect and defective. Bad acts 
in this sense entail a “punishment of deprivation of good ( !hirmān khayr),” 
which results from not doing what is better. Th us, those who commit bad 
acts before the arrival of messengers suff er the punishment of imperfection, 
but they do not suff er direct punishment from God. In this connection 
the shaykh also mentions that there are traditions reporting that those who 
have never received a messenger will have one sent to them on the Day of 
Resurrection.82
In the second kind of divine command and prohibition, an act becomes 
good or bad by the pronouncement of God, but it still entails benefi t and 
detriment. Ibn Taymiyya notes that God may specify places like the Ka≠ba 
and times like the month of Rama#dān in which to dispense greater quantities 
of His mercy, benefi cence and blessing. As examples of this second kind of 
command, he also cites the prohibition against drinking wine. In response 
to the objection that the forbidding of wine was arbitrary, the shaykh says 
that God prohibited it at the time dictated by His wise purpose. Something 
may be profi table at one time and harmful at another, or something that 
is harmful may not be prohibited if its prohibition might result in greater 
detriment. In the case of wine, God did not prohibit it completely until the 
early Muslims had adequate faith to withstand its prohibition.83
Th e third type of divine command is the trial. Th e primary example Ibn 
Taymiyya mentions is God’s command to Abraham to sacrifi ce his son. Th e 
shaykh explains that such a sacrifi ce would have brought no benefi t. Rather, 
God tried Abraham to see whether his love for Him was greater than his love 
for his son. God’s intention was to remove anything that might have come 
between them and to perfect Abraham’s friendship with Himself.84
To sum up, Ibn Taymiyya believes that reason provides knowledge of God’s 
existence, His right to exclusive worship, and the broad foundations of ethics. 
82 Tawba, MF 11:686–7.
83 Th ulth, MF 17:201–2; and Ta !hsīn al-≠aql, MF 8:435–6.
84 Th ulth, MF 17:203. Cf. Minhāj, 3:20/1:267. In another example, Ibn Taymiyya, Ta !hsīn 
al-≠aql, MF 8:436, and Th ulth, MF 17:203, cites a hadith about a leper, a bald-headed man 
and a blind man in the collection of Bukhārī, 3205, A!hādīth al-anbiyā±, (Hadīth abra $s wa 
a≠mā wa aqra≠ fī Banī Isrā±īl. In this hadith, God sent an angel to restore the skin, hair and 
sight of each of these men, respectively, and to grant them wealth. Th en the angel appeared 
to them each as a needy traveler in their previous respective forms asking for help. Only the 
blind man responded. Th en the angel told the blind man to keep his property because it 
was only a trial.
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Th e Law brings a higher level of accountability and some information about 
God’s command and recompense that cannot be known otherwise, but the 
Law confi rms and is fully compatible with what is known independently 
by reason. Although Ibn Taymiyya’s teleological ethic sets him at odds with 
both poles in the traditional Ash≠arī and Mu≠tazilī debate over the rational 
discernment of good and bad, he is nonetheless fi rmly within the mainstream 
of later philosophizing Kalām views on ethical value. As we will see in later 
chapters, this position off ers him a vantage point from which to polemicize 
against both the Mu≠tazilī and Ash≠arī positions on God’s justice and on 
the relation of God’s creation to God’s command. Th e shaykh’s teleological 
outlook also appears in the following treatment of another source of religious 
knowledge, the natural constitution.
Th e Natural Constitution (fi $tra) and its Perfection through Prophecy
Th e natural constitution ( fi $tra) in Ibn Taymiyya’s thought is an innate fac-
ulty or knowledge that is closely linked to reason (≠aql ), but it is diffi  cult 
to pinpoint the exact relationship.85 Th e shaykh occasionally uses ≠aql and 
fi $tra or their derivatives in parallel.86 In other places, the natural constitution 
appears to be the basis for reason. For example, the shaykh speaks of “the 
rational methods (al- $turuq al-≠aqliyya) that people endowed with reason 
know by their natural constitutions,”87 and he writes, “What is intended by 
the term object of reason (ma≠qūl ) is the clear object of reason that people 
know by their natural constitutions upon which they have been naturally 
constituted.”88 However, the following statement could be cited to sup-
port the opposite thesis—that reason is the basis of the natural constitu-
tion— “Rational propositions (al-qa #dāyā al-≠aqliyya) are the  foundations 
85 Nurcholish Madjid, “Ibn Taymiyya on Kalām and Falsafa: A problem of Reason and 
Revelation in Islam,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1985), 85–7, argues that ≠aql and 
fi $tra are synonymous in Ibn Taymiyya’s thought, but he gives relatively little evidence for 
this. For an overview of fi $tra in various domains of Islamic thought, see Geneviève Gobillot, 
La fi $tra: la conception originelle: ses interprétations et fonctions chez les penseurs musulmans 
(Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie orientale, 2000). Also of interest is Camilla Adang, 
“Islam as the Inborn Religion of Mankind: Th e Concept of Fi$tra in the Works of Ibn (Hazm,” 
Al-Qan$tara 21 (2000): 391–410.





of the natural constitutions of people endowed with reason (u$sūl fi $tar al-
≠uqalā±).”89
Many of the same things that Ibn Taymiyya says are known by reason 
are also known by the natural constitution. Th ese include the basic rules of 
thought. God has placed knowledge of likeness and diff erence in the natural 
constitution.90 It is known by the natural constitution that a body or person 
cannot be in two places at once. Th e shaykh adds that if in fact it appears 
that a person is in two places simultaneously, then one of the appearances 
is actually that of a jinn who has adopted the form of the person.91 As with 
reason, the shaykh also frequently claims that the existence of the Creator 
is known by the natural constitution through direct cosmological proofs. 
All human beings in their natural constitutions know necessarily that the 
creature needs a creator, maker and governor (mudabbir) and that an origi-
nated event needs an originator. Something possible needs a preponderator 
(murajji !h) to tip the scales in favor of its existence over its nonexistence. 
Th is fundamental affi  rmation of external determinative causality, or what 
may be called the ‘principle of preponderance’, corresponds to humanity’s 
fundamental felt need for and dependence upon God.92 Even the insane are 
aware of their need for a creator.93
Wael Hallaq, in an article on Ibn Taymiyya’s proofs for God’s existence, 
points out that the shaykh’s views of the natural constitution appear inconsis-
tent.94 Ibn Taymiyya sometimes presents the natural constitution as a means 
or faculty for knowing necessarily from created things that they must have 
a creator. Created things are signs pointing immediately to God. At other 
times, however, he regards the natural constitution as an inborn knowledge 
of God requiring no evidence whatsoever. In this vein, he argues that natural 
constitutions must know the Creator without signs: “If [the natural con-
stitutions] had not known Him apart from the signs, they would not have 
89 MF 12:229.
90 Jahd, 9:242/Man $tiqiyyīn, 382.
91 Jawāb, 4:397.
92 Furqān, MF 13:151; Fī Wujūb, MF 1:45,47; Irāda, MF 8:136; Dar ±, 8:348; and Fi $tra, 
MRK 2:341, 344–5, 348.
93 Fi$tra, MRK 2:337. Ibn Taymiyya also claims in (Hamawiyya, MF 5:15, that it is known 
by the natural constitution that God is above the sky.
94 Wael B. Hallaq, “Ibn Taymiyya on the Existence of God,” Acta Orientalia 52 (1991): 
49–69, argues that Ibn Taymiyya reserves the term ≠aql for the faculty conducting inferential 
operations (55). In view of the presentation of ≠aql above, I do not believe that this is sustain-
able because ≠aql, like fi $tra, includes innately held principles and beliefs.
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known that these signs [pointed] to Him.”95 Hallaq observes that the latter 
argument is circular and that it contradicts the former.
Further investigation shows that Ibn Taymiyya probed the matter more 
deeply, especially in the direction of the natural constitution being a faculty, 
yet one that necessarily entails knowledge of the Creator without signs. To 
examine this, it is helpful to begin with the textual basis for the doctrine of 
the natural constitution, a hadith found in the collections of Bukhārī and 
Muslim:
Every newborn is born with the natural constitution. Th en, his parents make 
him a Jew, Christian or Zoroastrian. Th is is like an animal that bears another 
that is perfect of limb. Do you sense any mutilation in it? Th en Abū Hurayra 
said: If you wish, recite, “Th e natural constitution ( fi $tra) of God according to 
which He has constituted ( fa$tara) humanity” (Q. 30:30).96
Th e shaykh interprets the natural constitution in this hadith to be the religion 
of Islam, and he connects this to the covenant God made with all humanity 
in primordial time, “[Th e Lord said], ‘Am I not your Lord?’ Th ey said, ‘Yes, 
indeed’” (Q. 7:172). However, he explains that this Islam does not exist in 
actuality (bi-l-fi ≠l) at birth because the newborn does not have knowledge of 
anything. Yet, as his innate potency (quwwa) of knowledge and will become 
active, the knowledge of God that the natural constitution entails arises as 
well so long as there are no impediments.97
In a part of Dar ± not accessible to Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya observes that 
teaching is not a suffi  cient condition for imparting knowledge.98 Teaching 
animals and inanimate objects does not yield the same results as teaching 
human beings. Th ere must be a potency entailing knowledge and will that is 
receptive to what is taught, and this potency is created so as to preponderate 
the true religion over any other. It is possible that inner voices (khawā$tir) 
in the soul alert it to the true religion without external teaching, and, apart 
from corrupting infl uences, this will indeed happen. To deal with the prob-
lem of circularity, the shaykh still has resort to external determinative causes. 
He says that these inner voices arise through the inspiration of an angel or 
95 Fī Wujūb, MF 1:48; and Hallaq, “Ibn Taymiyya on the Existence of God,” 65.
96 Bukhārī, 1270, Al-Janā±iz, Idhā aslama al- $sabī fa-māta; Bukhārī 1296, Al-Janā±iz, Mā 
qīla fī awlād al-mushrikīn; Muslim, 4803–7.
97 Dar ±, 8:460–1; and MF 4:245–9. Texts from MF 4:245, 427, are translated alongside 
Amrā#d, MF 10:132–6, in Yahya M. Michot, “Pages spirituelles d’Ibn Taymiyya: IX. La fi nalité 
du coeur,” Action (Mauritius), July 2000, 18–9, 26.
98 Dar ±, 8:359–468. Hallaq uses Muwāfaqat $sa !hī !h al-manqūl li- $sarī !h al-ma≠qūl, ed. 
Mu!hammad Mu!hyī al-Dīn ≠Abd al-(Hamīd and Mu!hammad (Hāmid al-Fiqī (Cairo: Ma$tba≠at 
al-sunna al-mu!hammadiyya, 1370/1951), which corresponds to Dar ±, 1:2–3:87, only.
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other causes (asbāb) that God originates. Yet, he insists that they do not arise 
from human teaching and calling. Guidance through human intermediaries 
is not a necessary condition for knowing the true religion. Ibn Taymiyya 
compares the natural constitution to an infant’s instinct for his mother’s 
milk. If nothing impedes the infant, such as illness in himself or his mother, 
he will necessarily drink. Th e shaykh adds that the natural constitution to 
believe in God is even stronger than the infant’s instinct.99
In Ibn Taymiyya’s view, the natural constitution also dictates what is good 
for humans to do and love. God has constituted humans to will naturally what 
is profi table for them and repel what is harmful: “Th e [human being] has 
been naturally constituted to will what he must inevitably have and to hate 
what harms him and injures him.”100 Th is corresponds to loving what is good 
and right and hating what is bad and wrong. Justice (≠adl ) is good because it 
is beloved to the natural constitution and yields pleasure, joy and profi t to 
oneself and others. Injustice ( )zulm) is bad because the natural constitution 
knows that it is hateful and causes pain, trouble and torment. Humans have 
been naturally constituted to love and fi nd pleasure in justice, truthfulness, 
benefi cence and knowledge just as they have been naturally constituted to 
fi nd pleasure in food and drink.101 Moreover, God has naturally constituted 
human beings to love and worship Him alone. To be a willing being is an 
essential concomitant of the natural constitution. A willing being necessarily 
has a god toward which it directs its love and which it loves for itself. Apart 
from corrupting infl uences, this ultimate object of the natural constitution’s 
will and love will be God. Th us, a child left  on his own will necessarily come 
to know, praise, love and worship his Lord.102 In Dar ±, Ibn Taymiyya sums 
up the religion of the natural constitution in terms of exclusive worship of 
God as the end for which creatures are created and the “lawfulness of good 
things” as the means toward this end:
Th e foundation of the religion upon which God naturally constituted His 
servants—as He said, “I have created My servants original believers ( !hunafā±). 
 99 Dar ±, MF 8:461–4. In Ma !habba, 9 and 23, Ibn Taymiyya gives angels the role of 
bringing forth all the motion in the universe that lies outside the capability of humans, jinn 
and animals.
100 ≠Abd al-Qādir, MF 10:481. Similarly, ≠Abd al-Qādir, MF 10:465; and Minhāj, 3:64/2:5, 
3:69/2:6.
101 Man$tiqiyyīn, 423. Cf. Man$tiqiyyīn, 429, “Souls are naturally disposed (majbūla) to love 
justice and its people and to hate injustice and its people. Th is love, which is in the natural 
constitution, is what it means for [justice] to be good.”
102 Fi$tra, MRK 2:338; Dar ±, 8:464–8; Man$tiqiyyīn, 423; Ma!habba, 44–5; Fī Wujūb, MF 
1:25–7; Amrā #d, MF 10:135; ≠Abd al-Qādir, MF 10:474; and (Hasana, MF 14:296.
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Th en, satans turned them away, forbade them what I had made lawful for 
them, and commanded them to associate to Me that to which I had not given 
authority”103—this combines two foundations. Th e fi rst of them is worship of 
God alone without associate. He is worshipped only through what He loves 
and has commanded. Th is is the objective for which God created creatures. 
Contrary to this is associationism and innovation. Second is the lawfulness of 
agreeable things ( $tayyibāt) in which help is sought toward the objective. Th is 
is the means (wasīla). Contrary to this is forbidding the lawful.104
Despite Ibn Taymiyya’s optimistic view of the natural constitution’s ability to 
know God and the purpose of worship for which it was created, the above 
quotation also indicates that it may become corrupted by satans (shayā $tīn). 
In scattered references, the shaykh cites many things that may corrupt the 
natural constitution. In addition to satans from among humans and jinn, 
ignorance and heedlessness play a detrimental role.105 As noted in the hadith 
on the natural constitution, parents may make a child a Jew, Christian or 
Zoroastrian.106 Also, vain doctrines may corrupt the natural constitution 
“like a veil blocking the eyesight from seeing the sun.”107 Pride, ill purposes, 
and divided love for God all exert their corrupting infl uences.108
In view of corrupted natural constitutions, Ibn Taymiyya notes that one 
of the best ways to reach necessary knowledge is through purifying the soul 
and spiritual disciplines.109 Inferential methods may also be needed and even 
obligatory to discern the existence of the Creator.110 However, Ibn Taymiyya 
distinguishes between the invalid rational inquiry (na)zar) of Kalām theology 
on the one hand and the valid na)zar of examining the guidance brought by 
the Messenger and inferring the Creator from the existence of the human 
being on the other.111 It is in fact part of the role of messengers, the Qur±an 
and the Sunna to make the correct rational proofs obvious to those whose 
natural constitutions have become corrupt.112 In addition to revealing details 
of the Law that cannot be known by the natural constitution, messengers 
have been sent to those who have suff ered corruption in order to set the 
103 Muslim, 5109, Al-Janna wa $sifāt na≠īmihā, Al- !Sifāt allatī yu≠raf bihā fī al-dunyā ahl 
al-janna. . . .
104 Dar ±, 8:455.
105 (Hasana, MF 14:296–7.
106 Amrā#d, MF 10:135.
107 MF 4:247.
108 Minhāj, 5:403/3:101.
109 Fi$tra, MRK 2:341.
110 Fi$tra, MRK 2:341, 345. 
111 Nubuwwāt, 62–73; and Ma≠ārij, MF 19:172.
112 Jahd, 9:242/Man $tiqiyyīn, 382.
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natural constitution back on the right path and complete and perfect it.113 
Th e following passage from Ibn Taymiyya’s Nubuwwāt elaborates this:
Th e Prophet, he and the rest of the believers inform only of the truth. Th ey 
command only justice. Th ey command the right and they prohibit the wrong. . . . 
Th ey were raised up to perfect the natural constitution and fi rmly establish it, 
not to replace it and change it. Th ey command only what agrees with what is 
right to rational minds which pure hearts accept with receptivity. So too, they 
themselves did not diff er, and they did not contradict one another. Rather, 
their religion and their faith were one even if the laws were of diverse kinds. 
Th ey also agree with the obligation of the natural constitution according to 
which God constituted His servants. [Th ey] agree with rational proofs and 
do not contradict them at all. . . . Th e prophets perfected the natural constitu-
tion and made humankind see. As has been said concerning the description 
of Mu!hammad—God bless him and give him peace—that through him God 
opens the eyes of the blind, the ears of the deaf and hearts that are closed. Th eir 
opponents corrupt sense perception and reason just as they have corrupted the 
proofs of revelation.114
A similar passage in another work points to the role of messengers in perfect-
ing the natural constitution for the sake of blessing in Paradise.
God—Exalted is He—raised up the messengers to perfect the natural consti-
tution. Th ey indicated to human beings that by which they obtain blessing 
in the hereaft er and are saved from the chastisement of the hereaft er. Th e 
diff erence between what is commanded and what is forbidden is like the dif-
ference between Paradise and the Fire, pleasure and pain, and blessing and 
chastisement.115
Th e role then of prophets and messengers for Ibn Taymiyya is purifying 
humans of corrupting infl uences and perfecting the natural constitution 
in which they were created, which is to love God alone and dedicate their 
religion solely to Him.116 Th is involves pointing to what is known to be just 
and right in reason and guiding them on the path to Paradise. Prophecy and 
revelation are fully congruent with and the perfection of what all human 
beings have naturally constituted within them.
113 Minhāj, 1:300–1/1:82; Man$tiq, MF 4:45; Jahd, MF 9:242–3/Man$tiqiyyīn, 382; and 
≠Abd al-Qādir, MF 10:466.
114 Nubuwwāt, 430–1. Ma!habba, 62, makes a similar affi  rmation.
115 I!htijāj, MF 8:312.
116 Amrā#d, MF 10:135.
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Connections to Ibn Taymiyya’s Th eodicean Writings
Th e previous two subsections show that reason and the natural constitution 
constitute two functionally equivalent sources in Ibn Taymiyya’s thought 
for attaining knowledge of God’s existence and the ends to which human 
beings should devote themselves. Apart from prophetic revelation, human 
beings, by virtue of their very createdness, know that God exists, that the 
fundamental human telos is to gain benefi t and repel detriment, and that 
this may be achieved most fully in worshipping and loving God. Prophecy 
and revelation of God’s command restore and perfect these basic human 
intuitions.
Certain rational diffi  culties arise from Ibn Taymiyya’s ethical vision. His 
view of the powers of the natural constitution to recognize and follow truth 
is very optimistic, and it does not appear to take into account the problem 
of inveterate unbelievers for whom prophecy and spiritual discipline do 
not avail. It is insuffi  cient to pass the blame off  on satans because this only 
pushes the question back one step to how even the natural constitutions of 
the satans were corrupted. From whence then does evil ultimately come? A 
similar problem exists with respect to reason. If humans know by reason what 
will profi t and harm them, why do they go astray, and if it is a matter of God 
creating disbelief and disobedience in them—as Ibn Taymiyya asserts—then 
how is God just to create that, much less punish it? Th e shaykh attends to 
these problems in several places, but most fully in (Hasana, which will be 
examined in Chapter Five.
Beyond this, two key principles underlying the material above will reappear 
in subsequent chapters. First, Ibn Taymiyya’s cosmological proof for God’s 
existence is rooted in the metaphysical presupposition that every possible 
and originated existent requires an external cause preponderating and deter-
mining its existence. As will become apparent in Chapter Two below, the 
shaykh usually upholds this principle of preponderance with an extraordinary 
rigor that extends even into God’s will. Second, as already noted above, the 
shaykh rejects Mu≠tazilī rational objectivism and Ash≠arī voluntarism in favor 
of a teleological theory of ethical value. At fi rst glance, this appears to apply 
not only to the human plane but to God as well, especially as Ibn Taymiyya 
underlines the causal character of the wise purposes in God’s creative acts 
(Chapter Two). An important question then is whether the shaykh applies 
the two principles of preponderance and teleology to God univocally or in 
some other fashion. What follows on the character of theological discern-
ment of God’s attributes begins to suggest how the shaykh might answer 
this question.
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Th e Methodology of Th eological Jurisprudence
To Ibn Taymiyya’s mind, both reason and the natural constitution on the one 
hand and Law and prophecy on the other affi  rm that God exists and that 
God should be loved and worshipped. Beyond this, the revealed tradition also 
ascribes various qualities and acts to God that resemble those of creatures. 
But what is reason to make of these? More pointedly, what should be the 
response to God’s messengers who bring information about God—such as 
God’s sitting (istiwā±) on the Th rone (Q. 57:4)—that apparently confl icts 
with rational proofs demonstrating God’s incomparability with creatures? 
Ibn ≠Arabī in Al-Futū!hāt al-makkiyya provides a typology of responses to 
this question that will help situate Ibn Taymiyya’s approach.117
Th e fi rst of six groups outlined by Ibn ≠Arabī responds by doubting the 
truthfulness of the messenger and turning away from the faith when informed 
that God has attributes that are normally ascribed to originated things. Th is 
is simply unbelief. Th e second group does not waver in its faith and retains 
its rational proofs, but it takes the messenger’s report to be a wise adapta-
tion to the weak who do not have access to the proofs of reason. Ibn ≠Arabī 
does not link names to any of the groups, but this second group represents 
the basic position of Muslim philosophers like al-Farābī, Ibn Sīnā and Ibn 
Rushd.118 Th e third group believes that the report of God’s self-description 
contradicts its proofs negating all ascriptions of creaturely attributes to God, 
but it accepts the truthfulness of the report-giver nonetheless and submits 
to his greater knowledge since there is no harm in this. Still, the relation 
of this description to God Himself is not known since God’s essence is 
not known. Here Ibn ≠Arabī may have in mind traditionalists who affi  rm 
God’s description of Himself in revelation but refuse to interpret its mean-
ing, especially in the way practiced by the next group. Yet, there is little to 
distinguish this position from his own which he affi  rms and elaborates at 
the end of the typology.
117 Ibn ≠Arabī al- (Hātimī al-+Tā±ī, Al-Futū!hāt al-Makkiyya, 4 vols. (Beirut: Dār !Sādir, n.d.), 
2:306–7, translated in William C. Chittick, Th e Sufi  Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-‘Arabi’s Meta-
physics of Imagination (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989), 186–7.
118 On the philosophers’ views of prophecy, see F. Rahman, Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy 
and Orthodoxy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958), 36–45, and Richard C. Taylor, 
“Averroes: religious dialectic and Aristotelian philosophical thought,” in Th e Cambridge Com-
panion to Arabic Philosophy, eds., Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 182–9. On Ibn Taymiyya’s rejection of the philosophers’ 
perspective, see Michot, “A Mamlūk Th eologian’s Commentary.”
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Th e fourth group, clearly the Kalām theologians, accepts the truthfulness 
of the report-giver but re-interprets (ta±wīl ) the apparent ()zāhir) sense of 
some reports to accord with its rational proofs, which, this group observes, 
are congruent with God’s statement about Himself, “Th ere is nothing like 
Him” (Q. 42:11). Th e fi ft h group has no appreciation for rational proofs of 
God’s incomparability and does not grasp the meaning of “Th ere is nothing 
like Him.” Rather, it takes the revealed descriptions of God in their apparent 
sense without drawing a distinction between themselves and God. Th is is 
the anthropomorphism and corporealism that the Islamic heresiographical 
tradition oft en ascribes to Hadith scholars under the pejorative label (Hash-
wiyya. It is also what many of Ibn Taymiyya’s opponents from his own day 
onward understand him to teach.119
Ibn ≠Arabī’s sixth and last group, the one approved as attaining salvation, 
“has faith in what came from God as God means it and knows it, while 
negating assimilation (tashbīh) [of God to creatures] with ‘Th ere is nothing 
like Him’ (Q. 42:11).”120 Ibn ≠Arabī continues with a long list of creaturely 
attributes which revelation has ascribed to God—including inter alia a 
hand, hearing, sight, good pleasure, hesitation (taraddud), joy, laughter and 
descent—many of which the Kalām theologians seek to reinterpret.
Given Ibn Taymiyya’s notoriety for polemic against Ibn ≠Arabī, it may 
seem odd to resort to a typology from the latter to enlighten the views of 
the former. Yet, from the following exposition of Ibn Taymiyya’s view, it will 
become apparent that the two agree on one thing. With the sixth group 
above, both affi  rm allegedly anthropomorphic expressions about God on 
a par with other divine attributes found in revelation while simultaneously 
confessing that God is equally incomparable to creatures in all of His names 
and attributes. Neither follows the philosophers for whom revelation is an 
expedient for the masses who cannot bear pure intellectual truth. Nor does 
either adopt the hermeneutical strategy of Kalām theology, which argues that 
revelation must give way to reason through the practice of re-interpretation 
(ta±wīl ). Nor may either of them be accused of the simplistic anthropomor-
phism and corporealism of the (Hashwiyya.
119 Following Ibn Taymiyya’s unsympathetic biographer Ibn (Hajar al-≠Asqalānī, Ignaz 
Goldziher, Th e %Zāhirīs: their doctrine and their history, trans. and ed. Wolfgang Behn (Leiden: 
Brill, 1971 [1884]), 174, reports baldly that Ibn Taymiyya taught tajsīm, that is, corporealism 
or giving God bodily characteristics.
120 Ibn ≠Arabī, Futū !hāt, 2:307; translation adapted from Chittick, Th e Sufi  Path of Knowl-
edge, 187.
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Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn ≠Arabī do diff er at signifi cant points, and two of 
these need to be clarifi ed here. Ibn Taymiyya does not follow the Sufi  theorist 
in privileging mystical experience or revelation over reason. Rather, reason 
and revelation are on the same level and provide much of the same informa-
tion about God. As we will see below, reason rightly exercised knows even 
many of God’s allegedly anthropomorphic attributes found in revelation.
Th e two great fi gures also do not agree on the ontological referents of 
God’s attributes and acts. Ibn ≠Arabī does not always distinguish God’s acts 
from created things, and from a certain illumined perspective, God’s acts are 
the created things themselves. God’s attributes and names then indicate the 
diverse relationships between God’s many acts and God’s one unknowable 
essence, but these relationships (i.e. the attributes) do not exist in reality.121 
Ibn Taymiyya, unlike Ibn ≠Arabī whom he charges with confl ating God and 
the world, maintains that God’s attributes are real and that not only God’s 
essence but also God’s attributes and acts are always ontologically distinct 
from creatures: “Th ere is nothing like (mithl ) [God], neither in His essence, 
nor in His attributes, nor in His acts.”122
Nevertheless, Ibn Taymiyya acknowledges that the unseen world, which 
includes both God and the hereaft er, can be discussed only through the 
medium of what is known in the visible world: “Th ings that are concealed 
from sight and feeling are only known, loved and hated via a kind of likening 
(tamthīl) and analogy (qiyās).”123 Th e question then is how to speak correctly 
of the God who is wholly other. Ibn Taymiyya answers this question from 
the tradition and with rational arguments concerning what human concep-
tion of God’s perfection should entail.
Affi  rming God’s Attributes in the Revealed Tradition without Modality
Contributing perhaps to his anti-rationalist reputation, Ibn Taymiyya oft en 
calls for acceptance of God’s attributes found in the authoritative textual 
sources of Islam without making a parallel appeal to reason, asserting that 
God must be spoken of strictly as He has revealed Himself to be and as the 
121 For explanation of Ibn ≠Arabī’s theology, see Chittick, Th e Sufi  Path of Knowledge, 
8–12 and 33–46.
122 I$sfahāniyya, 9; Tadmuriyya, MF 3:25; Wa$siyya kubrā, MF 3:374; MF 5:195; Nuzūl, 
5:330; Jawāb, 2:164, 4:428; and Minhāj, 3:151/2:27. On God having his essence and attributes 
“in reality (!haqīqatan),” see MF 5:196–9. For brief note of Ibn Taymiyya’s polemic against 
Ibn ≠Arabī’s ontology, see below Chapter Th ree.
123 Ma!habba, 214. Cf. Tadmuriyya, MF 3:57.
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Prophet speaks of Him. Th is approach rests on the quranic verse, “Th ere 
is nothing like Him, and He is all-Hearing, all-Seeing” (Q. 42:11), which 
the shaykh understands to entail both a negation of God’s likeness to any 
creature and an affi  rmation that God has attributes called hearing and see-
ing. By extension, all other attributes that appear in the authoritative texts 
must be affi  rmed as they are, but always with the qualifi cation that they are 
wholly unlike those of creatures. A typical statement of this position occurs 
in Ibn Taymiyya’s Tadmuriyya creed:
God is qualifi ed by that with which He has qualifi ed Himself and by that with 
which His messengers have qualifi ed Him, negatively and positively. What 
God establishes for Himself is established and what He negates for Himself is 
negated. It is known that the way of the Salaf of the Community and its Imāms 
is establishment of the attributes ($sifāt) that He establishes without [giving 
them] modality (takyīf ) or likening [them to something else] (tamthīl ) and 
without distorting [them] (ta!hrīf ) or stripping [them] away (ta≠ $tīl ). Likewise, 
they negate of Him what He negates of Himself. . . .
 Th eir way involves establishing His names and attributes, as well as nega-
tion of His likeness with creatures—establishing without assimilating [Him 
to creatures] (tashbīh), declaring [Him] incomparable (tanzīh) without strip-
ping away [His attributes]. As He—Exalted is He—said, “Th ere is nothing 
like Him, and He is all-Hearing, all-Seeing” (Q. 42:11). In His statement, 
“Th ere is nothing like Him,” is a rejection of assimilation and likening, and 
His statement, “He is all-Hearing, all-Seeing,” is a rejection of heresy (il !hād ) 
and stripping away.124
Adhering to these guidelines, God must be mentioned only in the theologi-
cal language of the Qur±an and the Sunna. Th e admonitions against takyīf, 
tamthīl, tashbīh, ta!hrīf and ta≠$tīl protect this language from interpretation that 
ties God to creatures in some fashion. Ibn Taymiyya supports his rejection 
of assimilation (tashbīh) and likening (tamthīl ) with several quranic verses 
indicating that God has no son, associate or equal (Q. 2:22, 2:165, 16:74, 
19:65, 25:2, 112:3–4, etc.). He also provides numerous verses establishing 
that God has various names and attributes and that God is the Creator of 
created things. For example, God is Self-Subsistent (al-Qayyūm) and Living 
(Q. 2:255), all-Knowing and all-Wise (Q. 4:26). He created the heavens and 
the earth and then sat upon the Th rone (Q. 57:4). He loves (Q. 5:54) and 
124 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:3–4. Other basic creedal statements of this kind include (Hamawiyya, 
MF 5:26; I$sfahāniyya, 9–10; Wāsitiyya, MF 3:129–130; Minhāj, 2:111/1:174; and Jawāb, 
2:163–4, 4:405 ( Jawāb, 4:384–411 is translated in Michel, A Muslim Th eologian’s Response 
to Christianity, 327–341).
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gets angry (Q. 4:93). He spoke to Moses (Q. 4:164). He is Creator, and to 
Him belong the most Beautiful Names (Q. 59:24).125
Ibn Taymiyya further explains that attempts by philosophers and Kalām 
theologians to understand the detail of the revealed language about God 
begin from alien conceptual frameworks and lead to error. Th ose who make 
God analogous to creatures or liken God to them violate His incompara-
bility and end up worshipping an idol. A philosophical via negativa strips 
away God’s positive attributes (ta≠ $tīl ) and leads to worship of a nonexistent. 
Moreover, those who negate God’s attributes only do so because they have 
fi rst likened these attributes to those of creatures and found them unfi t for 
God. In this way, even the strippers are likeners. In sum, the language about 
God presented in the revealed sources must be accepted as it is without it 
implying any likeness of God to creatures whatsoever.126
Th e shaykh’s agnosticism as to the modality of God’s attributes becomes 
especially apparent when he argues that they remain unique to God even if 
He has identifi ed Himself with names and attributes that are also employed 
with respect to creatures. Th e shaykh elaborates this with a philosophical 
nominalism that denies the existence of extramental universals. Wael Hallaq 
comments that Ibn Taymiyya holds individuals in the extramental world to 
be “so distinct and diff erent from one another that they cannot allow for 
the formation of an external universal under which they are assumed.”127 
Th e shaykh explains that God calls Himself Living, Knowing, Merciful, 
125 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:4–7; and Jawāb, 4:405–8. A full list of quranic verses that negate 
God’s likeness to creatures and affi  rm His many names and attributes is found in Wāsi$tiyya, 
MF 3:130–143.
126 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:7ff .; Jawāb, 4:405–6; and (Hamawiyya, MF 5:27, 59. Also, see espe-
cially Henri Laoust, “Quelques opinions sur la théodicée d’Ibn Taimiya,” Mélanges Maspero, 
Vol. 3, Orient Islamique (Cairo: Imprimerie de l’institut français d’archéologie orientale, 
1935–40), 431–8, which argues that Ibn Taymiyya is not the anthropomorphist that earlier 
western scholarship and a good part of the Islamic tradition had made him out to be. Sherman 
Jackson, “Ibn Taymiyyah on Trial,” 53–6, discusses the same matter briefl y but with greater 
technical depth. Other discussions in the secondary literature include Laoust, Essai, 155–7; 
Victor E. Makari, Ibn Taymiyyah’s Ethics: Th e Social Factor (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983), 
34–41; Serajul Haque, “Ibn Taymīyyah: A Life and Works,” in A History of Muslim Philosophy, 
ed. M. M. Sharif (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrossowitz, 1966), 2:796–819 (at 799–803); and 
Michel, A Muslim Th eologian’s Response to Christianity, 1–3, 5–23 passim, 41–4.
127 Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians, xxii. Hallaq’s reference for this point 
leads to Dar ±, 1:116, where Ibn Taymiyya argues for the complete unlikeness of all individual 
entities, including all human beings, from each other. Th e shaykh quotes the verse, “If you turn 
away, He will exchange you for some other people, and they will not be your likes (amthāl )” 
(Q. 47:38). From this, he denies that humans bear a likeness (mumāthala) one to another 
even though they may share in having bodies, moving, laughing and so forth. By denying all 
likeness even between creatures, Ibn Taymiyya applies the same agnosticism that he holds 
with respect to the modality of God’s attributes to the modality of human attributes.
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Hearing, Seeing and so on and that in the Qur±an He has used these names 
for creatures as well. However, God and creatures share nothing in common 
but these names.
Ibn Taymiyya does observe that the mind recognizes shared qualities and 
connotations when these names are abstracted from their particular and 
concrete manifestations. Th is is as when we recognize that both snow and 
ivory share something in common with each other that we call whiteness 
even though the whiteness of snow is much more intense than the white-
ness of ivory. Yet, despite observed similarities, the shaykh asserts that the 
abstract universal of whiteness or any other name has no existence outside 
the mind. Applying this nominalism in the realm of theological language, 
there is no longer any similarity between the referents of identical names 
when they are particularized in the Creator and the creature apart from the 
very names themselves. Th e shaykh suggests that this is obvious, for example, 
in the attribute of knowledge. Th e knowledge of creatures is accidental, 
originated, and acquired whereas that of the Creator is none of these. Th e 
modalities of the concrete realities to which the names of the unseen God 
refer are unknowable because they are completely unlike referents given the 
same names in the created world.128
Th is rigorously agnostic and nominalistic approach permits affi  rming all 
the revealed names and attributes of God without fear of anthropomorphism 
because all of them are equally unlike their counterparts in the created world. 
A sample of Ibn Taymiyya’s dialectic against the Kalām theologians from 
Tadmuriyya illustrates how this works. He takes particular issue with the 
Kalām theologians interpreting God’s love, good pleasure, anger and hate as 
metaphors for either God’s will or God’s blessing and punishment of human 
beings. He explains, for example, that if the Kalām theologians understand 
God’s will to be like that of creatures, then there should be no off ense in 
making God like creatures in other attributes as well, such as in love and 
anger. Conversely, they might take God to have a will uniquely befi tting 
Him just as creatures have wills uniquely befi tting them and diff erent from 
God’s. In this case, however, there should be no reason not to affi  rm love 
128 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:10–16; Jawāb, 4:421–8; Minhāj, 2:112–120/1:174–7; Jahd, MF 
9:145/Man$tiqiyyīn, 154–5; and Munā)zara, 3:191. My discussion avoids the highly technical 
vocabulary Ibn Taymiyya uses because the main point is otherwise clear: the link between 
God’s attributes and those of creatures is confi ned to the level of abstract universals in the mind. 
For discussion of the technical terms involved—tawā $tu±, tashkīk and ishtirāk—see Jackson, 
“Ibn Taymiyyah on Trial,” 54–5; Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians, 74–5; 
and especially Mohamed M. Yunis Ali, Medieval Islamic Pragmatics: Sunni Th eorists’ Models 
of Textual Communication (Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 2000), 114–125.
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and anger of God in a sense uniquely befi tting Him as well. Moreover, if the 
Kalām theologians take anger to be “the boiling of the blood of the heart 
from seeking vengeance” and then say that this cannot be applied to God, 
it can be countered that will means “the inclination of the soul to obtain 
profi t or repel harm” which also cannot be applied to God. Anger and will 
in the anthropomorphic senses of these defi nitions are equally inapplicable 
to God because neither God’s anger nor God’s will bears any relationship 
to the human senses of anger or will. Rather, Ibn Taymiyya argues, God has 
an anger and a will that uniquely befi t Him.129
Th e shaykh also notes that the Kalām theologians establish some of God’s 
attributes by rational proofs and imply that those attributes not proven 
rationally must be reinterpreted. For example, the theologians argue that a 
temporally originated act proves that God has power, will and knowledge. 
Th ese attributes necessarily imply life, and that which is living must be hear-
ing, seeing and speaking. Th en, other attributes like love and anger, which 
are not proven rationally, may not be predicated of God except as metaphors 
for the rationally proven attributes. Ibn Taymiyya retorts that absence of 
proof does not necessarily imply that something does not exist. Furthermore, 
rational proofs of a similar kind could be marshaled in support of God’s other 
attributes. For example, God’s benefi cence to humans proves His mercy; His 
punishment of unbelievers points to His hate; and so on.130
Ibn Taymiyya’s hermeneutic presupposition throughout these arguments 
is an absolute application of “Th ere is nothing like Him” (Q. 42:11), which 
he complements with a rigorous nominalism that denies the existence of 
extramental universals. On the basis of God’s complete unlikeness, the shaykh 
portrays the Kalām theologians as inconsistent in their attempt to set apart 
some of God’s attributes as metaphorical and in need of reinterpretation 
(ta±wīl ) while taking other attributes in senses common to creatures. Ibn 
Taymiyya understands God’s names and attributes neither literally nor meta-
phorically. What is literal or absolute is that the names and attributes refer to 
realities wholly beyond human comprehension. While God’s attributes may 
connote certain things in the human mind, these thoughts do not correspond 
to anything in the modality of the attributes of God Himself.
129 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:17–8. Bell, Love Th eory, 64–5, recounts similar arguments from 
Iklīl, MF 13:298–300.
130 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:18–9.
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Giving Meaning to the Revealed Attributes in Human Language
Absolute unlikeness between God and creatures may present diffi  culties 
for the religious life insofar as the language about God does not connect 
to anything concrete in human experience.131 Sherman Jackson argues that 
Ibn Taymiyya’s view of God’s names and attributes does, however, represent 
an advance over the earlier (Hanbalī Ibn Qudāma. Ibn Qudāma sets out his 
position as follows:
We have no need to know the meaning of what God—Exalted is He—intended 
by His attributes—He is Great and Almighty. No deed is intended by them. 
No obligation is linked to them except belief in them. Belief in them is possible 
without knowing their meaning. Indeed, belief with ignorance is correct.132
Whereas Ibn Qudāma rejects any attempt to link God’s attributes to the 
referential world of ordinary human language, Ibn Taymiyya acknowledges 
that God’s attributes do connote certain qualities in the mind although not 
in the external world. In the following quote, Jackson suggests that these 
mental associations give more tangibility to religious language than does 
the full agnosticism of Ibn Qudāma.
On this approach, a !hadīth such as the one asserting God’s descent to the 
lower heavens to off er forgiveness to repentent [sic] sinners is transformed 
from an abstract mystery into a concrete promise of immanent grace. For, 
what is understood by ‘descent’ is now informed by its meaning in the case of 
created entities, without this entailing, meanwhile, the belief that God actually 
descends like anything created.133
While the associations that God’s attributes and acts evoke in the mind may 
bring blessing and comfort of a kind, it seems doubtful that what Jackson 
calls a “concrete promise of immanent grace” is in fact concrete because it 
does not correspond to anything humans experience in concrete reality. 
Nonetheless, Ibn Taymiyya does diff er from Ibn Qudāma in taking these 
connotations very seriously and giving considerable attention to the meanings 
of the words that are used for God’s attributes. He delineates these meanings 
131 For a sociological analysis of this outlook not only in Ibn Taymiyya but among the 
(Hanbalīs in general, see Aziz Al-Azmeh, “Orthodoxy and (Hanbalite Fideism,” Arabica 35 
(1988): 253–266, who observes that doctrinal language in this view is equivalent to a technical 
language that is “not native to the human understanding” (257). He argues further that this 
position was sustained through the rigorous transmission of texts claiming to preserve the 
original revelation and through the structures of (Hanbalī authority that included charismatic 
preaching and miraculous signs.
132 Ibn Qudāma, Ta!hrīm al-na)zar, 51–2.
133 Jackson, “Ibn Taymiyyah on Trial,” 56.
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by reference to the authoritative tradition of the Qur±an, the Hadith, the 
Salaf, the early Qur±an exegetes and the conventions of the Arabic language, 
as well as by rational considerations.
Ibn Taymiyya’s discussion of God’s attribute of sitting on the Th rone (cf. 
Q. 20:5, 25:59), especially as it appears in his (Hamawiyya creed, provides 
an example of how this works. Basic to the argument are the distinctions 
Ibn Taymiyya draws between three types of ta±wīl.134 First is the ta±wīl of the 
Kalām theologians and others who turn away from the probable meaning 
and adopt the less probable meaning on account of some proof for this. In 
the case of God’s sitting, the shaykh in (Hamawiyya castigates the Mu≠tazilīs 
for reinterpreting God’s sitting (istawā) as possessing (istawlā) in order to 
reconcile it with the quranic affi  rmation, “[God] is with you wherever you 
are” (Q. 57:4).135 Th e shaykh also criticizes Kalām theologians for applying 
the verse, “No one knows its ta±wīl except God” (Q. 3:7), to God’s descend-
ing, sitting and so forth. He says that this makes the prophets and the Salaf 
out not to have known what they were talking about when they mentioned 
these attributes. Th e second meaning of ta±wīl is the linguistic inquiry or tafsīr 
(interpretation or explanation) of early Qur±an exegetes such as Ibn ≠Abbās 
(d. 68/687), Mujāhid (d. ca. 100–4/718–722) and al- +Tabarī (d. 310/923). 
Th is is the ta±wīl of the Salaf and “those fi rmly grounded in knowledge” 
(Q. 3:7). Th e third meaning of ta±wīl is the very reality of the thing referred 
to, as for example the existence of the various realities in Paradise. Th is is the 
ta±wīl that only God knows (Q. 3:7). Ibn Taymiyya puts God’s attributes in 
this third category since only God knows their reality.
In (Hamawiyya, the shaykh also cites the well-known statement of Mālik b. 
Anas on God’s sitting: “Th e sitting is known, and the modality is unknown,” 
and then interprets this as referring to his latter two types of ta±wīl:
Th e sitting is known (ma≠lūm). Its meaning (ma≠nā) is known; it is interpreted 
( yufassar), and it is translated into another language. Th is is part of the ta±wīl 
that those fi rmly grounded in knowledge know. As for the modality (kayfi yya) 
of this sitting, this is the ta±wīl that only God—Exalted is He—knows.136
134 Th e following discussion is based on Tadmuriyya, MF 3:55–8; (Hamawiyya, MF 5:35–7; 
Iklīl, MF 13:288ff .; Abū al-Fidā±, 161; and Dar ±, 1:12–6 (also found in trans. in Michot, Ibn 
Taymiyya: Lettre à Abû l-Fidâ±, 25–7). See also Ali, Medieval Islamic Pragmatics, 125–135; 
and al-Julaynad, Al-Imām Ibn Taymiyya, 149–185, for further treatment of Ibn Taymiyya’s 
approach to ta±wīl.
135 Hamawiyya, MF 5:20, 96–7.
136 (Hamawiyya, MF 5:36–7. Cf. Dar ±, 1:278. Several more brief passages in which Ibn 
Taymiyya interprets God’s sitting are translated in Yahya M. Michot, “Textes Spirituels d’Ibn 
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Th e level of ta±wīl at which the shaykh works interpretively and theologically 
is the second, the linguistic level of tafsīr and ascertaining the meaning. In 
(Hamawiyya, Ibn Taymiyya’s insistence that God’s sitting means sitting, and 
not possessing as the Mu≠tazilīs would have it, leads him to refl ect on the 
apparent contradiction between God’s sitting on the Th rone and His omni-
presence found in “He is with you wherever you are” (Q. 57:4). Th e shaykh 
affi  rms that, just as God is with His creatures in reality ( !haqīqatan), He is on 
His Th rone in reality, and, in an analysis based on the authority of Arabic 
semantic conventions, he explains that God’s ‘withness’ (ma≠iyya) consists in 
watching over His creatures and knowing them. He suggests that this might 
be as when someone says that the moon or stars are with him when travel-
ing. Similarly, a father sitting on a roof may say to a son crying below, “Do 
not be afraid! I am with you.” Th e father-son and moon-star images that 
Ibn Taymiyya provides are simply suggestions as to what Q. 57:4 may mean 
linguistically. However, interpretive maneuvers such as these were not well 
understood by Ibn Taymiyya’s contemporaries and earned him the charge of 
anthropomorphism that led to his Damascene trials in 705/1306.137
In (Hamawiyya, Ibn Taymiyya also attempts to reconcile God’s sitting on 
the Th rone with the hadith, “If one of you stands to pray, God is in front of 
his face. So, let him not spit in front of his face.”138 Ibn Taymiyya explains 
that this is as when someone talks to the sky, sun or moon: they are over him 
and also, simultaneously, in front of his face. In this case, the shaykh fi nds 
precedent for his interpretive images in another hadith. He writes,
Th e Prophet—God bless him and give him peace—propounded the similitude 
in this. “To God is the highest similitude (al-mathal al-a≠lā)” (Q. 16:60). 
However, what is meant by drawing a similitude (tamthīl ) is explanation of 
the permissibility ( jawāz) of this and its possibility (imkān), not assimilation 
(tashbīh) of the Creator to the creature. Th e Prophet—God bless him and give 
him peace—said, “Th ere is not among you one but that he will see his Lord 
alone.” Abū Razīn al-≠Uqaylī said to him, “How is this, O Messenger of God, 
when He is only one and we are all together?” Th e Prophet—God bless him 
and give him peace—said, “I will inform you of the like (mithl ) of this in the 
favors of God. Th is moon, each of you sees it alone, and this is a sign among 
the signs of God. God is greater,” or as the Prophet—God bless him and give 
Taymiyya: X. «Je ne suis dans cette aff aire qu’un musulman parmi d’autres . . .»,” Le Musul-
man (Paris) 23 (1994): 27–32 (at 28 n. 9).
137 (Hamawiyya, MF 5:103–4; and Munā)zara, 3:177–8 (trans. in Jackson, “Ibn Taymiyyah 
on Trial,” 71–2).
138 Abū Dāwūd, 410, Al-!Salāt, Fī karāhiyyat al-buzāq fī al-masjid. Similar hadiths are found 
in Bukhārī, 391, and Muslim, 852.
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him peace—said.139 He said, “You will see your Lord as you see the sun and 
the moon.”140 He assimilated (shabbaha) the [one] vision to the [other] vision 
even if the [one] thing seen is not similar (mushābih) to the [other] thing seen. 
When the believers see their Lord on the Day of Resurrection and talk to Him, 
each one will see Him over him in front of his face just as he sees the sun and 
the moon. Th ere is no incompatibility fundamentally.141
On guard against anthropomorphism, Ibn Taymiyya prefaces his remarks 
in this quotation by noting that the hadith supplies a similitude that does 
not assimilate God to creatures. It only indicates what is permissible and 
possible with respect to God but not what exists necessarily in reality. Th e 
shaykh provides similar similitudes or interpretative images in his theodicean 
writings, especially in Minhāj, and these will be noted in Chapter Th ree. In 
methodological discussions examined next, Ibn Taymiyya links the verse, 
“To God is the highest similitude” (Q. 16:60), to a rational criterion for 
delineating the meanings of God’s attributes and for deriving many of the 
attributes themselves.
Giving God the Highest Similitude with the a fortiori Argument
Up to this point, we have seen Ibn Taymiyya defend and explain an agnos-
tic realism with respect to God’s attributes on the authority of traditional 
sources. Th e attributes are real and meaningful, but their modality cannot 
be known, and this we know from tradition. However, he also believes that 
much of the same information concerning God’s attributes is known by 
reason independently of revelation. Th e shaykh’s rational proofs for God’s 
complete unlikeness will be given toward the end of the following subsection; 
here it is suffi  cient to note that they are founded on his rigorous denial of 
extramental universals. Th e present subsection surveys his explanation and 
justifi cation of the a fortiori argument as a rational tool for deriving and 
interpreting God’s attributes of perfection. Th e following subsection then 
examines the shaykh’s proofs for God’s perfection from both revelation and 
reason, and it details several divine perfections.
139 Ibn Taymiyya’s reporting of this hadith indeed appears to be very loose since I could 
not locate anything that closely resembles it. However, similar affi  rmations of the vision of 
God are found in Bukhārī, 521, Mawāqīt al- $salāt, Fa #dl $salāt al-≠a $sr; in Ibn Māja, 176, Al-
Muqaddima, Fīmā ankarat al-Jahmiyya; and elsewhere.
140 Th e closest to what Ibn Taymiyya reports—but without mention of the sun—are al-
Tirmidhī, 2477, !Sifāt al-janna ≠an rasūl Allāh, Minhu; and A!hmad, 18394.
141 (Hamawiyya, MF 5:107.
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When discussing the methodology of theological argument, Ibn Taymiyya 
condemns the use of both analogy and categorical syllogism, and he explains 
that discussion of God’s attributes and acts must occur in a fortiori mode. 
Th e shaykh is not adverse to analogy in legal matters. He traces the usage 
of legal analogy back to the Salaf and criticizes the %Zāhirīs for rejecting it.142 
Th e juristic analogy is invalid, however, if it contradicts what God has clearly 
legislated: “Wherever we know that the explicit text opposes an analogy, 
we know absolutely that it is an invalid analogy.”143 In matters of theologi-
cal doctrine, Ibn Taymiyya argues that the juristic analogy is always invalid 
because it brings God and creatures into a relationship of direct comparison. 
Even if God and an idol both happen to be objects of worship, and even 
if God and creatures share the fact of existence, these coincidences do not 
imply that God may be equated with created things in any other respect. 
Rather, God may not be made analogous to any created thing because of 
His incomparability. Drawing an analogy from a creature to God sets the 
two on the same level and is tantamount to idolatry.144
Turning now to the categorical syllogism, Ibn Taymiyya is well known for 
his polemic against Aristotelian logic, especially as it is found in his major 
work Kitāb al-radd ≠alā al-man $tiqiyyīn [Man $tiqiyyīn]. Wael Hallaq has 
provided a translation of Jahd, an abridged version of Man $tiqiyyīn, and, in 
his introduction, Hallaq shows that the shaykh’s critique of the Aristotelian 
theory of defi nition and the categorical syllogism is extensive and incisive.145 
For our purposes, however, it is important to note only two points. First, 
Ibn Taymiyya accepts the formal validity of the categorical syllogism (qiyās 
al-shumūl). However, he rejects the power of this syllogism to give certain 
knowledge, and he denies that the premises that philosophers, Kalām theo-
logians and theosophical Sufi s introduce into it are real universals. Universals 
for Ibn Taymiyya exist only in the mind. Th us, he believes, the elaborate 
metaphysical structures built up by Ibn Sīnā, Ibn ≠Arabī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī 
and many others exist only in the mind and not in external reality.146 Second, 
142 I$sfahāniyya, 79.
143 Qiyās, MF 20:505.
144 Qiyās, MF 20:541–2.
145 Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians. Jahd al-qarī !ha fī tajrīd al-na $sī !ha 
is found in MF 9:82–254. The abridgement was carried out by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyū $tī 
(d. 911/1505).
146 Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians, xiv–xxxii. Hallaq notes that qiyās 
al-shumūl is a rare expression for the categorical syllogism and may have been coined by 
Ibn Taymiyya himself (xiv, n. 17). He also explains that logic is simply superfl uous for Ibn 
Taymiyya. Whatever knowledge it might provide can be obtained through simpler means 
including the natural constitution (xl; cf. Jahd, MF 9:187/Man $tiqiyyīn, 199–200; Jahd, 
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in Jahd and elsewhere, the shaykh does not permit the use of the syllogism 
with respect to God because, as with the juristic analogy, it places God and 
creatures as diff erent syllogistic terms on the same level.147
Although Ibn Taymiyya does not permit the univocal use of analogy and 
the categorical syllogism with respect to God, he does permit their use in a 
fortiori mode. Like analogy, the a fortiori argument plays an important role 
in Islamic jurisprudence. A common example of this argument concludes 
from the quranic injunction, “Do not say to [parents] ‘Fie!’” (Q. 17:23), that 
hitting parents is a fortiori (i.e. all the more) prohibited because the disrespect 
shown to parents in hitting is all the worthier of being prohibited than the 
disrespect shown in saying “Fie!”148 When applied to God, this argument, 
in Ibn Taymiyya’s view, maintains the necessary unlikeness between God 
and creatures and, moreover, asserts that God is all the worthier (awlā) of 
whatever judgment of perfection is applied to creatures than are the creatures 
themselves. He explains this as follows:
Sometimes, the common degree (qadr mushtarak) in a rational argument is con-
sidered without consideration of priority (awwaliyya), and sometimes priority 
is considered in it. Th e a fortiori argument (qiyās al-awlā) is composed in this 
[latter] way. Th is [obtains] if it has been made a kind of categorical syllogism 
or analogy having a particular [characteristic] by which it is distinguished 
from all [other] kinds, which is that the desired judgment be worthier of being 
established than is the case mentioned in the proof proving it.
Th is type is what the Salaf and the Imāms—like Imām A !hmad and others 
among the Salaf—followed with respect to rational proof in the matter of 
217–8/Man$tiqiyyīn, 293–8). In this regard, according to Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya argues that 
the categorical syllogism diff ers only in form from the juristic analogy. Th e two are in fact 
interchangeable because the middle term of the syllogism is equivalent to the cause and shared 
attribute of the analogy. For example date wine (nabīdh) has been prohibited by analogy to 
grape wine (khamr) whose assessment or rule ( !hukm) of prohibition has been set down in 
the authoritative sources of the Qur±an and the Sunna. Th rough a process of induction, 
the jurists determine that the cause (≠illa) of this rule is intoxication even though it is not 
given in the texts. Now, since intoxication is a common attribute (wa$sf mushtarak) between 
grape wine and date wine, the rule of prohibition also applies to date wine. Th e prohibition 
of date wine may also be set out syllogistically as follows. All intoxicants are prohibited 
(major premise). Date wine is intoxicating (minor premise). Th erefore, date wine is prohibited 
(conclusion). In this case, the middle term ‘intoxicants’ is equivalent to the cause and com-
mon attribute in the analogy. Th e rule of prohibition that attaches to intoxicants establishes 
both the major premise of the syllogism and the analogical transfer of the ruling from grape 
wine to all other intoxicants (xxxv–xxxix; cf. Nubuwwāt, 270–3; Kaylāniyya, MF 12:345–7; 
I$sfahāniyya, 48; and Jahd, MF 9:197–206/Man$tiqiyyīn, 209–246).
147 Jahd, MF 9:141–2/Man$tiqiyyīn, 150; Tadmuriyya, MF 3:30; Kaylāniyya, MF 12:347; 
and I$sfahāniyya, 49.
148 Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Th eories: An introduction to Sunnī u$sūl al-
fi qh (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 96–9.
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[God’s] lordship, and it is what the Qur±an brought. Th is is because it is not 
admissible that God—Exalted is He—and another be included in a categori-
cal syllogism whose terms are on the same level or in an analogy in which the 
judgment of the original case and that of the assimilated case are on the same 
level. Indeed, God—Exalted is He—there is nothing like Him neither in His 
essence (nafs) which is mentioned through His names, nor in His attributes, 
nor in His acts. However, the a fortiori argument is followed with respect to 
Him. As He said, “And to God is the highest similitude (al-mathal al-a≠lā)” 
(Q. 16:60).
[Concerning] every perfection and attribute praiseworthy in itself and 
devoid of imperfection that belongs to some created, originated existents, it is 
known that the Lord, Creator, Self-Subsistent (!Samad), Everlasting (Qayyūm), 
Eternal and Necessary Existent in Himself is all the worthier of it. And [con-
cerning] every imperfection and defect from which some originated, possible 
creatures must be exonerated, the Lord, Creator, Holy, Peace, Eternal, Necessary 
of Existence in Himself is all the worthier of being exonerated from it.149
Analogies and categorical syllogisms may not be employed univocally for 
God. Rather, the a fortiori argument which maintains God’s unlikeness should 
be used, and, following the quranic verse, “For God is the highest similitude” 
(Q. 16:60), God should be given the highest similitude or likeness (mathal). 
Th is entails attributing all creaturely perfections to God and freeing Him 
from every creaturely imperfection because He is a fortiori worthy of being so 
qualifi ed. Ibn Taymiyya asserts furthermore that the a fortiori argument has a 
venerable tradition in the Qur±an and among the Salaf and other important 
leaders of the Islamic community such as Ibn (Hanbal.
I have not found the shaykh showing how the Salaf and Ibn (Hanbal use 
the a fortiori argument.150 In Dar ± however he does furnish some examples 
149 I $sfahāniyya, 49. For the same arguments, see also Dar ±, 1:29–30, Tadmuriyya, MF 
3:30; and Kaylāniyya, MF 12:347.
150 Ibn (Hanbal uses the highest similitude argument in a passage in Al-Radd ≠alā zanādiqa 
wa al-Jahmiyya, ed. Mu!hammad (Hasan Rāshid (Cairo: al-Ma$tba≠a al-salafi yya, 1393/1973–4), 
37, which Ibn Taymiyya quotes in Minhāj, 2:484–5/1:234, for other purposes. In response 
to the Jahmī charge that the traditionalists deny God’s unity by affi  rming His attributes, Ibn 
(Hanbal compares God to a palm tree. Th e palm tree has a stump, leaves and so forth, but yet 
it is considered one in name. “So, likewise, God—for Him is the highest similitude—with all 
His attributes is one God.” Immediately following this, Ibn (Hanbal gives a second example, 
this time from the Qur±an: “Leave Me [to deal] with him whom I have created one (wa !hīd )” 
(Q. 74:11). Ibn (Hanbal takes the one created to be al-Walīd b. al-Mughīra al-Makhzūmī 
who despite being called “one” still had ears, eyes and other body members. From this Ibn 
(Hanbal concludes, “So, likewise, God—for Him is the highest similitude—He, with all His 
attributes, is one God.” I have not here followed the unclear translation of Ibn (Hanbal’s Radd 
found in Morris S. Seale, Muslim Th eology: A Study of Origins with Reference to the Church 
Fathers (London: Luzac, 1964), 96–125 (specifi cally 116–7). Wesley Williams, “Aspects of 
the Creed of Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal: A Study of Anthropomorphism in Early Islamic 
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of the a fortiori argument in the Qur±an. He gives two sets of arguments, 
fi rst providing proofs for the resurrection at the Last Day and second giving 
proofs for God’s exoneration from having associates.151
Concerning the resurrection, Ibn Taymiyya begins by explaining that we 
know the possibility of something existing in the extramental world either 
by its actual existence, by the existence of something equivalent to it, or by 
the existence of something greater. In the latter case, “Th e existence of some-
thing is a proof that something below it is a fortiori possible.”152 Moreover, 
the existence of any possibility is contingent upon the Lord having power to 
make it occur. Ibn Taymiyya then cites quranic verses pointing to the original 
creation of the heavens and the earth, as well as of humans, to demonstrate 
a fortiori God’s power to raise humankind again. Th ese include, “It is He 
who begins the creation, and then brings it back again, and this is easier for 
Him. To Him is the highest similitude in the heavens and the earth” (Q. 
30:27), and, “Do they not see that God Who created the heavens and the 
earth is powerful to create the like of them” (Q. 17:99). However, the shaykh 
devotes the most attention to several verses in Sūrat Yā Sīn:
He set forth a similitude and forgot His creation. He said, “Who will give life 
to these bones when they are decayed?” Say, “He will give life to them Who 
brought them forth the fi rst time! He is All-Knowing about every creation. He 
who makes fi re for you out of the green tree. Behold, from it you kindle.” Is not 
He Who created the heavens and the earth powerful to create the like of them? 
Yes, indeed! He is the Supreme Creator, the All-Knowing (Q. 36:78–81).
Th e shaykh points out that the question, “Who will give life to these bones 
when they are decayed?” is rhetorical, inviting the response that no one can 
give life to decayed bones. However, the Qur±an then underlines that this 
is indeed possible for God by pointing to His original creation of life from 
dust: “He will give life to them Who brought them forth the fi rst time.” 
Th en with the statement, “He who makes fi re for you out of the green 
tree,” the Qur±an shows that God produces hot dry fi re from what is cold 
and moist, something even more diffi  cult than bringing life out of decayed 
Discourse,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 34 (2002): 441–463, confi rms that 
Ibn (Hanbal engages in more interpretation and rational theological argument than is com-
monly acknowledged. Williams also shows that Ibn (Hanbal is fully an anthropomorphist 
(mushabbih) who makes no eff ort to deny that the modality (kayf ) of God’s attributes can 
be known. In this respect, Ibn Taymiyya does not follow Ibn (Hanbal.
151 Dar ±, 1:31–7. I$sfahāniyya, 86, includes a much briefer demonstration of the a fortiori 
argument in the Qur±an, citing only Q. 16:58–62 and 30:28, which will fi gure also in the 
following discussion.
152 Dar ±, 1:32.
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bones. Th us, the formation of living beings from decayed bones is a fortiori 
possible, and the God who can create fi re from a green tree is a fortiori able 
to create life from dust.153
Th e second set of a fortiori arguments Ibn Taymiyya cites from the Qur±an 
in Dar ± show God’s freedom from associates. Th ese arguments are of two 
kinds. In the fi rst, the belief of pre-Islamic idolaters that God had daughters 
while they themselves disliked having daughters is shown to be absurd. If 
having daughters is judged to be an imperfection in the human sphere, God is 
all the worthier of being exonerated from this imperfection. Following is one 
of the quranic passages that the shaykh uses to illustrate this argument:
And they assign daughters to God—Glory be to Him—and to themselves what 
they desire. When one of them is given the news of a girl, his face becomes dark, 
and he chokes inwardly. He hides himself from the people because of the evil 
of the news that has been given him. Shall he keep her with dishonor or bury 
her in the earth? Certainly, evil is their decision. For those who do not believe 
in the hereaft er is a similitude of evil, and for God is the highest similitude. 
And He is All-Mighty, All Wise . . . Th ey assign to God what they hate, and 
their tongues assert the lie that better things will be theirs. Without doubt, 
theirs will be the Fire, and they will be hastened into [it] (Q. 16:57–62).
Ibn Taymiyya concludes from this passage and two others (Q. 43:16–9 and 
53:19–23) that God has made it obvious that He is far worthier of being 
exonerated of imperfections than humans. It is not permissible for humans 
to attribute to God what they hate to attribute to themselves.154 Th is is 
apparently so even when the value system sustaining the argument—dis-
like of daughters and female infanticide—is denounced in the process of 
argumentation.
Th e same point lies behind a second kind of quranic argument showing 
God’s a fortiori freedom from associates. Ibn Taymiyya cites the verse, “He 
set forth a similitude for you from yourselves. Do you have, among what 
your right hands own, associates in what we have provided for you so that 
you are equal with regard to it, you fearing them as you fear each other?” 
(Q. 30:28). According to the shaykh, God is here explaining that humans 
do not permit what they own, that is, their slaves, to be associates with them 
in their property such that they would fear their slaves as they fear their 
peers. Th en, God is asking humans how they could make His slaves and 
His creatures associates with Him. Th e implication is that God is a fortiori 
153 Dar ±, 1:31–5.
154 Dar ±, 1:35–7.
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worthy of being exonerated of associates that humans do not permit even 
for themselves.155
With the above examples, Ibn Taymiyya shows that the type of theologi-
cal argumentation found in the Qur±an is a fortiori and that this establishes 
the permissibility of arguing in this mode in theological matters. In the 
shaykh’s view, the a fortiori argument preserves the unlikeness between God 
and creatures which univocal use of analogy and syllogism fails to respect. 
Moreover, the last two arguments cited above—God’s a fortiori right not 
to have daughters and associates—illustrate the principle that God must be 
given the highest similitude. Th at is, the Qur±an stipulates that God has an 
a fortiori right to be ascribed with perfections found in creatures and exoner-
ated of all creaturely imperfections. Th is style of reasoning guarantees that 
God is spoken well of and in praiseworthy fashion without making Him 
like creatures.
Affi  rming God’s Attributes of Perfection and Praiseworthiness
Ibn Taymiyya maintains that God’s perfection (kamāl ) is known by reason 
and the natural constitution on the one hand and revealed tradition on the 
other.156 He combines arguments from both streams in his lengthy fatwa 
Akmaliyya, which also provides a fairly complete overview of God’s attributes 
of perfection. Much, but not all, of what follows here comes from this fatwa. 
Although the philosophical term ‘perfection’ is not used with reference to 
God’s attributes in the Qur±an, Ibn Taymiyya claims that the Qur±an indi-
cates its meaning in mentioning God’s praiseworthiness, in giving God “the 
highest similitude” (Q. 16:60), and in establishing God’s names. Th e shaykh 
also reports that the Qur±an exegete Ibn ≠Abbās interpreted the divine name 
Self-Subsistent (al-!Samad ) found in Surat al-Ikhlā $s (Q. 112) to mean that 
God has the right to perfection.157
Some of the shaykh’s quranic support for God’s perfection has already 
been cited above as examples of the a fortiori argument (Q. 16:57–62 and Q. 
30:28). A few more examples follow here. Th e verse, “Is then He who creates 
as one who does not create? Do you not remember?” (Q. 16:17), shows that 
creating is an attribute of perfection and that the Creator is better than the 
creature. Another verse illustrates that being an impotent slave is an attribute 
155 Dar ±, 1:37.
156 Akmaliyya, MF 6:71–3; and Jawāb, 3:220.
157 Akmaliyya, MF 6:71–3. Cf. Nuzūl, 5:229. On the name al-!Samad see also Ikhlā$s, MF 
17:214–221; and Irāda, MF 8:149–150.
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of imperfection while power, sovereignty and benefi cence are attributes of 
perfection: “God propounded a similitude: a servant owned by another who 
has no power to do anything and one to whom We have provided a good 
provision from Us and who spends from it secretly and openly. Are they 
equal? Praise belongs to God, but most of them know not” (Q. 16:75). Ibn 
Taymiyya also cites Abraham’s question to his father, “O my father! Why 
do you worship that which does not hear, does not see and cannot avail you 
anything?” (Q. 19:42), to show that hearing, seeing and availing are attributes 
of perfection and to illustrate that the Qur±an oft en describes idols as devoid 
of perfections such as speech, life, action and so forth.158
In addition to the Qur±an, Ibn Taymiyya bases the attributes of perfec-
tion in reason and the natural constitution. He says that it is known by the 
natural constitution necessarily that God is more perfect than anything else 
just as it is known that He is the Creator.159 Similarly, the shaykh argues 
that God’s right to perfections that are completely devoid of imperfection, 
as well as His right to freedom from all imperfection, is known by reason 
necessarily and “in the bases of intellects ( fī bidāyat al-≠uqūl ).” He grounds 
this in two separate but related principles. First is causal priority. A cause is 
known necessarily to be more perfect than the eff ect; the Creator is more 
perfect than the creature; the Eternal is more perfect than the temporal; 
and the Necessary Existent is more perfect than the possible that is suscep-
tible to nonexistence. Second, God is the source of all perfections found in 
creatures. God is the Creator of every existent belonging to the creature, 
and creatures derive (istafāda) all of their perfections from their Lord and 
Creator. An imperfect creature cannot create a perfect existent, and so all 
perfection must ultimately depend upon God. On both grounds, God is a 
fortiori worthy of all perfections found in creatures. Th e Creator is all the 
worthier of any perfection found in the creature because He is more perfect 
than the creature and because He is the very source of the creature’s perfec-
tion. As Ibn Taymiyya sees it, creatures are worthier of the imperfections of 
nonexistence, possibility and origination.160
Ibn Taymiyya makes extensive use of the disjunctive reasoning indigenous 
to Kalām theology to establish the various attributes of perfection rationally. 
Accordingly, diverse attributes must be ascribed to God because the contrar-
ies would render Him imperfect. For example, the shaykh says that reason 
158 Akmaliyya, MF 6:72–3, 79–82.
159 Akmaliyya, MF 6:72–3; and I$sfahāniyya, 87–8.
160 Dar ±, 1:29–30; I$sfahāniyya, 85–6; Akmaliyya, MF 6:75–7; and Jawāb, 3:215–6.
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knows necessarily that hearing and sight are attributes of perfection because 
a living being who can see and hear is more perfect than one who cannot. 
Similarly, one who is living and knowing is more perfect than one who is not. 
Moreover, God must be qualifi ed as hearing and seeing lest He be imperfect 
and dependent upon another. If God were not qualifi ed with hearing and 
seeing, hearing and seeing creatures would be more perfect than He is, and 
He would not be worthy of worship.161 In another example the same logic 
applies to God’s life. If God were not qualifi ed with life, an attribute to which 
He has an essential right, he would be dead, and living creatures would be 
more perfect than He would be.162 Th e following text provides a reasonably 
comprehensive sample of such disjunctive reasoning:
If [God] were not living, knowing, hearing, seeing and speaking, it would 
necessarily follow that He is dead, ignorant, deaf, blind and mute. He must be 
exonerated of these imperfections. Indeed, He—Glory be to Him—has created 
whoever is living, hearing, seeing, speaking, knowing, powerful and moving 
(muta!harrik). So, He is all the worthier to be like that. Indeed, every perfection 
in a caused, created thing is from the perfection of the Creator.163
While Kalām theologians oft en prove God’s attributes in like fashion, they 
would not include movement as we fi nd in this text. Th ey would typically 
reinterpret this and other alleged anthropomorphisms such as God’s descend-
ing and coming that appear in the Qur±an and the Sunna. Ibn Taymiyya 
however argues that if God could not move He would be inferior even to 
inanimate objects. Such objects are at least subject to being moved by another. 
Moreover, if God could move but did not, then He would be inferior to 
objects that do move on their own initiative. Rather, a living being is mov-
ing and active by itself.164
Ibn Taymiyya also provides arguments to prove and explain the perfection 
of God’s other seemingly anthropomorphic attributes. For example, God is 
qualifi ed with laughter to exclude crying and with joy to exclude sadness. 
Crying and sadness entail weakness and impotence that are not fi tting for 
God.165 Joy also appears in another argument. One who loves, rejoices and is 
well pleased with attributes of perfection and who hates imperfection such 
as injustice and ignorance is more perfect than one who does not diff erenti-
ate between perfection and imperfection. Th us, love, joy, good pleasure and 
161 I$sfahāniyya, 85, 87–8.
162 Jawāb, 3:208–9, 211.
163 Qudra, MF 8:21. For similar argumentation, see Jawāb, 3:217.
164 Qudra, MF 8:22–4.
165 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:86–7.
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hate are among God’s attributes of perfection. One who has power to act 
by his hands is more perfect than one who does not because the former can 
choose to act with his hands or through some other means whereas the latter 
does not have the option of using his hands. By implication, God’s hands 
are among His attributes of perfection.166
Exonerating God of certain imperfections poses slightly more diffi  culty for 
Ibn Taymiyya. He admits that it is true that living beings that eat and drink 
are more perfect than those that are sick and do not eat and drink. Th is is 
because their sustenance depends upon eating and drinking. Nonetheless, 
the creaturely perfections of eating and drinking are not completely free of 
imperfection because they imply need, that is, need for food and drink. Now, 
one who does not need to take anything into himself and is not dependent 
on something outside himself is more perfect than one whose perfection 
consists in eating and drinking. Th us, eating and drinking are not among 
God’s attributes of perfection.167 Ibn Taymiyya argues that even the angels 
do not eat and drink. Th us, God a fortiori does not eat and drink since God 
is all the worthier of whatever perfections are found in creatures, in this 
case the angels. Moreover, the shaykh adds, God’s not eating and drinking 
is confi rmed by the revealed tradition through God’s name Self-Subsistent 
(al-!Samad ).168
Ibn Taymiyya also asserts that the perfection of God’s attributes entails 
their unlikeness to created things: “[God] is qualifi ed by every attribute of 
perfection such that no one bears any likeness to Him in it.”169 Paradoxi-
cally, this means that God must be qualifi ed with the highest conceivable 
perfection and that the perfection of that perfection is to be completely 
unlike any created thing. In his Tadmuriyya creed, the shaykh supports the 
unlikeness of God’s attributes with a number of a fortiori arguments rooted 
in his thoroughgoing nominalism and rejection of real universals.
In one of these arguments, Ibn Taymiyya observes that the revealed sources 
describe numerous things in Paradise such as foods, clothes, dwellings, mar-
riage and so on. To this he adds a saying of Ibn ≠Abbās, “Th ere is nothing in 
this world that is in Paradise except the names.”170 Ibn Taymiyya then argues 
that, if there is such a great distinction between the realities of Paradise and 
166 Akmaliyya, MF 6:92–3.
167 Akmaliyya, MF 6:87.
168 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:86.
169 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:74.
170 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:28.
66 chapter one
the realities of this world such that they share only the names given them, 
the distinction between God and created things must be even greater.171
In a second argument, Ibn Taymiyya outlines the diffi  culty of pinning 
down what it means for the human spirit (rū !h) to be powerful, hearing, 
ascending at death and so on. Although we qualify the spirit with such 
attributes, we cannot investigate its modality because we cannot see it. Th us, 
the shaykh concludes, “If the spirit is qualifi ed with these attributes, but 
without their likeness to what is seen of created things, then the Creator is 
all the worthier of His distinction from His creatures while being qualifi ed 
with His names and attributes that He deserves.”172
In a third argument from Tadmuriyya, Ibn Taymiyya states, “If the creature 
is exonerated of likeness to [another] creature despite concordance in name, 
then the Creator is all the worthier of being exonerated from likeness to a 
creature even if there is concordance in name.”173 It may appear gratuitous 
to presuppose that creatures bear no likeness (mumāthala) one to another 
except in name. Th is is not explained in its context in Tadmuriyya, but it 
fi ts with Ibn Taymiyya’s thoroughgoing rejection of the extramental status 
of universals.174
Although Ibn Taymiyya maintains that the modalities of God’s attributes 
are completely unlike those of creatures except for the names, he occasionally 
ascribes a certain religious function to God’s attributes and acts by claiming 
that a God without this or that attribute or act is not worthy of worship 
(≠ibāda) or praise (!hamd). As noted in passing above, for example, Ibn Taymi-
yya maintains that a God who cannot see and hear is not worthy of worship. 
Similarly, he writes, “It is fi rmly established in natural constitutions that that 
which does not hear, see or speak is not a lord who is worshipped. Similarly, 
that which does not avail anything, does not guide and does not possess any 
harm or benefi t is not a lord who is worshipped.”175 Elsewhere, the shaykh 
argues that a God who does not love has no right to be worshipped, and in 
the theodicean text (Hasana he states that a God who does not act with mercy 
and wise purpose is not worthy of praise.176 Such assertions may suggest that 
God should be praised and worshipped on account of His attributes and 
acts. To draw this conclusion however would be misleading.
171 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:28. Cf. Ikhlā $s, MF 17:325–6 and (Hamawiyya, MF 5:115.
172 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:33. Cf. (Hamawiyya, MF 5:115–6.
173 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:30.
174 On this see Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians, xxii.
175 I$sfahāniyya, 87.
176 ≠Alaq, MF 16:296–7; and (Hasana, MF 14:313.
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In Akmaliyya, Ibn Taymiyya explains the religious function of God’s 
attributes more fully. He observes that God’s attributes of perfection are not 
mentioned in the Qur±an merely to counter those who strip them away (ahl 
al-ta≠ $tīl ). It also enumerates them to show God’s right to worship, especially 
against the associationists (mushrikūn): “God—Glory be to Him—did not 
mention these texts only to confi rm the attributes of perfection for Him. 
Rather, He mentioned them to make evident (li-bayān) that He has the right 
to worship apart from any other.”177 Th e shaykh further notes that there are 
two kinds of praise ( !hamd ) due to God:
Praise is of two kinds: [1] praise for His benefi cence to His servants, which 
belongs to giving thanks; and [2] praise for that to which He has a right in 
Himself (bi-nafsihi) with respect to the attributes of His perfection. Th is praise 
is only for what He in Himself has a right to praise. Only one who is ascribed 
with attributes of perfection, which are existing things (umūr wujūdiyya), has 
a right to that. Th ere is no praise, good or perfection in purely nonexisting 
things.178
With this, it becomes clear that God is praised not only for what He does 
but also for who He is in His very self (nafs), and, as indicated in the text, 
Ibn Taymiyya links God’s attributes very intimately to God’s self or essence 
(dhāt). He explains later in Akmaliyya that a perfect essence without attri-
butes of perfection is impossible and that it is known necessarily that an 
essence ascribed with such attributes is more perfect than one without. Th ese 
attributes are necessary concomitants (lawāzim) of God’s essence, without 
which the essence would not exist. Th us, mentioning God’s attributes of 
perfection is tantamount to mentioning His essence.179 In Akmaliyya, Ibn 
Taymiyya is not as clear as he could be that worship and praise of God for 
His essence and the concomitant attributes of perfection takes priority over 
praise of God for His acts, but as we have seen earlier in this chapter, God’s 
divinity—God’s right to worship in Himself—takes precedence over God’s 
lordship and acts. God should be worshipped fi rst for who He is and only 
secondarily for what He does, and the role of God’s attributes of perfection 
is to make evident God’s essential right to praise and worship. Th is religious 
function of God’s attributes increases the gravity of Ibn Taymiyya’s juridical 
search for the best way to speak about God.
177 Akmaliyya, MF 6:83.
178 Akmaliyya, MF 6:84.
179 Akmaliyya, MF 6:95–7. For other assertions of the necessary concomitance of God’s 
attributes with His essence, see (Hamawiyya, MF 5:26; MF 5:206; Nuzūl, MF 5:326; MF 
12:46; and I$sfahāniyya, 49.
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Th e Apologetic Quality of Ibn Taymiyya’s Th eological Jurisprudence
We are now in position to characterize Ibn Taymiyya’s theological fi qh more 
precisely. For the shaykh, both reason and revelation yield knowledge of God’s 
existence and basic human ethical ends, especially that God alone should be 
worshipped. One aspect of worship is speaking correctly about God, and 
the task of Ibn Taymiyya’s theological jurisprudence is to ascertain how to 
do this. Th e shaykh explains that both reason and revelation specify that 
God is ascribed with attributes of perfection and praiseworthiness. As for 
revelation, the Qur±an and the Hadith indicate God’s attributes; the views 
of early Qur±an exegetes and the conventions of the Arabic language delin-
eate the linguistic meanings of these attributes; and similitudes are used to 
suggest possible resolution of rational diffi  culties that may arise. Moreover, 
God’s attributes are ontologically real, but on the basis of “Th ere is nothing 
like Him” (Q. 42:11) their modalities are entirely unknown. As for reason, 
Ibn Taymiyya employs a fortiori argumentation to build a kind of natural 
theology that takes human perfection as its point of departure for defi ning 
God’s perfection while exonerating God of neediness and creaturely modali-
ties. As the shaykh sees it, this is likewise the kind of theological reasoning 
found in the Qur±an, fi nding specifi c support in the verse, “To God is the 
highest similitude (al-mathal al-a≠lā)” (Q. 16:60).
Although Ibn Taymiyya claims that independent reason or the natural 
constitution, exercised without corrupting infl uences, will arrive at correct 
theological doctrine, it is perhaps going too far, as I do above, to speak of 
the shaykh building a natural theology. Rather, it seems clear enough that 
he is devising his rational arguments so as to arrive safely at theological doc-
trines held a priori on the basis of the authoritative tradition. With this in 
mind, the methodology of Ibn Taymiyya’s theological jurisprudence may be 
characterized more analytically as a two step process. Th e fi rst step is more 
properly theological. Th e shaykh seeks to determine what should be said 
about God from the Qur±an and the Hadith, and he employs philosophical 
concepts or models—similitudes—to elucidate the sense and coherence of 
his ordinary language reading of these sources. Th e resulting theological 
vision is that of a dynamic God who is far more engaged in the vicissitudes 
of human life and the historical process than the God of the philosophers 
and the Kalām theologians but who is in no way confl ated with the created 
world as the shaykh understands the God of Ibn ≠Arabī to be. Th is unique 
concept of God provides the theological framework from within which Ibn 
Taymiyya compares and critiques rival theologies.
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Th e second step is apologetic. Ibn Taymiyya makes and seeks to dem-
onstrate the claim that his theological vision is that of both tradition and 
reason, which agree and confi rm each other. He attempts to show that his 
reading of the Qur±an and the Hadith follows the intentions of the Salaf, 
accords with the conventions of the Arabic language and ascribes to God 
the highest praise and perfection. Likewise, he asserts that this doctrine is 
known by independent reason properly exercised and that such reasoning 
is the kind found within revelation. With this, the shaykh seeks to claim 
the rational high ground over against the Kalām theologians and Muslim 
philosophers on behalf of his tradition-based theological vision. He resists 
intellectual currents that each in their own way drift  toward elitism and 
esotericism, either elevating reason over revelation on the one hand (Kalām 
theologians and especially philosophers) or subordinating reason to mysti-
cal experience on the other (Ibn ≠Arabī). Th us, Ibn Taymiyya commends 
his theological vision as both faithful to the revealed tradition and publicly 
available to all right thinking people.
In short Ibn Taymiyya’s juridical work on how to speak of God is theo-
logical in both the sense that it has to do with God and in the sense that it 
seeks to explore the rationality and coherence of theological doctrine derived 
from revelation. It is apologetic in that it makes a claim not only on those 
who accept revelation fi deistically but on all persons of sound intellect, even 
those without access to revelation. Th us, Ibn Taymiyya’s methodology may 
be characterized most precisely, albeit awkwardly, as apologetic theological 
jurisprudence.
Th e remainder of this study examines how Ibn Taymiyya interprets Islamic 
doctrine concerning the metaphysical and moral relationship between God 
and His creatures and how he faces rational diffi  culties that arise concern-
ing purposeful creation and God’s self-suffi  ciency, human responsibility and 
God’s determination, and evil and God’s justice. Ibn Taymiyya could take 
these diverse conundrums as keys to esoteric knowledge; or he could protest 
that God’s ways with humankind appear unjust and irrational; or he could 
abandon obedient worship of God altogether. But he does none of these. At 
a number of points along the way, it becomes evident that his understanding 
of God’s essential right to perfection and his apologetic aims impede giving 
voice to paradox, protest or skepticism. In this light, Ibn Taymiyya’s theodicy 
comes into view as a valiant juristic eff ort to fi nd the best way to give God 
the highest praise in the face of seemingly intractable rational dilemmas.
CHAPTER TWO
GOD’S WISE PURPOSE, PERPETUAL ACTIVITY 
AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY
Th e Problematic of God’s Goodness and God’s Self-Suffi  ciency
In order to safeguard God’s suffi  ciency apart from the world, Ash≠arī Kalām 
theologians deny that God wills to create the world on account of causes 
or wise purposes. Th ere is no reason why God created the world in time 
out of nothing when He did, and God does not need the world to be God. 
Mu≠tazilī Kalām theologians agree that God has no need for the world and 
that He created the world ex nihilo. Nonetheless, the Mu≠tazilīs try to affi  rm 
a stronger sense of God’s goodness by introducing some kind of rationality 
into creation. God created the world to benefi t humankind, but God’s wise 
purpose in creation has no impact on Him.
Ibn Taymiyya follows neither the Ash≠arīs nor the Mu≠tazilīs on the issue 
of God’s suffi  ciency apart from the created world. Instead, he affi  rms that 
God creates for the sake wise purposes that God loves, and, to make sense 
of this, he employs conceptual strategies found also in Ibn Sīnā. A review 
of some of Ibn Sīnā’s basic ideas here will prepare the ground for further 
consideration of Ibn Taymiyya’s approach in the rest of the chapter.
Within Ibn Sīnā’s writings is found a view of God’s unchanging perfec-
tion not unlike that of the Kalām theologians. God is completely perfect 
as He is. He is pure perfection, pure good and pure actuality. God has no 
need, and there is no unrealized potentiality or possibility in God. God does 
not change because change would entail imperfection in God.1 However, 
Ibn Sīnā rejects the Kalām doctrine of creation ex nihilo and portrays the 
creation of the world as an emanation proceeding necessarily from its First 
Cause God. God is essentially productive, emanating the world as a neces-
sary concomitant of His essence. Th e world is eternal because its Cause is 
1 Ibn Sīnā, “Al-Risāla al-≠arshiyya fī taw#hīdihi ta≠ālā wa $sifātihi,” in Majmu≠ rasā±il al-Shaykh 
al-Ra±īs Abī Alī al-(Husayn b.≠Abd Allāh b. Sīnā al-Bukhārī, (Haydarābād al-Dakkan: Ma$tba≠at 
jam≠iyyat dā±irat al-ma≠ārif al-≠uthmāniyya, 1354/1935–6), 5; Ibn Sīnā, Al-Mabda± wa al-ma≠ād, 
10–11; Ibn Sīnā, Al-Shifā±: Al-Ilāhiyyāt (2), 356; and Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ta≠liqāt, ed. ≠Abd al-Rā!hmān 
Badawī (Cairo: Al-Hay±a al-mi $sriyya al-≠āmma li-l-kitāb, 1973), 21, 102–3, 150.
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eternal. Ibn Sīnā also rejects the Mu≠tazilī claim that God creates the world 
for the good of creatures. God does not emanate the world out of concern 
for the world itself, nor does God act for causes or purposes external to 
Himself because that would entail change in God.2 Instead the emanation 
of the world follows necessarily from the very essence of God. Ibn Sīnā puts 
it this way: “Th e emanation of things from [the Creator] is because of His 
essence, not because of something external, and His essence is the cause of 
order and good.”3 Ibn Sīnā speaks about the origin of the world in a variety 
of idioms. For example, he speaks of the First’s (i.e. God’s) love (≠ishq) of 
Itself: “When the First loves Its essence because It is good and Its beloved 
essence is the principle of existing things, then they emanate from It ordered 
in the best order.”4 Another idiom is the First’s knowledge of Itself. Th e First 
does not acquire knowledge from existing things but from Its essence, and Its 
knowledge is then the cause of existing things: “Th e First knows everything 
from Its essence, not that existing things are a cause of Its knowledge, but 
Its knowledge is a cause of them.”5
Al-Ghazālī takes Ibn Sīnā and his ilk to task for denying the agency and 
will of God despite their claims that God is the Artisan and Agent of the 
world.6 While Ibn Sīnā does speak of God willing and choosing to create 
the world, he does so only in a certain sense. Th e philosopher equates God’s 
will (irāda) with God’s knowledge or God’s providence and insists that God’s 
will is not subject to purpose in the Mu≠tazilī sense.7 Rather, God’s choice is 
conformity with His essence:
In the choice (ikhtiyār) of the First, no motive motivates It to [exercise] that 
[choice] other than Its essence and Its goodness. It does not have choice 
potentially and then become one who chooses actually. Rather, It has been 
eternally choosing in actuality. Its meaning is that It does not choose other 
than what It does.8
2 Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt, 3:147–151; Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ta≠liqāt, 16, 53–54, 159; 
and Ibn Sīnā, Al-Mabda± wa al-ma≠ād, 33.
3 Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ta≠liqāt, 159.
4 Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ta≠liqāt, 157.
5 Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ta≠liqāt, 192. Cf. Ibn Sīnā, “Al-Risāla al-≠arshiyya,” 9.
6 Al-Ghazālī, Th e Incoherence of the Philosophers, Arabic ed. of Tahāfut al-falāsifa and 
trans., Michael E. Marmura (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 1997), 56–78 
(Th ird Question).
7 Ibn Sīnā, Al-Shifā±: Al-Ilāhiyyāt (2), 366–7; Ibn Sīnā, “Al-Risāla al-≠arshiyya,” 10–11; Ibn 
Sīnā, Al-Mabda± wa al-ma≠ād, 20–21; and Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ta≠liqāt, 19, 71–2, 80, 117. 
8 Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ta≠liqāt, 50–51.
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Here as with God’s knowledge and God’s love, any thought that God needs 
the world as an arena in which to manifest His attributes or carry out His 
will is eliminated by making God’s essence the fi rst point of reference. God’s 
self-referentiality is essential while the world that emanates eternally from 
the essence is only accidental. As Ibn Sīnā puts it, “[Th e First] loves Its 
essence . . . and the order of the good is beloved to It accidentally (bi-l-≠ara#d).”9 
God loves, wills, knows and chooses only Himself in the fi rst instance. God 
has no need of the world, and He does not love or will it directly. Th e world 
only emanates from God as an accidental, but necessary, concomitant of 
God’s self-love and self-willing.10
As will become apparent below, Ibn Taymiyya resolves the problem of 
relating God’s self-suffi  ciency to God’s goodness in creating the world with 
the notions of God’s self-love and God’s necessary, but accidental, creative 
work in a fashion similar to that of Ibn Sīnā. However, the shaykh departs 
substantially from Ibn Sinā by rejecting emanation and giving a much stronger 
and more dynamic role to God’s will.
Joseph Bell on God’s Wise Purpose and Self-Suffi  ciency in 
Ibn Taymiyya’s Th eology
Joseph Bell gives extended attention to Ibn Taymiyya’s theology of God’s 
wise purpose and God’s suffi  ciency in his Love Th eory in Later (Hanbalite 
Islam. In line with the book’s title, Bell’s primary interest is Ibn Taymiyya’s 
doctrine of love, especially in dialogue with Ash≠arī theology. Th e Ash≠arīs 
maintain that God cannot love humans and humans cannot love God. 
Otherwise, God would suff er need, and God would share some measure 
of affi  nity with human beings. Th ey also argue that the eternal God can-
not be an object of human love because only a nonexistent or something 
susceptible to nonexistence can be loved. Henri Laoust attributes this view 
to Ibn Taymiyya as well, arguing that the shaykh taught love for God’s law 
 9 Ibn Sīnā, Al-Shifā±: Al-Ilāhiyyāt (2), 363.
10 For further exposition, see Rahim Acar, Talking about God and Talking about Creation: 
Avicenna’s and Th omas Aquinas’ Positions (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 132–149; which is nearly 
identical to Rahim Acar, “Avicenna’s Position Concerning the Basis of the Divine Creative 
Action,” Th e Muslim World 94 (2004): 65–79. Ibn Sīnā’s view of God’s creation of the world 
has oft en been portrayed as naturalistic—like fi re burning—rather than volitional. Acar shows 
that this is inaccurate and interprets Ibn Sīnā’s view of creation along lines compatible with 
what I present here.
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and command but not love for God Himself in His essence or attributes.11 
Bell corrects this and shows how Ibn Taymiyya sets the Ash≠arī arguments 
aside to make room for his own doctrine that God loves human beings and 
that human beings can and should worship and love God for Himself in 
His essence, not merely for the blessing and reward that they might gain 
from obeying Him.12
Additionally, Bell examines how Ibn Taymiyya relates God’s love to 
God’s will, and this draws him into an analysis of the shaykh’s theodicy. Ibn 
Taymiyya rejects the Ash≠arī theologian al-Juwaynī’s reduction of God’s love 
(ma!habba) and good pleasure to nothing more than God’s will in creating 
all things, even unbelief and iniquity. Th e shaykh agrees with the Ash≠arīs 
that God wills all that exists with His creative will (irāda khalqiyya), but, 
whereas al-Juwaynī affi  rms that God loves even the unbelief and iniquity that 
He creates, Ibn Taymiyya asserts that God hates these evils. What God loves 
is the belief and obedience that correspond to His prescriptive or legislative 
will (irāda shar≠iyya). God does create things that He hates, but He does this 
only for the sake of a wise purpose ( !hikma) that He loves.13 With this, Bell 
observes, Ibn Taymiyya subordinates God’s will to God’s love, and, in the 
shaykh’s understanding, God may forgo creating something that He loves 
in order to attain something else which is better. Th us, while God loves 
what He wills humans to do in obedience to His law, he also loves the wise 
purpose in everything that He wills to create.14
Probably due to his focus on love theory, Bell does not notice that Ibn 
Taymiyya is oft en content to leave the explanation for evil at the level of 
God’s wise purpose without going on to God’s love. He also does not mention 
that Ibn Taymiyya uses other theological idioms to speak of the substance 
of God’s creative and legislative wills. Both points will become apparent in 
Chapter Th ree below. However, metaphysical diffi  culties in Ibn Taymiyya’s 
notion of wise purpose do prompt Bell to discuss God’s self-suffi  ciency.
11 Laoust, Essai, 471.
12 Bell, Love Th eory, 46–49, 74–91. On worshipping God for His essence, see above 
Chapter One, as well as below Chapter Th ree, where parallels are noted between God’s 
divinity, His command and His very self, in which case perhaps Bell and Laoust are both 
correct: loving God’s command is loving God in His essence.
13 Bell, Love Th eory, 69, explains that !hikma is translated better as “wise purpose” than 
as “wisdom” because it envisions some end or reason that is sought or loved. In addition to 
evidence presented by Bell, the translation of !hikma as “wise purpose” is supported by the 
fact that Ibn Taymiyya occasionally uses it synonymously with the term ≠illa ghā±iyya (fi nal 
cause) denoting purpose and aim (see Irāda, MF 8:88 and (Hasana, MF 14:299).
14 Bell, Love Th eory, 56–73.
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Bell correctly observes that Ibn Taymiyya employs the term !hikma to 
give moral signifi cance to the created world in the face of the Ash≠arī denial 
that God performs acts on account of causes, reasons or purposes. However, 
he also argues that Ibn Taymiyya uses !hikma instead of ghara#d, a common 
Mu≠tazilī term for purpose, in order to bypass the Ash≠arī objection that 
ghara#d implies need in God. According to Bell, the shaykh believes that God 
wills and creates for a “cause, reason or end” but yet that “God is defi nitely 
not moved by a ‘purpose’.”15 Bell’s distinction is not suffi  ciently precise. While 
it is true that Ibn Taymiyya prefers !hikma to ghara #d, Bell does not point 
out that the shaykh still takes it upon himself to defend !hikma against the 
same objections that the Ash≠arīs level against the Mu≠tazilī understanding 
of ghara#d. It entails need in God, temporal origination ( !hudūth) in God, 
and an infi nite regress. Examination of Ibn Taymiyya’s response to these 
three Ash≠arī charges will take up the bulk of the present chapter, and this 
will show that God’s acts in his view are purposive in a stronger sense than 
that held even by the Mu≠tazilīs.
Bell falters because he misapprehends Ibn Taymiyya’s reason for rejecting 
ghara#d. In Minhāj, from which Bell derives his argument, the shaykh under-
stands !hikma and ghara#d to have identical senses, but he prefers to carry out 
his discussion in terms of the former. Before responding to Ibn al-Mu$tahhar 
al-(Hillī’s claim that the Sunnīs believe that “God has no ghara#d in his acts,” 
Ibn Taymiyya shift s the discussion to the equivalent !hikma: “the ghara #d 
which is the !hikma,” and, “for a ghara#d, that is, a !hikma.”16 Th en, he notes 
that the rejection of purpose, whether under the name ghara#d or !hikma, is 
limited only to a few Sunnīs such as al-Ash≠arī and his followers. Rather, 
“Most Sunnīs establish wise purpose ( !hikma) in the acts of God—Exalted 
is He—and that He acts to the profi t and benefi t of His servants.”17 Ibn 
Taymiyya explains elsewhere in Minhāj why he prefers !hikma to ghara #d. 
Th ose who affi  rm !hikma but reject ghara#d do not use ghara#d with respect 
to God because it may connote injustice and need in common usage. Th e 
shaykh continues, “When people say, ‘So-and-so did that for a ghara#d ’, and, 
‘So-and-so has a ghara #d toward someone’, they oft en mean by this some 
blameworthy intention such as injustice, abomination, etc.”18 Th us, the 
15 Bell, Love Th eory, 69.
16 Al-(Hillī’s comment is as quoted in Minhāj, 3:7/1:264–5. Th e two cases in which Ibn 
Taymiyya shift s from ghara#d to !hikma are found in Minhāj, 3:14/1:266.
17 Minhāj, 3:14/1:266. Al-(Hillī himself, as quoted in Minhāj, 1:125/1:30 and 1:454/1:126, 
uses !hikma as a synonym for ghara#d, as does Ibn Taymiyya in Nubuwwāt, 143.
18 Minhāj, 2:314/1:215. Cf. Minhāj, 1:455/1:126.
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shaykh eschews ghara#d not to avoid purpose in God’s acts but only to avoid 
the negative connotations ghara#d may carry in ordinary speech. Th is sort of 
linguistic analysis is identical to what Bell observes in Ibn Taymiyya’s rejection 
of the term ≠ishq (passionate love). Th e shaykh believes that ≠ishq could be 
applied to divine love but should not be because it may carry connotations 
of excessive passion and earthly pleasure. Moreover, ≠ishq need not be used 
because it is not found in revelation.19
Although momentarily sidetracked claiming that Ibn Taymiyya’s God 
is not moved by a purpose, Bell does observe that the shaykh still has a 
problem with God’s suffi  ciency when engaging the Mu≠tazilīs. For the lat-
ter, God acts for a reason or a purpose that benefi ts humankind, not God 
Himself. Ibn Taymiyya retorts in Irāda that this is irrational. Some measure 
of pleasure, reward or praise returns to the agent for the wise purpose in his 
act.20 But does this not imply a God who acts out of need? Bell argues that 
the shaykh solves this problem—or rather evades it—with God’s love of His 
wise purpose. He states, “Having asserted that the relationship between God 
and his !hikma was one of love, Ibn Taymīya felt himself unobliged to deal 
with the problem of a need or a lack on the part of God which the concept 
of !hikma might otherwise have entailed.”21 Drawing on Minhāj and Irāda, 
Bell explains that Ibn Taymiyya takes refuge in the Neoplatonic notion of 
God’s self-love employed by medieval Sufi s—we may add Ibn Sīnā—and 
that the shaykh oft en expresses this in his own idiom as God’s self-praise. 
God’s self-love and self-praise far outstrip His love for creatures and their 
love and praise of Him, and this renders Him completely suffi  cient apart 
from them.22
Th is is not quite the whole story. Contrary to what Bell might have lead 
us to believe earlier, Ibn Taymiyya does respond to the Ash≠arī objection that 
!hikma implies need in God, and, as we will see below, he does so by shift ing 
the meaning of God’s suffi  ciency ( ghinā) from God’s essential indiff erence 
to the world—the Kalām view—to God’s lack of need for help in creation. 
Bell does in fact note this in an overly concise fi nal paragraph on the topic 
of God’s suffi  ciency. Drawing again on Irāda, he explains that Ibn Taymiyya’s 
God is free of want and defi ciency because “everything worthy of love in 
his creatures is God’s own work.” Bell then concludes that creation does not 
19 Bell, Love Th eory, 81. Cf. Ma!habba, 52–8.
20 Irāda, MF 8:89–90, as discussed in Bell, Love Th eory, 69–70.
21 Bell, Love Th eory, 71.
22 Bell, Love Th eory, 71–2, based on Minhāj, 5:408/3:101–2 and Irāda, MRK 1:374, 
which is equivalent to MF 8:144.
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arise from need in God but from the “natural and logical” outworking of 
God’s attributes—especially love—through God’s acts.23 Since “natural” and 
“logical” imply necessity, is then creation necessary and even eternal for Ibn 
Taymiyya? Th is question Bell does not answer.
Although halting at times, Bell breaks important new ground and is accu-
rate in his basic intuitions. His diffi  culties derive from failing to bring out 
two key concepts in Ibn Taymiyya’s theology. First, as Bell begins to perceive 
in the remark just noted, the shaykh agrees with the Neoplatonism of Ibn 
Sīnā that God is essentially productive. Second, Ibn Taymiyya easily dispenses 
with creation as eternal emanation because he reconfi gures the nature of 
God’s essence. For both Ibn Sīnā and the Kalām theologians, timeless and 
unchanging eternity is what ultimately characterizes the perfection of God. 
Ibn Taymiyya breaks with this mainstay of the Greek and Islamic intellectual 
traditions and envisions God’s essential perfection as perpetual dynamism. 
Purposive activity is of the very essence of God—God is indeed moved by 
purposes, but purposes that are His own—and God has been creating for 
wise purposes from eternity. At the level of creation itself, nothing created 
is eternal, but there have always been created things of one sort or another. 
What follows below is closer analysis of relevant material in Irāda, Minhāj 
and a few other texts showing how Ibn Taymiyya works out this theologi-
cal vision in response to Kalām, and especially Ash≠arī, objections to wise 
purpose in God’s acts.
Ibn Taymiyya’s Classifi cation of Views on Wise Purpose/Causality 
in the Will of God
In the fatwa Irāda, Ibn Taymiyya elaborates on God’s willing for a wise 
purpose in response to an inquiry concerning causality (ta≠līl ) in the will 
of God. Th e fatwa inquiry outlines the metaphysical options concisely and 
provides a useful entry into Ibn Taymiyya’s typical classifi cation of views on 
this question:
Concerning the goodness (!husn) of the will (irāda) of God—Exalted is He—in 
creating creatures and bringing forth the human race. Does He create for a 
cause (≠illa) or for other than a cause? If it is said, “not for a cause,” He is 
aimless—Exalted is God above that. If it is said, “For a cause,” and if you say 
23 Bell, Love Th eory, 73, based on Irāda, MRK 1:375–6, which is equivalent to MF 
8:146–7.
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that it is pre-eternal, it follows necessarily that the eff ect is pre-eternal (lam 
yazal ).24 And if you say that it is originated (mu!hdatha), it follows necessarily 
that it has a cause, but an endless chain is absurd.25
Ibn Taymiyya identifi es the advocates of each metaphysical position men-
tioned in the inquiry as follows.26 Th ose who deny that God wills for a cause 
are the Ash≠arīs and the %Zāhirīs, among them Ibn (Hazm (d. 456/1064). Ibn 
Taymiyya identifi es those who maintain that God acts for an eternal cause 
entailing an eternal eff ect as the philosophers upholding the eternity of the 
world. Th e shaykh then divides those who teach that God acts for an originat-
ing cause into two groups. First are the Mu≠tazilīs who claim that the cause 
or wise purpose is a created thing disjoined (munfa $sil ) from God, which 
consists only in His benefi cence to creatures and giving them opportunity 
to earn reward. In this view, however, God Himself is indiff erent to His wise 
purpose: “No judgment ( !hukm) returns to Him from that.”27 Second are 
those who disagree with the Mu≠tazilīs on this point: jurists, hadith scholars, 
Sufīs, Karrāmīs and some philosophers. Th is latter group maintains that a 
judgment from God’s act returns to Him and that He does what He does 
“for a wise purpose that He knows.”28
A similar classifi cation in the fi rst volume of Minhāj leaves out the phi-
losophers, but identifi es more adherents of the other views. Ibn Taymiyya 
notes that the Islamic tradition is agreed that God is endowed with wisdom 
(!hikma), but he points out that there is no agreement on what God’s wisdom 
implies. Jahm b. !Safwān and the Ash≠arīs deny causality in the will of God, but 
most Sunnīs uphold it, believing that God has a wise purpose in His creation 
and His command. Th e shaykh adds that not only the Mu≠tazilīs and Shī≠īs 
following Mu≠tazilī theology adhere to this but also Sufi s, hadith scholars 
and the Karrāmīs, as well as followers of each of the four Sunnī schools 
of law. Among the Shāfi ≠īs, he names Abū ≠Alī b. Abū Hurayra (d. 345/
956) and Abū Bakr al-Qaff āl (d. 365/975–6). Among the (Hanbalīs, he lists 
Abū al-(Hasan al-Tamīmī (d. 371/982) and Ibn ≠Aqīl, and he mentions that 
Abū Ya≠lā sometimes upholds one position and sometimes the other. As in 
24 I usually translate Arabic terms implying some dimension of eternity as follows: abad 
(post-eternity), abadī (post-eternal), azal (pre-eternity), azalī (pre-eternal), qidam (eternity), 
qadīm (eternal), lam yazal (had been/has been/was . . . pre-eternal/from eternity). Th e literal 
meaning of lam yazal is ‘has not ceased . . .’ but this translation is avoided because it oft en 
yields cumbersome double negatives in English.
25 Irāda, MF 8:81.
26 Irāda, MF 8:83–93.
27 Irāda, MF 8:89.
28 Irāda, MF 8:93.
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Irāda, Ibn Taymiyya sets the Mu≠tazilīs and their Shī≠ī followers apart from 
the rest of the Sunnīs because they hold the view—irrational in the shaykh’s 
eyes—that the cause is disjoined from God and God is indiff erent to whether 
it exists.29 For Ibn Taymiyya, the cause is not disjoined from God, and God 
is not indiff erent to His wise purposes. Th e shaykh elaborates the theology 
that sustains these convictions in the course of refuting arguments for the 
Ash≠arī position, and to these arguments we now turn.
Th e Ash≠arī Case against Causality in the Will of God: It Entails 
 Imperfection and Origination in God, as well as an Infi nite Regress
In Irāda Ibn Taymiyya sets out the Ash≠arī case against causality and wise 
purpose in God’s will as follows. First, causality in God’s will makes God 
imperfect: “If [God] created creation for a cause, He would be imperfect 
without it and perfected (mustakmal ) by it.”30 In Minhāj Ibn Taymiyya 
relates the same argument thus: “Whoever acts for a cause is perfected by it, 
because if the occurrence of the cause were not better than its nonexistence, 
it would not be a cause. One who is perfected by another is imperfect in 
himself. Th is is impossible for God.”31 Th is form of the argument makes 
explicit the premise that the cause allegedly perfecting God arises from out-
side God Himself. As we will see below, this argument does not undermine 
Ibn Taymiyya’s theology because he locates the cause within God’s essence 
and reinterprets the meaning of God’s perfection and suffi  ciency.
Th e second objection reported by Ibn Taymiyya in Irāda follows the 
sequence of dilemmas outlined in the inquiry prompting the fatwa. For the 
sake of argument, the Ash≠arīs admit the Avicennan proof for the eternity of 
the world: “If [the cause] is eternal, the eternity of the eff ect is necessary.”32 
Th en, they pose a dilemma, the fi rst horn of which reads, “If it were said 
that [God] acts for an eternal cause, it follows necessarily that no originating 
events originate, but that is contrary to what is observed.” Here our experi-
ence of temporal origination in this world is taken to preclude the eternity 
of its cause. Th is is the primary argument Ibn Taymiyya himself employs 
29 Minhāj, 1:141–6/1:34–5.
30 Irāda, MF 8:83.
31 Minhāj, 1:145/1:35.
32 Irāda, MF 8:83.
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against the philosophers, but it raises the question of how the eternal God 
brings forth originating events in time.33
Th e second horn of the dilemma states, “If it is said that [God] acts for an 
originating cause, two prohibited things follow necessarily.” Th e fi rst “prohib-
ited thing” mentioned in Irāda is that God becomes “a substrate (ma!hall ) 
for originating events (!hawādith).”34 In Minhāj Ibn Taymiyya reports how 
the Mu≠tazilī’s evade this with their doctrine that God acts for a cause that 
is disjoined from His essence. However, the Ash≠arīs counter that this cause 
must have some impact on God. Otherwise, it would not be a cause. If then 
it is disjoined from God—as the Mu≠tazilīs say—His acting for its sake 
implies that the cause—which is something outside of Himself—perfects 
Him. Conversely, if the cause is “subsisting in Him (qā±im bihi),” the Ash≠arīs 
argue, “it necessarily follows that He is a substrate for originating events,”35 in 
which case God becomes subject to temporal origination. As Ibn Taymiyya 
notes, the Mu≠tazilīs do not believe that the cause has any impact on God. 
God is indiff erent in Himself to whether the cause brings something into 
existence or not.36
Ibn Taymiyya sets out the two horns of this dilemma posed by the Ash≠arīs 
somewhat diff erently in Irāda: “[1] If the cause is disjoined from Him, and if 
no judgment (!hukm) returns to Him from it, its existence will not be worthier 
of Him than its nonexistence. [2] If it is supposed that a judgment returns 
to Him from it, that [judgment] is originating, and thus originating events 
subsist in Him.”37 Below it will become clear that Ibn Taymiyya adopts the 
second horn of the dilemma as his own view, although he prefers to speak 
not of originating events subsisting in God’s essence but rather, equivalently, 
of God’s voluntary acts.
In Irāda the second “prohibited thing” ensuing from originating causality 
in God’s acts is an endless chain or infi nite regress (tasalsul ). As the Ash≠arīs 
see it, a cause precipitating God’s act must itself be originated and so requires 
an originated cause of its own, and so on ad infi nitum in an endless chain 
33 Irāda, MF 8:84. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī recounts this argument in Arba≠īn, 78; and in 
Al-Ma$tālib al-≠āliyya min al-≠ilm al-ilāhī, ed. A!hmad (Hijāzī al-Saqā, 9 parts in 5 vols (Bei-
rut: Dār al-kitāb al-≠arabī, 1407/1987), 4:55–6. Th e latter text is discussed in Muammer 
İskenderoğlu, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Th omas Aquinas on the Question of the Eternity of 
the World (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 80–1.
34 Irāda, MF 8:84.
35 Minhāj, 1:145/1:35.
36 Minhāj, 1:145/1:35.
37 Irāda, MF 8:84.
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of originating events.38 Th e impossibility of an infi nite regress is also a key 
argument in the Kalām arsenal against the eternity of the world doctrine 
held by philosophers like Ibn Sīnā. For this reason, Ibn Taymiyya gives 
considerable attention to the doctrine of creation when discussing causality 
in the will of God.39
Exposition of Ibn Taymiyya’s responses to these Ash≠arī arguments will 
be in reverse order of the latter’s presentation here. Th us, we begin with his 
rejoinder to the Ash≠arī contention that causality in God’s will leads to an 
endless chain and then move to his replies to the charges that this involves 
originating events in the essence of God and God’s imperfection.
Ibn Taymiyya’s Case for a God Who Acts Perpetually for Wise 
Purposes and Creates fr om Eternity
In the edited version of Minhāj, Ibn Taymiyya’s response to the Ash≠arī objec-
tion that wise purpose in God’s will entails an endless chain or infi nite regress 
takes up over 270 pages of the fi rst volume.40 As this treatment far exceeds 
any other in length and detail, it constitutes my primary source. By the same 
token, however, this is not the place for an exhaustive account of this long 
passage, and I will thus highlight only its main arguments. Ibn Taymiyya fi rst 
explains very briefl y that the sequence of God’s wise purposes constitutes an 
endless chain of originating events into the future, not into the past:
When [God] performs an act for a wise purpose, the wise purpose obtains aft er 
the act. When from this wise purpose another wise purpose is sought aft er it, 
this is an endless chain into the future. Th is wise purpose which has occurred 
is beloved to Him, and it is a cause of a second wise purpose. He—Glory be 
to Him—does not cease originating, with respect to wise purposes, what He 
loves and making it a cause of what He loves.41
Here Ibn Taymiyya gives wise purpose the sense of the fully realized objective 
or fi nal cause for which acts are carried out, and he momentarily bypasses 
38 Irāda, MF 8:84. Cf. Minhāj, 1:145/1:35.
39 In what follows, I leave aside Ibn Taymiyya’s many writings on God and creation 
that do not fall within treatments of causality in God’s will. See for example Dar ±, passim; 
Nubuwwāt, 71–92; !Safadiyya, passim; and ≠Imrān, MF 18:210–243, which is translated in 
Hoover, “Perpetual Creativity,” 300–329. For overviews of medieval Islamic arguments for 
and against creation ex nihilo and the eternity of the world, see the works of Davidson, Proofs 
for Eternity, and İskenderoğlu, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. 
40 Minhāj, 1:146–420/1:35–117.
41 Minhāj, 1:146/1:35–6. Cf. MF 8:380.
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the fact that the wise purpose had a prior existence as an intention in the 
mind of God. Th e shaykh reasons that there should be no objection to an 
endless chain in the future because the great majority of Muslims and even 
non-Muslims believe that Paradise and the Fire will be perpetual.42 Aft er this, 
Ibn Taymiyya’s turns in Minhāj to the question of an endless chain into the 
past. He fi rst sets out the position that he will defend:
[God] has been active from eternity when He willed with acts that subsist in 
His self by His power and His will one aft er another. . . . He has been speaking 
from eternity by His will, and He has been acting from eternity by His will 
one thing aft er another . . . Everything other than God is originated, created 
[and came into] being aft er it was not. In the world, there is nothing eternal 
accompanying God.43
Th e question of God’s acts subsisting within Him will be taken up later. First, 
however, we are concerned with Ibn Taymiyya’s claim that God’s creative 
activity extends back in time to pre-eternity while no one created thing has 
existed from eternity. To make intellectual space for this vision of God and 
creation, Ibn Taymiyya must refute both Kalām arguments for creation ex 
nihilo and philosophical arguments for the world’s eternity.
Th e Philosophers’ Argument that God Is an Eternal Cause Implies that 
Nothing Originates
Th e fi rst of the philosophers’ arguments that Ibn Taymiyya addresses in 
Minhāj was noted when discussing Ash≠arī arguments above. As the philoso-
phers see it, the Creator is a complete cause (≠illa tāmma) necessitating in 
His essence and necessarily entailing His eff ect (ma≠lūl ), that is, the world, 
without a delay in time. Th us, the world is the eternal eff ect of God.44 For 
Ibn Taymiyya, however, an eternal complete cause entirely precludes any 
kind of origination in time, which manifestly contradicts human experience 
of temporal origination:
Temporally originating events are observed in the world. If the Artisan were 
necessitating by His essence [and] a complete cause necessarily entailing its 
42 Minhāj, 1:146/1:36.
43 Minhāj, 1:147–8/1:36. For Ibn Taymiyya’s understanding of God’s speech, see Hoover, 
“Perpetual Creativity,” 296–9.
44 Minhāj, 1:148/1:36; and Irāda, MF 8:85. Th is argument goes back to the fi ft h century 
Neoplatonist Proclus who maintains that creation would involve change or prior imperfec-
tion in the cause of the world. See Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 56–67, for proofs of this 
kind from Proclus to Aquinas.
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eff ect, not one originating event would originate in existence since it is impos-
sible for what originates to emanate from a pre-eternal, complete cause. If the 
world had been eternal, its Creator would have been a complete cause. Noth-
ing of the eff ect of a complete cause comes aft er it. So, it follows necessarily 
from that that nothing originates in the world. Th erefore, the origination of 
events is a proof that their Agent is not a complete cause in pre-eternity, and, 
when the complete cause in pre-eternity is disproved, holding to the eternity 
of part of the world is vain.45
Under the conviction that nothing temporal can originate from the eternal, 
Ibn Taymiyya expends much eff ort to show that the philosophers’ attempts 
to arrive at temporal origination by way of intermediaries fails. He reports 
that the philosophers themselves do not say that events arise out of a pre-
eternal complete cause. All agree that a complete cause necessarily entails 
its eff ect without any delay between the cause and the eff ect and that the 
cause of an originating event only becomes complete or decisive at the very 
instant that the event comes into existence. Rather, the philosophers—here 
he mentions Ibn Sīnā explicitly—explain that God is the pre-eternal com-
plete cause of the eternal elements of the world such as the celestial spheres 
(afl āk). Th e eternal motion of the spheres is then the source of the change 
that occurs in the world by functioning as the cause of receptacles (qawābil ) 
and preparednesses (isti ≠dādāt) that regulate the perpetual emanation of the 
First Cause.46
Ibn Taymiyya does not accept such explanations of how change and 
motion arise in the world. He maintains that it is incongruous for any events 
whatsoever to originate from an eternal complete cause, whether directly or 
indirectly. When originating events such as the receptacles are traced to God, 
it implies that God is not the eternal complete cause of them. Conversely, if 
God is the eternal complete cause for any so-called originating events, these 
events must be either eternal or nonexistent. God as an eternal complete cause 
ultimately “implies the nonexistence of originating events or the eternity of 
originating events, and both of them oppose what is observed.”47 Th e shaykh 
concludes that the philosophers posit motion arising out of nothing. Since 
the motion of the celestial spheres, which is the cause of all other motion, 
cannot arise from a pre-eternal complete cause, the spheres must be moving 
of their own accord. Ibn Taymiyya rejects this as inadequate, and he asserts 
45 Minhāj, 1:148/1:36.
46 Minhāj, 1:336–8/1:92–3; and Minhāj, 1:182–7/1:45–7.
47 Minhāj, 1:344/1:95.
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that there must be something above the celestial spheres necessitating their 
motion.48
Th e Philosophers Argue Correctly that the Kalām Th eologians Posit 
 Temporal Origination without a Cause
A second proof for the eternity of the world that Ibn Taymiyya attributes 
to the philosophers, and to Ibn Sīnā in particular, reduces the Kalām view 
that God created the world ex nihilo to absurdity.49 In Minhāj the shaykh 
presents the proof as follows:
Th e philosophers’ support for the eternity of the world is their view that the 
[temporal] origination of originating events without an originating cause is 
impossible. Positing an essence stripped (mu≠a$t$tal) of acting that was not acting 
[but] then acted without an originating cause is impossible.50
Ibn Taymiyya denies that this argument proves the eternity of the world: 
“Th is view does not prove the eternity of any individual thing belonging 
to the world, the celestial spheres and otherwise. It proves only that [God] 
has been acting from eternity.”51 Elsewhere in Minhāj, he explains further: 
“All of what you [philosophers] and those like you mention proves only 
the perpetuity (dawām) of action, not the perpetuity of an individual act 
and not of an individual enacted thing.”52 What this argument proves for 
Ibn Taymiyya is only that God has been acting from eternity. Against the 
philosophers, he denies that it implies the eternity of any particular part of 
the world. Th e shaykh also points out that the philosophers’ argument for 
the eternity of the world from an eternal complete cause falls afoul of the 
very principle of origination that they use in the present proof against the 
Kalām theologians. As noted in the previous subsection, the shaykh argues 
that the philosophers cannot adequately explain the origin of movement in 
the celestial spheres unless they permit the origination of events without a 
temporally originating cause.53
48 Minhāj, 1:343–6/1:94–5. Cf. Minhāj, 1:150–5/1:37–8, 1:218/1:56, 1:323–334/1:88–
91; Irāda, MF 8:86–7; and Nubuwwāt, 132–133.
49 Minhāj, 1:154/1:38. For this argument in Ibn Sīnā, see al-Najāh (Cairo: Ma$tba≠at al-
sa≠āda, 1331/1913), 412–422; and Al-Mabda± wa al-ma≠ād, 46. For its history, see Davidson, 






Beyond this, Ibn Taymiyya does agree with the philosophers that their 
proof refutes the Kalām doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Th e shaykh attributes 
the denial of God’s perpetual activity to the Mu≠tazilīs, the Ash≠arīs, the 
Karrāmīs and the Shī≠īs, and he traces the foundation of this Kalām posi-
tion to Jahm b. !Safwān and Abū al-Hudhayl al-≠Allāf who presuppose that 
originating events without a beginning are impossible and that the genus 
of events must have had a beginning. Ibn Taymiyya argues that positing a 
necessary beginning to the genus of temporally originating events renders 
the origination of any events prior to the emergence of the whole genus 
impossible. Since the genus of events has a beginning, no origination of 
events could have occurred prior to this beginning. Th is raises the question 
of how the genus of originating events itself became possible aft er having 
been impossible. Ibn Taymiyya follows the philosophers in asserting that such 
a transition was impossible unless a cause emerged to produce it. However, 
this poses the problem of how a cause could originate before origination was 
possible. For the shaykh, all of this ends in absurdities, and he concludes that 
origination must have been possible from eternity since there could not have 
been an origination of the possibility of origination.54
God Wills with an Infi nite Regress of Willings
Ibn Taymiyya also casts this argument of the philosophers in terms of the 
principle of preponderance. Th at is, every possibility requires a complete 
preponderator (murajji!h tāmm) that tips the scales in favor of its existence 
over its nonexistence, and, in refutation of the Kalām doctrine of creation 
ex nihilo, God cannot change from the impossibility of acting to the pos-
sibility of acting without a preponderator.55 According to the philosophers 
and Ibn Taymiyya, the diffi  culty with the Kalām outlook is that the world 
originates in time without a cause preponderating its origination. Al-Ghazālī 
responds to this problem in his Tahāfut al-falāsifa by giving the function 
of preponderance to the eternal divine will. He argues that it is in the very 
nature of God’s eternal will to have designated the time at which the world 
originated. Th e world did not come into existence until the point at which 
God in His eternal will had set, and He had not willed it to be created prior 
to that.56 Ibn Taymiyya rejects this, and, in the fi rst volume of Minhāj, he 
54 Minhāj, 1:155–161/1:38–40.
55 Minhāj, 1:161–2/1:40, 1:195–6/1:49.
56 Al-Ghazālī, Th e Incoherence of the Philosophers, 15–26.
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asserts that al-Ghazālī erred in adopting this Kalām position, that is, the 
idea that “one who is powerful and choosing preponderates one of his two 
possibilities over the other without a preponderator.”57
Ibn Taymiyya denies that an eternal will can give rise to temporal origina-
tion, and he asserts that it is impossible for God to will a concrete individual 
in eternity.58 Th e shaykh argues that if God had an eternal will that applied 
in general to all things, then everything would be eternal and nothing could 
originate. Th is denies the origination and motion that we actually see, such 
as the motions of the sun, moon, celestial bodies, wind, clouds, living beings 
and plants. Rather, God’s willing of something to happen occurs at the time 
that it happens.59
Th e dynamic quality of God’s will in Ibn Taymiyya’s thought becomes 
clearer in his criticism of the philosopher Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī 
(d. ca. 560/1165). Th e shaykh reports that Abū al-Barakāt in his Mu≠tabar 
posits two divine wills: an eternal will to will what is eternal—the celestial 
sphere—and successive wills or newly arising willings (irādāt mutajaddida) 
subsisting in the essence of God to will successive originating events.60 Th e 
shaykh fi rst notes that an object of will is necessarily originated in time: 
“Something being willed necessarily entails its origination.”61 What is eter-
nal cannot be an object of God’s will. Th us, Ibn Taymiyya believes that it is 
totally unnecessary to posit an eternal divine will because everything other 
than God, including the celestial sphere, is originated.62 Originating events 
may be accounted for adequately with successive willings: “If it is permissible 
that He has successive willings perpetual in species, it is not impossible that 
everything other than Him originate by these willings.”63
Th e shaykh elaborates a bit more elsewhere in the fi rst volume of Minhāj 
on the operation of God’s will and power using the conceptual framework 
of complete causality. His fundamental premise is that someone who wills 
decisively to do something that he is able to do will necessarily produce the 
act. Applied to God, “Whatever God wills is, and whatever He does not 
will is not. Truly, He is powerful over what He wills. With complete power 
57 Minhāj, 1:356/1:99. Cf. Irāda, MF 8:147–9.
58 Minhāj, 1:165/1:41, 1:75/1:43.
59 Minhāj, 1:234–5/1:61 and 1:296–8/1:80–1.
60 Minhāj, 1:178/1:44, 1:219–220/1:57, 1:338/1:93; Abū al-Barakāt Hibat Allāh b. ≠Alī 
b. Malkā al-Baghdādī, Kitāb al-mu≠tabar fī al-!hikma, 3 vols. (Hyderabad: Jam≠iyyat dā±irat 
al-ma≠ārif al-≠uthmāniyya, 1357–8/1938–9), 3:164, cf. 3:45.
61 Minhāj, 1:179/1:44.
62 Minhāj, 1:178–9/1:44–5, 1:219–220/1:57.
63 Minhāj, 1:179/1:44–5.
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(al-qudra al-tāmma) and decisive will (al-mashī ±a al-jāzima), the existence of 
the act is necessary.”64 God is the one Necessitating in His Essence (al-mūjib 
bi-l-dhāt), not in the philosophers’ sense of being an eternal complete cause, 
but as “necessitating what He originates by His will and His power.”65
Ibn Taymiyya’s notion of God’s decisive and necessitating willing as a 
complete cause faces philosophical diffi  culties. By virtue of Ibn Taymiyya’s 
adherence to the principle of preponderance, each originating act of “decisive 
will” must be activated by a prior originating cause that makes its existence 
preponderate. Th e shaykh may say that “Whatever God wills is, and whatever 
He does not will is not,” but there still must be a complete cause precipi-
tating each act of willing. If we posit an infi nite regress of decisive divine 
wills and complete causes whose eff ects are immediately necessary, we may 
inquire into the ground of this whole infi nite regress. Is the series as a whole 
self-preponderating just as Ibn Taymiyya believes the eternal motions of the 
spheres to be for the philosophers? Or does it go back to a First Cause that 
preponderates the existence of the series? If it does go back to a First Cause 
which is eternal and complete, it would seem that the chain of complete 
causes and decisive wills must lock up into a timeless series under the eternal 
complete First Cause, which would yield the eternity of the world. As we 
will see, the shaykh resists this conclusion by insisting that willed or created 
things come into existence in time aft er they did not exist.
Ibn Taymiyya may not be able to evade the diffi  culty of explaining how 
temporal origination arises without violating the principles of preponderance 
and originating causality that he employs polemically against his adversaries. 
What is signifi cant, however, is that he locates the boundary between the 
eternal and the temporal at a diff erent point from either the Kalām theolo-
gians or the Neoplatonic Islamic philosophers. Whereas the latter explain 
temporal events as the product of the eternal motion of the celestial spheres 
and al-Ghazālī explains them with God’s eternal and unchanging will whose 
nature it is to preponderate in time, Ibn Taymiyya posits their source in an 
infi nite regress of divine willings within God. Although Ibn Taymiyya does 
not say so explicitly, he places the boundary between time and eternity in 
God’s very essence.
64 Minhāj, 1:405/1:113.
65 Minhāj, 1:164/1:41. Cf. Minhāj, 1:404/1:113.
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God in His Perfection Acts, Wills and Creates fr om Eternity
To this point, the arguments surveyed have been largely deconstructive. Ibn 
Taymiyya maintains that the eternal divine will of the Kalām theologians 
and the eternal complete cause of the philosophers cannot explain the emer-
gence of originating events. Every such argument founders on the shoal of 
the principle of preponderance or originating causality. Th e alternative set 
forth by Ibn Taymiyya is that God has been willing and acting from eternity, 
with eternity here meaning not timelessness but time without beginning. 
Th e shaykh also proves his position positively from the necessity of God’s 
perfection.
Invoking considerations of God’s perfection discussed above in Chapter 
One, Ibn Taymiyya fi rst explains in Minhāj that the Creator has a greater 
right to perfections found in creatures than do the creatures themselves 
because creatures derive their perfections from the Creator. Likewise, God 
has an even greater right to be exonerated of imperfections from which 
creatures exonerate themselves.66 With these principles in place, the shaykh 
argues that activity is not neutral with respect to perfection because creat-
ing, which he takes here to be synonymous with acting, is better than not 
creating. Moreover, in an obvious stab at the philosophers, Ibn Taymiyya 
argues that one who performs successive acts is better than one who has 
something conjoined to him from eternity:
[People from the Muslim, Jewish and Christian religious communities]67 say 
also that acting is an attribute of perfection. Th ey reply to the Kalām theolo-
gians who say that it is neither an attribute of perfection nor imperfection: 
He—Exalted is He—has said, “Is then He Who creates as one who does not 
create? Will you not then remember?” (Q. 16:17). Th at being the case, it is 
reasonable that the agent who acts by his power and his will is more perfect than 
one having no power and no will. Th e powerful, freely choosing (mukhtār) agent 
who performs acts one aft er the other is more perfect than one the product of 
whose act is necessarily concomitant with him [and who] is not powerful to 
originate anything or to change anything from one state to another.68
Ibn Taymiyya also casts the latter part of the quoted argument into a contrast 
between the whole species of acting and an individual eternal act. First, he 
66 Minhāj, 1:371/1:103. Cf. Minhāj, 1:417–8/1:116.
67 Th e antecedent of the third person plural pronoun hum beginning this sentence is found 
a few pages earlier in Minhāj, 1:367/1:102, at the beginning of a series of proofs against those 
who believe in the eternity of the world.
68 Minhāj, 1:371–2/1:103. Cf. Minhāj, 1:384/1:107.
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says that the eternity of the species of enacted things in the world is more 
perfect than the eternity of one individual. Th en, he argues that agency over 
a species of things occurring successively is more perfect than agency over an 
individual thing. He adds that the perpetuity of agency over an individual 
thing is an unknown concept and that the perpetuity of agency does not 
entail the perpetuity of an individual. What it does entail is the origination 
of the individuals of the species.69 In sum, Ibn Taymiyya maintains that 
God’s perfection requires that He has been acting and creating the species 
of originating things from eternity. God’s ultimate perfection is found not 
in the Kalām theologians’ and philosophers’ ideals of eternal stillness and 
changelessness, but in God’s eternal activity and creativity.
No One Originating Event Is Eternal, but the Genus of Originating Events 
Is Eternal
Th is brings us to closer consideration of Ibn Taymiyya’s view of the created 
world itself. In Minhāj the shaykh claims that God’s perpetual activity does 
not mean that any one thing in the world is eternal. God is “perpetual of 
agency (dā±im al-fā ≠iliyya),” but, “it does not follow necessarily from the 
perpetuity of His being an agent that there is an individual, eternal enacted 
thing with Him.”70 Rather, originating events come into being aft er they were 
not, and all things other than God are originated and created: “Everything 
except God is created [and came into] being aft er it was not.”71
With the phrase, “being aft er it was not (kā±in ba≠d an lam yakun),” the 
shaykh denies the eternity of any individual thing apart from God and also 
distinguishes himself from Ibn Sīnā and others who speak of the world as 
eternal but originated and possible. Th e issue turns on Ibn Sīnā’s under-
standing of possibility and causal priority. Th e philosopher maintains that 
the world can be eternal but yet possible (mumkin) in the senses that it is 
not self-suffi  cient and that it might not have been. Considered in itself, the 
world is possible. It only becomes necessary through another, namely, God 
who is the eternal effi  cient cause of the existence of the world. Ibn Taymiyya’s 
summary of this idea reads, “Th e world is an eff ect (ma≠lūl ) of [God’s]. He 
is necessitating it and emanating it. He is prior to it in honor, causality and 
nature. He is not prior to it in time.”72 Moreover, according to the shaykh, 
69 Minhāj, 1:387/1:108.
70 Minhāj, 1:336/1:92.
71 Minhāj, 1:359/1:100. Cf. Minhāj, 1:298/1:81.
72 Minhāj, 1:149/1:36.
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Ibn Sīnā calls the world originated (mu!hdath) only in the sense of its being 
the eff ect of an eternal cause.73
Against Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Taymiyya marshals the support of Aristotle and Ibn 
Rushd to show that what is possible originates in time and that something 
originated and possible must be preceded by nonexistence in time.74 Th e 
shaykh writes, “Aristotle and the ancients among his followers along with 
the rest of the people of reason say that the possible whose existence or 
nonexistence is possible is only originated, being aft er it was not.”75 For Ibn 
Taymiyya, it is not possible that something eternal could have been nonex-
istent. Likewise, it is not possible that something possible be eternal.76
Ibn Taymiyya asserts in Minhāj that everything except God is originated 
and preceded by nonexistence and that there is nothing eternal in the world.77 
However, he also maintains that there have always been originating events 
of one sort or another in the universe. Moreover, the perpetuity of God’s 
creative activity requires this. While there is no one thing in the universe that 
is eternal, the species or genus of originating events is eternal.78 Th e shaykh 
gives a number of examples to tease out the diff erence between an eternal 
species and its originating individuals. In some cases, individuals and species 
are qualifi ed in a similar way. When, for example, all of the individuals of a 
species are qualifi ed as existent, possible or nonexistent, the species itself must 
also be so qualifi ed. Ibn Taymiyya cites the following example: “If each one of 
the Zanj is black, then the whole group is black.”79 However, the individuals 
of a species do not necessarily have to share the same attributes as the spe-
cies itself, as when individuals are qualifi ed by origination and passing away 
while the species as a whole is perpetual. As an example of this distinction, 
Ibn Taymiyya cites quranic verses on the provision of Paradise, “Its food is 
eternal, and its shade” (Q. 13:35), and, “Truly, this is our provision which 
has no end” (Q. 38:54). What is perpetual here is the species of provision 
and not the individual units that go out of existence. No one piece of food 
is perpetual. Th e shaykh probes this distinction further by observing that 
73 Minhāj, 1:200–1/1:51.
74 Minhāj, 1:199/1:51, 1:235–6/1:61–2, 1:374–380/1:103–4.
75 Minhāj, 1:236/1:62.
76 Minhāj, 1:197–9/1:50, 1:276–7/1:74. In Minhāj, 1:239–296/1:63–80, Ibn Taymiyya 
treats Ibn Sīnā’s idea that an act need not be preceded by nonexistence in a refutation of ten 
proofs for it set out by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Kitāb al-mabā!hith al-mashriqiyya (Hyderabad: 
Ma$tba≠at majlis dā±irat al-ma≠ārif al-ni )zāmiyya, 1343/1924), 1:485–492.




the attributes of individual parts of something may not qualify the whole 
and vice versa. Certain parts of a house, a human being or a tree may be 
long or wide, but this does not necessarily mean that every part is long or 
wide. If one says that this day or that prayer is long, it does not mean that 
all parts of this day or that prayer are long. Similarly, the origination and 
passing away of individual units does not necessarily entail the origination 
or passing away of the whole species of originating events.80
If the species of originating events is eternal, we may ask what Ibn Taymi-
yya believes existed prior to this present world. He asserts that the celestial 
sphere was originated in time, and he does not rule out the possibility 
that there were other celestial spheres prior to this one.81 He also indicates 
that this present world was created out of pre-existing matter. He explains that 
Aristotle was the fi rst to claim that the celestial sphere was eternal, but he 
notes that the philosophers before Aristotle believed “that this world was 
originated, either in its form ($sūra) only or in its form and matter (mādda). 
And most of them maintain the priority of the matter of this world over 
its form.”82
Ibn Taymiyya shows that the revealed tradition also indicates that other 
things existed before the creation of this world and that this world was created 
out of pre-existing matter. In support of this, he cites the following quranic 
verses: “[God] created the heavens and the earth in six days, and His Th rone 
was on the water” (Q. 11:7), and, “He rose toward heaven when it was smoke, 
and He said to it and to the earth, ‘Come under coercion or obediently’. 
Th ey both said, ‘We come obediently’” (Q. 41:11). In this regard, he also 
notes two hadiths: “Truly, God determined the determinations of created 
things before He created the heavens and the earth by fi ft y thousand years, 
and His Th rone was on the water,”83 and, “God was, and there was nothing 
before Him. And His throne was on the water. And He wrote everything 
in a Reminder. Th en He created the heavens and the earth.”84 Th e shaykh 
says that traditions from the Companions and the Followers affi  rming God’s 
creation of the heavens from water vapor, that is, smoke, are abundantly 
transmitted (mutawātir).85
80 Minhāj, 1:426–431/1:118–9.
81 Minhāj, 1:220/1:57 and 1:385/1:107.
82 Minhāj, 1:360/1:100. Unfortunately, Ibn Taymiyya does not provide names of any 
pre-Aristotelian philosophers.
83 Muslim, 4797, Al-Qadar, (Hijāj Ādam wa Mūsā.
84 Bukhārī, 6868, Al-Taw !hīd, Wa kāna ≠arshuhu ≠alā al-mā±. . . . Th e variant readings of this 
hadith are discussed in Hoover, “Perpetual Creativity,” 300–1.
85 Minhāj, 1:360–1/1:100. Ibn Taymiyya’s intepretation of the quranic verses listed here 
resembles that of Ibn Rushd in Kitāb fa $sl al-maqāl, ed. George F. Hourani (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
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In interpreting these texts, Ibn Taymiyya reports debate over whether 
God fi rst created the Pen—as in the hadith, “Th e fi rst thing God created 
was the Pen,”86—or the Th rone. Th e shaykh explains that God most likely 
created the Th rone fi rst. Th en, the Pen was the fi rst thing created of this 
world for the purpose of writing down the determinations fi ft y thousand 
years before the creation of the heavens and the earth. He adds that there 
must have been time prior to the creation of this world so that God would 
have had some measure by which to say that He had created it in six days.87 
Ibn Taymiyya also notes that the Torah says much the same thing: the earth 
was covered with water and the wind was blowing over it before God created 
the heavens and the earth in several days’ time (Genesis 1:1–2). He then 
cites some unnamed scholars among the People of the Book to the eff ect 
that this means that God created from matter and in time.88
Th e shaykh does not discuss whether the Th rone itself, as the fi rst cre-
ated thing, was also created from pre-existing matter. Th e logic of God’s 
perfection would appear to entail that there has always been one created 
thing or another, even before the Th rone. Yet, the shaykh does imply that 
there was in some sense a fi rst created thing by asserting that it is in God’s 
perfection that He is prior to all others in every respect.89 Although Ibn 
Taymiyya does not himself suggest the possibility, we might imagine that 
the infi nite regression of originating events in this world approaches God’s 
pre-eternity asymptotically. Th e regression grows ever closer to pre-eternity 
but never touches it, and, so, it may still be said that God is prior to every 
originating event in time.
Refutation of Kalām Arguments against an Infi nite Regress
Although most of Ibn Taymiyya’s polemic in the fi rst volume of Minhāj uses 
the principle of preponderance or originating causality to reduce the Kalām 
position of creation ex nihilo to absurdity, he also seeks to undermine posi-
tive Kalām arguments against the eternity of the world.90 Refutation of these 
proofs is especially important to Ibn Taymiyya in order to open the door to 
1959), 19–21; in trans. as Averroes, On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, trans. George 
F. Hourani, (London: Luzac, 1961), 55–7.
86 Abū Dāwūd, 4078, Al-sunna, Fī al-qadar; Al-Tirmidhī 2081, Al-Qadar ≠an Rasūl Allāh, 
Mā jā±a fī al-ri#dā bi-l-qa #dā±.




90 Minhāj, 1:432–438/1:120–2. Cf. Irāda, MF 8:152–3.
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the possibility of an infi nite regress of causes or wise purposes in God’s will. 
Th e main Kalām proofs are based on two arguments for the impossibility 
of an actual infi nite stemming from the sixth-century philosopher John 
Philoponus (d. ca. 570). Th e Kalām theologians conclude that, since any 
actual infi nite is impossible, the world must have a beginning.91
One of John Philoponus’s arguments asserts that the passing of time 
increases the number of past events. However, infi nites cannot be increased. 
So past events cannot be infi nite.92 From the notion that an infi nite can-
not be increased, Ibn Sīnā, with precedents in the philosopher al-Kindī 
(d. ca. 252/866), developed the application (ta$tbīq) argument to show that 
magnitudes must be fi nite. Th e argument may be summarized as follows. 
Suppose that a magnitude A is fi nite on one end and infi nite on another. 
Some length is added to the fi nite end of A yielding a new magnitude B. 
Th e fi nite end of B is then “applied” to the fi nite end of A, and it is noted 
that the two infi nite ends no longer match. Th is is absurd and disproves 
the possibility of infi nite magnitudes. Ibn Sīnā does not use this argument 
against an infi nite regression of causes and eff ects, but the Kalām theologian 
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī does, and al-Rāzī’s form of the argument is what Ibn 
Taymiyya refutes in Minhāj.93
Ibn Taymiyya presents al-Rāzī’s argument as follows. If the series of origi-
nating events from the time of the (Hijra to infi nity is compared with the 
series of originating events from the time of the Flood of Noah to infi nity, 
the one series will be longer than the other by the diff erence between the 
Flood and the (Hijra. Since disparity between two infi nites is impossible, an 
infi nite series of originating events is impossible.94 For Ibn Taymiyya, such a 
disparity is not impossible. From the Flood to future infi nity is greater than 
from the (Hijra to future infi nity. Likewise, what is between the (Hijra and 
past infi nity is greater than what is between the Flood and past infi nity even 
though both lack a beginning. Th e disparity, however, occurs only between 
the two fi nite ends, in this case between the Flood and the (Hijra. It does not 
91 On Philoponus and the adoption of his arguments against an actual infi nite into the 
Kalām tradition, see Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 86–94 and 117–127; and Harry Austryn 
Wolfson, Th e Philosophy of the Kalam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 
410–434.
92 Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 88–9.
93 Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 125–7; and al-Rāzī, Arba≠īn, 34. On the origins of the 
application argument, see also Husâm Muhî Eldîn al-Alousï, Th e Problem of Creation in Islamic 
Th ought: Qur±an, Hadith, Commentaries, and Kalam (Baghdad: Th e National Printing and 
Publishing Co., 1965), 304–313.
94 Minhāj, 1:432/1:120.
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occur in the infi nite ends. Infi nity itself is not subject to specifi c measure-
ment such that one infi nite may be said to be commensurate to, greater than, 
or less than another infi nite. To illustrate his point, Ibn Taymiyya compares 
the concept of infi nity to multiplicity. Th e numbers 1, 10, 100, 1000, etc. 
all share in multiplicity, but this does not mean that they all have the same 
value. Likewise, infi nites may entail diverse values from one perspective, yet 
all share in infi nity from another.95 Ibn Taymiyya also recounts Ibn Sīnā’s 
refutation of the Kalām use of the application argument. In Ibn Sīnā’s view, 
the application argument against an infi nite regress of causes and eff ects is 
just a mental exercise. It does not correspond to anything in actuality because 
everything in the past no longer exists and everything in the future does not 
yet exist. Th e application argument against an actual infi nite is only valid 
for what actually exists.96
Th e second argument from John Philoponus exploited by the Kalām 
tradition maintains that an infi nite cannot be traversed. Th is being the case, 
something in the present cannot be preceded by an infi nite regression of 
events.97 In Minhāj Ibn Taymiyya refutes the defense that al-Juwaynī gives 
for this argument in his Kitāb al-irshād.98 Al-Juwaynī argues that positing an 
originating event preceded by originating events without beginning is like 
saying to someone, “I will not give you a dirham unless I give you a dinar 
before it, and I will not give you a dinar unless I give you a dirham before 
it.” Under these conditions, al-Juwaynī concludes that no dirham or dinar 
will ever be given. He argues that the only way that this statement can be 
turned into a valid condition is to say, “I will not give you a dinar unless I 
give you a dirham aft er it.”99
Rephrasing al-Juwaynī’s formulas slightly, Ibn Taymiyya agrees that it 
is possible to say, “I will not give you a dirham unless I give you a dirham 
95 Minhāj, 1:432–4/1:120.
96 Minhāj, 1:434–5/1:120–1. For the attribution of this argument to Ibn Sīnā, see David-
son, Proofs for Eternity, 128–9. Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 89, 122, also distinguishes a 
third argument from John Philoponus that carried over into the Kalām tradition even though 
it is merely a variation of the second. Rather than assume that an infi nite cannot be added 
to, it assumes that an infi nite cannot be multiplied. Th e Kalām theologians argued that the 
revolutions of the planets could not be infi nite because it was known the planets revolved at 
diff erent speeds. If the planets had revolved from eternity, each planet would have revolved 
an infi nite number of times proportionally diff erent from the other planets. Th is was rejected 
as absurd. Ibn Taymiyya does not treat this argument nor does he need to since he permits 
infi nites that are not commensurate.
97 Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 87–8, 119–120.
98 Minhāj, 1:435–6/1:121.
99 Imām al- (Haramayn ≠Abd al-Malik b. ≠Abd Allāh al-Juwaynī, Kitāb al-irshād ilā qawā $ti ≠ 
al-adilla fī u$sūl al-i ≠tiqād (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-≠ilmiyya, 1416/1995), 16.
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aft er it.” However, he believes that it is wrong-headed and impossible to say, 
“I will not give you a dirham until I give you a dirham before it,” because 
this negates that something will happen in the future until the same thing 
happens in the future. Th e argument as stated is invalid, and does not deal 
with an infi nite regress in the past. Th e shaykh believes that the statement 
should instead read, “I have not given you a dirham unless I have given you 
a dirham before it.” Th is is a negation of a past event until another past event 
has occurred prior to it, and this is possible. So, by correcting al-Juwaynī’s 
formulation to make it properly applicable to an infi nite regress in the past, 
Ibn Taymiyya believes that he has eliminated any diffi  culty that al-Juwaynī’s 
argument might pose for an infi nite regress of events.100
By refuting the Kalām arguments against an actual infi nite, Ibn Taymiyya 
clears the way for the possibility of an infi nite regression, and, as we have 
seen, he upholds an endless chain of originating events into the past and into 
the future. However, he clarifi es in Minhāj that he admits only an infi nite 
regress of eff ects (āthār), not an infi nite regress of causes, creators, agents 
and originators. Causes and agents in an infi nite regress are all possible, 
originated and nonexistent in themselves and must be given existence by 
another. In fact, he notes, the longer the chain of these agents becomes, the 
greater is its need for an agent who is “only existent in Himself, necessarily 
existent, not admitting nonexistence, eternal and not originated.”101 Yet, Ibn 
Taymiyya does not explain how this eternal and necessary First Cause gives 
rise to a regress of temporally originating events.
Summing up the present discussion, Ibn Taymiyya agrees with the Ash≠arīs 
that wise purpose and causality in the will of God lead to an infi nite regress, 
but he denies that this constitutes grounds to reject God’s rationality. Th e 
shaykh refutes the arguments for the impossibility of an actual infi nite 
that the Kalām theologians use to disprove the eternity of the world, and 
he maintains that the perfection of God requires that God create and will 
originating events from eternity. Using the principles of preponderance and 
originating causality, he deconstructs the cosmologies of the Kalām theolo-
gians and philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā. He argues against the philosophers 
that originating events in the world cannot arise from an eternal complete 
cause and against the Kalām theologians that events cannot originate from 
an eternal divine will. Rather, he maintains that there is an infi nite regress 
100 Ibn Taymiyya gives al-Juwaynī’s argument fuller treatment in Dar ±, 9:186–8, and con-
cludes that al-Rāzī and al-Āmidī had already detected the argument’s weakness.
101 Minhāj, 1:436–8 (quote on 437)/1:121.
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of God’s willings corresponding to the originating events that God creates 
in the world.
Ibn Taymiyya on God’s Voluntary Acts Subsisting in God’s Essence
Besides an infi nite regress, a key Ash≠arī objection to wise purpose in the 
will of God is that it makes God a substrate for originating events. In the 
fi rst volume of the edited Minhāj, Ibn Taymiyya traces this objection’s root 
to the Jahmī argument that God’s attributes must subsist outside of Him 
because originating events (i.e. the attributes) only subsist in originating 
bodies and God is not an originating body.102 Ibn Taymiyya himself does 
not take God to be an originating body, but he rejects as fallacious the claim 
that originating events subsist only in originating bodies. Despite this, the 
shaykh is reticent to affi  rm explicitly that origination, much less time, subsists 
in God’s essence. Although he does on rare occasion allow that originating 
events subsist in God, he typically states the doctrine in other terms.103 He 
hints at why in Minhāj.
Ibn Taymiyya argues in Minhāj that the Mu≠tazilīs and their Shī≠ī followers 
must admit originating events in God because they say that God became an 
agent aft er He was not one, that is, He was subject to a change in state when 
He began to create the world. Th e shaykh adds that all groups, including the 
philosophers, must admit this doctrine, an argument Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī 
makes as well without working out its implications in his theology.104 Perhaps 
with some exaggeration, Ibn Taymiyya goes on to claim that, in addition to 
Abū al-Barakāt, the pre-Aristotelian philosophers, the Karrāmīs and others, 
the mainstream Sunnī tradition does in fact uphold this doctrine: “As for 
the great majority of the People of the Sunna and the Hadith, they speak 
of it or its meaning, even if some of them choose to speak only in legislated 
terms (al-alfā)z al-shar≠iyya) and some of them express the legislated meaning 
with expressions indicating it.”105 Here, Ibn Taymiyya draws a distinction 
between those who use the technical term ‘originating events’ to identify 
this doctrine and other scholars who seek to speak of the doctrine in terms 
102 Minhāj, 1:311/1:85.
103 In Furqān, MF 13:156, Ibn Taymiyya states briefl y but explicitly that the Salaf uphold 
originating events subsisting in God.
104 Al-Rāzī, Al-Ma $tālib al-≠āliyya, 2:106–7. For further discussion of this argument in 
al-Rāzī, see Hoover, “God Acts by His Will and Power.”
105 Minhāj, 1:421–3/1:117–8 (quote on 1:422–3/1:118).
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closer to the authoritative texts. It seems apparent that Ibn Taymiyya takes 
the latter path since he studiously avoids ‘originating events’ in his own doc-
trinal affi  rmations and speaks instead of God’s attributes or acts which are 
‘voluntary’ (ikhtiyāriyya). While the very term ikhtiyāriyya does not appear 
in the Qur±an or the Hadith, other forms of the verb ikhtāra (to choose), 
from which it is derived, do occur.106
Ibn Taymiyya’s Minhāj discussion of Ibn Sīnā’s denial of change in God’s 
essence illustrates his typical idiom in this respect. Ibn Taymiyya argues that 
when God the Agent remains in one state, there is no way to explain the 
diff erence and origination that arise in the world. While there are enacted 
things, there is no act to bring them into existence. Rooting himself in the 
authority of the prophets, the Salaf and unnamed pre-Aristotelian phi-
losophers, Ibn Taymiyya argues that there must be voluntary acts in God’s 
essence in order for change to arise in the world.107 To deny acts subsisting 
in God is to deny that He is acting and originating.108 Rather, he affi  rms, 
“Th e Lord must inevitably be qualifi ed by acts subsisting in Him one aft er 
another . . . like His will subsisting in His essence, His words subsisting in His 
essence, and His voluntary acts subsisting in His essence.”109
With this, Ibn Taymiyya leaves aside the ideal of the philosophers and the 
Kalām theologians that God is timelessly eternal and replaces it with a God 
whose essential perfection consists in perpetual dynamism. In this theology, 
the question of the origin of the causes or wise purposes giving rise to God’s 
acts of will poses no diffi  culty because they are simply prior and posterior 
acts of God extending backwards and forwards forever in God’s eternal activ-
ity. It remains to address how Ibn Taymiyya conceives God’s self-suffi  ciency. 
An infi nite regress of God’s acts implies an infi nite regress of the objects of 
those acts. If then there has always been one world or another, in what sense 
is God suffi  cient apart from the worlds?
106 For example, “I [i.e. God] have chosen you (ikhtartuka). So, listen to what is revealed” 
(Q. 20:13). In Ikhtiyāriyya, MF 6:217–267, a treatise devoted to the active quality of God’s 
attributes, Ibn Taymiyya also rejects the Kalām position and upholds the substance of originat-
ing events subsisting in God’s essence while avoiding the very words and speaking instead of 
God’s voluntary attributes. For analysis of Ikhtiyāriyya and further contextualization of Ibn 
Taymiyya’s position in the tradition of later Kalām, see Hoover, “God Acts by His Will and 
Power.” Ibn Taymiyya, MF 8:380, also speaks of “voluntary matters (al-umūr al-ikhtiyāriyya)” 
subsisting in God’s essence.
107 Minhāj, 1:334–6/1:91–2.
108 Minhāj, 1:352–3/1:97. See Irāda, 8:149–151, for polemic against the Mu≠tazilīs in 
this regard.
109 Minhāj, 1:327/1:89. Cf. Minhāj, 1:336/1:92 and 3:191–6/2:37–8.
 god’s wise purpose 97
Ibn Taymiyya on God’s Suffi  ciency apart fr om the Worlds in the 
Exercise of Wise Purpose
In order to guarantee God’s suffi  ciency apart from the world, the Ash≠arīs 
deny that God acts for wise purposes lest He be perfected (mustakmal ) by 
those purposes and imperfect beforehand. Th e Mu≠tazilīs affi  rm that God 
acts on account of wise purposes, but, again to protect God’s suffi  ciency, 
these are disjoined from God and yield a return of benefi cence and profi t 
only to creatures. Ibn Taymiyya adopts a decidedly diff erent and appar-
ently paradoxical stance. He asserts God’s suffi  ciency ( ghinā), but he also 
maintains that God acts on account of wise purposes that return to God. 
Qudra, a treatise on God’s power, contains a clear and concise statement of 
the shaykh’s view:
God has a wise purpose in everything that He creates. As He said, “Th e handi-
work of God who perfected everything” (Q. 27:88), and He said, “Who made 
good everything He created” (Q. 32:7). He—Glory be to Him—“is suffi  cient 
apart from the worlds” (Q. 3:97, 29:6). Th e wise purpose includes two things. 
First is a wise purpose that returns to Him (ta≠ūdu ilayhi), which He loves and 
with which He is well pleased. Th e second [returns] to His servants, which 
is a blessing for them at which they rejoice and in which they take pleasure. 
Th is is in things commanded and in things created.110
With respect to things commanded, Ibn Tamiyya goes on in Qudra to explain 
that God loves obedience and rejoices when His servants repent. Th ere is 
happiness in this for servants as well: “In what He has commanded of acts 
of obedience is its praiseworthy end which returns to Him and to His ser-
vants. In it, He has a wise purpose, and His servants have a mercy.”111 Th e 
same applies to created things: “Likewise, what He created He created for 
a wise purpose which returns to Him and which He loves, and for servants 
He created it to be a mercy from which they profi t.”112
Taken by other concerns, Ibn Taymiyya does not respond to Ash≠arī and 
Mu≠tazilī objections against his view of wise purpose in Qudra, but he does 
so in Irāda and Minhāj. In Irāda the shaykh identifi es contradiction in the 
Mu≠tazilī view. Th e Mu≠tazilīs, he argues, maintain that God created and 
110 Qudra, MF 8:35–36.
111 Qudra, MF 8:36. Ibn Taymiyya, Qudra, MF 8:39, also explains that God created ser-
vants to worship, praise, laud and glorify him, and he devotes most of the rest of Qudra to 
an explanation of “I did not create the jinn and humankind except that they might worship 
Me” (Q. 51:56).
112 Qudra, MF 8:37.
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commanded creatures for the wise purpose of showing them benefi cence 
and giving those who are legally obligated their reward. However, they 
claim that no judgment ( !hukm) returns to God for His benefi cence, and 
they make God indiff erent to His own acts by asserting that His acts do 
not subsist in His essence. But, Ibn Taymiyya continues, someone who is 
benefi cent is praised, and it is the judgment that returns to the benefi cent 
that makes benefi cence praiseworthy. Moreover, someone who is benefi cent 
is not indiff erent to his acts: “Th e generous soul rejoices, is glad and takes 
pleasure in the good that proceeds from it to another.”113 Conversely, it is 
irrational that someone not seek gain through his acts: “Anyone who commits 
an act in which there is neither pleasure, nor benefi t nor profi t for himself 
in any respect, neither sooner nor later, is aimless, and he is not praised for 
this.”114 Th us, the Mu≠tazilīs end up in contradiction by portraying God as 
aimless in the very act of trying to protect Him from the aimlessness of the 
Ash≠arī position.
Ibn Taymiyya’s argument gives short shrift  to disinterested benefi cence 
and makes a measure of self-interest intrinsic to what constitutes rational and 
praiseworthy action. Implied, but left  unstated, is that God is perfect and 
praiseworthy because of the rationality in the things that He does. From 
this, it could be understood that God acts rationally in order to elicit His 
servants’ praise for the sake of His perfection. However, this would run 
counter to what we fi nd for example in a blustery passage on God’s suffi  ciency 
in Nubuwwāt, Ibn Taymiyya’s book on prophecy. He seeks to allay Kalām 
fears that love, wise purpose and the like lead necessarily to God’s need 
for His servants by denying that God’s servants can profi t Him or that He 
needs their profi t. Likewise, God has no need to fear creatures. Unbelievers 
cannot harm Him, and it does Him no harm when people fail to keep His 
commands.115 Th e shaykh’s defense here off ers no theological analysis; it is 
limited to negations.
Ibn Taymiyya does more substantial theological work on God’s suffi  -
ciency in Irāda and Minhāj by considering the all-comprehensive character 
of God’s acts instead of their ethical quality. Here is how the shaykh replies 
briefl y in the fi rst volume of Minhāj to the Ash≠arī charge that wise purpose 
in God’s will implies that God is perfected by another and was imperfect 
beforehand:
113 Irāda, MF 8:89.
114 Irāda, MF 8:89–90.
115 Nubuwwāt, 135–6.
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When [God] is powerful over [and] the agent of everything, He does not 
need another in any respect. On the contrary, the causes enacted are objects 
of His power and will. God—Exalted is He—inspires His servants to invoca-
tion and He answers them. He inspires them to repentance, and He rejoices 
at their repentance when they repent. He inspires them to deeds and rewards 
them when they perform deeds. It will not be said that the creature impacts the 
Creator or makes Him act to answer, reward and rejoice at their repentance. 
He—Glory be to Him—is the Creator of all of that. To Him is sovereignty, 
and to Him is praise. He has no associate in anything of that, and in it He 
has no want of another.116
What Ibn Taymiyya leaves unsaid is that he does not accept the presup-
position provoking the Ash≠arī objection. Th e Ash≠arīs posit creation as 
an utterly free and arbitrary act of God that could just as well not have 
occurred without any loss to God being God. If God acts or creates for a 
purpose, this detracts from His freedom by making the act essential to His 
perfection. For Ibn Taymiyya, however, God’s creative activity is not free in 
the sense intended by the Ash≠arīs. Instead, perpetual creativity is intrinsic 
to God’s perfection, and the existence of the genus of created things follows 
necessarily from this. What would detract from God’s perfection is someone 
else controlling or helping God in what He wills to create. God’s suffi  ciency 
and lack of need consist in God alone creating all things with no one else 
helping Him or infl uencing Him in that.117
Ibn Taymiyya responds to the Ash≠arī objection more comprehensively 
in Irāda in fi ve points. Leading up to this is a discussion of love that sets 
the theological context. On the authority of texts from the Qur±an and 
the Hadith, Ibn Taymiyya argues that God’s servants should love God in 
Himself and love other things only for God’s sake. Conversely, God loves 
His servants who believe in Him and do what He loves. Much as we fi nd in 
Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Taymiyya locates the source of God’s love for His servants in 
God’s love for Himself: “What God loves of worship of Him and obedience 
to Him follows from love for Himself, and love of that is the cause of [His] 
love for His believing servants. His love for believers follows from love for 
Himself.”118 Th at is, God’s love for Himself is primary, and God’s love for 
116 Minhāj, 1:421/1:117. Th e translation, “. . . that the creature impacts the Creator or 
makes Him act . . .,” follows the text of Minhāj which reads: inna al-makhlūq aththara fī al-
khāliq aw ja≠alahu fā≠ilan. MinhājB reads somewhat diff erently: inna li-l-makhlūq atharan 
fī al-khāliq ja≠alahu fā≠ilan.
117 See similar arguments at MF 8:379.
118 Irāda, MF 8: 140–4 (quote on 144). Similarly in Nubuwwāt, 111, Ibn Taymiyya writes, 
“Th e Lord—Exalted is He—loves Himself, and among the necessary concomitants of His 
love of Himself is that it is a love willing what He wills to do. What He wills to do, He wills 
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human beings follows on from that secondarily. On this basis, Ibn Taymiyya 
argues comparatively that God’s self-love, self-praise and self-laudation so 
greatly exceed human love, praise and laudation of God that God has no 
need of them. More decisively, however, the shaykh leaves the human vantage 
point aside completely and adds that God has no need because it is He who 
creates the love and good deeds of His servants:
[God] is the Suffi  cient-in-Himself (al-ghanī bi-nafsihi). He does not need 
anyone else. Even more, everything other than Him is in want of Him . . . When 
He rejoices at the repentance of the repenting, loves whoever draws close to 
Him with supererogatory deeds, is well pleased with the earliest predecessors 
and such like, it is not permissible to say that He has want of another in that. 
He is not perfected by another. It is He who created them, and it is He who 
guided them and helped them so that they did what He loves, is well pleased 
with and rejoices at.119
As in the argument cited from Minhāj above, Ibn Taymiyya here preserves 
God’s suffi  ciency not by making the world arbitrary—as the Ash≠arīs do—but 
by crediting all that occurs within it to God’s creative acts. One might ask 
what role volition plays in the shaykh’s understanding of human agency, but 
answering this question must await Chapter Four. Continuing on in Irāda, 
Ibn Taymiyya identifi es the argument above as that of “the great majority 
who affi  rm in [God’s] acts a wise purpose which is linked to Him, which He 
loves, with which He is well pleased, and for the sake of which He acts.”120
Aft er this, the shaykh takes up his fi ve point response to the Ash≠arī 
objection that this makes God “perfected by another and imperfect prior 
to that.”121 Four of the fi ve points made in Irāda are arguments from reason. 
Th e fi rst point states that only someone perfected by his acts is rational. We 
have already seen this premise at work in Ibn Taymiyya’s polemic against the 
Mu≠tazilī notion that God acts for wise purposes that do not return to Him. 
Th e second point briefl y sets aside the Ash≠arī theology of a God who acts 
without cause: a God not able to act for a wise purpose would be imperfect. 
Th is is expanded in the fi ft h point where the shaykh explains that reason 
knows that someone able to bring events into existence for a wise purpose is 
more perfect than someone not able to do that. Probably with the philoso-
for an objective ( ghāya) that He loves. Love is the fi nal cause (al-≠illa al-ghā±iyya) because of 
which everything exists.” Although not explicitly stated, the context indicates that the fi nal 
cause here is God’s very essence. My translation diff ers somewhat from that of Bell, Love 
Th eory, 80, who quotes it for other purposes.
119 Irāda, MF 8:145.
120 Irāda, MF 8:145.
121 Irāda, MF 8:146–7 (quote on 146).
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phers in mind, he adds that it does not matter that these events originate 
temporally and are not eternal. In fact it is of the perfection or character of 
an originating event not to exist prior to its origination. In his fourth point, 
and arguing in a similar vein, Ibn Taymiyya takes on the Ash≠arī complaint 
that God’s acting for a cause makes God imperfect prior to His alleged 
perfection. Th e shaykh replies that perfection is the existence of something 
only when wise purpose requires. Imperfection is its existence at other times. 
Th us, imperfection is not the nonexistence of something as such, but only its 
absence when it should exist. Ibn Taymiyya notes that God is ascribed with 
both negative and positive attributes, both of which imply His perfection, 
and greater perfection is not always attained through addition.
Th e third point has been saved for last because it is not properly a ratio-
nal argument but a clarifi cation. Ibn Taymiyya explains that God is not 
perfected by another, as the Ash≠arīs surmise. Rather, God is perfected by 
His own will and power without help from any other. God’s suffi  ciency is 
brooking no rivals in the act of creation; it is not indiff erence to creation 
as such. If it should still be thought that God somehow gains something 
from others through His acts, he adds, “When it is said that He is perfect 
through (kamula bi) His act in which He does not need anyone else, it is as 
if it were said that He is perfect through His attributes or perfect through 
His essence.”122 From this angle, God’s acts are just as constitutive of His 
perfection as His attributes and essence. God’s activity is a necessary con-
comitant of God’s perfection, and in no way does God acquire perfection 
through His acts.123
Conclusion
Ash≠arī objections to rationality in God’s will present a major obstacle to 
articulating a theodicy, and Ibn Taymiyya must face these objections squarely 
in order to carve out intellectual space for his own view. Th e shaykh’s insis-
tence that God acts rationally on account of wise purposes or causes in a 
self-interested sense strongly suggests that God needs creatures to manifest 
His perfection. Th e shaykh thus appears to fall afoul of the Ash≠arī charge 
that causality in the will of God endangers God’s self-suffi  ciency. Ibn Tay-
miyya sidesteps the Ash≠arī allegation by explaining that it is God who creates 
122 Irāda, MF 8:146.
123 Cf. Kasb, MF 8:387, which is translated below in Chapter Four, n. 122.
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both creatures and their responses. God is suffi  cient in the sense that He 
needs no help in creating all that is in the world. Th e shaykh also employs 
the Avicennan notion that while the world is a necessary concomitant of 
God’s perfection and self-love it is not essential to who God is. God has no 
need of the world. He loves, praises and lauds Himself primarily, and from 
that fl ows the world only secondarily, even if necessarily.
Th e Ash≠arīs also argue that causality in God’s will entails an infi nite regress 
and subjects God to temporal origination, both of which the Ash≠arīs take to 
be impossible. In response, Ibn Taymiyya refutes Ash≠arī arguments against 
an infi nite regress and turns perpetual origination in God’s essence into a 
virtue of God’s perfection. However, the shaykh prefers to speak not techni-
cally of originating events subsisting in God’s essence but more scripturally 
of God’s voluntary attributes and acts, which He exercises by His will and 
power. Th is is much the same as when Ibn Taymiyya indicates causality in 
God’s will with the term wise purpose ( !hikma) instead of purpose ( ghara#d ) 
in order to avoid negative connotations attached to the latter term in every-
day speech. In sum, God in His perfection has been willing and creating 
originated things of one kind or another for wise purposes from eternity 
by means of His will and power.
Th is perpetually dynamic vision of God’s essence sets Ibn Taymiyya apart 
from much, perhaps all, of the preceding Islamic philosophical and theologi-
cal tradition and especially from fellow optimist Ibn Sīnā. Th e shaykh rejects 
the Kalām doctrine that creation had a defi nite beginning, and he jettisons 
Ibn Sīnā’s emanation cosmology and timeless God. However, he retains the 
necessity of optimal productivity inherent in Ibn Sīnā’s notion of God. Ibn 
Taymiyya portrays God’s creation of the world as voluntary and dynamic, but 
this dynamic and voluntary creativity is nonetheless a necessary concomitant 
of God’s essential and self-suffi  cient perfection.
CHAPTER THREE
GOD’S CREATION AND GOD’S COMMAND
Ibn Taymiyya’s Creation/Command Hermeneutic
If God is the wise Creator of everything that occurs in the world, how does 
Ibn Taymiyya account for human agency and responsibility? Th e following 
chapter focuses directly on how God creates human agency. Th e present 
chapter examines how the shaykh relates God’s legislation, which imposes 
human obligation and responsibility, to God’s all-encompassing creation. As 
noted in the last chapter, Joseph Bell shows how Ibn Taymiyya attacks al-
Juwaynī for equating God’s love and good pleasure with God’s creative will 
(irāda khalqiyya) of all things. According to Ibn Taymiyya, God does not 
love the unbelief that He creates. Rather, God loves and is well pleased with 
obedience to His legislative will (irāda shar≠iyya). God only creates unbelief 
for a wise purpose that he loves. God does not love unbelief, but God loves 
the wise purpose for which it is created.
While Bell has well described the core of Ibn Taymiyya’s doctrine, it 
remains to display the variety of ways in which the shaykh expresses it. Th e 
terms ‘creative will’ and ‘legislative will’ are part of a creation/command 
hermeneutic that Ibn Taymiyya employs to interpret a wide range of quranic 
and theological terms. Equivalent to God’s creation are God’s lordship, inspi-
ration, determination, decree and ontological will. Corresponding to God’s 
command are God’s divinity, love, good pleasure and religious will, as well 
as the distinction between piety and immorality. Additionally, Ibn Taymiyya 
does not always address the conundrum posed by creation and command with 
God’s love for his wise purpose. Frequently he simply affi  rms wise purpose, 
justice or mercy in God’s creation. On a few occasions, however, he does 
suggest images or similitudes to render the non-coincidence of creation and 
command more plausible.
Besides surveying diverse ways that Ibn Taymiyya affi  rms creation and 
command, the present chapter gives much space to his attendant polemic 
against Kalām theologians, Sufi s and skeptics. However, the shaykh’s critique 
of Sufi sm, which grows out of his concern to give creation and command 
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each their due, is much more extensive than can be examined here.1 Th e 
discussion below is limited to indicating some major directions this takes. 
More detailed treatment of Ibn Taymiyya’s criticism of Sufi sm may be found 
elsewhere.2
Ibn Taymiyya’s Classifi cation of Errors in Creation and Command
A Typology of Errors
In several theodicean texts, Ibn Taymiyya sets out a four-fold typology on 
creation and command that classifi es his polemical opponents and identi-
fi es his own view.3 Although not complete, the following passage translated 
from Tadmuriyya is fairly typical. Four major positions are identifi ed with 
the appellations “Majūsīs,” “Mushrikīs,” “Iblīsīs,” and “People of Guidance 
and Success.” Following the translation, the fi rst three positions will be 
clarifi ed and augmented from the shaykh’s other instances of the typology 
and related polemic.
It is well known that it is obligatory to believe in God’s creation (khalq) and 
His command (amr), His decree (qa#dā±) and His legislation (shar≠). Th e mis-
1 Much of Ibn Taymiyya’s thinking on Sufi  matters is found in volumes 1, 2, 10 and 11 
of MF, and in Iqti #dā±, Istiqāma and Ma!habba. Th ere is also a great deal of material scattered 
throughout his other writings.
2 For Ibn Taymiyya’s various critiques of Sufi  speculation and popular religious practices, 
see Alexander D. Knysh, Ibn ≠Arabi in the Later Islamic Tradition: Th e Making of a Polemical 
Image in Medieval Islam (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999), 87–111, 
with corrections to the analysis of Ibn Taymiyya in the review by Jon Hoover in Islam and 
Christian-Muslim Relations 10:3 (Oct. 1999): 392–4; Muhammad Umar Memon, Ibn 
Taimīya’s Struggle against Popular Religion: With an Annotated Translation of his Kitāb 
iqti #dā± a $s-$sirā$t al-mustaqīm mukhālafat a$s!hāb al-ja!hīm (Th e Hague: Mouton, 1976); Michel, 
A Muslim Th eologian’s Response to Christianity, 5–14, 24–39; Jean R. Michot, Musique et 
danse selon Ibn Taymiyya, Le livre du Samâ≠ et de la danse (Kitâb al-Samâ≠ wa l-Raq $s) com-
pilé par le shaykh Muhammad al-Manbijî (Paris: J. Vrin, 1991); P. Nwyia, “Une cible d’Ibn 
Taimîya: Le moniste al-Tilimsânî (m. 690/1291),” Bulletin d’Etudes orientales 30 (1978): 
127–145; Niels Henrik Olesen, “Étude comparée des idées d’Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) 
et de Martin Luther (1483–1546) sur le culte des saints,” Revue des Etudes Islamiques 50 
(1982):175–206; and Niels Henrik Olesen, Cultes des Saints et Pélerinages chez Ibn Taymiyya 
(Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1991).
3 Ib$tāl, MF 2:300–4; Fī Fu$sū$s, MF 2:409–411; Tadmuriyya, MF 3:111–2; Qadariyya, MF 
8:256–261; and +Tā ≠a, MF 8:444–6. Cf. Minhāj, 3:82/2:9–10. Th e following discuss the same 
ideas although not in the form of a tidy typology: Wāsi$tiyya, MF 3:148–150; Irāda, 8:97–117; 
Sa≠āda, MF 288–9; I!htijāj, MF 8:303–370; Jabr, MF 8:449–478; Furqān, MF 13:211–229; 
(Hasana, MF 14:347–359; Shams, MF 16:230–248; and Minhāj, 3:75–8/2:7–8.
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guided people who delve into determination (qadar) have divided into three 
sects: Majūsīs, Mushrikīs and Iblīsīs.
Th e Majūsīs are those who gave the lie to the determination of God even 
if they believed in His command and His prohibition. Th e extremists among 
them denied the [fore-]knowledge [of God] and [pre-]writing [of human 
acts]. Th e moderates among them denied the generality of His will (mashī±a), 
His creation and His power (qudra). Th ese are the Mu≠tazilīs and those who 
agree with them.
Th e second sect is the Mushrikīs who acknowledged decree and determina-
tion and denied command and prohibition. He—Exalted is He—said, “Th ose 
who gave associates [to God] will say, ‘If God had willed, we would not have 
given associates, nor would have our fathers, and we would not have forbidden 
anything [against His will]’” (Q. 6:148). Whoever argues for stripping away 
the command and prohibition with determination is one of these. Th is has 
become frequent among those Sufi s who claim [to have attained] reality.
Th e third sect is the Iblīsīs who acknowledged the two elements, but they 
regarded them as contradictory in the Lord—Glory be to Him, Exalted is 
He—and they discredited His wise purpose (!hikma) and His justice (≠adl ), 
just as this is mentioned concerning Iblīs, their ringleader, according to what 
the experts in sectarian teachings (ahl al-maqālāt) transmitted and what is 
transmitted from the People of the Book.
Th e point is that [the above] is what the people who go astray say. As for 
the People of Guidance and Success, they believe in both. Th ey believe that 
God is Creator, Lord and Sovereign of everything. What He wills is, and what 
He does not will is not. He is powerful over everything, and His knowledge 
encompasses everything. . . . And it is necessary to believe in legislation. Th is is 
belief in the command and the prohibition and the promise and the threat, as 
God raised up His messengers with this and sent down His books.4
As noted under the fourth position, that of the People of Guidance and 
Success, Ibn Taymiyya includes “the promise and the threat” on the side of 
divine command and prohibition.5 Th is involves the promise of reward for 
good deeds and the threat of punishment for bad deeds. Under command, 
he elsewhere includes “the names and the judgments (al-asmā± wa al-a!hkām)” 
which deal with whether one is a believer or unbeliever.6 Th ese matters fall 
on the side of command rather than creation because they involve questions 
of human accountability.
In other texts, Ibn Taymiyya identifi es all of the fi rst three positions cited 
above as Qadarī. Th is yields the “Majūsī Qadarīs,” the “Mushrikī Qadarīs” and 
4 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:111–3. Much of the ellipsis is translated below (157–8).
5 Th e connection between command and prohibition, or related notions, and promise 
and threat also occurs in Jabr, MF 8:452; and Shams, MF 16:230, 235.
6 Furqān, MF 13:211.
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the “Iblīsī Qadarīs.”7 Th ese are polemical labels rather than names of actual 
groups. Th e sense of Qadarī in these appellations is that of anyone who goes 
astray on the doctrine of determination (qadar), and the adjectives Majūsī, 
Mushrikī and Iblīsī denote three diff erent ways of erring. Ibn Taymiyya occa-
sionally uses other adjectival forms with Qadarī such as “Mujbirī Qadarīs,”8 
“Jabrī Qadarīs”9 and “Murji±ī Qadarīs.”10 For Ibn Taymiyya the Mujbirīs or 
Jabrīs deny that humans are the agents of their acts, and the Murji±īs, who 
did constitute an actual movement in early Islamic history, understand faith 
(īmān) as assent and knowledge without deeds.11 Th e shaykh places both 
groups under the category of Mushrikī Qadarīs because of their perceived 
weakness in upholding human accountability.
Qadarīs and Mu≠tazilīs: Compromising Creation
Th e terms Mushrikī Qadarī and Iblīsī Qadarī do not appear oft en in Ibn 
Taymiyya’s writings.12 He most commonly reserves the term Qadarī for those 
who follow the precedent of the historical Qadarī trend in early Islam and 
deny that God creates human acts.13 He states, for example, “Not one of the 
Qadarīs affi  rms that God is Creator of the acts of servants.”14 Ibn Taymiyya 
also calls Qadarīs “Deniers (nufāh)” because they deny that God can make 
someone either obedient or disobedient.15 In light of this, the shaykh oft en 
uses the term Qadarī to denote the Mu≠tazilīs.16 He cites the Mu≠tazilī Abū 
al-(Husayn al-Ba$srī as a prominent proponent of the Qadarī view and credits 
 7 For these three types of Qadarīs, see Fī Fu $sū$s, MF 2:409–411; Qadariyya, MF 8:256–
261; MF 10:718; and Shams, MF 16:230, 232, 235, 238, 239.
 8 Furqān, MF 13:212, 225; and (Hasana, MF 14:247. In Irāda, MF 8:105, Ibn Taymiyya 
also notes that some early scholars in Islam called those who believed in God’s compulsion 
( jabr) of human acts Qadarīs.
 9 Nubuwwāt, 96.
10 Irāda, MF 8:105.
11 For Ibn Taymiyya’s views on the Jabrīs, see below. For his views on the Murji±īs, see 
Īmān I, MF 7:190ff ., and the translation of this work, Kitab Al-Iman: Book of Faith, trans. 
Salman Hassan Al-Ani and Shadia Ahmad Tel (Bloomington, IN: Iman Publishing House, 
1999), 200ff . See also Shams, MF 16:241–3.
12 I located fi ve occurrences of the term “Iblīsī Qadarīs” in MF: Fī Fu $sū$s, MF 2:400, 411; 
Qadariyya, MF 8:260; MF 10:718; and Shams, MF 16:232.
13 On the Qadarī movement in early Islam, see W. Montgomery Watt, Th e Formative Period 
of Islamic Th ought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973), 82–118.
14 Shams, MF 16:232. Cf. Fī Fu $sū $s, MF 2:400, where Ibn Taymiyya includes with the 
Qadarīs the “naturalists” who attribute acts to bodies, natures, celestial spheres or souls 
rather than God.
15 Furqān, MF 13:225–6. Cf. (Hasana, MF 14:347.
16 See for example Shams, MF 16:239; and Minhāj, 3:18/2:267.
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him with being “the foremost of the later Mu≠tazilīs.”17 He also uses the term 
Qadarī for later Shī≠īs such as Ibn al-Mu$tahhar al- (Hillī who adopt Mu≠tazilī 
theology.18 In creation and command typologies, Ibn Taymiyya typically only 
explains that the Mu≠tazilīs reject God’s creation of human acts in order to 
maintain His justice, but he does give the Mu≠tazilī rationale closer atten-
tion in other contexts.
Th e term Majūsī, which appears in the quotation from Tadmuriyya above, 
comes from Majūs, the Arabic word denoting the followers of the dualist, 
Persian religion Zoroastrianism, also called Mazdaism.19 Th e Majūs were 
known to Ibn Taymiyya as believing in an agent of evil other than God. 
He adds that they were a community which paid the jizya to the Muslims 
and whose women some scholars said Muslims could marry.20 He equates 
the Majūs with the Persians,21 and he explains that they fell into dualism 
(thanawiyya) by inquiring into the cause of evil.22 Th e shaykh links the 
Qadarīs to the Majūs on the basis of a hadith in which the Prophet is said 
to have called the Qadarīs “the Majūs of this community.”23 He also notes 
17 Shams, MF 16:236. Concerning Abū al- (Husayn, Ibn Taymiyya continues, “He had 
more intelligence and erudition than most of his peers, but he had little acquaintance with 
the traditions (al-sunan), the meanings of the Qur±an and the path of the Salaf.”
18 For example, see Minhāj, 3:181/2:34, where Shī≠īs are subsumed under the Qadarīs, 
and Minhāj, 3:190/2:37, where Ibn Taymiyya calls his opponent al-(Hillī a Qadarī. Minhāj, 
1:127–8/1:31, describes how later Shī≠īs adopted Mu≠tazilī doctrine. For the assimilation of 
the Mu≠tazilīs to the Qadarīs in early Kalām theology, see Daniel Gimaret, La doctrine d’al-
Ash≠arī (Paris: Cerf, 1990), 396–8.
19 On Zoroastrianism and its relationship to the Islamic tradition, see M. Morony, “Madjūs,” 
EI2 5:1110–8; Guy Monnot, Penseurs musulmans et religions iraniennes: ≠Abd al-Jabbār et 
ses devanciers (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1974), 77–81, 88–91, 137–142; Guy 
Monnot, Islam et religions (Paris: Éditions Maisonneuve et Larose, 1986), 129–156 (on al-
Māturīdī) and 157–170 (on the Ash≠arī al-Bāqillānī); and Christoph J. Bürgel, “Zoroastrianism 
as Viewed in Medieval Islamic Sources,” in Muslim Perceptions of Other Religions: A Historical 
Survey, ed. Jacques Waardenburg (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), 202–212. 
For the view that Zoroastrianism and Mazdaism are synonymous, see Gherardo Gnoli, 
“Zoroastrianism,” in Th e Encyclopedia of Religion, ed., Mircea Eliade (New York: MacMillian, 
1987), 15:579–591. On the dualism of both Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism in relation to 
Islam, see G. Monnot, “Th anawiyya,” EI2 10:439–441. Also of interest on Islamic responses 
to dualism is G. Vajda, “Le Témoignage d’al-Māturidī sur la doctrine des Manichéens, des 
Day$sānites et des Marcionites,” Arabica 13 (1966): 1–38, 113–128.
20 Irāda, MF 8:100.
21 Shams, MF 16:239.
22 Ta±iyya, MF 8:248 (reading ≠illat al-sharr instead of  ≠illat al-sirr).
23 Wāsi$tiyya, MF 3:150; Abū Dāwūd. 4071, Al-Sunna, Fī al-qadar. Sarah Stroumsa and 
Gedaliahu G. Stroumsa, “Aspects of Anti-Manichaean Polemics in Late Antiquity and under 
Early Islam,” Harvard Th eological Review 81:1 (1988): 37–58 (especially 54–5), cite this 
hadith as evidence that debate over divine determination in Islam emerged in the context of 
the challenge posed by Zoroastrian, as well as Manichaean, dualism.
108 chapter three
that the Qadarīs resemble the Majūs inasmuch as both “affi  rm [someone] 
other than God who produces evil things apart from His will, His power 
and His creation.”24 Th e point in comparing the Qadarīs to the Majūs is to 
accuse the former of a dualism of creators when they posit human beings 
as the creators of their acts.
Th e quotation from Tadmuriyya above also distinguishes between “extrem-
ist” Majūsīs who deny God’s foreknowledge and “moderate” Mu≠tazilīs who 
do not. In Jabr Ibn Taymiyya reports that Ma≠bad al-Juhanī (d. 83/703) 
promulgated the extremist Qadarī teaching fi rst in Basra to counter the 
Umayyads but was opposed by the Companions of the Prophet.25 Elsewhere, 
the shaykh notes that deniers of foreknowledge argue that it would be bad 
of a prince to command someone to do something when he knows that the 
person will not obey, and so also with God.26 Apart from such occasional 
mentions, denial of God’s foreknowledge is not a major concern for Ibn 
Taymiyya, and he says that almost no one denied it in his time.27
Sufi  Antinomians, Jahmīs, Jabrīs and Ash≠arīs: Compromising Command
Turning now to the Mushrikī Qadarīs, or more simply the Mushrikīs, the 
crux of the problem shift s from denying God’s creation of human acts to 
nullifying God’s command. Th e term mushrik means idolater or more liter-
ally one who associates partners (ashraka) with God, and, for Ibn  Taymiyya, 
Mushrikī is a term of aspersion rather than the name of a historical group. 
Th e shaykh’s primary concern in the Tadmuriyya quotation above is the 
argument of the Arab associationists found in the Qur±an that divine 
determination prevented them from pure worship of God. He notes that 
this argument is widespread among Sufi  gnostics in his time. He alleges that 
the Sufi  antinomians (mubā!hiyya) are worse than the Arab associationists. 
Th e latter, he observes, at least have some laws whereas the Sufi s annul the 
Law completely.28
24 Jabr, MF 8:452.
25 Jabr, MF 8:450. Cf. Sa≠āda, MF 8:288. According to Watt, Formative Period, 85, 87, 
Ma≠bad was involved in political opposition to the Umayyads and denied that God had 
determined their misdeeds. J. van Ess underlines the politically charged and thus uncertain 
nature of the sources for knowledge of this fi gure in “Ma≠bad b. ≠Abd Allāh b. ≠Ukaym al-
Djuhanī,” EI2 5:935–6.
26 Shams, MF 16:233.
27 Wāsi$tiyya, MF 3:148–9. God’s foreknowledge is discussed briefl y in Ta !hsīn al-≠aql, MF 
8:429–430; and Shams, MF 16:233–4. A full defense consisting mostly of quranic quotations 
occurs in Jabr, MF 8:490–7.
28 Jabr, MF 8:457–8.
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Ibn Taymiyya writes prolifi cally against this “determination argument (al-
i!htijāj bi-l-qadar).”29 His main complaint is that it does not hold up against 
human rationality. Reason and the natural constitution know it to be a vain 
argument.30 He explains that no one will accept divine determination as an 
excuse for injustice, violation of his wife, and murder of his son. Nor will 
anyone who excuses his own misdeeds with determination accept it as an 
excuse from someone who acts against him. Everyone is subject to the same 
divine determination, and so it cannot serve as an argument for anyone. 
Th e shaykh asserts that, if all could do as they pleased without censure, the 
world would be destroyed.31
On this basis, Ibn Taymiyya adopts a pragmatic perspective. If someone is 
warned of an approaching enemy, he does not wait for God to create “fl ee-
ing” in him; he strives to fl ee and then God helps him fl ee.32 Someone who 
truly wills to believe and obey God and has the power to do so will do it. 
If he does not do it, it is because he did not will it.33 Whoever defends his 
sins with determination is simply following his caprice and does not have 
knowledge.34 For Ibn Taymiyya, the proper attitude is patience with the affl  ic-
tions that God has determined. In sins the response should be repentance 
and asking forgiveness, while in acts of obedience one should also confess 
God’s determination to avoid pride.35
Th e shaykh identifi es two diff erent foundations of Sufi  antinomianism, one 
particular and the other general.36 Th e particular occurs when the individual 
Sufi  in ecstatic annihilation ( fanā±) erroneously believes that he no longer 
has a will of his own but passes away into the will of the Real. In this wit-
nessing (mushāhada), any distinction between good and evil does not apply 
to the gnostic, and the Law is no longer relevant. Ibn Taymiyya cites the 
(Hanbalī Sufi  Abū Ismā≠īl al-An$sārī al-Harawī (d. 481/1089) as an example 
of this line of thinking. In response Ibn Taymiyya appeals to the teaching 
of the early Sufi  master al-Junayd (d. 298/910) that even in witnessing the 
29 Giving extended attention to the qadar argument are I!htijāj, MF 8:303–370; Minhāj, 
3:54–86/2:2–11; Qa #dā±, MF 8:262–271; ≠Ubūdiyya, MF 10:157–172; and Ib $tāl, MF 
2:300–3, 323–330.
30 Minhāj, 3:56/2:3, 3:60/2:4, and 3:65/2:5.
31 Tā≠a, MF 8:263; Tā±iyya, MF 8:248–251; Jabr, MF 8:453–5; Minhāj, 3:56–7/2:3; 
≠Ubūdiyya, MF 10:164–5; Ib$tāl, MF 2:300–2; and Irāda, MF 8:114.
32 Minhāj, 3:67/2:5. Cf. Minhāj, 3:65/2:5.
33 Minhāj, 3:69–70/2:6.
34 Minhāj, 3:65/2:5; and ≠Ubūdiyya, MF 10:165.
35 I!htijāj, MF 8:327–8, 331; Minhāj, 3:78/2:8; ≠Ubūdiyya, MF 10:159–160; Ib$tāl, MF 
2:301–2; Tadmuriyya, MF 3:122; MF 8:76–7; and MF 8:237.
36 Fī Fu $sū$s, MF 2:364–370, outlines the two perspectives.
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universal will of God one must also witness command and prohibition.37 
He also asserts that ≠Abd al-Qādir al-Jilānī (d. 561/1166), the eponym of 
the Qādirī Sufi  order, prohibits arguing from determination.38 Ultimately, 
the shaykh asserts, the Sufi  gnostic cannot escape the fact that he still draws 
distinctions between what profi ts and harms him, and this is in fact what 
the Law was sent to clarify.39
Ibn Taymiyya identifi es a general basis for antinomianism in the doc-
trine of Ibn ≠Arabī and his followers whom the shaykh calls the “People of 
the Oneness of Existence (ahl wa !hdat al-wujūd )”40 or the “Unifi cationists 
(itti!hādīs).”41 Th e shaykh interprets their teaching as a monism that collapses 
a proper distinction between God and His creatures and makes God identical 
to creation. Th is leads to the repulsive notion that God punishes Himself 
and is identical to idols, satans, pigs and unbelievers.42 Ibn Taymiyya alleges 
that Ibn ≠Arabī and his followers thus accept any kind of worship: “Th ey 
agree with every form of associationism in the world, equate God with every 
created thing, and permit worship of everything.”43 Furthermore, the shaykh 
charges the Unifi cationist poet al-Tilimsānī (d. 690/1291) with falling into 
explicit antinomianism, making all forbidden things lawful, even marriage 
to one’s mother or daughter.44
Although Ibn Taymiyya does not mention the Jahmīs, Jabrīs and Ash≠arīs 
in the above typology from Tadmuriyya, he includes them in similar discus-
sions elsewhere. He accuses them of upholding determination at the expense 
of God’s command, and he sometimes links them to Sufi  antinomianism.45 
He usually takes the early Muslim theologian Jahm b. !Safwān to be the 
source of this tendency, explaining that Jahm upheld God’s determination 
37 (Hasana, MF 14:354–5. Cf. I!htijāj, MF 8:317–8, 346, 369; Awliyā±, MF 11:245; Minhāj, 
3:168/2:31; and Furūq, MF 8:228–9.
38 I!htijāj, MF 8:306, 369. Ibn Taymiyya devotes the treatise ≠Abd al-Qādir, MF 10:455–548, 
to ≠Abd al-Qādir’s Futū !h al-ghayb. Th e latter has been translated as ≠Abdul-Qādir al-Jīlānī, 
Revelations of the Unseen (Futū !h al-Ghaib), trans. Muhtar Holland (Houston, TX: Al-Baz, 
1992).
39 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:116–7; and I!htijāj, MF 8:308–311, 346–7.
40 Fī Fu $sū$s, MF 2:367. Cf. Ib $tāl, MF 2:294ff .
41 Itti!hādiyyīn, MF 2:134, 140–1.
42 Itti!hādiyyīn, MF 2:142, 173; Fī Fu$sū$s, MF 2:364–5; and Ib $tāl, MF 2:331, 355–6.
43 Itti!hādiyyīn, MF 2:255.
44 Manbijī, MF 2:472; and Fī Fu$sū$s, MF 2:364–7. Ibn Taymiyya, Ib$tāl, MF 2:342, also 
reports that al-Tilimsānī said that even a dead, scabby dog was part of God’s essence.
45 Tā≠a, MF 8:444–5; I !htijāj, MF 8:352–3; and (Hasana, MF 14:346–359. Cf. Shams, 
MF 16:235.
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in the extreme.46 Ibn Taymiyya describes Jahm and his followers the Jahmīs 
as Jabrīs and Mujbirīs, calling Jahm himself “the Imām of the Mujbirīs.”47 
Additionally, the shaykh frequently compounds the names Jahmī and Mujbirī 
to yield “Mujbirī Jahmīs.”48 Th e labels Jabrī and Mujbirī both derive from the 
word jabr (compulsion), which denotes the idea that God, as the sole Actor 
in the universe, compels the human act. In earlier Islamic history, these terms 
did not denote a particular group but were used by the Mu≠tazilīs to cast 
aspersion upon their opponents.49 Ibn Taymiyya asserts that the Jahmīs were 
the fi rst to deny that humans were truly the agents ( fā ≠il ) of their acts, and 
he reports that it was said that they believed that “the servant is compelled 
(majbūr), and he has no act fundamentally.”50 Th e shaykh accuses Jahm of 
several related errors. Jahm sees no real diff erence between good and evil 
deeds.51 He rejects God’s wise purpose, justice and mercy by denying that 
God creates and commands for a cause or reason: “[ Jahm] used to deny 
that God was the Most Merciful of the merciful. He used to go out to the 
lepers, look at them and say, ‘Th e Most Merciful of the merciful has done 
the likes of this with them.’”52 Ibn Taymiyya also claims that Jahm and his 
followers bear a strong resemblance to the people of India (ahl al-Hind), but 
he does not explain why.53 Th e Muslims knew the Brahmans (Barāhima) of 
India primarily as deniers of prophecy, and possibly Ibn Taymiyya linked an 
extreme emphasis on compulsion to a denial of the need for prophecy.
Under the rubric of the Jabrīs, Ibn Taymiyya mentions the Ash≠arī theo-
logian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.54 He writes, “[Al-Rāzī] openly proclaimed that 
he taught jabr,”55 and he calls al-Rāzī a “pure Jabrī.”56 As we will see in the 
next chapter, al-Rāzī does in fact call himself a Jabrī, and the well-known 
46 (Hasana, MF 14:346–358, in which passage Ibn Taymiyya accuses Jahm of two inno-
vations: denial of the divine attributes and excess in divine determination. Th e Mu≠tazilīs 
then fell into the fi rst error and the Ash≠arīs the second. Cf. I !htijāj, MF 8:347, 352ff . In 
Fī Fu$sū$s, MF 2:367, Ibn Taymiyya says that the Itti !hādīs realized the Jahmī position better 
than anyone else.
47 Kasb, MF 8:394; and Minhāj, 3:75/2:7. In Th ulth, MF 17:177, Ibn Taymiyya calls Jahm 
“the Imām of the extremist Mujbirīs.”
48 Jabr, MF 8:497; Minhāj, 3:75/2:7, 3:193–6/2:38; and (Hasana, MF 14:310.
49 Watt, Formative Period, 118.
50 Jabr, MF 8:460.
51 Jabr, MF 8:466; and (Hasana, MF 14:346–358.
52 Jabr, MF 8:460. Th is story is also found in Nubuwwāt, 353; Minhāj, 3:32/1:270; and 
Th ulth, MF 17:102.
53 Shams, MF 16:239.
54 Shams, MF 16:236; and Isti $tā ≠a, MF 8:375.
55 Minhāj, 3:267/2:56.
56 I!htijāj, MF 8:307.
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Ash≠arī doctrine of acquisition (kasb) in human acts is of no consequence 
to either al-Rāzī or Ibn Taymiyya. Beyond this, Ibn Taymiyya is convinced 
that al-Rāzī’s doctrine of jabr annuls ethical distinctions: “[Al-Rāzī] fi rmly 
believes . . . that the servant is compelled (majbūr) [to do] his act and that 
the act of one compelled is not bad. Th us, no acts of servants are bad.”57 Ibn 
Taymiyya believes that al-Ash≠arī is better in this regard since he affi  rms that 
the diff erence between command and prohibition is real for creatures even 
if not for God.58
It is something of an oddity that the two major groups that Ibn Taymiyya 
brings together under the one rubric of those compromising command—the 
Sufi s and the Ash≠arīs—diff er fundamentally in their approach to problems of 
evil. Th e Sufi s typically adopt some kind of optimism while the voluntarism 
of the Ash≠arīs completely rejects rationality in God’s will. What the two 
groups share, however, is belief in God’s determination of all existents, and 
Ibn Taymiyya’s primary concern in this type is with those who shirk God’s 
command because they take determinism to be incompatible with human 
responsibility.
Free-thinkers and Poets: Impugning God’s Wise Purpose and Justice
Th e Iblīsīs constitute the third group in the Tadmuriyya typology quoted 
earlier. Ibn Taymiyya explains that the Iblīsīs take their name from their fore-
runner Iblīs and accuse God of injustice and foolishness in what He creates 
and commands. Elsewhere, Ibn Taymiyya identifi es this as the view of “the 
fools among the poets and such like among the free-thinkers (zanādiqa),” 
and he cites the poet Abū al-≠Alā± al-Ma≠arrī (d. 449/1058) as an example.59 
Curiously, Ibn Taymiyya does not identify the voluntarist Jahmīs and Ash≠arīs 
explicitly with the Iblīsī position even though their problems are similar: 
both deny rationality in God’s all-determining will. Possibly the diff erence 
is that the shaykh regards the Ash≠arīs as seeking to maintain a semblance 
57 Shams, MF 16:246.
58 (Hasana, MF 14:355; and Shams, MF 16:246–7.
59 Qadariyya, MF 8:260. I have not found Ibn Taymiyya naming any particular free-think-
ers on the question of God’s justice. One of the better known is Ibn al-Rāwandī (4th/10th 
century) who voiced the basic Iblīsī complaints mentioned here in a book called Kitāb al-ta≠dīl 
wa al-tajwīr. For notice of this book, see Abū al- (Husayn ≠Abd al-Ra!hmān b. Mu !hammad b. 
≠Uthmān al-Khayyā$t, Kitāb al-inti$sār, ed. H.S. Nyberg and trans. Albert N. Nader (Beirut: Les 
lettres orientales, 1957), 12 (trans. 2); and Sarah Stroumsa, Freethinkers in Medieval Islam: 
Ibn al-Rāwandī, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, and Th eir Impact on Islamic Th ought (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 
131–2, which includes an English translation of al-Khayyā$t’s notice.
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of piety in practice while the Iblīsī position is that of explicit skepticism, 
disbelief and rebellion.
Th e Qur±an does not speak of Iblīs’s denial of God’s wisdom and justice. 
It only mentions that he grew proud and refused to bow before Adam at 
God’s command.60 However, as noted in the typology from Tadmuriyya 
above, Ibn Taymiyya indicates that experts in sectarian teachings and the 
People of the Book have transmitted an account of Iblīs’s defamation of 
God’s wisdom and justice.61 He probably has in mind the story of Iblīs’s 
seven objections to God’s wisdom found at the beginning of the Kitāb al-
milal wa al-ni!hal of al-Shahrastānī. (Among other charges, Iblīs questions 
God’s wisdom in creating him when God already knew what would become 
of him).62 A passage in Irāda similar to that in Tadmuriyya makes explicit 
reference to al-Shahrastānī’s account and the fact that al-Shahrastānī traces 
it to the People of the Book. Ibn Taymiyya casts doubt on the authenticity 
of the story by noting that it lacks a proper chain of transmission, and he 
goes on to argue that it is probably a Mu≠tazilī forgery.63
In Irāda the shaykh also explains why the Mu≠tazilīs would have interest 
in forging such a story: “Th eir intention in this is to refute those who affi  rm 
determination. Th ey say that God’s case against His creatures can only be 
brought forward by denying determination.”64 In Ibn Taymiyya’s view, the 
60 Th e story of Iblīs is found in Q. 2:34, 7:11–8, 15:28–42, 17:61–5, 18:50, 20:116–120 
and 38:71–85. On the reception of this story in Sufi sm, see Peter J. Awn, Satan’s Tragedy 
and Redemption: Iblīs in Sufi  Psychology (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1983).
61 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:111. In Minhāj, 3:82/2:9, Ibn Taymiyya also mentions that a dis-
putation by Iblīs was related, but he does not indicate by whom.
62 Mu!hammad b. ≠Abd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī, Al-Milal wa al-ni!hal, ed. A!hmad Fahmī 
Mu!hammad (Beirut: Dar al-kutub al-≠ilmiyya, n.d.), 7–9, which is translated in Mu!hammad 
b. ≠Abd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī, Muslim Sects and Divisions: Th e Section on Muslim Sects in 
Kitāb al-Milal wa ±l-Ni !hal, trans. A.K. Kazi and J.G. Flynn (London: Kegan Paul, 1984), 
12–5, and Shahrastani, Livres des religions et des sectes, trans. Daniel Gimaret and Guy Mon-
not (Louvain: Peeters, 1986), 1:115–9.
63 Irāda, MF 8:114–5. Sarah Stroumsa, Freethinkers, 130–1, sees the ethical challenge 
presented to monotheists by Manichaean and Zoroastrian dualists behind this story. Stroumsa 
and Stroumsa, “Aspects of Anti-Manichaean Polemics,” 51–8, argue that Mu≠tazilīs such as 
≠Abd al-Jabbār sought to refute the dualist challenge by rejecting the foolish and unjust God 
of the Manichaean caricature of monotheism. Th is Mu≠tazilī polemic then found a target 
closer home in their Mujbirī co-religionists whose belief in God’s absolute determination 
seemed to bear a strong resemblance to the Manichaean caricature. Th ese observations do 
not, of course, prove that al-Shahrastānī’s story of Iblīs was a Mu≠tazilī forgery, but they do 
indicate the sort of milieu in which it may have arisen. Th e above comments may also help to 
explain why, in Fī Fu$sū$s, MF 2:400, Ibn Taymiyya lists the Majūsīs not with those who deny 
God’s creation of human acts but with the Iblīsīs. Perhaps he was thinking of the Zoroastrian 
polemic against the goodness of a monotheistic God.
64 Irāda, MF 8:115.
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story of Iblīs defaming God’s wisdom and justice serves the Mu≠tazilī polemi-
cal purpose of undermining belief in God’s all-encompassing creation and 
determination. If God’s creation of all human acts can be shown to entail 
foolish and unjust behavior from God, then this view must be wrong. Th is 
is in fact the strategy adopted by the Shī≠ī scholar al-(Hillī in his Minhāj al-
karāma, the Mu≠tazilī-inspired polemic against Sunnism that Ibn Taymiyya 
in turn refutes in Minhāj. Al-(Hillī’s basic charges against an all-determining 
God have already been noted in the description of Minhāj found in the 
Introduction to this study.
In setting out the four-fold typology of positions on creation and com-
mand, Ibn Taymiyya does not always highlight Iblīsī skepticism. Instead, one 
version confronts ethical laxity with a quotation attributed to the (Hanbalī 
scholar Ibn al-Jawzī, “You are a Qadarī in obedience, and you are a Jabrī in 
disobedience, which is to say, whatever school of thought suits your caprice 
is the one you adopt.”65 Ibn Taymiyya says that people holding this view take 
credit for their good deeds but blame their acts of disobedience on God’s 
decree, and he notes that this is not a particular school of thought but the 
attitude of those unconcerned with the Law. In other places dealing with 
creation and command, the shaykh cites this statement in conjunction with 
Sufi  antinomianism.66
To sum up the creation and command typology, Ibn Taymiyya charges that 
the Sufi s and the Ash≠arīs emphasize God’s determination at the expense of 
God’s command and drift  towards a monism that collapses the human sphere 
entirely into God. He castigates the Mu≠tazilīs for dualism in denying that 
God creates human acts, and he censures those who impiously reject God’s 
creation and command on the grounds that they are irrational and unjust. 
Ibn Taymiyya himself maintains the reality of both the human responsibility 
involved in God’s command and the all-encompassing character of God’s 
creation without favoring one at the expense of the other. He makes no 
eff ort here to resolve the conundrum of creation and command rationally. 
He simply wards off  theological and ethical shortcomings that he perceives 
in the solutions of others.
65 +Tā≠a, MF 8:446.
66 Ib$tāl, MF 2:301; and Shams, MF 16:248. Th e quotation is also found in MF 8:241; 
≠Ubūdiyya, MF 10:165; and Abū Dharr, MF 18:204.
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Ibn Taymiyya: Analogy Is the Cause of Error in Creation and Command
Ibn Taymiyya’s commentary on Surat al-Shams (Q. 91) [hereaft er Shams]67 
provides a colorful analysis of the causes of the three types of error in creation 
and command noted above. Th e shaykh here traces the roots of the problem 
to a common Qadarī and Jabrī presupposition in the realm of ethical value 
and to an analogy Iblīs drew from himself to God. Th ese same points are 
made elsewhere, but Shams appears to be unique in the degree to which it 
draws them together and fi lls them out into a story of what went wrong.
Ibn Taymiyya opens Shams with a brief comment on the sura’s fi rst eight 
verses.68 Th en he devotes the bulk of his energy to polemic involving the 
eighth verse, “[God] inspired [the soul] to its immorality ( fujūr) and its 
piety (taqwā)” (Q. 91:8). Th is one verse, he claims, exposes error in both the 
Majūsī Qadarī and the Jabrī/Mushrikī/Sufi  antinomian currents of thought. 
Ibn Taymiyya explains that inspiration (ilhām) here carries the meaning of 
creation. Th us, God is Creator of both piety and immorality. Th is invalidates 
a Qadarī interpretation of inspiration that excludes God’s creation of human 
acts even if it affi  rms both God’s foreknowledge and God’s determination 
of everything else.69
Th e shaykh then contends that the verse also establishes God’s legislation 
because the phrase “its immorality and its piety” distinguishes between the 
good of piety that is commanded and the evil of immorality that is prohib-
ited. If the verse had read only, “He inspired it to its acts,” the indication of 
command and prohibition would not have been present. “Th ere would be 
no distinction between the good and the evil, the loved and the hated, and 
the commanded and the prohibited.” As it stands, however, the verse “is a 
proof against the Mushrikīs, such as the antinomians and Jabrīs, who do 
away with command and prohibition, and good and bad.”70
Th us the verse, “He inspired [the soul] to its immorality and its piety,” 
affi  rms both God’s creation and God’s command. Ibn Taymiyya also fi nds 
both together in other verses such as “He misguides whomever He wills, and 
He guides whomever He wills” (Q. 16:93). In this verse, God’s will involves 
67 Shams, MF 16:226–250. Th e text gives no indication of its date. At MF 16:237, Ibn 
Taymiyya mentions having once elaborated something elsewhere but without specifying the 
location.
68 Shams, MF 16:226–30.
69 Shams, MF 16:230–4.
70 Shams, MF 16:235.
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creation of all things, while guidance and misguidance involve the distinction 
between good and evil found in His command and prohibition.71
Following a discussion of the human act in Shams, Ibn Taymiyya locates 
the ultimate source of Qadarī and Jabrī diffi  culties in the shared presup-
position that rational judgment of ethical value is incompatible with God’s 
creation of human acts. He argues that both the Qadarīs and the Jabrīs agree 
that something created by God cannot be subject to judgments of moral 
value by virtue of some inherent quality. “Th ey say, ‘If [God] is the Creator 
of an act, it is impossible for the act to be inherently good and deserving 
of reward or bad and deserving of punishment’.”72 Th e Jabrīs then conclude 
that acts cannot be inherently good or bad since God creates everything. 
Good and bad only arise from the command and prohibition of the God 
who has the right to “command what He wills without any quality [inhering] 
in it and prohibit what He wills without respect to any quality [inhering] 
in it.”73 On the other hand, the Qadarīs conclude that God does not create 
human acts because acts are indeed inherently good or bad. If God created 
inherently bad acts, He Himself would be bad.74
In Shams Ibn Taymiyya does not defend himself against what appears 
to be the inevitable conclusion of his polemic: that God creates inherently 
bad acts. Instead, he continues his diatribe against the Qadarīs and the 
Jabrīs, showing his preference for the Qadarīs and the Mu≠tazilīs over the 
Jabrīs because the former give stronger emphasis to God’s command and 
prohibition. Following this, the shaykh turns to the Iblīsīs. He explains that 
they acknowledge God’s command as well as His determination. Th ey err, 
however, in claiming that, in the contradiction of these two, God is ignorant 
and foolish and that God is unjust to punish someone for what He created 
in him.75 Ibn Taymiyya then traces the source of Iblīs’s error to the analogy 
he drew from himself to God in his rebellion:
[Iblīs] said, “Because You misled me, I will indeed adorn the path of error for 
them in the earth, and I will mislead them all” (Q. 15:39). He confessed that 
God misled him. Th en he deemed that to be a motive making it necessary 
for him to mislead Adam’s progeny. Iblīs was the fi rst to show enmity toward 
71 Shams, MF 16:235.
72 Shams, MF 16:237–8.
73 Shams, MF 16:238.
74 Shams, MF 16:238. Similarly, in ≠Ubūdiyya, MF 10:166, Ibn Taymiyya indicates that 
neither Sufi  antinomians nor the Mu≠tazilīs can imagine someone being commanded to do 
the opposite of what has been determined for him.
75 Shams, MF 16:238–9.
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God, exceed the proper bounds of His creation and command, and oppose 
what was appointed with analogy (qiyās).
Because of this, one of the Salaf said, “Th e fi rst to draw an analogy was 
Iblīs.” God commanded him to prostrate before Adam, but he opposed that 
command with, “I am better than him” (Q. 7:12), and he refused to prostrate. 
He was the fi rst to show enmity toward God. He is ignorant and unjust—igno-
rant of the wise purpose in the command of God and unjust by virtue of his 
pride in which he combined disregard for the Real (al- (Haqq) and contempt 
for humanity.
Th en his statement to his Lord, “Because You misled me, I will surely do 
[such and such],” made God’s act—which is His misleading him—into his 
argument and motive for misleading humankind. Th is was his discrediting of 
God’s act and His command and his allegation that it was bad. So [he said], 
“I will do bad also.” He drew an analogy from himself to his Lord and likened 
himself to his Lord. Th us, he was imitating [God] in lordship.76
In this passage, Iblīs’s fi rst error is to draw an analogy between himself and 
Adam and then to conclude that God’s command was without wise purpose. 
Moreover, Iblīs accuses God of having committed a bad act in misleading 
him. Th is is also based on an analogical projection of his own sense of good 
and bad onto God, which, in Ibn Taymiyya’s judgment, is tantamount to 
claiming the prerogative of lordship.
In Shams the shaykh does not directly accuse the Qadarīs/Mu≠tazilīs of 
holding God analogically to human standards of good and bad, but it is 
implicit in his analysis of why they maintain that God cannot create bad acts. 
If we say that God cannot do acts that we know to be inherently bad, then 
we are holding God to human standards of what is bad. As we will see later 
in Chapter Six, Ibn Taymiyya argues this explicitly against the Mu≠tazilīs in 
his discussions of God’s justice. In discussing God’s creation and command, 
the shaykh also does not accuse the Jabrīs/Ash≠arīs of falling into the analogy 
trap. Yet, this as well is implicit in his analysis here in Shams when he argues 
that the Jabrīs share with the Qadarīs the common presupposition that God 
could not create inherently bad deeds. Th us, the Jabrī viewpoint also rests 
on a human analogical judgment about what is impossible for God. Th is 
common presupposition of the Qadarīs and the Jabrīs comes out clearly in 
Ibn Taymiyya’s narrative description of their joint failure to defeat Iblīs:
Th e Qadarīs intended to exonerate God of foolishness. Th eir intention was 
good because He—Glory be to Him—is much too holy for what the unjust 
among Iblīs and his forces say. [He is] a wise arbiter and just. However, [the 
Qadarīs] were not up to the task, and a sort of ignorance overtook them. With 
76 Shams, MF 16:239–240.
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this, they fi rmly believed that this exoneration could only be completed by 
stripping Him of His power over the acts of servants, His creation of them, 
and His all-encompassing will of everything. Th ey disputed with Iblīs and his 
party in one thing, but Iblīs got the better of them from another angle. Th is is 
one of the greatest banes of debating in religion without knowledge or without 
truth. Th is is the talk (kalām) that the Salaf blamed. One who does this refutes 
vanity with vanity and innovation with innovation.
Th en groups from the People of Affi  rmation [of determination] came and 
disputed with [the Qadarīs] in order to establish fi rmly that God is Creator of 
everything, that what God wills is and what He does not will is not and that 
He is powerful over everything. However, their strength and knowledge were 
not up to the task. For they fi rmly believed that this could not be completed 
unless we deny God’s love, good pleasure and the good and evil attributes that 
set one act apart from another and we deny His wise purpose and His mercy. 
Th us, every act is admissible for Him, and He is exonerated neither from 
injustice nor any other act.77
Here Ibn Taymiyya alleges that the Qadarīs maintain God’s wisdom and 
justice at the expense of God’s power, creation and will. Th e “People of 
Affi  rmation” (i.e. Jabrīs) maintain God’s creation, will and power against 
the Qadarīs at the expense of God’s love and good pleasure and His wise 
purpose, justice and mercy. In the Jabrī outlook, God can do anything, and 
good and evil are totally subjective.
It must be said, of course, that the historical fi gures lying behind the 
polemical labels Qadarī and Jabrī do not deny the divine attributes in ques-
tion. Rather, they interpret them in senses not to Ibn Taymiyya’s liking. 
Yet, this raises questions about the coherence of the shaykh’s polemic in 
Shams. On the one hand, he rejects analogical extension of human concepts 
onto God. On the other, he has defi nite ideas about what God’s attributes 
mean—obviously based on some kind of relation to human language—and 
he criticizes those who diff er with his interpretations. However, the shaykh 
does not explain in Shams how he himself escapes the analogy trap, and 
his polemic taken in isolation presents itself as completely contradictory. 
Sense can be made of it only by reference to his theological methodology 
surveyed in Chapter One. Th e God who bears no analogy to creatures must 
nonetheless be spoken well of—given the highest similitude—in accord with 
considerations of tradition and reason.
77 Shams, MF 16:241.
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Modes of Expressing Creation and Command in Ibn Taymiyya’s Th ought
Creation and Command in the Wāsi$tiyya Creed
Th e previous two sections have outlined Ibn Taymiyya’s polemic against those 
whom he believes fail to uphold creation and command in proper balance. 
Th e commentary in Shams has shown also how the shaykh reads creation 
and command into the quranic term inspiration (ilhām) and the contrast 
between piety and immorality, respectively. Th e present section examines 
the diverse modes of expression that fall under this rubric more directly, 
beginning with the basic confession of creation and command found in the 
segment on God’s determination in Ibn Taymiyya’s well-known catechismal 
creed Wāsi$tiyya.78 Th e shaykh opens this segment by affi  rming that the People 
of the Sunna believe in “determination, the good of it and the evil of it.” He 
then proceeds to note that belief in determination has two stages. Th e fi rst 
stage (daraja) is belief in God’s knowledge of all human acts from eternity 
and in God’s writing down all that He determined to be, in general and in 
detail. Th e second stage of belief in determination sets out God’s creation 
and command:
As for the second stage, it is the operational will of God (mashī±at Allāh al-
nāfi dha) and His all-inclusive power (qudra). It is belief that what God wills 
is and that what He does not will is not. And that there is no motion and rest 
in the heavens and the earth except by the will of God—Glory be to Him. 
Th ere is nothing in His sovereignty except what He wills. And that He—Glory 
be to Him, and Exalted is He—is powerful over everything among existents 
and nonexistents. Th ere is no created thing in the earth or in heaven but that 
God is its Creator—Glory be to Him. Th ere is no creator other than Him 
and no lord except Him.
Along with this, He has commanded His servants to obey Him and obey His 
messengers, and He has prohibited them from disobeying Him. He—Glory be 
to Him—loves the pious, the benefi cent and the fair, and He is well pleased 
with those who believe and perform righteous deeds. He does not love the 
unbelievers, and He is not well pleased with iniquitous people. He does not 
78 “Al-≠Aqīda al-wāsi$tiyya,” MF 3:129–159, which is equivalent to MRK 1:387–406 and 
has been translated into three European languages: Henri Laoust, La profession; Merlin Swartz, 
“A seventh-century (A.H.) Sunnī creed: Th e ≠Aqīda Wāsi$tīya of Ibn Taymīya,” Humaniora 
Islamica 1 (1973): 91–131; and Clemens Wein, trans., Die Islamische Glaubenslehre ( ≠Aqīda) 
des Ibn Taimīya (Bonn: n.p., 1973). Th is creed became very well known in Ibn Taymiyya’s 
day and has had widespread appeal down to the present. For affi  rmations similar to those 
found here in Wāsi$tiyya, see MF 8:235–8; Tā±iyya, MF 8:246–7; and Jabr, MF 8:449–450, 
452, 459, 466.
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command abomination, and He is not well pleased with unbelief in His ser-
vants. He does not love corruption.
Servants are agents in reality (!haqīqatan), and God is the Creator of their 
acts. Th e servant is the believer and the unbeliever, the righteous and the 
immoral, the one praying and the one fasting. His servants have power to do 
their acts, and they have a will. God is their Creator and the Creator of their 
power and their will, as He—Exalted is He—said, “To whosoever among you 
wills to go straight. You will not unless God, Lord of the worlds, so wills” 
(Q. 81:28–9).
Th e vast majority of the Qadarīs denounce this level of determination as 
lies—those whom the Prophet—God bless him and give him peace—called 
the Majūs of this community. A group from among the people who establish 
[God’s attributes and determination] are extreme in it to the point that they 
strip the servant of his power and choice, and they exclude wise purposes 
(!hikam)79 and benefi ts from God’s acts and judgments.80
Th e fi rst paragraph of this passage establishes that God’s attributes of will, 
power, sovereignty, lordship and creation encompass everything. He is the 
Creator of all things. Th e third paragraph treats the special instance of 
God’s creation of human acts. Ibn Taymiyya is here concerned to maintain 
that human acts are real and that humans are in fact the agents of their acts 
despite God’s will and creation of them. Th e human act will receive further 
consideration in Chapter Four. Th e second paragraph links God’s command 
to His attributes of love (ma!habba) and good pleasure (ri#dā). God loves and 
is well pleased with belief and obedience, and He does not love unbelief, 
disobedience and corruption. Th e fourth paragraph disparages the Qadarī 
position on determination and criticizes those who deny that God acts for 
wise purposes and benefi ts (i.e. the Jabrīs).
Lordship and Divinity
Parallel to the creation/command distinction in Ibn Taymiyya’s thought is 
a further distinction between God’s lordship and divinity. We have already 
met these two notions in Chapter One, and, as noted there, God’s lordship 
(rubūbiyya) deals with His creation of all things and the great need of crea-
tures to call upon Him for help while God’s divinity (ulūhiyya or ilāhiyya) is 
linked to His command and indicates His essential right to worship. Th ese 
79 Laoust, La profession, 73, appears to have read !hikam as !hukm because he renders the 
Arabic as “sens” (“sense” or “meaning”). Th e plural form !hikam of the singular !hikma (“wis-
dom” or “wise purpose”) fl ows better with the Arabic style of the sentence since it lies in 
parallel with the clearly plural ma$sāli!h (“benefi ts”).
80 Wāsi$tiyya, MF 3:149–150; the translation is my own.
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terms usually appear in strongly ethical discussions, oft en dealing with the 
verse in the Fāti !ha, “You alone we worship; You alone we ask for help” 
(Q. 1:5). Th ese discussions make an appeal to confess both that God is 
the only Lord who may be called upon for help (taw !hīd al-rubūbiyya or 
al-taw!hīd al-rabbānī) and that God is the sole divinity or worthy object of 
worship (taw!hīd al-ulūhiyya or al-taw!hīd al-ilāhī). Th is taw!hid al-ulūhiyya 
excludes any kind of shirk or giving partners to God; God has the right to 
exclusive devotion.81
A reasonably full treatment of these concepts appears in Ibn Taymiyya’s Fī 
Fu$sū$s, an apologetic text directed toward Sufi s. Its primary lacuna is explicit 
reference to the Avicennan causal analysis relating lordship as the effi  cient 
cause to divinity as the fi nal cause, which was noted in Chapter One. In 
discussing lordship, Ibn Taymiyya affi  rms that God is the Lord, Creator and 
Sovereign of all things. He created the heavens and the earth. Th e heart of 
every servant is “between two fi ngers of the fi ngers of the All-Merciful. If 
He wills to set them aright, He sets them aright. If He wills to turn them 
aside, He turns them aside.”82 Th e Lord makes people laugh, and He makes 
people cry. He sends the wind and the rain. He guides and misguides. He 
knows all things and has power over them.83 Th e shaykh complements God’s 
overwhelming power, lordship and governance with His goodness, wise pur-
pose and mercy. Everything that God has created is good, perfect and wise. 
His mercy extends far and wide, and, as found in the Hadith, “Indeed, God 
is more merciful toward His servants than this mother toward her son.”84
Ibn Taymiyya draws these affi  rmations together under two principles: 1) 
the universality of God’s creation and lordship and 2) the universality of 
His benefi cence (i!hsān) and wise purpose. God’s attributes of lordship and 
sovereignty are not capricious but give evidence of God’s goodness and mercy. 
God creates all, and all that God creates is good and wise. All things are in 
fact signs of God, and they manifest (mu)zhir) the names and attributes of 
God from which they derive.85
Following this Ibn Taymiyya moves in Fī Fu$sū$s to God’s divinity (ilāhiyya), 
which indicates that creatures should make God their god (ta±alluh), that is, 
81 Taw !hī #d, MF 1:22–3; Shirk, MF 1:89–90; Manbijī, MF 2:455–9; Tadmuriyya, MF 
3:98–109; ≠Ubūdiyya, MF 10:156–8; Fāti!ha, MF 14:5–15, 31–6; (Hasana, MF 14:376–380; 
Ma!habba, 24–5; Talbīs, 2:454; and Minhāj, 3:276–336/2:59–74.
82 Fī Fu $sū$s, MF 2:398–9.
83 Fī Fu $sū$s, MF 2:398–9.
84 Fī Fu$sū$s, MF 2:399–400. Th is hadith is found in Bukhārī, 5540, Al-Adab, Ra!hmat al-
walad wa taqbīluhu wa mu≠ānaqatuhu; Muslim 4947; and Ibn Māja, 4287.
85 Fī Fu $sū$s, MF 2:400.
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their object of worship, and that worship should be devoted to God alone.86 
Th e shaykh elaborates further that the source of God’s exclusive right to 
worship is God’s essence or very self (nafs):
To Him is the destiny [of beings] and their return, and He is their object of 
worship and their God. It is not fi tting that any [being] be worshipped except 
Him—just as no one created them but He—because of that to which He has 
a right in Himself (limā huwa musta!hiqquhu bi-nafsihi) and of that which He 
alone possesses of the attributes of divinity, in which He has no associate.87
Ibn Taymiyya then discusses how God’s divinity and lordship appear in 
humans. Traces of divinity and the rulings of the law are manifest only in 
those who serve God, take God as a friend, agree with God in what He loves 
and is well pleased with and follow what He commands and prohibits. God 
manifests traces of His lordship and the rulings of His power in both believ-
ers and unbelievers as He gives them provision, property, beauty, knowledge 
and religious experiences. Th e manifestation of lordship apart from divinity 
is especially clear in Pharaoh, the Mongol conqueror Ghengis Khan and the 
one-eyed Dajjāl. Th e manifestation of divinity and lordship together occurs 
in angels, prophets and friends of God as in the Prophet Mu!hammad and the 
Messiah, son of Mary. Ibn Taymiyya notes further that lordship corresponds 
to the judgments of the ‘ontological words’ and divinity to judgments of the 
‘religious words’, and he gives an extensive list of such ‘words’.88 Th ese two 
kinds of words correspond to creation and command, respectively, and they 
will be examined next from a diff erent text.
Ontology and Legislation
Ibn Taymiyya oft en qualifi es matters linked to God’s determination and 
creation with the term ontological (kawnī) and things related to God’s com-
mand and prohibition with the terms religious (dīnī) and legislative (shar≠ī). 
Th e shaykh speaks, for example, of the “ontological, determinative and lordly 
realities (al- !haqā±iq al-kawniyya al-qadariyya al-rubūbiyya),” which apply to 
all things, and the “religious, legislative, divine realities (al-!haqā±iq al-dīniyya 
al-shar≠iyya al-ilāhiyya),” which extend only to those who obey God’s com-
mand.89 Other similar ways of speaking include God’s “address of generation 
86 Fī Fu $sū$s, MF 2:404–6.
87 Fī Fu $sū$s, MF 2:406.
88 Fī Fu $sū$s, MF 2:407–8, 411–3.
89 Fāti!ha, MF 14:15; and ≠Ubūdiyya, MF 10:156–7.
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(khi$tāb al-takwīn)” and God’s “address of obligation (khi$tāb al-taklīf ),”90 and 
“His ontological creation (khalquhu al-kawnī)” and “His religious command 
(amruhu al-dīnī).”91 Ibn Taymiyya takes a number of quranic terms to have 
an ontological meaning in some contexts and a legislative meaning in oth-
ers. Among these are God’s will (irāda), decree (qa#dā±), judgment (!hukm), 
authorization (idhn) and command (amr). Th e shaykh sets these out in list 
form with example quranic verses and hadiths in a number of texts.92
One such list, which is typical of the rest, is translated below with its intro-
duction. Th is passage falls within Taraddud, a short fatwa on the meaning of 
God’s hesitation (taraddud) found in the Hadith of Supererogatory Works 
(!hadīth al-nawāfi l). Th e last portion of the hadith reads, “I do not hesitate 
over anything as I hesitate over taking the soul of My believing servant. He 
hates death, and I hate to torment him.”93 Ibn Taymiyya notes that God loves 
His servants who draw close to Him through supererogatory works, and so 
He hates to take their lives. Yet, God has decreed death. God’s hesitation 
means that God decrees death despite the fact that He hates it. Th ere is thus a 
confl ict of interest between God’s love and God’s decree. To resolve this, Ibn 
Taymiyya concludes that God has a wise purpose (!hikma) in everything that 
He determines and decrees.94 In the middle of the fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya notes 
that a similar confl ict between God’s moral attributes and His ontological 
attributes exists in His willing of unbelief and disobedience, and this leads 
him into a listing of parallel ontological and religious terms:
[Concerning] the unbelief, iniquity and disobedience that occur in existence. 
God—Exalted is He—loathes that, displays wrath against it, hates it and 
prohibits it. And He—Glory be to Him—has determined it, decreed it and 
willed it with His ontological will (al-irāda al-kawniyya), even if He did not 
will it with a religious will (irāda dīniyya). Th is is the crux of the matter ( fa$sl 
al-khi$tāb) about which the people dispute: Does He—Glory be to Him—com-
mand what He does not will?
90 Marātib, MF 8:182–6.
91 Fī Fu $sū$s, MF 2:409.
92 Th e fullest text of this kind that I have located is Awliyā±, MF 11:265–271, which is 
translated in Yahya M. Michot, “Textes Spirituels d’Ibn Taymiyya: II. L’étre (kawn) et la 
religion (dîn),” Le Musulman (Paris) 13 (1990–1): 7–10, 28. Similar lists are found in Fī 
Fu$sū$s, MF 2:411–3; Tu!hfa, MF 10:23–8; and MF 8:58–61.
93 Th is is the last part of the !hadīth al-nawāfi l found in Bukhārī, 6021, Kitāb al-riqāq, 
Bāb al-tawā#du≠. See Graham, Divine Word and Prophetic Word, 173–4, for a brief discussion 
of the transmission and content of this hadith.
94 Taraddud, MF 18:129–135, which is translated into French in Yahya Michot, Un Dieu 
hésitant? (Beirut: Dar Al-Bouraq, 1425/2005).
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Th e general belief among the Kalām theologians who establish [determina-
tion] and those who agree with them from among the jurists is that He com-
mands what He does not will. Th e Qadarīs, the Mu≠tazilīs and others say that 
He only commands what He wills.
Th e truth of the matter is that will (irāda) in the Book of God is of two 
kinds: a religious, legislative will and an ontological, determinative (qadarī) 
will. Th e fi rst is like His statement—Exalted is He—“God wills ease for you. 
He does not will diffi  culty for you” (Q. 2:185), and His statement—Exalted 
is He—“He wills to purify you” (Q. 5:6). And His statement—Exalted is 
He—“God wills to make plain to you and to guide you in the ways of those 
before you,” to His statement, “and God wills to turn toward you” (Q. 4:26–7). 
Here, will has the meaning of love and good pleasure, and this is the religious 
will. Th e indicator of this is His statement, “I did not create the jinn and 
humankind except that they might worship Me” (Q. 51:56).
As for the ontological, determinative will, this is like His statement—Exalted 
is He—“Whomever God wills to guide, He opens his breast to Islam. Whom-
ever He wills to misguide, He makes his breast narrow and tight as if he were 
climbing up to the sky” (Q. 6:125). And like the saying of the Muslims, “What 
God wills is, and what God does not will is not.” All beings are encompassed 
in this will (irāda) and necessitating will (ishā±a). Good and evil, right and 
wrong do not deviate from it. Th is will and the necessitating will include what 
the legislative command does not include. Th e religious will corresponds to 
the legislative command. Th ey do not diff er. Th is division between the onto-
logical, determinative and the religious, legislative appearing in the term will 
appears likewise in the terms command (amr), words (kalimāt), judgment 
(!hukm), decree (qa#dā±), writing (kitāb), raising up (ba≠th), sending (irsāl) and 
their like.
Th e ontological words are those from which neither a righteous person nor 
an immoral person deviates. Th ese are those with which the Prophet—God 
bless him and give him peace—asked for help in his statement, “I take refuge in 
the complete words of God that no righteous or immoral person oversteps.”95 
God—Exalted is He—said, “His command when He wills something is only 
that He says to it, ‘Be!’ and it is” (Q. 36:82). As for the religious [words], these 
are the books sent down about which the Prophet said, “Whoever fi ghts so 
that the word of God is exalted is on the path of God.”96 And He—Exalted 
is He—said, “She judged the words of her Lord and His books to be true” 
(Q. 66:12).
Also, the religious command is like His statement—Exalted is He—“Truly, 
God commands you to deliver trusts back to their owners” (Q. 4:58). And 
the ontological, “His command when He wills something” (Q. 36:82).97 
95 A!hmad, 14914, Musnad al-makkiyyīn, (Hadīth ≠Abd al-Ra!hmān b. Khanbash.
96 Bukhārī, 120, Al-≠Ilm, Man sa±ala wa huwa qā±im ≠āliman jālisan; Bukhārī, 2599; Muslim, 
3525; and elsewhere.
97 Ibn Taymiyya only quotes the fi rst part of this verse, having already quoted it in full 
above.
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The religious raising up is like His statement—Exalted is He—“It is He 
who raised up from among the unlearned a Messenger from among them” 
(Q. 62:2). And the ontological raising up, “We raised up against you servants 
of ours” (Q. 17:5). Th e religious sending is like his statement, “He it is who 
sent His messenger with guidance and the religion of truth” (Q. 9:33). And 
the ontological, “Do you not see that We sent satans against the unbelievers 
to incite them” (Q. 19:83).98
Behind some of these terms lie polemical debates and distinctions. Th e fi rst 
part of the quotation mentions the diffi  culties of Kalām theologians with 
will, and these will be treated below.99 A further example comes from Ibn 
Taymiyya’s polemic against Ibn ≠Arabī’s interpretation of decree (qa#dā±). In 
the verse, “Your Lord has decreed that you serve none but Him” (Q. 17:23), 
Ibn ≠Arabī understands decree (qa#dā±) to mean that no one in the universe 
worships anyone but God, no matter what his immediate object of worship 
might be. In the story of Aaron, Moses and the calf, for example, Ibn ≠Arabī 
says that Moses knew that those worshipping the calf were in fact worship-
ping God because this is what God decreed.100 In Ibn Taymiyya’s view, Ibn 
≠Arabī incorrectly reads decree in Q. 17:23 in an ontological sense, while the 
context of the verse dictates that decree means command.101
Ontological Will and Legislative Will
Several times in his writings, Ibn Taymiyya sets out the two types of will 
(irāda) found in the list from Taraddud above along with the same or similar 
illustrative verses.102 Th e two types receive a number of diff erent names. For 
example, the shaykh calls them the “commanding will (al-irāda al-amriyya)” 
and the “creative will (al-irāda al-khalqiyya).”103 On the side of creation are 
also “the ontological, determinative (qadariyya) will”104 and “the ontological, 
 98 Taraddud, MF 18:131–3.
 99 See also discussion of the two types of command (amr) in Ib$tāl, MF 2:289, 320–330, 
and the two types of authorization (idhn) in (Hasana, MF 14:383ff ., which occur in a treat-
ment of God’s authorization of intercession in Q. 2:255. Cf. Qawl ≠Alī, MF 8:168.
100 See Mu !hyī al-Dīn Ibn ≠Arabī, Fu$sū$s al-!hikam, ed. and commentary Abū al-≠Alā± ≠Afīfī 
(Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-≠arabī, n.d.), 72 and 191–2. Both passages from Fū$sū$s al-!hikam are 
quoted by Ibn Taymiyya in Itti!hādiyyīn, MF 2:251–2.
101 Itti!hādiyyīn, MF 2:264.
102 Minhāj, 3:16–7/1:266–7, 3:156–7/2:29, 5:412–3/3:103; Irāda, MF 8:131, 140; 





all-inclusive (shāmila) will.”105 Other ways of drawing the distinction include 
“the will of decree (qa#dā±) and determination (taqdīr)” versus “the will of 
command and legislation (tashrī≠),”106 and “the will of generation (takwīn)” 
versus “the will of command, Law, love, good pleasure and religion.”107 Th e 
following passage speaks of the two wills in yet another combination of 
terms—determinative, creative and commanding, legislative—and links 
them to lordship and divinity, respectively. Also, God’s commanding will 
is linked to God’s love and good pleasure and that which is benefi cial for 
human beings.
Th e Salaf, the leaders of the jurists and the great majority of Muslims affi  rm 
creation and command: the determinative, creative will including every origi-
nating event and the commanding, legislative will concerning everything that 
God loves and is well pleased with for His servants, which is what the Mes-
sengers were commanded and is what profi ts servants, is benefi cial to them, 
and has a praiseworthy end, profi table at the Return (al-ma≠ād ) and repelling 
corruption. Th is commanding, legislative will is linked to His divinity which 
includes His lordship. Similarly, that creative, determinative will is linked to 
His lordship.108
Ibn Taymiyya outlines the four possible combinations of ontological will and 
legislative will in a brief treatise called Marātib al-irāda. First, the two wills 
coexist in the generation of righteous deeds. Second, righteous deeds that 
do not occur are linked to the legislative will, but not to the ontological. 
Th ird, acts of disobedience and permitted acts (mubā !hāt) that occur, but 
are not commanded, are linked to the ontological will, but not the legisla-
tive. Fourth, neither the legislative will nor the ontological will are linked to 
permitted acts and acts of disobedience that do not occur.109 Ibn Taymiyya 
makes similar notes on the combinations of the two wills elsewhere. For 
example, he defi nes the happy person as the one in whom God’s will of 
determination and will of command concur and the unhappy person as the 
one in whom they do not.110 Also, God wills belief and obedience from those 
105 Irāda, MF 8:131.
106 MF 8:197.
107 MF 8:201–2.
108 Th ulth, MF 17:64.
109 Marātib al-irāda, MF 8:188–9, which is translated in Fritz Meier, “Th e Cleanest about 
Presdestination: A Bit of Ibn Taymiyya,” in Essays on Islamic Piety and Mysticism, trans. John 
O’Kane (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 309–334 (text on 328–9), which is in turn a translation of 
Fritz Meier, “Das sauberste über die vorbestimmung: Ein stück Ibn Taymiyya,” Saeculum 32 
(1981): 74–89. Reference to Meier hereaft er is only to the English. Bell, Love Th eory, 67, 
provides a diagram illustrating the various combinations of will.
110 MF 8:198.
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who believe and obey both in command and creation, and He helps them 
and makes them do that. On the other hand, God commands unbelievers 
to believe and obey in His legislative, religious will, but He does not will 
to create their obedience in His ontological will. Th is is for a wise purpose 
and a benefi t that overrides whatever benefi t may have been attained in 
creating obedience.111
Th e shaykh furthermore links the ontological will to God’s mashī±a (will) 
and, as we saw above, the legislative will to His love and good pleasure.112 
For Ibn Taymiyya, the semantic fi elds of mashī±a and irāda are not identical, 
and this presents a problem in translation. For lack of better alternatives, 
I usually translate both terms as “will” and transliterate the Arabic when 
necessary. Ibn Taymiyya uses mashī±a only for God’s ontological activity as 
when he says that the irāda “linked to the creation is the mashī±a and is the 
ontological, determinative irāda.”113 Th e term irāda, however, carries either 
an ontological or a legislative sense depending on the context.114
Th e distinction between irāda and mashī±a also becomes apparent in Ibn 
Taymiyya’s discussion of oath taking. If someone swears an oath that he will 
do such and such if God wills (shā±a) and does not do it even when he has 
no excuse, he has not broken his oath. A person cannot be held accountable 
for not conforming to God’s mashī±a. If, however, he swears an oath by God’s 
love, and he does not do it, then he has broken his oath. He is liable to do 
what God loves and commands. If he swears by God’s irāda and does not 
do it, he has broken his oath only if he intended the irāda of love.115
Ibn Taymiyya’s primary polemical targets when discussing the two types 
of irāda are Kalām theologians who make the semantic fi elds of divine will, 
love and good pleasure identical. Th is has diff erent results for the Mu≠tazilīs 
and the Ash≠arīs, respectively. Th e shaykh reports that the Mu≠tazilīs equate 
love, good pleasure and will—both irāda and mashī±a—solely with God’s 
command. In this case, things exist which God does not will ( yashā±), and 
God wills things that do not exist.116 Ibn Taymiyya reports that al-Juwaynī 
111 Minhāj, 5:414. Cf. Minhāj, 3:162–3 and 182–3, and MF 8:199.
112 Minhāj, 3:233/2:47–8; and MF 8:159.
113 Minhāj, 3:156/2:29.
114 Bell’s brief discussion of mashī±a and irāda in Love Th eory, 65–6, is not suffi  ciently 
precise and may be read to mean that both mashī±a and irāda carry ontological and religious 
senses. As noted here, however, Ibn Taymiyya uses mashī±a only in the ontological sense.
115 Minhāj, 3:16/1:266, 3:19/1:267, 3:155–6/2:28, 3:188/2:36; and Jabr, MF 8:475. Cf. 
Minhāj, 3:258/2:54.
116 Minhāj, 3:14–5/1:266, 3:158/2:29, 3:196/2:39; I !htijāj, MF 8:340; and Jabr, MF 
8:474, 476–7.
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said that al-Ash≠arī was the fi rst to equate divine love, good pleasure and 
will (both irāda and mashī±a) wholly with God’s creation of all that exists, 
and in this he was followed by Abū Ya≠lā, al-Juwaynī himself and others. 
Th e shaykh says that this ultimately goes back to Jahm b. !Safwan, although 
he also accuses the latter of denying God’s attributes completely.117 In this 
Ash≠arī view, God loves and is well pleased with everything, including iniq-
uity, unbelief and disobedience. God loves, wills and is well pleased with 
all that exists. He does not love and will what does not exist, and He is not 
well pleased with it. Ibn Taymiyya notes that the Ash≠arīs reinterpret such 
verses as “God does not love corruption” (Q. 2:205) and “God is not well 
pleased with unbelief in His servants” (Q. 39:7) to mean that God does not 
love and will corruption and unbelief in those in whom they do not exist 
or that God does not love and will these things religiously in the sense that 
He does not will to reward the corrupt and the unbeliever.118
Ibn Taymiyya also reports that al-Ash≠arī held a second position, which 
is that of the majority among those who believe in only one type of irāda. 
In this view, the irāda is God’s mashī±a alone whereas God’s love and good 
pleasure are linked to His command.119 Th e shaykh attributes this view to 
most of the Kalām theologians, the Karrāmīs and the (Hanbalīs Abū Bakr 
≠Abd al-≠Azīz and Ibn al-Jawzī.120 Ibn Taymiyya argues that the majority of 
Sunnīs up to the time of al-Ash≠arī, as well as subsequently, distinguish God’s 
irāda of all things from His love and good pleasure linked to His command. 
However, it is not always clear whether the shaykh also attributes a two-irāda 
view to this majority or simply a separation between a single irāda on the 
one hand and love and good pleasure on the other.121
For the sake of independent historical perspective, Gimaret and Bell have 
shown that the complete identifi cation of love and good pleasure with all 
that God wills to exist is not found in Ash≠arī theology until al-Juwaynī. It 
also appears that no Ash≠arī followed him in this thereaft er.122 Bell cites the 
117 Minhāj, 3:15/1:266, 5:412/3:102–3; Jabr, MF 8:475; (Hasana, MF 14:353; and Th ulth, 
MF 17:101–2.
118 Minhāj, 3:14–5/1:266, 3:158–9/2:29, 3:196/2:39–40; I!htijāj, MF 8:340–5; Jabr, MF 
8:476–7; Th ulth, MF 17:101; and Irāda, MF 8:98. Much of Irāda, MF 8:97–106, is translated 
in Rahman, Revival and Reform in Islam, 149–153.
119 Minhāj, 3:181/2:34.
120 Minhāj, 5:411–2/3:102–3.
121 Minhāj, 3:15/1:266, 3:17–8/1:267, 3:159/2:29; and Jabr, MF 8:475–6.
122 Bell, Love Th eory, 56–60. See al-Juwaynī, Kitāb al-irshād, 99 (in the middle of “Bāb 
al-qawl fī al-isti$tā≠a wa !hukmihā”), for the identifi cation of will, love and good pleasure. In 
this text, however, al-Juwaynī does not identify this view as that of al-Ash≠arī explicitly but 
only as that of those Ash≠arīs who are right (man !haqqaqa min a±immatinā). D. Gimaret, 
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later Ash≠arīs al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī as maintaining a distinction between 
good pleasure and love on the one hand and will on the other.123 Also, 
Roger Arnaldez has shown that al-Rāzī sets out a scheme of two wills, one 
pertaining to creation and one to command.124 Additionally, the Sufi  Abū 
+Tālib al-Makkī (d. 386/996) identifi es irāda with mashī±a and love with 
God’s command, and he also then distinguishes two types of irāda: one 
pertaining to generation and one to command.125 In sum Ibn Taymiyya says 
nothing new with his doctrine of two wills and the restriction of love and 
good pleasure to God’s legislative will. However, he singles out al-Juwaynī’s 
view that God loves all that exists and makes it a frequent focus of polemic. 
He may believe that this is what Ash≠arism truly reduces to, or possibly this 
doctrine enables him to make the link that he perceives to exist between 
Ash≠arī theology and antinomian Sufi sm.126
Ibn Taymiyya Defending the Coherence of Creation and Command
As is clear from the preceding discussion, Ibn Taymiyya devotes much eff ort 
to holding creation and command in balance without compromising one to 
the other and without succumbing to skepticism or irrationality. However, 
he devotes relatively little energy to exploring the sense of their relation-
ship when they appear to contradict. Yet, he does not ignore the problem 
completely. Perhaps his most powerful metaphor capturing the paradoxical 
“Un problème de théologie musulmane: Dieu veut-il les actes mauvais? Th èses et arguments,” 
Studia Islamica 40 (1974): 5–73 and 41(1975): 63–92 (at 40:17–23), locates the direct attri-
bution of this view to al-Ash≠arī only in non-Ash≠arī texts including the Māturīdī theologian 
al-Pazdawī (d. 593/1099), and he adds that he could fi nd no grounds in al-Ash≠arī’s texts for 
attributing the view to the master himself.
123 Bell, Love Th eory, 233 n. 5. For further historical background, see especially Gimaret, 
“Un problème de théologie musulmane,” 40:17–23; and al-Julaynad, Qa#diyyat al-khayr wa 
al-sharr, 42–51 (includes Mu≠tazilī views). See also, Gardet, Dieu et la destinée de l’homme, 
120–1; and Meier, “Th e Cleanest about Predestination,” 321–2.
124 Roger Arnaldez, “Apories sur la prédestination et le libre arbitre dans le commentaire 
de Razi,” Mélanges de l’institut dominicain d’études orientales 6 (1959–1961): 123–136 (at 
135–6).
125 Abū +Tālib al-Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb (n.pl.: n.p., n.d.), 1:127–8 (i.e. toward the end of 
Section 30 in Vol. 1), distinguishes between God’s command which attaches only to religious 
obligations and God’s love which attaches to both religious obligations and supererogatory 
works. See also the general discussion of the confl ict between God’s will (irāda) and com-
mand (amr) in Sufi sm in Awn, Satan’s Tragedy and Redemption, 101–9.
126 Ibn Taymiyya clearly links the Ash≠arī equation of will and love to Sufi  antinomianism 
in I!htijāj, MF 8:337–370; and (Hasana, MF 14:346–359. Cf. Bell, Love Th eory, 90–1.
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linkage of creation and command is the image of seeing with two eyes. I 
have found only one clear usage of this in the shaykh’s writings. Concerning 
God’s will of determination and God’s will of the Law, he says, “Judgment 
(al-!hukm) goes according to these two wills. Whoever looks at deeds with 
these two eyes sees. Whoever looks at determination without the Law or 
the Law without determination is one-eyed.”127
Ibn Taymiyya explores the coherence of his position in a few diff erent 
places, but it is in Minhāj, writing against al- (Hillī the Shī≠ī theologian of 
Mu≠tazilī orientation, that he makes his fullest contribution. Al-(Hillī strongly 
insinuates that the will of the Sunnī God is irrational, charging inter alia 
that the Prophet disobeys God in commanding belief when the Sunnī God 
wills the unbelief of the unbeliever.128 Ibn Taymiyya’s counter polemic against 
Mu≠tazilism has been surveyed above. Here we focus on the shaykh’s attempt 
to defend the rationality of his approach.
Wise Purpose in Commanding but not Helping
In an extended discussion in Minhāj, Ibn Taymiyya distinguishes two kinds 
of will (irāda) as follows. First is the will of an agent to perform his own act, 
and second is the will of an agent that someone else commit an act.129 With 
respect to God, the shaykh observes that some affi  rm only the fi rst kind of 
will, God’s will to act Himself. Th ese are obviously the Jabrīs, although he 
provides no labels. Conversely, the Qadarīs affi  rm the second kind of will but 
deny the fi rst by denying that God creates human acts. Ibn Taymiyya asserts 
that the Salaf affi  rm both kinds of will, and he continues with examples 
from human aff airs of how this might be so to advance the plausibility of 
this view. For instance, someone may command another to do what profi ts 
the latter but not help him do it because there is no benefi t (ma$sla!ha) in 
it for the commander. Th is is like someone who advises another to marry a 
certain woman but does not marry her himself. Ibn Taymiyya argues that if 
127 MF 8:198. When discussing God’s lordship and divinity in Shirk, MF 1:90, Ibn Taymi-
yya speaks similarly, but less vividly, of two views (mashhad ): “When the servant is found 
true in this view [of lordship] and [God] gives him success in that such that this view does 
not veil him from the fi rst view [of God’s divinity], he is learned ( faqīh) in his servitude. 
Th ese two views are indeed the pivot around which the religion turns.” For this reference I 
am indebted to Yahya M. Michot, “Textes Spirituels d’Ibn Taymiyya: IV. Entre la divinité 
et la seigneurialité, le polymorphisme de l’associationnism (shirk),” Le Musulman (Paris) 16 
(1991): 8–13, (at 10), which translates Shirk, MF 1: 88–94.
128 Minhāj, 3:154/2:28.
129 Minhāj, 3:168–177/2:31–4. Th is distinction is also made in Minhāj, 3:18/1:267; and 
Jabr, MF 8:477–8.
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this distinction is possible with respect to creatures it is a fortiori possible 
with respect to God. God has commanded human beings what profi ts them 
and prohibited them from what harms them. Yet, God does not create all 
acts which He commands. Such was the case in God commanding Pharaoh 
and Abū Lahab to believe but not helping them do so because of His wise 
purpose in that or to avoid some unspecifi ed detriment (mafsada).
Ibn Taymiyya goes on in Minhāj to emphasize that commanding someone 
to do something that will benefi t the commanded or even the commander is 
not the same as helping the commanded carry out the act. Th e commander 
may refrain from helping in order to avoid his own detriment. As an example, 
the shaykh cites the quranic story of one who came running to warn Moses 
to fl ee. “He told Moses, ‘A crowd is conspiring to kill you. Leave! I am an 
advisor to you’ (Q. 28:20). It was to his benefi t to command Moses to leave 
but not to help him in that. Indeed, if he had helped him, his people would 
have harmed him.”130 Again, Ibn Taymiyya argues that if it is possible on the 
human plane that someone command but not help out of consideration for 
his own wise purpose and benefi t then it is a fortiori possible for God. He 
adds another example to illustrate the basic concept. Someone—apparently 
a king, although the shaykh does not specify—may realize that it would be 
to the benefi t of one of his subjects to learn the ways of power. Furthermore, 
this king might command his subject to do what would benefi t him (i.e. the 
subject). However, the king himself will not help his subject lest he rise up as 
an enemy against the king’s son. Th e upshot is that God has a wise purpose 
in all that He commands and all that He creates “even if there is a kind of 
harm in that for some people on account of the wise purpose in that.”131
Ibn Taymiyya’s various illustrations from human aff airs presuppose liber-
tarian freedom in the one commanded, that is, freedom to act apart from 
any external control. Yet, as the shaykh makes clear at the beginning of this 
passage in Minhāj, the distinction between willing to act oneself and will-
ing that another act involves subsuming the creation of human acts strictly 
under God’s own will to act. It thus goes without saying that Ibn Taymiyya’s 
examples do not apply to the God-human relationship univocally, and the 
shaykh acknowledges this in an aside as he reiterates his main point:
[As for] the examples that are mentioned concerning creatures—even if it is 
not possible to mention the like of them with respect to God—the point here 
is that it is possible with respect to the wise creature to command someone else 
130 Minhāj, 3:172/2:32.
131 Minhāj, 3:171–5/2:32–3 (quote at 3:175/2:33).
132 chapter three
with a command and not help him do it. Th e Creator is all the more worthy 
(awlā) of that possibility with respect to Him with His wise purpose.132
As elsewhere, Ibn Taymiyya does not explain the methodology of his 
theological jurisprudence as well as he might, but reference to the quranic 
injunction to give God the highest similitude (al-mathal al-a≠lā) discussed 
in Chapter One makes his procedure reasonably clear. While maintaining 
that God’s essence, attributes, and acts are wholly unlike those of creatures, 
the shaykh nonetheless seeks to ascribe to God praiseworthy human per-
fections. In the present passage from Minhāj, Ibn Taymiyya wards off  the 
implication in al-(Hillī’s polemic that the relationship between creation and 
command is irrational by building on examples of human wisdom to point 
to the praiseworthiness of God’s wisdom.
Ibn Taymiyya continues in Minhāj with some suggestions as to God’s wise 
purposes in untoward things. God’s creation of illness and oppression lead 
to invocation, humility, repentance, expiation of sins, removal of pride and 
enmity, and soft ening of the heart, all benefi ts that health and justice would 
not necessarily bring. Ibn Taymiyya ends the present Minhāj discussion of 
two wills by saying that it is not given to humans to know the details of God’s 
wise purposes.133 Further attention will be given to God’s wise purposes in 
evil in Chapter Five below.
A little later in Minhāj, Ibn Taymiyya again draws a distinction between 
will as commanding another and will as helping another. Th e shaykh quotes 
the Shī≠ī theologian al-(Hillī’s charge that someone (i.e. the Sunnī God) who 
commands what he does not will and wills what he prohibits is foolish. Ibn 
Taymiyya argues that this is not so. A doctor who commands a sick person 
to take medicine does not have to help his patient take it, and advisors in 
matters of business and agriculture do not have to follow their own advice. 
Conversely, an advisor may tell an advisee not to do what the advisor him-
self is doing because it would be harmful to the advisee. Th e shaykh notes 
that a snake handler is not foolish to prohibit his son from handling a 
snake. Likewise, a swimmer tells someone who cannot swim not to swim, 
and a king who goes out to fi ght prohibits women from going out with 
him. Upon mentioning these examples, Ibn Taymiyya makes a clear state-
ment of his methodological aim. He notes that it is not possible to fi nd an 
example or similitude that is applicable to God in every respect since there 
is nothing like Him. Rather, the point is to show that it is possible that one 
132 Minhāj, 3:176/2:33.
133 Minhāj, 3:176–7/2:33.
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commands what he does not will, whereas the Mu≠tazilīs think this to be 
foolish necessarily.134
Doing what one Hates for a Wise Purpose that Is Loved
As Bell has observed, Ibn Taymiyya also tries to give sense to the conun-
drum of creation and command by interpreting God’s creation of things 
contradicting His command as a means to that which He loves. Again, the 
shaykh articulates this most fully in Minhāj when responding to al- (Hillī’s 
Mu≠tazilism. He argues that humans may will things that they hate as when 
taking medicine. Conversely, they may will not to have things that they love 
as when a sick person does not eat something that would harm him. Similar 
logic applies to someone fasting who does not eat even though he loves 
food or does not drink even though he is thirsty. Likewise for someone who 
loves to follow his appetites but does not do so because he hates them from 
the perspective of his reason and religion. Th e shaykh infers that if these 
distinctions are possible with respect to creatures, then there is no reason 
that they might not be possible for God. Ibn Taymiyya extends this think-
ing into a distinction between what is willed and loved in itself and what is 
willed accidentally as a means (wasīla) to something that is loved in itself. 
For example, a sick person may take medicine as a means to the health that 
he loves and wills. Th us, the shaykh concludes, there are two kinds of will 
(irāda): the will for what is loved in itself and the will for something hated 
but willed for the sake of something else that is loved in itself.135
In defense of God’s creation of hateful things as a means to things that He 
loves, Ibn Taymiyya observes the need to choose between contrary alterna-
tives. At the human level, we understand that one cannot enjoy everything 
at once. Th e pleasure (ladhdha) of eating precludes the pleasure of drinking 
at the same time. Listening to one thing prevents listening to another. One 
cannot simultaneously go on hajj and fi ght in jihad. Everything has its neces-
sary concomitants. Similarly, even though God is powerful over all things, He 
cannot create contraries simultaneously in one place, and He cannot create 
a son before his father. God is bound to follow the rules of logic. Th us, if 
134 Minhāj, 3:188–190/2:36–7.
135 Minhāj, 3:163–4/2:30, 3:182/2:35, 3:207/2:41, 5:414/3:103; I!htitjāj, MF 8:362–3; 
and Jabr, MF 8:478.
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He creates obedience in some but not in others, it is for some wise purpose 
that could not have been achieved through some other means.136
In some places in Minhāj, the shaykh defi nes God’s wise purpose itself as 
that which is willed and loved. He asserts, “[God] created creatures accord-
ing to His wise purpose that He loves.”137 Moreover, God creates things that 
He hates and loathes “for the sake of a wise purpose that He loves and is 
well pleased with.”138 Elsewhere, he notes that these things are created with 
respect to their end ( ghāya) and not for themselves,139 and this explains 
God’s creation of satans and other detestable things.140 He adds in Minhāj 
that God could have created everyone to be a believer but has not done so 
in His wisdom. He may know that that would have led to some end that 
He would have hated.141 Ibn Taymiyya does not speculate what that hateful 
end might have been. In keeping with his method of giving God the highest 
similitude, his aim is simply to suggest how it might be thought that God 
loves the wise purpose in what He creates.
Conclusion
Th is chapter has shown how Ibn Taymiyya polemicizes against three currents 
which he believes fail to hold God’s creation and God’s command in proper 
balance. First, he castigates the Qadarīs and the Mu≠tazilīs for denying God’s 
all-encompassing creation and falling into dualism by asserting that human 
beings are the creators of their own acts. Second, he charges the Jahmīs, the 
Ash≠arīs and the Sufi s with using God’s creation and determination of human 
acts as an excuse to weaken adherence to the Law. Moreover, the shaykh 
alleges that Ibn ≠Arabī and his followers not only annul human responsibility 
but also collapse the distinction between Creator and creature into a meta-
physical monism that makes value judgments meaningless because everything 
is divine. In the treatise Shams, Ibn Taymiyya accuses both the Mu≠tazilīs 
and the Ash≠arīs of having fallen afoul of the belief that God’s creation of 
human acts is incompatible with rational judgment of the ethical value of 
136 Minhāj, 3:183–6/2:35–6, 5:415–6/3:103–4. Cf. Jabr, MF 8:512–3.
137 Minhāj, 5:408/3:102. Cf. Minhāj, 5:401/3:100.
138 Minhāj, 5:411/3:102. Cf. Th ulth, MF 17:99.
139 I!htijāj, MF 8:363, in which Ibn Taymiyya also notes that the correct attitude of the Sufi  
gnostic (≠ārif ) is to hate the unbelief and disobedience that God creates just as God hates it 
but to love God’s wise purpose in creating these things just as God loves His wise purpose.
140 Jabr, MF 8:478.
141 Minhāj, 3:183/2:35.
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those same acts. Th e Mu≠tazilīs maintain that reason distinguishes good and 
bad human acts and that this precludes God’s creation of these acts. For the 
Ash≠arīs, God’s creation of human acts precludes rational discernment of the 
ethical value that God attaches to these acts. Ibn Taymiyya censures a third 
group consisting of poets, free-thinkers and the ethically lax, and he charges 
these with following Iblīs in making God’s creation and command out to be 
contradictory and disparaging God’s wise purpose and justice.
Beyond polemics, Ibn Taymiyya employs his hermeneutic of creation and 
command to give sense to diverse vocabularies found in the Qur±an and the 
wider religious discourse. Equivalent terms for expressing God’s creation of all 
things include lordship, determination, will (mashī±a), inspiration, power and 
the ontological words. Terms used on the level of command and prohibition 
include divinity, love, good pleasure, hate, the religious and legislative words 
and the distinction between piety and immorality. Moreover, Ibn Taymiyya 
identifi es a number of words, including will (irāda), judgment (!hukm) and 
decree (qa#dā±), which appear in the Qur±an in an ontological sense at some 
points and in a legislative sense at others. Th ese various sets of terms indicate 
two distinct realms, that of God’s determination of all things and that of 
human responsibility to obey God.
Ibn Taymiyya does not oft en address the rational diffi  culty in upholding 
creation and command simultaneously. However, especially in Minhāj, he 
does employ the juridical imperative to give God the highest similitude to 
show that God creating what opposes God’s command need not be irrational. 
Citing various examples from human aff airs, he argues that someone may 
have a wise purpose in commanding someone to do something but refrain 
from helping, or that someone may do something he hates out of love for a 
desirable end. While recognizing that these explanations do not fully explain 
the relation of God’s creation to God’s command, Ibn Taymiyya maintains 
that such worthy intentions are a fortiori ascribable to God.
CHAPTER FOUR
GOD’S CREATION OF ACTS IN THE HUMAN AGENT
Ibn Taymiyya’s View of the Human Act in Prior Research
Ibn Taymiyya’s view of the human act has received considerably more schol-
arly attention than other aspects of his theology. Henri Laoust observes 
in his Essai that the shaykh criticizes the Ash≠arī doctrine of acquisition 
(kasb) and sometimes admits secondary causality but that he also maintains 
God’s full omnipotence. Th e result is an irresolvable duality of perspective: 
“Th rough theological refl ection, the human being becomes more and more 
profoundly conscious of absolute determinism. He must, for the sake of 
the necessities of the social and moral life, willingly convince himself of his 
freedom.” Laoust adds in a footnote that the shaykh oft en contradicts him-
self by affi  rming God’s omnipotence and human freedom simultaneously.1 
Laoust’s observations are correct so far as they go, but they do not illumine 
Ibn Taymiyya’s position fully.
More enthusiastically, Victor Makari fi nds Ibn Taymiyya’s view of the 
human act “inescapably convincing” and “lucid and profound.” Makari’s 
commendation appears to derive from reading Ibn Taymiyya against the 
backdrop of causal chain theories attributed to the Ash≠arī theologian al-
Juwaynī and the philosopher Ibn Rushd.2 While Ibn Taymiyya does employ 
the philosophical language of secondary causality, this chapter will show that 
these causes are not effi  cacious but only instruments in God’s acts of creation. 
God creates all existents directly; human acts are not links in a causal chain 
headed by a First Cause.3
1 Laoust, Essai, 166–7 and n. 4 (quote on 167). Laoust repeats the assessment that Ibn 
Taymiyya is ambiguous on the human act in Les schismes dans l’Islam (Paris: Payot, 1965), 
400–401, as does Christian van Nispen, Activité Humaine et Agir de Dieu, 264–5.
2 Makari, Ibn Taymiyyah’s Ethics, 76–81 (quotes on 80).
3 Th omas Michel, A Muslim Th eologian’s Response to Christianity, 44–55, does not analyze 
Ibn Taymiyya’s doctrine of the human act in detail, but he does demonstrate a historically 
signifi cant point. Th e shaykh’s criticism of the Ash≠arī doctrine of divine determination for 
undercutting human responsibility adds a new dimension to the traditionalist (Hanbalī censure 
of Kalām theology. Earlier (Hanbalī polemicists had not condemned the Ash≠arīs for this.
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Makari unfortunately does not take note of the earlier and far more thor-
ough work of Daniel Gimaret. In a 1977 article on the human act in (Hanbalī 
thought, Gimaret devotes a section to Ibn Taymiyya’s views in Minhāj and 
Irāda.4 Among the features of the shaykh’s doctrine that Gimaret highlights 
are mediation between the Ash≠arīs and the Mu≠tazilīs, polemic against the 
Ash≠arī doctrine of acquisition, assertion that human agency is both real 
and created by God and affi  rmation of some kind of secondary causality. 
Gimaret also briefl y mentions the two kinds of divine will—ontological and 
legislative—which were treated in the previous chapter. Gimaret is impressed 
with Ibn Taymiyya’s ingenuity and originality and with the degree to which 
he gives a role to human agency.5 However, Gimaret is rather less admiring 
in his 1980 book on the human act in Sunnism as a whole. He justifi es his 
exclusion of the (Hanbalīs and Ibn Taymiyya from the book by stating that 
they did not make an original contribution to this doctrine in the Sunnī 
tradition. In a short footnote Gimaret explains that when writing his ear-
lier article on (Hanbalī views he was not aware of the extent to which Ibn 
Taymiyya had been inspired by the Ash≠arī theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. 
Unfortunately, Gimaret says no more about this linkage.6
Th e present chapter examines Ibn Taymiyya’s views afresh, going beyond 
the work of Gimaret by drawing on a wider range of the shaykh’s texts, clari-
fying how he is similar to al-Rāzī and showing that he is less comfortable 
than are both al-Rāzī and Ibn ≠Arabī with compulsion ( jabr) and paradox. 
First, however, more attention must be given to these and others among Ibn 
Taymiyya’s predecessors.
Th e Th eological and Philosophical Context
As is evident from the preceding chapter, the fundamental division in Islamic 
theological refl ection on the human act turns on who creates and determines 
this act: God or human beings? Out of concern for God’s justice in reward 
and punishment, the Mu≠tazilīs maintain that humans create their own acts 
4 Daniel Gimaret, “Th éories de l’acte humain dans l’école (Hanbalite,” Bulletin d’études 
orientales 29 (1977): 156–178.
5 Also, following Gimaret, “Th éories de l’acte humain dans l’école (Hanbalite,” George 
Makdisi, “Ethics in Islamic Traditionalist Doctrine,” 51–6, provides a brief exposition from 
Minhāj, showing that for Ibn Taymiyya God is the Creator while the human is the agent 
of the human act.
6 Daniel Gimaret, Th éories de l’acte humain en théologie musulmane (Paris: J. Vrin, 1980), 
x n. 3.
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with libertarian freedom, that is, with freedom to choose apart from the 
decisive control of external determinants. Out of concern for the all-pervasive 
quality of God’s power, the rest of the Islamic tradition affi  rms that God 
creates and determines the human act. Western philosophy of religion dis-
tinguishes determinism of this sort into two basic kinds. Hard determinism 
denies the human will any role in producing human acts; human freedom is 
an illusion. Soft  determinism or compatibilist freedom gives signifi cance to 
human action and will without granting libertarian freedom. In this latter 
view, human beings paradoxically exercise choice and are thereby morally 
responsible even though external causes fully determine their wills.7
Th e pure compulsion (al-jabr al-ma!hd ) attributed to Jahm b. !Safwān is 
the archetypal case of Islamic hard determinism. In this view, God not only 
creates and determines the human act but is also the act’s sole Agent ( fā ≠il ). 
If humans may be said to act, it is only in a metaphorical sense. Th ere is no 
diff erence between human acts and the movements of inanimate bodies or 
between voluntary and involuntary acts. God creates all of them equally.8
Some scholars portray Ibn Sīnā as a hard determinist or nearly so, while 
others argue that he makes room for human freedom.9 Ibn Sīnā’s best pos-
7 For conceptual analysis of the notions libertarianism, compatibilism (i.e. soft  determin-
ism) and hard determinism which I introduce here, see Th omas P. Flint, “Providence and 
predestination,” in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. Philip L. Quinn and Charles 
Taliaferro (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 569–576.
8 Gimaret, Th éories de l’acte humain en théologie musulmane, 64–6. Gimaret adds that this 
view of Jahm’s doctrine may need to be qualifi ed from al-Ash≠arī’s Maqālāt, which indicates 
that Jahm gives humans a power and a will in a sense resembling that of the Ash≠arī doctrine 
of acquisition (kasb).
9 George F. Hourani, “Ibn Sīnā’s ‘Essay on the Secret of Destiny’, ” Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and Afr ican Studies 29 (1966): 25–48, reads Ibn Sīnā in a way that is very close to 
hard determinism. Opposing this are Alfred L. Ivry, “Destiny Revisited: Avicenna’s Concept 
of Determinism,” in Islamic Th eology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani, 
ed. Michael E. Marmura (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1984), 160–171; 
and Lenn E. Goodman, Avicenna (London: Routledge, 1992), 83–96. Nevertheless, favoring a 
hard determinist reading is Michot, La destinée de l’homme selon Avicenne, 61–63 n. 18, who 
observes that for Ibn Sīnā humans produce their invocation of God only from “a certain point 
of view” (bi-wajh mā) while God produces the invocation “in reality” (bi-l-!haqīqa). Humans 
can thus not be said to act in reality but only metaphorically. Yahya Michot, ed. and trans., 
Ibn Sînâ: Lettre au vizir Abû Sa‘d (Beirut: Les éditions al-Bouraq, 1421/2000), 104*–111*, 
120*–129* and 104–7, translates and comments on several more strongly deterministic pas-
sages from Ibn Sīnā. Adding to his evidence for “le total déterminisme d’Avicenne” is Yayha 
Michot, ed. and trans., Avicenne: Réfutation de l’astrologie (Beirut: Les éditions al-Bouraq, 
1427/2006), 61–71 (quote on 61), which translates additional relevant texts, mostly from 
Ibn Sīnā’s al-Ta≠līqāt. More polemically, Inati, Th e Problem of Evil, 154–162, argues that Ibn 
Sīnā is a hard determinist no matter what he might say about human freedom. Abū Zayd, 
Mafh ūm al-khayr, 183–191, also discusses Ibn Sīnā’s jabrism. Also, see now Catarina Belo, 
Chance and Determinism in Avicenna and Averroes (Leiden: Brill, 2007).
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sible world order in which all contingent existents are necessary by virtue 
of external causes leading back to the First certainly precludes libertarian 
freedom, but it goes beyond our present purposes to sort out whether Ibn 
Sīnā’s determinism is hard, soft , or ambiguous and underdetermined. What 
is of interest here is that Ibn Sīnā speaks of free choice (ikhtiyār) in a way 
that has soft  determinist or compatibilist potential and is employed by later 
thinkers including Ibn Taymiyya. In the following passage from al-Ta≠līqāt, 
Ibn Sīnā explains that human beings perceive themselves to be choosing 
freely for their own purposes even though they are fully determined by 
external causes.
The [human] soul is necessitated in the form of one who chooses freely 
(al-nafs mu #dtarra fī $sūrat mukhtāra), and its movements are also subject to 
subjection like natural movement. It depends on purposes10 and motives, 
and it is subjected to them, except that the diff erence between it and natural 
[movements] is that it perceives its purposes, and nature (al- $tabī ≠a) does not 
perceive its purposes.11
Formulations of this kind fi nd their way into the post-Avicennan tradition 
in the writings of al-Ghazālī, al-Rāzī, Ibn ≠Arabī and, as we will see, Ibn 
Taymiyya. Al-Ghazālī for example writes in his I!hyā± ≠ulūm al-dīn that the 
human being is “compelled to choose freely (majbūr ≠alā al-ikhtiyār),” which 
means “his being compelled is that all [of his acts] occur in him from outside 
of him, not from him . . . [and] his freely choosing is that he is a substrate 
(ma!hall ) for a will which originates in him.”12
Most Ash≠arī theologians may be described as compatibilists, but they 
articulate this in diff erent ways. In the view traditionally ascribed to al-
Ash≠arī by later Ash≠arīs, God is both Creator and Agent of the human 
act—as in the doctrine of Jahm b. !Safwān—but the human acquires this 
act with a power originated by God in the person. Th ere is no causal con-
nection between the power and the acquisition (kasb) of the act, and this 
power does not determine the act/acquisition in any respect. Yet, the power 
and the acquisition do establish human responsibility for acts. Th e Ash≠arī 
theologian Bāqillānī takes a slightly diff erent course, maintaining that the 
10 Reading aghrā #d instead of a≠rā#d.
11 Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ta≠līqāt, 53.
12 Abū (Hāmid al-Ghazālī, I!hyā± ≠ulūm al-dīn, (Beirut: Dār al-ma≠rifa, n.d.), 4:254–5, cf. 4:5. 
On al-Rāzī see further below in the present section. William C. Chittick, Th e Self-Disclosure 
of God: Principles of Ibn al-≠Arabī’s Cosmology (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1998), 188–190, translates several examples of Ibn ≠Arabī’s affi  rmation that humans are 
compelled in their choosing from Futū!hāt al-Makkiyya (e.g. 2:444 and 3:229).
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human power determines an attribute of the act, but other Ash≠arīs, such as 
al-Juwaynī in his Irshād, and later al-Āmidī and Ījī, deny the human power 
any effi  cacy in the act, and this is the strict Ash≠arī determinism that Ibn 
Taymiyya denounces.13
A second stream of Ash≠arī thought on the human act is couched in causal 
terms. In al-Juwaynī’s al-≠Aqīda al-ni)zāmiyya, the human power is created 
by God to serve as an intermediate or secondary cause for His creation of 
the human act.14 Al-Shahrastānī sees in this the philosophers’ doctrine of a 
chain of causes leading back to the First Cause, God. Gimaret hesitates to 
interpret al-Juwaynī’s secondary causality along Neoplatonic lines of this kind 
because al-Juwaynī explicitly states that God creates the causes producing 
the human act directly.15
Similar uncertainty surrounds the interpretation of al-Ghazālī. Th ere is 
little dispute that he employs Ibn Sīnā’s causal vocabulary, but its meaning is 
not entirely clear. According to Gimaret and Michael Marmura, al-Ghazālī 
is a strict Ash≠arī denying causal effi  cacy between the human power and 
the human act. God creates each cause and each eff ect directly in the chain 
of causes and eff ects that constitute the world. While there is no effi  cient 
causality between causes, causes do function as conditions (sg. shar#t) upon 
which subsequent causes depend. In order for God to create the human will, 
there must be prior human knowledge; for knowledge there must be prior 
human life; for life there must a prior human body; and so on. In Marmura’s 
13 Gimaret, Th éories de l’acte humain en théologie musulmane, 79–118, 154–6, 160–1. 
It is not entirely clear whether al-Ash≠arī himself denied secondary causality between the 
human power and the acquired act. Arguing that al-Ash≠arī did uphold secondary causality 
is Richard M. Frank, “Th e structure of created causality according to al-Aš≠arī: An analysis 
of the Kitāb al-Luma≠, pars. 82–164,” Studia Islamica 25 (1966): 13–75. Refuting Frank’s 
thesis is Binyamin Abrahamov, “A re-examination of al-Ash≠arī’s theory of kasb according to 
Kitāb al-luma≠,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1989 ii: 210–221. Gimaret, Th éories de 
l’acte humain en théologie musulmane, 79–92, detects weakness in Frank’s thesis, but he also 
cites evidence for the possibility of secondary causality in al-Ash≠arī. See additionally the 
survey of M. Schwarz, “ ‘Acquisition’ (Kasb) in early Kalām,” in Islamic Philosophy and the 
Classical Tradition: Essays presented by his fr iends and pupils to Richard Walzer on his seventieth 
birthday, ed. S.M. Stern, Albert Hourani and Vivian Brown (Columbia, SC: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1973), 355–387.
14 Imām al-(Haramayn Abū al-Ma≠ālī ≠Abd al-Malik al-Juwaynī, Al-≠Aqīda al-ni)zāmiyya, ed. 
Mu!hammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī ([Cairo]: Ma $tba≠at al-anwār, 1368/1948), 30–42. 
15 Al-Shahrastānī, Kitāb nihāyatu ’l-iqdām fī ≠ilmi ’l-kalām, ed. and English paraphrase 
Alfred Guillaume (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), 78 (Arabic), 35 (English). For 
full discussion, see Gimaret, Th éories de l’acte humain en théologie musulmane, 120–8, who 
argues that al-Shahrastānī over-interprets al-Juwaynī.
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summation, “Ghazali . . . adopts Avicennan ideas. But these are reinterpreted 
and cast in Ash≠arite occasionalist terms.”16
Binyamin Abrahamov and Richard Frank read al-Ghazālī diff erently. Th ey 
explain that al-Ghazālī adheres ultimately, but not explicitly, to a chain of 
natural cause and eff ect leading back to God as the First Cause and Sustainer, 
a chain in which God cannot intervene. To make sense of the inconsistencies 
in al-Ghazālī’s writings, Frank argues that al-Ghazālī is Ash≠arī in outward 
allegiance and teaching while holding various Neoplatonic notions in his 
private belief.17 Frank’s proposals have not escaped critique. Both Michael 
Marmura and Ahmad Dallal criticize Frank for misreading al-Ghazālī’s texts 
and misunderstanding his terminology.18 Th is yet unresolved debate over 
al-Ghazālī well illustrates that Muslim theologians’ use of causal language 
is subject to diverse interpretations. Ibn Taymiyya is a prime case in point. 
Whereas Makari reads the shaykh’s theology of the human act in terms 
of effi  cacious and natural causality, I will show that, from the theologi-
cal perspective at least, conditional or instrumental causality is the better 
interpretation.
A key fi gure in post-Avicennan Islamic theology and a frequent foil in Ibn 
Taymiyya’s writings is the Ash≠arī theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Gimaret 
explains that al-Rāzī is inspired by both Ibn Sīnā and the Mu≠tazilīs in his 
approach to the causal relations involved in the human act. Yet, al-Rāzī 
reduces Mu≠tazilī libertarian freedom to either compatibilist freedom or 
compulsion. Al-Rāzī either does not speak about the traditional Ash≠arī 
notion of acquisition or simply rejects it as a word without meaning. More-
over, al-Rāzī does not believe that proofs from the Qur±an can give certain 
16 Michael E. Marmura, “Ghazali and Ash≠arism Revisited,” Arabic Sciences and Philoso-
phy 12 (2002): 91–110, especially 102–110 (quote on 108); and Gimaret, Th éories de l’acte 
humain en théologie musulmane, 128–132. See also Michael E. Marmura, “Ghazali’s Chapter 
on Divine Power in the Iqti $sād,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 4 (1994): 279–315.
17 Binyamin Abrahamov, “Al-Ghazālī’s Th eory of Causality,” Studia Islamica 67 (1988): 
75–98; and Richard M. Frank, Al-Ghazālī and the Ash≠arite School (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1994), 4, 20–1, 36–9, and 86–101. Frank states that for al-Ghazālī God in 
His custom cannot interrupt the “lawful operation of secondary causes” (20–1). Richard M. 
Frank, Creation and the Cosmic System: Al-Ghazâlî and Avicenna (Heidelberg: Carl Winter 
Universitätsverlag, 1992), 47–82, and 86, gives detailed support for this assessment and 
argues that al-Ghazālī adopts the optimism and natural necessitarianism of Ibn Sīnā despite 
incompleteness in his theology and his rejection of numerous “inconsequential” theses of 
the philosopher. 
18 Michael E. Marmura, “Ghazālian Causes and Intermediaries,” Journal of the American 
Oriental Society 115 (1995): 89–100, responds to Frank’s Creation and the Cosmic System. 
Ahmad Dallal, “Ghazali and the Perils of Interpretation,” Journal of the American Oriental 
Society 122.4 (2002): 773–787, reviews Frank’s Al-Ghazālī and the Ash≠arite School.
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knowledge on the question of the human act because the sacred text may 
be used to prove either the Qadarī or the Jabrī theses. Only rational proofs 
are decisive.19
Al-Rāzī’s primary rational proof is the preponderator (murajji!h) argument, 
which we have already seen Ibn Taymiyya use to prove the existence of God 
and refute the arguments of the philosophers and the Kalām theologians on 
the origin of the world. Gimaret credits al-Rāzī with having invented this 
argument even though the terms murajji!h, ruj!hān (preponderance), and their 
cognates go back to Ibn Sīnā and the Mu≠tazilī theologian ≠Abd al-Jabbār (d. 
415/1025). To begin the argument, al-Rāzī presupposes with the Mu≠tazilīs 
that God creates the human power by which the human acts. In the Mu≠tazilī 
conception, this power is a power to perform either an act or its contrary. 
Al-Rāzī argues that there is nothing to “tip the balance” for this human power 
in favor of one of the two equally possible acts. Th e human power cannot 
preponderate out of itself. It requires a preponderator that makes one act 
preponderate (rāji &h) over the other. So, al-Rāzī maintains, God must supply 
this preponderator. Th us, the human act comes into existence by means of a 
human power and a preponderator, both of which God creates.20
Gimaret suggests that al-Rāzī devises the preponderator argument to 
embarrass the Mu≠tazilīs by drawing out what he believes to be their implicit 
determinism. Th e Jubbā±ī Mu≠tazilīs, among them ≠Abd al-Jabbār and his 
student Abū al-(Husayn al-Ba$srī, maintain that voluntary human acts arise 
not only from human power but also from a motive (dā ≠ī).21 Like al-Rāzī, 
Gimaret claims that this Mu≠tazilī doctrine leads inevitably to determinism 
since the motive that God creates determines the act. Richard Frank and 
Wilferd Madelung have both refuted Gimaret in the case of ≠Abd al-Jabbār, 
for whom, they say, the motive does not necessitate the act. Frank does not 
19 Gimaret, Th éories de l’acte humain en théologie musulmane, 134–140. In discussing al-
Rāzī, Gimaret draws extensively, but not exclusively, from a manuscript of al-Rāzī’s Al-Ma$tālib 
al-≠āliyya. Th e material on the human act is now found in the ninth part of the published 
edition. Also, see now Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, 13–44, for a more detailed treatment of 
al-Rāzī’s theology of human action than that provided by Gimaret. Shihadeh clarifi es that 
al-Rāzī did adhere to the traditional Ash≠arī doctrine of acquisition in his earliest works but 
abandoned it later on. Additionally, according to Shihadeh (10 n. 34), the ninth part of the 
edited Al-Ma$tālib al-≠āliyya is rather a separate and earlier work called Al-Jabr wa al-qadar.
20 Gimaret, Th éories de l’acte humain en théologie musulmane, 140–1.
21 Gimaret, Th éories de l’acte humain en théologie musulmane, 39–60. For a detailed his-
tory of the followers of Abū ≠Alī al-Jubbā±ī and especially those of his son Abū Hāshim (the 
Bahshamiyya), which include ≠Abd al-Jabbār and Abū al-(Husayn al-Ba$srī, see Margaretha T. 
Heemskerk, Suff ering in Mu≠tazilite Th eology: ≠Abd al-Jabbār’s Teaching on Pain and Divine 
Justice (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 13–71.
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speak to the case of Abū al-(Husayn, but Madelung contends that he also, 
albeit with diffi  culty, retains the non-necessitating character of motives 
and factors of preponderance in bringing about the human act. For Abū 
al- (Husayn, it is human choice that decides the act.22 Th ese clarifi cations 
aside, it remains that al-Rāzī imputes to Abū al- (Husayn the doctrine that 
the motive is necessitating, and, as Gimaret explains, he draws out the logi-
cal conclusion of compulsion ( jabr). Th e motive necessarily brings the act 
into existence. Otherwise, the act would require another motive prior to it, 
and so on ad infi nitum. Th e stark choice is thus between compulsion and 
determinism on the one hand and denying the Creator on the other. Al-Rāzī 
chooses compulsion and the Creator, and, unlike his Ash≠arī predecessors, 
he does not hesitate to call himself a Jabrī.23
Apart from anti-Mu≠tazilī polemic, al-Rāzī conceives the operation of the 
human act in compatibilist terms with parallels in the Mu≠tazilī psychology 
of voluntary action. Th e human is the agent of his act, but God creates and 
determines the act. When the motive combines with the power that is equally 
powerful for an act and its contrary, then the act becomes necessary. Gimaret 
notes that al-Rāzī sometimes calls the motive an intention (qa$sd) or a will 
(irāda or mashī ±a). He also speaks of the decisive will (al-mashī ±a al-jāzima) 
that brings the act into existence necessarily. Th e human being acts by his 
will, but God creates this will. Accordingly, employing a formula like those 
of Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazālī noted above, al-Rāzī affi  rms, “Th e human being 
is necessitated in the form of one who chooses freely (al-insān mu#dtarr fī 
$sūrat mukhtār).”24
In addition to this compatibilism, a passage in al-Rāzī’s Tafsīr fi nds him 
underlining the contradictory character of human agency.25 Al-Rāzī sets out 
his comments when interpreting the verse: “God has sealed the hearts [of the 
22 Wilferd Madelung, “Th e Late Mu≠tazila and Determinism: Th e Philosopher’s Trap,” in 
Yād-nāma in memoria di Alessandro Bausani, ed. Biancamaria Scarcia Amoretti and Lucia 
Rostagno, vol. 1, Islamistica (Rome: Bardi, 1991), 245–257; and R.M. Frank, “Th e Autonomy 
of the Human Agent in the Teaching of ≠Abd al-Ğabbar,” Le Muséon 95 (1982): 323–355. 
Frank points out that the “psychological determinism” that Gimaret imputes to the Jubbā±īs 
runs counter to the fundamental Mu≠tazilī concern for justice. See also al-Julaynad, Qa#diyyat 
al-khayr wa al-sharr, 185–6, for an exposition of ≠Abd al-Jabbār’s thought on motives that 
corresponds to the analyses of Frank and Madelung.
23 Gimaret, Th éories de l’acte humain en théologie musulmane, 142–5.
24 Gimaret, Th éories de l’acte humain en théologie musulmane, 145–9 (quote from al-Rāzī, 
Al-Ma$tālib al-≠āliyya, 9:25).
25 Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī, Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr li-l-Imām al-Fakhr al-Rāzī, 3d ed. (Cairo: 
Mu±assasat al-ma$tbū≠āt al-islāmī, n.d.), 2:52–3. Gimaret, Th éories de l’acte humain en théologie 
musulmane, 152–3, provides a partial translation of this passage, as does Shihadeh, Teleologi-
cal Ethics, 38–9.
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unbelievers] and their hearing” (Q. 2:6). Aft er concluding that the quranic 
evidence on the human act falls into the realm of contradiction ( !hayyiz 
al-ta≠āru#d ), al-Rāzī turns to the rational arguments of the Ash≠arīs—whom 
he calls Sunnīs—and the Mu≠tazilīs. He fi rst notes that the Shāfi ≠ī jurist 
Abū al-Qāsim al-An$sārī (d. 512/1118) argues that neither Mu≠tazilīs nor 
Sunnīs (i.e. Ash≠arīs) should be called unbelievers on this matter because 
both exalt God. Al-Rāzī explains that Sunnīs emphasize God’s greatness and 
say that God must be the sole Creator (mūjid ) while Mu≠tazilīs stress God’s 
wisdom (!hikma) and say that it is unbefi tting of God’s sublimity to commit 
bad deeds (qabā±i&h). Aft er this, al-Rāzī goes on to a second “mystery (sirr),” 
this time dealing with the cause of the human act. On the one hand, he 
writes, “Establishing the Divinity leads necessarily to the view of compul-
sion ( jabr).” On the other, “Establishing the Messenger leads necessarily to 
the view of [human] power.” In the latter view, that of the Mu≠tazilīs, God’s 
guidance through the Messenger Mu !hammad entails human accountability 
and human power to commit acts. Al-Rāzī proves the contrary compulsion 
position with his preponderator argument. Acts that are merely contingent 
or possible (mumkin) require a preponderator (murajji!h) to bring them into 
existence. God must create this preponderator. So, denying that human acts 
require a preponderator is tantamount to denying the Creator, but affi  rming 
a preponderator entails compulsion and determinism in human acts and is 
tantamount to denying the Messenger. Al-Rāzī then outlines a third mystery. 
We intuitively sense a need for a preponderator to determine something’s 
existence or nonexistence, but, following the logic of the previous mys-
tery, this insight leads to compulsion in human acts. Conversely, we know 
intuitively that there is a diff erence between voluntary and involuntary acts, 
between the good of praise and the bad of blame, and between command 
and prohibition. Th is entails the doctrine of the Mu≠tazilīs. Al-Rāzī concludes 
that it seems as though the dictates of reason and the exaltation of God’s 
power and wisdom lead into the realm of contradiction, and he closes his 
discussion by asking God to lead us to truth and to good ends. In this text, 
al-Rāzī pits Mu≠tazilī libertarian freedom against compulsion and makes no 
attempt to render the two perspectives compatible.26
26 Al-Rāzī, Al-Ma $tālib al-≠āliyya, 8:118, observes the same contradiction or opposition 
(ta≠āru#d) and indicates that it is obligatory for ordinary people (al-≠awāmm) not to delve into 
it. Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, 181–203, provides a sensitive discussion of al-Rāzī’s late-life 
skepticism concerning apodictic knowledge in metaphysical and theological matters.
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Th ree somewhat diff erent outlooks may be detected in the above review 
of al-Rāzī’s thought on the human act. First, he calls himself a Jabrī, openly 
confessing compulsion ( jabr) in human acts and reducing Abū al- (Husayn 
al-Ba $srī’s libertarianism to compulsion as well. Second, he articulates a 
compatibilism in which the human being is the agent of his act while God 
creates the act by creating the power and the decisive will through which the 
act comes into existence. Th ird, al-Rāzī in his Tafsīr stresses the contradic-
tion between libertarian freedom and compulsion and makes no attempt to 
articulate their compatibility.
In some sense, Ibn ≠Arabī picks up where al-Rāzī leaves off . For the Sufi  the-
orist, proofs from revelation contradict each other, and while the Mu≠tazilīs 
and the Ash≠arīs both make strong and valid rational arguments—the fi rst 
based on God’s command, the second based on God’s power—their views 
are contradictory as well. With Ibn ≠Arabī, ambiguity is the fundamental 
character of reality, and all perspectives—even if contradictory—have their 
proper validity. So, in this question as in others, it is perhaps missing the 
point to try to pin Ibn ≠Arabī down to one position or another. Nonetheless, 
he does say that the truth of this matter is found only through unveiling 
(kashf ) and that this gives greater credence to the Ash≠arī view. Ultimately, the 
gnostic sees that all acts are God’s acts and that there is no linkage between 
secondary causes or between the human power and the human act. At most, 
the acquisition or performance (kasb) of the act is attributed to the human 
being, and this is his free choice (ikhtiyār).27
As the following sections will bear out, Ibn Taymiyya resists the drift  toward 
open admission of contradiction characteristic of al-Rāzī and Ibn ≠Arabī and 
refuses to surrender claim to rationality in the face of this most intransigent 
of theological paradoxes. Working within a metaphysical framework devel-
oped in al-Rāzī’s theology, Ibn Taymiyya holds fast to the compatibility of 
human agency and God’s preponderance of human acts. Th is, as well as his 
polemic against Jabrīs and strict Ash≠arīs, explains why Ibn Taymiyya may 
look—in Gimaret’s words—“much more anti-Ash≠arī than anti-Mu≠tazilī,”28 
even though the underlying metaphysic is fully deterministic.
27 Chittick, Th e Sufi  Path of Knowledge, 205–211, translates several texts pertaining to the 
human act from Ibn ≠Arabī’s Futu!hāt al-makkiyya (especially 3:403 translated on 208).
28 Gimaret, “Th éories de l’acte humain dans l’école (Hanbalite,” 166.
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Ibn Taymiyya on the Compatibility of Divine Creation and 
Human Action
God Is the Creator, Originator and Preponderator of the Human Act
Ibn Taymiyya supports the view that God is the Creator of human acts with 
quranic verses such as, “[Abraham and Ishmael said,] ‘Our Lord! Make us 
(ij ≠alnā) submissive to You and of our progeny a nation submissive to You’ ” 
(Q. 2:128), “We made ( ja≠alnā) leaders from among them guiding under our 
command” (Q. 32:24), and, “Surely, the human being was created (khuliqa) 
fretful, when evil touches him, anxious, when good touches him, grudging” 
(Q. 70:19–21).29 For rational proof that God is the Creator of the human act, 
Ibn Taymiyya turns to al-Rāzī’s preponderator argument and an equivalent 
originator argument. Th e shaykh uses these extensively in Minhāj to counter 
the Mu≠tazilism of al-(Hillī.
One full and clear version of the originator argument proceeds as follows. 
Ibn Taymiyya fi rst notes that the human will or act originates aft er not exist-
ing. Now, he argues, an originating event either has an originator or it does 
not. If it does not, then we have origination without an originator. If the 
act has an originator, it must be either the human, or God, or someone else. 
If it is the human, then the act’s originator itself requires a prior originator 
and so on ad infi nitum. Th is is impossible because an infi nite regress of 
originating events cannot subsist in humans who are themselves originated. 
If the originator of the act is someone else, the same diffi  culty of an infi nite 
regress recurs as when the originator is the human himself. Th erefore, God 
must be the Creator and Originator of the human act and will.30
Th e preponderator argument has already been presented from al-Rāzī 
above, and its details need not be repeated here. For Ibn Taymiyya, it yields 
the same result as the originator argument.31 Th e shaykh occasionally even 
interchanges the terms ‘origination’ and ‘preponderance’ in the course of the 
same argument.32 Th e upshot of the preponderator and originator arguments 
is that God creates, preponderates or originates human acts directly by sup-
plying the complete cause that makes the respective act necessary.
29 Minhāj, 3:110/2:17, 3:153/2:28, 3:237/2:48, 3:258ff ./2:54ff .; Ib $tāl, MF 2:322; MF 
8:78–9; and Dar ±, 1:68–9.
30 Minhāj, 3:236/2:48.
31 Minhāj, 3:118–9/2:19, 3:236/2:49, 3:268–9/2:57–8.
32 Minhāj, 3:30–1/1:270, 3:116–8/2:18–9.
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For Ibn Taymiyya, there is also no essential diff erence between voluntary 
and involuntary human acts from the perspective of God’s creation. He 
explains that God creates human acts “through the intermediary of His 
creation of the servant’s will and his power just as He creates the eff ects by 
their secondary causes (asbāb). He creates clouds through wind, rain through 
clouds, and plants through rain.”33 More will be said about secondary causality 
later in this chapter. Here it suffi  ces to note that the modes of God’s creation 
in the moral and natural spheres are identical, the only diff erence being that 
human will and power are the relevant intermediaries in the moral realm. 
Moreover, all human activities are contingent upon God’s will to create them. 
In support of this, Ibn Taymiyya frequently cites the verse, “To whomsoever 
among you wills to go straight: You will not unless God, the Lord of the 
worlds, so wills” (Q. 81:28–9).34 He explains that this verse affi  rms against 
the Jabrīs that humans have a will and against the Qadarīs that this will is 
dependent upon the will of God.35 He also notes that belief in the human 
will is vital for belief in command and prohibition, promise and threat, while 
belief in God’s will is central to belief in determination.36 Nonetheless, he 
maintains that the human will and power are totally dependent upon God’s 
creation for their operation.37 Ibn Taymiyya discusses human power and will 
oft en, although not always precisely. Th e following two sections analyze this 
discourse further.
Determining Power and Legislative Power
Ibn Taymiyya uses several terms to indicate power in humans: power (qudra), 
capability (isti $tā ≠a), ability ( $tāqa) and strength or potency (quwwa). Power 
and capability occur most commonly. All four of these terms are used 
33 Minhāj, 3:146/2:26.
34 Wāsi$tiyya, MF 3:150; Irāda, MF 8:118; MF 8:238; Qa#dā±, MF 8:268; Isti$tā ≠a, MF 8:374; 
Kasb, MF 8:393; Jabr, MF 8:459, 488; and Minhāj, 3:111/2:17, 3:236/2:48.
35 Jabr, MF 8:488.
36 MF 8:240.
37 Th e following passage in Minhāj, 3:269/2:57, illustrates Ibn Taymiyya’s view of God’s 
complete causality in the creation of human acts: “Since the act of the servant does not occur 
except by a preponderator from God—Exalted is He—and upon the existence of this prepon-
derator the existence of the act is necessary, his act is like the rest of the originating events that 
originate by means of secondary causes that God—Exalted is He—creates. Th e existence of 
the originating event is necessary with them. Th is is what it means for the Lord—Blessed is 
He, and exalted is He—to be Creator of the act of the servant. Th e meaning of that is that 
God—Exalted is He—creates the complete power and the decisive will in the servant. Upon 
their existence, the existence of the act is necessary because this is the complete cause for the 
act. When the complete cause exists, the existence of the eff ect is necessary.”
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 synonymously in the course of four pages in the third volume of the edited 
Minhāj.38 In Dar ± the shaykh says similarly that the “capability” of the human 
“is his power and his ability.”39 Ibn Taymiyya speaks of two kinds of power 
in humans. On the one hand is “the legislative power that is the factor of 
[bodily] soundness (mu$sa!h!hi!h) for the act which is the crux of command and 
prohibition”40 or “the power that is the condition for imposing obligation 
(al-qudra al-mashrū$ta fī al-taklīf ).”41 On the other hand is “the determin-
ing power necessitating the act which is conjoined to the thing empowered 
and is not posterior to it.”42 Th e shaykh also calls the latter the power that 
makes the act follow necessarily (mustalzim). Th e power that is a factor of 
soundness is both before and with the act, and it is a condition (shar $t) for 
the act to take place. Th e necessitating power comes into force at the very 
time of the act and not prior to it.43 Capability falls into the same two types 
as noted in a passage from the brief fatwa Isti $tā ≠a:
Capability is of two kinds: anterior and eff ectual for two opposites, and con-
joined and only with the act. [Th e fi rst] is the soundness factor for the act and 
the admissibility factor (mujawwiza) for it. [Th e second] is the necessitating 
factor for the act and the realization factor (mu!haqqiqa) for it.44
In a number of texts, the shaykh uses a few key quranic verses and hadith 
to illustrate the soundness factor senses of both capability and power. He 
quotes, for example, “It is the duty of people to God to take the Pilgrim-
age ( !hajj) to the House, whoever is capable of making his way there” 
(Q. 3:97). He argues that if this were the capability conjoined to the act, 
then the obligation of the Pilgrimage would fall only on those actually taking 
the Pilgrimage. In this case, those with requisite means for the Pilgrimage 
would not be disobeying if they did not take it.45 He also quotes the hadith 
in which the Prophet says, “When I have commanded you with a command, 
do of it what you are capable.”46 Th is capability is not conjoined to the act. 
38 Minhāj, 3:47–50/2:274–5. See also the interchangeable usage of qudra and isti $tā ≠ in 
Irāda, MF 8:129; Isti$tā ≠a, MF 8:371; and Tā ≠a, MF 8:441–2.
39 Dar ±, 1:60.
40 Irāda, MF 8:129.
41 Minhāj, 3:103/2:15.
42 Irāda, MF 8:129.
43 Minhāj, 3:50/1:275, 3:71/2:6, 3:103/2:15. Cf. Minhāj, 3:47/1:274.
44 Isti $tā ≠a, MF 8:372. Cf. Minhāj, 3:48–50/1:274–5; Dar ±, 1:60–1; Sa≠āda, 8:290–1; and 
Abū Dharr, MF 18:172–3.
45 Irāda, MF 8:129; Isti$tā ≠a, MF 8:372; and Minhāj, 1:407–8/1:114.
46 Bukhārī, 6744, Al-I≠ti$sām bi-l-kitāb wa al-sunna, Al-Iqtidā± bi-sunan rasūl Allāh; A!hmad, 
9158.
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Otherwise, the hadith would mean that they were commanded to do only 
what they did.47 As examples of the conjoined and necessitating capability, 
the shaykh cites, “Th ey were not capable of hearing, and they were not see-
ing” (Q. 11:20), and, “Th ose whose eyes were covered from My Reminder, 
and they were not capable of hearing” (Q. 18:101).48 Ibn Taymiyya adds in 
Isti$tā ≠a that the fi rst type of capability is legislative and the second ontologi-
cal, and he ties these to the commanding, legislative words and the creative, 
ontological words, respectively, which we observed in Chapter Th ree.49 Th e 
shaykh’s two senses of capability thus correspond to God’s command and 
creation, respectively.
Ibn Taymiyya attributes his doctrine of the two senses of power and 
capability to “those who grasp the full truth among the Kalām theologians, 
jurists, hadith specialists and Sufi s.”50 He reports that the Mu≠tazilīs and 
their followers among the Shī≠īs affi  rm only the soundness factor type of 
human power while the Ash≠arīs and others grant only the necessitating 
power. Th e former group insists that humans could do other than what they 
do. Th e human power is eff ectual for either an act or its opposite. However, 
the shaykh says that this violates the principle of preponderance. Th e latter 
group says that humans can do only what they actually do. Human power 
is only eff ectual for and conjoined to the act it creates. Ibn Taymiyya notes, 
however, that some from this latter group uphold the former type of capabil-
ity when working in the realm of jurisprudence.51
Imprecision in the Human Will
In view of the fact that Ibn Taymiyya conceives the conjoined power or 
capability to be immediately eff ectual in producing the human act, the place 
of the will is not apparent. Further investigation shows that the shaykh’s 
psychology of human action becomes imprecise when pressed beyond the 
basic distinction between power as the bodily soundness to perform an act 
and the complete cause that brings the act into existence.
We begin with several passages solely from Minhāj to demonstrate Ibn 
Taymiyya’s variety of expression. One passage sets out will and power in 
47 Irāda, MF 8:129; and Isti$tā ≠a, MF 8:372–3.
48 Isti$tā ≠a, MF 8:373; and Dar ±, 1:61.
49 Isti$tā ≠a, MF 8:373. Cf. Irāda, MF 8:129–131.
50 Dar ±, 1:60.
51 Isti$tā ≠a, MF 8:371; Abū Dharr, MF 18:173; Sa≠āda, MF 8:290, 292; Dar ±, 1:60; and 
Minhāj, 1:408–9/1:114. On jurists adhering to an anterior capability in jurisprudence but 
not in theology, see Irāda, MF 8:130.
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equivalent terms. Without giving names, the shaykh notes that people 
dispute over the “choosing agent (al-fā ≠il al-mukhtār).” Is his will before 
the act, conjoined to the act, or both? Likewise, is power prior to the act, 
conjoined to the act, or both? Th e shaykh then gives what he believes to be 
the correct view: “Th e decisive will (al-irāda al-jāzima) with the complete 
power (al-qudra al-tāmma) make the act follow necessarily and are conjoined 
with it. Th e act does not come to be by an unconjoined prior power only 
or an unconjoined prior will only.”52 Ibn Taymiyya observes that before the 
act there may be power but not will, or will but not power. Th ere may also 
be resolve (≠azm). Th en he writes, “When the time for the act comes, the 
resolve strengthens and becomes an intention (qa$sd ). Th e will at the time 
of the act is more perfect than it was before it, and likewise, the power at 
the time of the act is more perfect than it was before it.”53 Although this 
discussion holds will and power in perfect symmetry, there is no attempt to 
explain how the two are related or whether they are identical.
A second passage in Minhāj eliminates power as a necessitating factor in 
the act and gives this role solely to will. Aft er noting that some say that the 
power is before the act and others say that it is conjoined to it, Ibn Taymiyya 
articulates his own view:
Th e power is the factor of soundness only, and it is with it and before it. As 
for [the factor] making it follow necessarily, it only occurs upon the existence 
of the will with the power, not by the very thing that is called power. Th e will 
is not part of what is called the power. Th is view is the one agreeing with the 
language of the Qur±an and, moreover, the language of the rest of the nations. 
It is the most correct of the views.54
At a later point in Minhāj, the shaykh distinguishes will from power in similar 
terms. Power is the condition for imposing obligation, but will is not. Rather, 
the will is the condition for the existence of the act.55 A fourth passage just 
a little earlier in Minhāj gives less prominence to the will. Aft er explaining 
the two views that power is either before the act or at the time of the act, 
Ibn Taymiyya claims that there is both a power prior to and extending up 
to the time of the act and a second power necessitating the act. Th e power 
existing prior to the act is not suffi  cient to make someone believe or disbe-
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his will to believe. Th is will is part of “the entirety of the power conjoined 
with the act.”56 Here, the will has been subsumed under the power that is 
complete and produced directly by God. In a fi ft h passage from Minhāj, Ibn 
Taymiyya says that the human act follows necessarily when the decisive will 
and the complete potency (al-quwwa al-tāmma) combine (ijtama≠). He then 
explains that what brings an act into existence is the complete cause (al-≠illa 
al-tāmma) which is necessarily conjoined to the act and not prior.57
Beyond Minhāj, there are a number of other texts presenting similar 
diversity. A discussion of necessitating capability in Dar ± construes capabil-
ity as will. Ibn Taymiyya notes that the Salaf interpret the verse, “Th ey were 
not capable of hearing, and they were not seeing” (Q. 11:20), to mean that 
something—in this case hearing and seeing—is not possible, not due to a 
lack of power but a lack of will. Th e shaykh writes, “Th eir souls were not 
capable of willing it, even though they had the power to do it if they had 
so willed. Th is is the state of one whose caprice or corrupt opinion diverted 
him from listening to the books of God sent down and following them.”58 
Elsewhere, Ibn Taymiyya says that a decisive will is needed to make an act 
necessary, but he also allows that this will falls under the ensemble of factors 
constituting the conjoined capability.59 A brief passage in Kasb subsumes not 
only will but also every other cause that may be involved in the production of 
an act under the conjoined power: “Power here is absolutely nothing but an 
expression of that from which the act [comes] with respect to intention, will, 
soundness of [body] members, created potency in the limbs, etc. Th erefore, 
it must be conjoined with the act.”60
In short Ibn Taymiyya maintains one power that is the soundness of the 
human body for performing acts that is the condition for God’s imposition 
of obligation. He also upholds a second power—variously called will, power, 
capability or some combination thereof—that generates the human act and 
is created directly by God. Beyond this, nothing more precise may be said 
about how the shaykh conceives the psychology of human action.
56 Minhāj, 3:104.
57 Minhāj, 3:50/1:275.
58 Dar ±, 1:61.
59 Tā±a, MF 8:441–2.
60 Kasb, MF 8:390.
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Reconciling the Jabrīs and the Qadarīs with Compatibilist Freedom
Ibn Taymiyya occasionally articulates the compatibility of human account-
ability with God’s creation of human will and power by reconciling the 
Ash≠arī Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī with the Mu≠tazilī Abū al-(Husayn al-Ba$srī. In 
Minhāj, the shaykh quotes a passage from al-Rāzī’s Arba≠īn in which the 
Ash≠arī theologian accuses Abū al-(Husayn of contradiction. On the one hand, 
al-Rāzī argues, Abū al-(Husayn goes to the extreme in Mu≠tazilism by asserting 
that it is necessary knowledge that humans bring their acts into existence 
(ījād ). On the other, Abū al-(Husayn falls into extreme Jabrism because he 
holds that the occurrence of the act is dependent on a motive (dā ≠ī), which 
al-Rāzī understands as necessary to preponderate the existence of the act.61 
Ibn Taymiyya accuses the Shī≠īs Na$sīr al-Dīn al-+Tūsī (d. 672/1274) and Ibn 
al-Mu $tahhar al- (Hillī of the same contradiction that al-Rāzī fi nds in Abū 
al-(Husayn.62
Despite this accusation, Ibn Taymiyya goes on to use al-Rāzī’s deterministic 
reading of Abū al-(Husayn’s motive theory to argue, sophistically it will appear, 
for the compatibility of the Mu≠tazilī and Ash≠arī viewpoints. He maintains 
that Abū al-(Husayn’s theory is equivalent to the teaching of the majority of 
Sunnīs, and he claims that al-Juwaynī, the (Hanbalī Abū Khāzim b. Abū Ya≠lā 
(d. 527/1133) and the Karrāmīs come close to this position.63 Th e existence 
of human power alone is inadequate for an act to become preponderate. A 
motive, that is, a complete preponderator, must be conjoined to this power 
for the existence of the act to become necessary.64 According to the shaykh, 
the Mu≠tazilīs err only when they claim that the motive arises apart from 
God’s will and power.65
Ibn Taymiyya also uses the deterministic interpretation of Abū al-(Husayn 
al-Ba $srī to reconcile two data of necessary knowledge that Fakhr al-Dīn 
al-Rāzī took to be contradictory. As in the passage translated below from 
Isti$tā ≠a, the shaykh affi  rms fi rst that it is necessary knowledge that voluntary 
acts are attributed to the human who is their agent and originator (mu!hdith). 
Second, he contends that it is necessary knowledge that human will and 
action require an originator or preponderator from God. Th us, Ibn Taymiyya 
61 Al-Rāzī, Arba≠īn, 1:319, quoted in Minhāj, 3:251/2:52.
62 Minhāj, 3:247–250/2:51–2, 3:276/2:58–9. Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj, 3:273/2:58, also 
mentions that, unlike Abū al- (Husayn, the Mu≠tazilī al-Zamakhsharī does not adhere to the 
necessitating quality of the preponderator.
63 Minhāj, 3:239/2:49, 3:251/2:52, 3:268/2:56.
64 Minhāj, 3:31/1:270, 3:74/2:7, 3:239/2:49, 3:267–8/2:56. 
65 Minhāj, 3:75/2:7. Cf. Minhāj, 3:248/2:52.
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maintains that both the Qadarīs and the Jabrīs have part of the truth on the 
human act. Th e human act truly exists, and it is fully dependent upon God 
for its existence. Unlike al-Rāzī, he claims that the necessary knowledge of 
voluntary human agency is not incompatible with the necessary knowledge 
of the need of the human act for a preponderator, and he sees no contradic-
tion in this.66 Here is his argument in full:
Th e Qadarīs and the Jabrīs separate into two contradictory sides. Each of them 
is correct in what it establishes but not in what it denies. Abū al-(Husayn al-Ba$srī 
and whoever follows him among the Qadarīs claim that the knowledge that 
the servant originates ( yu!hdith) his acts and his actions is necessary knowledge 
and that denying that is sophistry.
Ibn al-Kha$tīb [Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī] and his like among the Jabrīs claim that 
the knowledge that preponderating the servant’s act over his not acting requires 
a preponderator apart from the servant is necessary. [Th is is] because one of 
the two positions of something which is possible and has two equal positions 
will not become preponderant over the other except with a preponderator.
Both of these views are correct. However, the claim that the necessary 
implication of one of them is to deny the other is not correct. Th e servant 
is originating his acts [and] acquiring (kāsib) them, and this origination is in 
need of an originator. Th e servant is acting, fabricating ($sāni ≠) and originat-
ing, and his being acting, fabricating and originating aft er he was not [thus] 
must inevitably have [another] agent. As He said, “To whomsoever among you 
wills to go straight”—When he wills to go straight, he begins going straight. 
Th en, He said—“You will not, unless God, Lord of the worlds, so wills” (Q. 
81:28–9).
All of what is known necessarily and what traditional (sam≠ī) and rational 
(≠aqlī) proofs demonstrate is true. Th erefore, there is neither might nor power 
except by God. Th e servant needs God. [He has] an essential need for Him 
in his essence, his attributes, and his acts. Nonetheless, he still has an essence, 
attributes and acts.67
It is apparent that Ibn Taymiyya eff ects his reconciliation of Fakhr al-Dīn al-
Rāzī and Abū al-(Husayn al-Ba$srī in this passage by reading the term originate 
( yu!hdith) in a much diff erent sense from the usual Mu≠tazilī sense of create. 
In Isti$tā≠a, from which this passage is taken, the shaykh does not elaborate 
how humans may be said to originate their acts, but he does broach this 
question in Minhāj. Th ere he explains that God’s origination (i!hdāth) of 
acts means that He creates them disjoined from Himself and subsisting in 
humans whereas human origination (i!hdāth) of acts means that acts  originate 
66 See similar discussions in Shams, MF 16:235–7, and Minhāj, 3:235–240/2:48–9.
67 Isti$tā ≠a, MF 8:375.
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(!hadatha) from humans by their will and power which God creates.68 Th us, 
human origination of acts does not involve human creation of acts for Ibn 
Taymiyya as it would for the Mu≠tazilīs. The shaykh follows al-Rāzī in 
insisting on God’s preponderance of the human act, and he maintains the 
compatibility of this with human accountability by replacing a libertarian 
account of human agency with the simple existence of a human agency willed 
and created by God. Ibn Taymiyya maintains that human beings have acts 
that exist in reality just as they have essences and attributes that are real, 
but, if human beings may be said to have choice and freedom in the shaykh’s 
thought, it is strictly in a compatibilist sense.
Th e Substrate Principle: Humans Are the Agents of their Acts in Reality
In a number of texts and especially in Minhāj, Ibn Taymiyya distinguishes 
between God who creates the human act ( fi ≠l ) and the human who is its 
agent ( fā ≠il ) by limiting attribution of the act to the substrate (ma!hall ) (i.e. 
the human) in which it subsists. Th e shaykh draws this distinction to counter 
the Mu≠tazilī objection that a God who creates acts of disobedience is bad 
and unjust.69 God cannot be called to account for creating bad acts because 
He creates them in a substrate other than Himself, namely, human beings, 
and He is not qualifi ed by them. By virtue of this ‘substrate principle’, only 
the substrate is qualifi ed by the acts subsisting in it.70
Th e shaykh explains that God’s creation of acts in humans is like God’s 
creation of their attributes. God creates some black and some white, some 
tall and some short, and so on. So also, He creates some believing and some 
disbelieving, some unjust and some oppressed. In each of these cases, it is not 
God but humans who are qualifi ed by what He creates. God is not black or 
white, tall or short, believing or unbelieving but only the humans in whom 
He creates these things.71
From the human perspective, humans are the agents of their acts in reality 
(!haqīqatan)—not metaphorically as Jahm b. !Safwān would have it—by virtue 
of what God has created to subsist in them. Humans act by their will, power 
68 Minhāj, 3:239–240/2:49.
69 See for example Minhāj, 1:455–460/1:126–7, 2:294–5/1:213, 3:137–154/2:24–8; 
Irāda, MF 8:122–7; and Abū Dharr, MF 18:151–5. Cf. Jabr, MF 8:468–9.
70 Minhāj, 1:455–7/1:126, 3:110/2:17, 3:146/2:26, 3:148/2:26; Irāda, MF 8:119–127; 
and Jabr, MF 8:483–4. Cf. Gimaret, “Th éories de l’acte humain dans l’école (Hanbalite,” 
176–7.
71 Jabr, MF 8:483–4; Kasb, MF 8:403; Abū Dharr, MF 18:155; and Minhāj, 1:455–
7/1:126, 2:294–5/1:213. Cf. Minhāj, 3:217–220/2:43–4.
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and free choice (ikhtiyār), and judgments for their acts are attributed to them 
and not to God.72 Ibn Taymiyya suggests that if things that cannot choose 
may even be said to come from a certain place—as fruit from a certain tree 
or a crop from a particular plot of ground—then acts are a fortiori attributed 
to those with free choice, even though God is their Creator.73 As the shaykh 
puts it in one discussion of the human act, “Th e Qur±an has informed that 
servants believe, disbelieve, act, commit deeds, acquire, obey, disobey, pray, 
give alms, undertake the Hajj, undertake the ≠Umra, kill, commit adultery, 
steal, tell the truth, lie, eat, drink, fi ght and wage war.”74 Th us, both acts of 
obedience and disobedience are attributed to humans, and humans thereby 
become worthy of reward and commendation or punishment and blame.75
Passages employing the substrate principle oft en include polemic against 
the ideas that God’s creation (khalq) and act ( fi ≠l ) are identical to the 
thing created (makhlūq) and the thing enacted (maf ≠ūl ), respectively.76 
Ibn Taymiyya attributes these views to Jahm b. !Safwān, al-Ash≠arī and their 
followers in the four Sunnī schools of law including the (Hanbalīs Ibn ≠Aqīl 
and Ibn al-Jawzī.77 He explains that their intention is to avoid saying that 
the human act has two agents (i.e. God and the human).78 But he counters 
that one must distinguish an act from the thing enacted and creating from 
the thing created. Th us, the human act is the act of the human in reality 
and a thing created and enacted by God. God creates the act, but He does 
not commit the act. If it is said that the act ( fi ≠l ) is His, it means that it 
is enacted (maf ≠ūl ) by Him in another. Th e shaykh attributes this view to 
Sunnīs generally on the report of the Shāfi ≠ī jurist al-Baghawī (d. 510/1117), 
to Sufi s on the report of al-Kalābādhī (d. 380/990 or 384/994), and to a 
number of (Hanbalīs. He also tells us that it was the last of two positions 
held by Abū Ya≠lā, and he attributes it to the (Hanafī law school, possibly 
72 Minhāj, 3:12/1:265, 3:109/2:17, 3:145/2:26, 3:148–9/2:26, 3:257/2:54; Wāsi$tiyya, MF 
3:150; Irāda, MF 8:118, 123; Jabr, MF 8:459, 482–3; and Abū Dharr, MF 18:151–5.
73 Minhāj, 3:145–6/2:26.
74 Jabr, MF 8:459. See also Wāsi$tiyya, MF 3:150; Irāda, MF 8:120; MF 8:237–8; and 
Minhāj, 3:111–2/2:17. See Minhāj, 3:256–265/2:53–6, 3:336–9/2:74–5, for an extended 
listing and discussion of quranic texts indicating both that humans commit acts and that 
God creates them.
75 Minhāj, 3:153–4/2:28.
76 Irāda, MF 8:118ff .; Jabr, MF 8:468; and Minhāj, 1:458–460/1:127, 2:296ff ./1:213ff ., 
3:13/1:266, 3:112/2:17, 3:240–1/2:49–50, 5:426–7/3:107.
77 Minhāj, 1:457/1:127, 2:296–7/1:213–4, 3:112/2:17; and Jabr, MF 8:428. Ibn 
Taymiyya also reports in Minhāj, 2:296/1:213, 3:240/2:59, that the Ash≠arī theologian Abū 
Is!hāq al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 418/1027) taught that the single act had two agents (i.e. God and the 
human).
78 Jabr, MF 8:428.
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having in mind the Māturīdī school of theology that was prominent among 
the (Hanafīs.79 Gimaret notes that Ibn Taymiyya’s distinction between the 
act and the thing enacted corresponds to the Māturīdī theological position, 
and he suggests that Ibn Taymiyya or an earlier (Hanbalī, such as Abū Ya≠lā, 
may have borrowed this idea from the Māturīdīs.80
In view of the substrate principle, Ibn Taymiyya maintains that God is 
not unjust in what He creates. As for why God would create unbelief and 
disobedience, Ibn Taymiyya asserts that God has wise purposes in this.81 
In Minhāj the shaykh also provides a fortiori arguments to defend God’s 
retributive justice further. He argues that, if a human is not unjust to pun-
ish his servant for injustice that God creates, then God Himself is a fortiori 
not unjust to punish injustice that He creates. Likewise, if someone is not 
considered unjust to chastise another when that is necessary to gain a cer-
tain benefi t, then God Himself is a fortiori not unjust to do the same.82 In 
a similar argument just a little later in Minhāj, Ibn Taymiyya explains that 
this is in keeping with the God who is not like anything, but Who, in His 
right to perfection, is given the highest similitude.83 Th ese arguments and the 
substrate principle that lie behind them may not have satisfi ed Ibn Taymiyya 
completely. In (Hasana, which will be examined in the next chapter, he goes 
beyond the substrate principle and attempts to absolve God of responsibility 
for creating bad deeds by locating the ultimate cause of human disobedience 
in nonexistence.
Ibn Taymiyya’s View of Divine Creation by Means of Secondary Causes
An Overview of Secondary Causality
As was noted previously, Ibn Taymiyya says that God creates the human act 
by means of human will and power just as He creates plants in the natural 
79 Minhāj, 1:457–8/1:127. Cf. Minhāj, 2:298–301/1:214, 3:112/2:17, 3:149/2:27. 
Ibn Taymiyya, Tā ≠a, MF 8:438, identifi es Abū Man$sūr al-Māturīdī as a Kalām theologian 
among the (Hanafīs. In Irāda, MF 8:120–3, Ibn Taymiyya gives a detailed account of the act 
( fi ≠l )/thing enacted (maf ≠ūl ) distinction, but the early part of this passage is confusing and 
may be textually corrupt. Two lines that appear in MF 8:121 (mid-line 4 to mid-line 6) are 
lacking in the MRM and MRK1 versions of the text. Moreover, the two lines in question 
include the key term musammā al-ma$sdar, which appears to be used inconsistently in the 
wider context.
80 Gimaret, “Th éories de l’acte humain dans l’école (Hanbalite,” 177–8.
81 Abū Dharr, MF 18:155; Minhāj, 3:148/2:27; Irāda, MF 8:123; and MF 8:238.
82 Minhāj, 3:148/2:26.
83 Minhāj, 3:150–1/2:27.
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world through secondary causes like clouds and rain. Yet, what exactly is 
meant by secondary causality? In Tadmuriyya the shaykh gives an overview 
of his views on this that is translated below. Th is will serve as the basis for 
exploration of this question in other texts, especially in Kasb, which contains 
much illustrative material. In Tadmuriyya Ibn Taymiyya affi  rms that God is 
Creator, Lord and Sovereign of all things and that He is powerful over all 
things and knows all things. Nothing occurs apart from His will (mashī±a). 
Th e shaykh continues:
Along with this, [the People of Guidance and Prosperity] do not deny what God 
creates of secondary causes (asbāb) by which He creates eff ects (musabbabāt). 
For example, He—Exalted is He—said, “[It is He Who sends the winds . . .] till 
when they have carried a heavy-laden cloud. We drive it to a land that is dead. 
Th en We send down rain to it, and thereby We bring forth every kind of fruit” 
(Q. 7:57). He—Exalted is He—said, “By [the Book] God guides whoever fol-
lows His good pleasure to ways of peace” (Q. 5:16). He—Exalted is He—said, 
“By [this parable], He leads many astray, and by it He guides many” (Q. 2:26). 
Th us, He informed that He acts by means of secondary causes.
Whoever [e.g. a strict Ash≠arī] says that He acts with them (≠indahā) and 
not by means of them (bihā) opposes what the Qur±an has brought and 
denies what God has created of potencies (quwā) and natures ( $tabā±i ≠). Th is 
is similar to denying what God created of potencies that are in living beings 
by which living beings act, like the power of the servant. Likewise, whoever 
[i.e. a Mu≠tazilī] makes them the creators of that has given associates to God 
and attributed His act to another.
Th at is because there is no cause among the causes but that needs another 
cause for its eff ect to occur, and there must inevitably be an impediment 
(māni≠) impeding what is entailed by it (muqta#dāhu) when God does not repel 
[the impediment] from the [cause]. Th ere is not one thing in existence that 
does anything independently when it wills, except God alone. He—Exalted is 
He—said, “And of everything We have created pairs, that you might remember” 
(Q. 51:49), that is, that you may know that the Creator of the pairs is one.
Th erefore, whoever [e.g. Ibn Sīnā] says that from God only one [thing] 
emanates because nothing emanates from one but one is ignorant.84 Indeed, 
there is no one thing in existence from which emanates anything alone—neither 
84 According to Ibn Sīnā, only unity can fl ow from the One (i.e. God) so as to preserve 
the utter simplicity of the One. Since the One cannot be the source of multiplicity, multi-
plicity arises from the First Intellect, which emanates from the One. For further discussion, 
see Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ta≠līqāt, 54, 99–100; Ian Richard Netton, Allah Transcendent (Surrey, UK: 
Curzon Press, 1989), 162–7; and Nicholas Heer, “Al-Rāzī and al- +Tūsī on Ibn Sīnā’s Th eory of 
Emanation,” in Neoplatonism and Islamic Th ought, ed. Parviz Morewedge (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1992), 111–125. Ibn Taymiyya argues in Irāda, MF 8:134, that 
Ibn Sīnā’s One is devoid of attributes and ultimately has no existence outside the mind.
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one [in number] nor two—except God who created all the pairs among what 
the earth makes to grow, their souls, and what they do not know.
Burning does not occur except by the fi re in which God created heat and in 
a substrate receptive to burning. When [fi re] falls on a phoenix, sapphire and 
such like, it does not burn them, and a body may be coated with something 
that prevents it from burning. As for the sun from which rays come, there must 
inevitably be a body that receives the refl ection of the rays upon it. When there 
is an obstacle such as a cloud or a roof, the rays do not pass below it.85
In other texts, Ibn Taymiyya gives numerous examples of God’s creation 
through secondary causality. God may create market price rises by means 
of (bi-sabab) human injustice and price drops by means of human benefi -
cence.86 God may grant humans their provision by the usual means of 
human endeavor or by the rarer means of angels and jinn.87 God may make 
an eclipse or a strong cold wind a cause of chastisement.88 God may make 
the celestial bodies (kawākib), the blowing of the wind, and the light of 
the sun and the moon secondary causes of originating events in the earth.89 
Also, invocation and intercession are among the secondary causes by which 
God brings to pass what He decrees.90 Marriage and sexual intercourse are 
the divinely established customary causes of begetting children.91 God has 
made deeds causes of reward and punishment just as He has made poison a 
cause of illness and illness a cause of death.92
Polemic on Secondary Causality
Th e Tadmuriyya passage translated above includes polemic, fi rst, against those 
who say that God creates only with or at (≠ind ) the instance of the causes, 
but not by (bi) them, and, second, against those who give human power the 
85 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:112–3.
86 MF 8:520.
87 Tawakkul, MF 8:534.
88 MF 35:176. Yahya J. Michot, “Ibn Taymiyya on Astrology: Annotated Translation 
of Th ree Fatwas,” Journal of Islamic Studies 11.2 (2000): 147–208, translates the fatwa on 
astrology found in MF 35:166–190. Cf. Qawl ≠Alī, MF 8:172.
89 Man$tiqiyyīn, 270 and MF 25:198–9, both of which are translated in Yahya Michot, 
“Pages spirituelles d’Ibn Taymiyya: XIII. Contre l’astrologie,” Action (Mauritius), January 
2001, 10–11, 26 (the passage from Man$tiqiyyīn is at 10 n. 4).
90 Wāsi $ta, MF 1:137. Wāsi $ta, MF 1:121–138, is translated in full in Yahya J. Michot, 
“Ibn Taymiyya: Les intermédiaires entre Dieu et l’homme (Risâlat al-wâsi$ta bayna l-khalq 
wa l- !haqq),” Le Musulman (Paris) Special Issue (1996). Cf. MF 8:192–3.
91 Sa≠āda, MF 8:276; and MF 8:68.
92 Qa#dā±, MF 8:268. Cf. Sa≠āda, MF 8:278–9. See also the listings of quranic verses indi-
cating secondary causality in Minhāj, 3:113–4/2:18; and Irāda, MF 8:137–8.
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ability to create acts. Th e former charge is leveled against the tradition of 
strict Ash≠arism in which whatever appears to be causally connected is simply 
a matter of God creating things conjoined at the same place and time. Th e 
human act does not occur by means of human power, but only with it.93 Th e 
latter charge is directed against the Mu≠tazilīs who argue that humans must 
create their own acts in order to be held properly accountable for them and 
also to free God from creating evil deeds. For Ibn Taymiyya, however, this 
is tantamount to giving God an associate (shirk) in His creative enterprise, 
and it must be rejected because God is the sole Creator. A discussion of 
secondary causality in Irāda adds a third charge.94 While some deny causes 
as the means by which God creates, others disregard causes that God has 
commanded such as invoking God and performing righteous deeds. Th e 
latter think that whatever God determines will happen whether or not they 
do what God has commanded. Th e shaykh counters this with two exchanges 
found in the Hadith:
[Some asked the Prophet], “Should we not leave deeds and trust completely 
on what has been written?” He said, “No! Perform deeds! Each is facilitated 
into that for which he was created”. . . . It was said, “O Messenger of God! 
Have you seen medicine by which we may be cured, charms by which we 
may invoke [God], and piety (taqwā) by which we may fear [God]? Do they 
ward off  anything of God’s determination?” He said, “Th ey are part of God’s 
determination.”95
Ibn Taymiyya adds furthermore that God makes one thing a cause of another 
and that what God has determined has been determined to happen by means 
of secondary causes. In summing up these positions in Irāda, Ibn Taymiyya 
cites a saying, which he elsewhere attributes to al-Ghazālī and Ibn al-Jawzī 
in their writings on complete trust (tawakkul ):96
Turning to the causes (asbāb) is giving associates in [violation of God’s] unique-
ness (shirk fī al-taw !hīd ). Obliterating the causes by denying that they are 
causes is an aberration with respect to reason. Abandoning the causes entirely 
is defamation of the Law.97
93 For this see also Minhāj, 3:239/2:49; Irāda, MF 8:136–7; Bughya, 35; and Michot, “Ibn 
Taymiyya on Astrology,” 155–6 and n. 34, which translate MF 35:168 and MF 9:287–8, 
respectively.
94 Irāda, MF 8:138–9.
95 Irāda, MF 8:138. Th e fi rst hadith is found in Bukhārī, 4568, Tafsīr al-Qur±ān, Fa-sa-
nuyassiruhu li-l-≠usrā, and the second in Ibn Māja, 3428, Al-+Tibb, Mā anzala Allāh dā±an 
illā anzala lahu shifā±.
96 Th e attribution to al-Ghazālī and Ibn al-Jawzī is found in Bughya, 35.
97 Irāda, MF 8:138–9.
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In the context of this dictum in Irāda, it appears that the Mu≠tazilīs are 
those “turning to the causes” in their attribution of the creation of acts to 
humans. Th e strict Ash≠arīs “obliterate” the causes, and those who fail to 
do what God has commanded because of determination “abandon” the 
causes. Th e shaykh also mentions this aphorism in other places with minor 
changes of wording, but its interpretation is not always apparent.98 In one 
text, however, he gives an extended discussion that clarifi es what he thinks 
it means. “Turning to the causes” is depending upon them and putting one’s 
hope in them. For Ibn Taymiyya, there is no cause worthy of this because 
all causes depend upon God for their origination. Nothing originates itself. 
Here he criticizes the philosophers and the astrologers at length for believing 
that the motions of the nine celestial spheres are the causes of all originating 
events.99 He also identifi es the naturalists and the Mu≠tazilīs with this fi rst 
part of the aphorism. Moving to its second part, he notes that “obliterat-
ing the causes” is not only an imperfection in reason but also defames the 
Law, and he identifi es this position with many of the Kalām theologians, 
presumably the Ash≠arīs.100 Regarding the third part, the shaykh says that 
“abandoning the causes entirely” is not only “defamation of the Law” but 
also irrational, and he censures those who think their deeds play no role 
in what will happen to them because of divine determination.101 For Ibn 
Taymiyya, the fi rst part of the aphorism negates God’s creation and the last 
two parts undercut the Law.
Secondary Causality fr om the Divine Perspective Is Instrumental
A key point in the Tadmuriyya quotation above is that the secondary causes 
by which God creates do not in themselves have the ability to entail their 
eff ects. No secondary cause can act alone. Examples from Kasb clearly illus-
trate that the causes are thus purely instrumental from God’s perspective. 
Ibn Taymiyya notes that God punishes via human eff ort: “Fight against 
them; God will chastise them by your hands” (Q. 9:14). Th en, he explains 
that “our hands are the secondary causes, the instruments (ālāt), the inter-
mediaries (awsā $t) and the tools (adawāt) in bringing the chastisement to 
 98 Wāsi$ta, MF 1:131; Tu!hfa, MF 10:35; MF 8:70; Qawl ≠Alī, MF 8:169; Tawakkul, MF 
8:528; MF 10:256; and Bughya, 35. I am indebted to Michot, “Ibn Taymiyya: Les intermé-
diaires entre Dieu et l’homme,” 8 (including n. 12), for the fi rst two references.
 99 Qawl ≠Alī, MF 8:169–173.
100 Qawl ≠Alī, MF 8:175.
101 Qawl ≠Alī, MF 8:175–8.
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them.”102 In Kasb he also illustrates the effi  cacy (ta±thīr) of human power on 
the human act with the images of a pen writing, an adz hewing and a stick 
striking.103 Th e pen, for example, is not considered an associate (sharīk) in 
the act of writing. Th e implication is that God has no associates in creating 
the human act. Nevertheless, the shaykh maintains that the eff ect (athar) 
of the pen cannot be ignored, and it is said that the act is performed by or 
with (bi) it. Here the shaykh adds in passing that God is given the highest 
similitude.104 Apparently, he is alerting the reader that he is not necessarily 
describing the very modality of God’s action but simply trying to speak well 
of it in accord with the principle of giving God the highest human perfec-
tion, as I have described in Chapter One. Following through on the pen and 
stick similes a little later in Kasb, Ibn Taymiyya fi elds the objection that no 
one has ever seen a writer’s pen rewarded or a striker’s stick punished. Th e 
images obviously fail him at this point, and he does no more than divert 
attention from the divine perspective to the human. He asserts that humans 
are agents in reality and do indeed have a will. He adds that every reasonable 
person knows intuitively that there is a diff erence between someone praying 
or committing adultery and someone shivering from fever, that is, there is a 
distinction between voluntary (ikhtiyārī) and involuntary (i#d$tirārī) acts.105
Th e shaykh’s integration of God’s guidance into the scheme of secondary 
causes also illustrates their instrumentality. Th e passage from Tadmuriyya 
quoted earlier cites an example from the Qur ±an: “By [the Book] God 
guides whoever follows His good pleasure to ways of peace” (Q. 5:16). Th e 
Book, that is, the Qur ±an, is a means by which God guides.106 In Kasb Ibn 
Taymiyya explains further that God’s command is a secondary cause distin-
guishing obedience from disobedience. It is part of the ensemble of causes 
that brings God’s determination of human destinies to fruition in happiness 
or punishment. Th e command in itself does not necessitate an obedient act, 
102 Kasb, MF 8:390.
103 See also Irāda, MF 8:134, where Ibn Taymiyya explains that the effi  cacy of the human 
power is that of secondary causality and condition (shar $t); and similarly, Minhāj, 3:114–
5/2:18. Al-Ghazālī, I !hyā± ≠ulūm al-dīn, 4:247–252 (in Kitāb al-taw !hī #d wa al-tawakkul), 
employs the image of the pen esoterically to point beyond humanity to God as the sole agent 
in the universe. Ibn Taymiyya uses the pen image somewhat diff erently both to point to God’s 
agency and to secure a role for human agency and obligation to the Law.
104 Kasb, MF 8:391. Cf. Kasb, MF 8:392. In Nubuwwāt, 81ff ., Ibn Taymiyya elaborates on 
God’s creation by means of other things and on how something created from matter is greater 
in servitude than something created from nothing (especially bottom of 89). Ibn Taymiyya’s 
belief in perpetual creation from pre-existing matter was noted above in Chapter Two.
105 Kasb, MF 8:393–4.
106 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:112.
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but it is the instrument that determines whether an act is an act of obedi-
ence or disobedience.107
In other texts, Ibn Taymiyya gives additional discussion on the dependence 
of the secondary causes on other causes and of these on the will of God. 
He notes that fi re cannot burn, food cannot fi ll the stomach, and drink 
cannot quench thirst by themselves. Th ese things require at least one other 
secondary cause. Heat, for example, requires two causes. It requires the agent 
fi re, and it requires a receptacle (qābil), such as a body that is receptive to 
heat and burning.108 Rain cannot make plants grow without air, soil and 
other such things, and anyone who provides help is depending on a great 
number of other causes beyond his own power.109 According to the shaykh, 
there is ultimately no secondary cause and no created thing that can be a 
complete cause (≠illa tāmma or sabab tāmm) entailing its eff ect necessarily. 
Everything is totally dependent on the will of God. It is God who perfects 
the combination of causes and conditions (shurū $t) and removes impedi-
ments (mawāni ≠) so that something comes into being.110 “If God does not 
make the causes perfect and repel the impediments, what is intended will 
not happen. What He—Glory be to Him—wills is, even if people do not 
will it, and what people will is not unless God wills.”111 It is not suffi  cient, 
for example, that a couple engages in sexual intercourse in order to bear a 
child; God must also will to make the woman pregnant. Likewise, good 
deeds are a cause, but not a suffi  cient cause, of happiness; God must also 
grant His mercy and pardon.112
Secondary Causality fr om the Human Perspective Is Natural
Even though Ibn Taymiyya’s dominant emphasis is that secondary causes are 
instrumental and cannot bring eff ects into existence apart from God’s will, 
107 Kasb, MF 8:402. Ibn Sīnā explains the causality of commands and prohibitions in much 
the same way in Risāla fī sirr al-qadar, 29 (Arabic) and 32 (trans.), in George F. Hourani, 
“Ibn Sīnā’s ‘Essay on the Secret of Destiny,’ ” 25–48.
108 Irāda, MF 8:133.
109 Qawl ≠Alī, MF 8:167.
110 MF 8:70; Irāda, MF 8:133; Jabr, MF 8:486–7; Ma!habba, 24; Qawl ≠Alī, MF 8:167–8; 
Minhāj, 3:115/2:18; and Abū Dharr, MF 18:179. Note also from Minhāj, 3:13/1:266: 
“God—Exalted is He—is the Creator of the cause and the eff ect. Although He is the Creator 
of the cause, it must inevitably have another cause sharing with it, and it must inevitably have 
an obstacle impeding it. Its eff ect is not complete—even though God created it—unless God 
creates another cause and removes the impediments.”
111 Wāsi$ta, MF 1:137. 
112 MF 8:70.
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he nonetheless oft en presents them as having certain and predictable eff ects 
once activated by that will. As stated in the long passage from Tadmuriyya 
quoted earlier, fi re burns whatever is receptive to burning, and roofs and 
clouds necessarily block the rays of the sun.113 Also, Ibn Taymiyya’s assertion 
in the same text, “Th ere must inevitably be an impediment impeding what 
is entailed by [the cause],” strongly suggests that causes automatically entail 
eff ects apart from impediments.114 Th e implication is that once God removes 
impediments the causes are free to exercise their effi  cacy in a natural causal 
fashion, at least from the human perspective. Once the cloud is removed (by 
God’s will), the sun’s rays will naturally heat the earth. Here God’s direct 
willing of every event begins to recede from the picture. In Kasb the shaykh 
presents human deeds and recompense in a similarly naturalistic fashion. 
Aft er discussing the divine side of the human act at some length in this fatwa, 
Ibn Taymiyya turns to the human basis of reward and punishment:
Know that God—Exalted is He—created the act of the servant to be a cause 
entailing praiseworthy or blameworthy eff ects (āthār). A righteous deed like 
prayer . . . is followed immediately by light in [the servant’s] heart, gladdening 
in his chest, tranquility in his soul, increase in his knowledge, confi rmation in 
his certainty, strength in his reason, and other than that. [Th is includes] the 
strength of his body, the splendor of his face, his renouncing abomination and 
wrong, fostering love for him in human hearts, repulsion of trials from him and 
other things that he knows and we do not know. Furthermore, these eff ects of 
light, knowledge, certainty and otherwise, which occur to him, are secondary 
causes leading to other eff ects of the same kind, of another kind higher than 
these, and so on. Th erefore, it has been said that from the reward of a good 
deed is a good deed aft er it and that from the punishment of an evil deed is 
an evil deed aft er it. One who commits an evil deed like lying, for example, 
is punished immediately by darkness in the heart, hardness and tightness in 
his chest, hypocrisy, restlessness, forgetting what he has learned, blocking of 
the door to knowledge he was seeking, a decrease in his certainty and reason, 
disgrace, hatred of him in human hearts, boldness in other sin of the same kind 
or of a diff erent kind, and so on, unless God sets him right by His mercy.115
Th is naturalistic account of reward and punishment shift s the focus from 
God’s all-pervasive will to the responsibility of humans for their destiny. Yet, 
its naturalism involves a kind of inevitability in the results of acts, and this 
shift s the focus back to God who set up this cause and eff ect world. Th e 
113 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:113. Cf. Minhāj, 3:270/2:57, where Ibn Taymiyya notes that when 
God creates fi re in a garment there will be burning thereaft er.
114 Tadmuriyya, MF 3:112.
115 Kasb, MF 8:396. Cf. Minhāj, 3:27–8/1:269 for similar notions of the natural eff ects 
of good and evil deeds.
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shaykh goes on in Kasb to explain that God has bound certain causes to 
certain eff ects with a “fi rm bond (rab$t mu!hkam)” such that, from the per-
spective of creatures, the operation of the secondary causes is that of natural 
causality. Someone who eats gets full. Someone who drinks quenches his 
thirst. Yet, this account, even from the human perspective, is not entirely 
naturalistic. According to Ibn Taymiyya, God can break these causal bonds 
if He wills. He can take the potency out of food or place an impediment 
in the stomach. He can even make people full and quench their thirst by 
some other means if He so wills. However, humanity cannot violate the 
causal bonds that God has arranged. No one can eat without getting full or 
drink without satisfying his thirst.116 Following this in Kasb, Ibn Taymiyya 
attributes everything to God’s wise purpose. God has a wise purpose in send-
ing His messengers, and He has a wise purpose in creating the secondary 
causes and eff ects. Yet, the shaykh in Kasb also relates everything back to 
God’s vanquishing power, operational will and even pre-eternal knowledge. 
God’s determination is a mystery (sirr). It is enough to know that God is 
“All-Knowing, All-Wise and All-Merciful.”117
Conclusion on Secondary Causality
To sum up this overview of secondary causality in Ibn Taymiyya’s thought, 
God’s perspective appears to be that of a real but inert world of tools and 
raw materials that is wholly dependent upon God’s will for its every move-
ment. God creates by means of these instruments in accord with His wise 
purpose. Th e human perspective is that of a world of naturalistic cause and 
eff ect and reward and punishment into which God can intervene at any 
point. Th e language of secondary causality does not resolve the rational 
diffi  culty that God’s all-encompassing will poses for free human agency 
and moral accountability. Th e shaykh’s comparison of human agency to 
the writing of a pen successfully models instrumental causality from God’s 
perspective, but it fails to make sense of voluntary human agency. When 
Ibn Taymiyya is faced with the injustice of an instrument like a pen being 
punished for what it writes, he can do no more than switch from the divine 
to the human perspective. In the course of his argument, he simply stops 
trying to explain how God creates human agency, and he appeals instead to 
rational intuition of the diff erences on the human level between acts that 
116 Kasb, MF 8:397. Cf. Sa≠āda, MF 8:284.
117 Kasb, MF 8:398–9.
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are good and bad, and voluntary and involuntary. Despite such rational dif-
fi culties, Ibn Taymiyya’s notion of secondary causality provides him with a 
powerful rhetorical tool for speaking of the compatibility of the divine and 
human spheres and for identifying error in those who he believes falter in 
one of the two domains.
Ibn Taymiyya on Controversial Kalām Terms Relating to Human Agency
No Ash≠arī Acquisition (kasb) and No Independent Effi  cacy (ta±thīr)
Th is and the following two sections examine what Ibn Taymiyya writes about 
certain controversial terms and issues in the Kalām tradition, namely, human 
effi  cacy (ta±thīr) in acts, human acquisition (kasb) of acts, God’s obligation of 
what humans are not able to do (taklīf mā lā yu$tāq), and compulsion ( jabr). 
Laoust and Gimaret both note that Ibn Taymiyya rejects the Ash≠arī view of 
acquisition, and this will be reviewed below.118 However, they do not mention 
that the shaykh still employs the term to refer to the act itself, as in, “Th e 
act is the acquisition.”119 Ibn Taymiyya also suggests that “acquiring” does 
not diff er from saying that someone “acts, brings into existence, originates, 
fabricates, performs deeds, etc.”120 Th e term also indicates to the shaykh 
that human acts have results. Th e act that God creates in the person is “an 
acquisition by which [the person] attracts profi t to himself and by which he 
repels harm from himself.”121 In Kasb Ibn Taymiyya links acquisition to the 
quranic verse, “What [the soul] has acquired is accounted to it, and what 
it has acquired is held against it” (Q. 2:286). Th ereaft er, he observes that 
acquisition appears as the act through which human beings gain what they 
need to develop from defi ciency to perfection.122
118 Laoust, Essai, 166; and Gimaret, “Th éories de l’acte humain dans l’école (Hanbalite,” 
166. 
119 Minhāj, 3:210/2:42.
120 Irāda, MF 8:119. Cf. Irāda, MF 8:124 and Isti$tā ≠a, MF 8:375.
121 Minhāj, 3:146/2:26.
122 Th e passage from Kasb, MF 8:387, reads, “Th e acquisition is the act that brings profi t 
or harm to its agent ( fā ≠il ), as He—Exalted is He—said, ‘What [the soul] has acquired is 
accounted to it, and what it has acquired is held against it’ (Q. 2:286). He—Glory be to 
Him—has made obvious that the soul’s acquisition is for it or against it. People say, ‘So-and-
so acquired property or praise or eminence.’ Similarly, he profi ted from that. When servants 
are perfected by their acts and benefi t from them—when they were created imperfect at 
the beginning of creation—establishing the secondary cause (sabab) is correct. Indeed, their 
perfection and their benefi t come from their acts. Th e act of God—Glory be to Him and 
166 chapter four
Ibn Taymiyya disparages the strict Ash≠arī concept of human acquisition 
with the aphorism, “Th ere are three things having no truth: the ‘leap’ of al-
Na)z)zām, the ‘states’ of Abū Hāshim and the ‘acquisition’ of al-Ash≠arī.”123 
Th e shaykh reports that for al-Ash≠arī God is the Creator of the human 
voluntary act, which the human then acquires conjoined to his temporally 
originated power in the same substrate. Th e existence of the originated power 
distinguishes voluntary from involuntary acts. However, this power has no 
effi  cacy in bringing the act into existence, and the human being is not the 
agent of his act. Th e shaykh believes that this is irrational, and he explains 
that this comes very close to the complete denial of human power set forth 
by Jahm b. !Safwān.124 In Minhāj he writes,
As for the Jabrīs such as Jahm and his followers, according to them, the servant 
has no power at all. Al-Ash≠arī agrees with them in meaning. He says that the 
servant does not have an effi  cacious power (qudra mu±aththira). He maintains 
something he calls a power, and he makes its existence like its nonexistence. 
Similarly for the acquisition that he maintains.125
Ibn Taymiyya asserts that merely conjoining the power to the acquisition 
without positing any effi  cacious link erases any distinction between the 
powerful and the impotent or between power and any other human attri-
butes, such as life, knowledge or will.126 Moreover, there is then no diff erence 
between voluntary and involuntary acts.127
It was noted in the discussion of secondary causality above that the effi  cacy 
(ta±thīr) that Ibn Taymiyya himself posits between human power and the 
act itself is not of the kind that produces eff ects independently. Independent 
causal effi  cacy is solely God’s prerogative. Human power is rather a condition 
and a secondary cause for God’s creation of the act. It is thus apparent that 
Ibn Taymiyya can criticize al-Ash≠arī for no more than failing to maintain 
that human power is among the secondary causes by which God creates the 
exalted is He—and His handiwork come from His perfection and His greatness. His acts 
come from His names and His attributes and are derived from them.”
123 Irāda, MF 8:128 and Dar ±, 3:444. A similar saying appears in Minhāj, 1:459/1:127, 
2:297/1:214. For discussion of al-Na )z )zām’s theory of the leap ( $tafr a) in causal operations 
and Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā±ī’s doctrine of states (a!hwāl ) in God’s attributes, see Wolfson, Th e 
Philosophy of the Kalam, 167–205 (Abū (Hāshim) and 514–7 (al-Na)z)zām); and Gimaret, La 
doctrine d’al-Ash≠arī, 54–8 (al-Na)z)zām), and 169–170 and passim (Abū Hāshim).




127 Jabr, MF 8:467; and Minhāj, 3:209–210/2:42.
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act. In this regard, the shaykh also rejects a third sense of effi  cacy proposed 
by al-Bāqillānī in which the human power is effi  cacious in determining an 
attribute or state of the act, but not the act itself. Th e shaykh says that this 
posits something—even if only an attribute—that falls outside the domain of 
God’s creation. He argues that there is no diff erence between giving effi  cacy 
to a speck or an elephant apart from God. Both equally involve giving God 
an associate (shirk).128
Ibn Taymiyya has no diffi  culty employing the terms effi  cacy and acquisi-
tion according to his own senses despite the fact that he believes Ash≠arī 
theologians have stripped them of meaning. However, the shaykh is much 
more reticent to say that God obligates humans to do what they are not 
able or that God compels them to act. As the next two subsections show, 
Ibn Taymiyya believes that these two ways of speaking, even if given cor-
rect senses, should not be used because they too easily suggest ideas that are 
inappropriate for God.
No Obligation of What One Is Not Able to Do (taklīf mā lā yu$tāq)
Closely connected to the issue of human power is that of the obligation of 
what one is not able to do (taklīf mā lā yu$tāq). On a number of occasions, 
Ibn Taymiyya notes that two diff erent kinds of obligation come under this 
label. Th e fi rst kind is obligating people to do what they have no power to 
do, as in obligating humans to fl y, the blind to vocalize copies of the Qur±an, 
the chronically ill to walk or the sitting simultaneously to stand. Th e shaykh 
asserts that most Sunnīs, including most Ash≠arīs, deny that this kind of 
obligation is found in the Law. Th e second kind is obligating people to do 
that of which they are capable in the sense of being sound of body and limb. 
However, the obligated does not commit the act because he lacks the will 
to do it and is preoccupied with something else. For example, an unbeliever 
could believe but does not do so because he is preoccupied by unbelief.
According to Ibn Taymiyya, the fi rst kind of obligation of what one is 
not able to do does not occur, but the second kind does. However, he does 
not believe that the second kind should be given this label even though the 
Ash≠arī theologian al-Bāqillānī, the (Hanbalī Abū Ya≠lā and many others do 
identify it as such. He explains that calling the second kind obligation of 
what one is not able to do is based on the Ash≠arī principle that the human 
128 Kasb, MF 8:389; and Minhāj, 3:113/2:18. Cf. Minhāj, 3:268/2:56. For detail on al-
Bāqillānī’s view, see Gimaret, Th éories de l’acte humain en théologie musulmane, 92ff .
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power or capability to act is present only at the time of the act and is only 
for the act that actually takes place. Th us, all imposition of obligation prior 
to an act itself is obligating what is beyond human ability.129 Presupposing his 
doctrine of two capabilities, Ibn Taymiyya argues that this is not in keeping 
with the teachings of the Qur±an, the Sunna and the Salaf because the Qur±an 
explicitly states that God has obligated acts of which one is capable. Th is 
includes things like going on pilgrimage and fasting (cf. Q. 3:97, etc.)130
Ibn Taymiyya also addresses a more extreme version of obligation of what 
one is not able to do, that of al-Rāzī.131 Th e shaykh provides a full discussion 
of this in Jabr. For al-Rāzī, this doctrine is not just a matter of obligating 
something of someone who lacks potency, as in commanding the blind to 
see. Rather, God obligates what is rationally impossible, as in combining two 
contradictories. Moreover, al-Rāzī believes that this is found in revelation. 
Th e prime example is when God obligated the Prophet’s uncle Abū Lahab 
to believe while knowing and revealing that he would not do so. Since God’s 
foreknowledge could not have been contradicted lest He become ignorant, it 
was inherently impossible that Abū Lahab believe. Additionally, obligation 
of anything apart from God’s knowledge of what will happen is obligation 
of what one is not able to do.132
Ibn Taymiyya evades al-Rāzī’s conclusions by switching from the eternal 
divine perspective adopted by al-Rāzī’s argument to the human historical 
perspective, and from the necessitating divine knowledge to the secondary 
causal sense of human power. Ibn Taymiyya explains that God commanded 
Abū Lahab to believe and that God did not put Abū Lahab in the predica-
ment of having also to believe that he would not believe. God did not tell 
the Prophet to share the quranic verse, “[Abū Lahab] will burn in a fi re of 
blazing fl ames” (Q. 111:3), with Abū Lahab himself. Th e shaykh also cites 
the parallel example of Noah and his people. God told Noah that no more 
129 For a detailed discussion of al-Ash≠arī’s views on this, see Gimaret, La doctrine d’al-
Ash≠arī, 437–9.
130 Jabr, 8:469–470; Dar ±, 1:60–3; and Minhāj, 3:52–3/1:276, 3:102–7/2:15–6. Th ere is 
also considerable discussion of taklīf mā lā yu$tāq in Sa≠āda, MF 8:293–302, and numerous 
scholars are linked to the various positions identifi ed. However, I have not relied on this text 
because its structure is confused and may be corrupt. Th is should entail no loss since its basic 
ideas are found in the other texts employed.
131 Jabr, MF 8:471–4, 498–500; Minhāj, 3:107/2:16; Sa≠āda, MF 8:302; Tā ≠a, MF 
8:437–8; and Dar ±, 1:62–4. See Gimaret, Th éories de l’acte humain en théologie musulmane, 
151–2, and Yasin Ceylan, Th eology and Tafsīr in the Major Works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī 
(Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Th ought and Civilization, 1996), 159–161, 
for discussions of Rāzī’s doctrine of taklīf mā lā yu$tāq.
132 See also Tā≠a, MF 8:438ff .
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of his people would believe (cf. Q. 11:36), but God did not tell Noah to 
convey this message to his people.
Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyya argues, human disobedience occurs for lack 
of human will, not for lack of power, and not because God knew it would 
occur.133 A discussion of impossibility (al-mumtani ≠) later in Jabr clarifi es 
the shaykh’s point. He says that it is correct that what is contrary to God’s 
foreknowledge will not happen and that if it did happen it would turn 
God’s knowledge to ignorance. However, this does not mean that someone 
obligated to do what God knows will not happen is unable to carry out the 
respective obligation. It could be that the one obligated is able but has no 
will to do it. “Th en,” the shaykh concludes, “he is obligated to do only what 
he is able to do despite the knowledge of the Lord that it will not be.”134
Ibn Taymiyya advances his argument further by invoking a parallel with 
the operation of God’s will. God knows that what He does not will will 
not exist. However, this does not mean that God could not will it. What 
He knows will not exist is only impossible by virtue of His not willing it, 
not because it is inherently impossible or because He is unable to do it. Th e 
shaykh supports this with a number of quranic verses including, “If your Lord 
had willed, He would have made you one nation” (Q. 5:48). Likewise, then, 
humans may be able to do something but not will to do it.135
Th is bit of polemic works for Ibn Taymiyya only because he has diverted 
the reader’s attention from the perspective of God’s fi xed foreknowledge to 
that of temporality and history, in respect both of human power and God’s 
will. Possibly it would be fairer for him to argue that the human act is con-
tingent from the perspective of human power and necessary from that of 
God’s knowledge. However, to conclude from this that humans are obligated 
beyond what they are able to do would not fi t his interpretation of the Qur±an 
and would probably off end his sense of what befi ts God’s perfection.
No Speaking of Compulsion (jabr)
In a number of texts, Ibn Taymiyya devotes attention to the term compul-
sion ( jabr), which Jahm b. !Safwān and al-Rāzī employ to describe the 
133 Jabr, MF 8:471–4.
134 Jabr, MF 8:498–9.
135 Jabr, MF 8:498–500. In Dar ±, 1:62, the shaykh also observes that those who deny 
God’s power to do anything but what He knows share a fundamental presupposition with the 
extremist Qadarīs who deny God’s foreknowledge: “Both sects agree that the opposite of what 
is known is not possible (mumkin) or within the realm of possibility (maqdūr ≠alayhi).”
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human act. In Dar ± the shaykh draws directly from a discussion of the early 
Jabrī/Qadarī controversy in Abū Bakr al-Khallāl’s al-Sunna, which appears 
no longer to be extant.136 Following al-Khallāl, Ibn Taymiyya reports that 
the early hadith specialist al-Zubaydī (d. 149/766) completely denies that 
God compels. Th is is because the generally accepted meaning of the term is 
coercing (ilzām) someone against his good pleasure (ri#dā), as when jurists 
say that a woman is compelled to be married apart from her choice and 
good pleasure. Th e shaykh explains that God does not compel someone in 
this sense because God has the power to make someone choose and be well 
pleased to do what he does and to make someone hate what he does not 
do. Someone who chooses his acts is not compelled.137
Ibn Taymiyya reports a second view, that of the early jurist al-Awzā≠ī 
(d. 157/774), who prohibits speaking about compulsion since the term 
does not appear in the Qur±an and the Sunna.138 Th e shaykh explains that 
al-Awzā≠ī’s prohibition against discussing the term compulsion is better 
than al-Zubaydī’s complete denial. Th e reason relates to the fact that one of 
God’s names, which does appear in the Qur±an, is “Compeller (al-Jabbār)” 
(Q. 59:23), a name with the same Arabic root as compulsion. In this regard, 
Ibn Taymiyya notes that a certain Mu !hammad b. Ka≠b (d. 118/736)139 said, 
“[God] is only called Compeller because He compels creatures to [do] 
what He wills.” Th e shaykh takes this to be a correct usage of compulsion. 
Th us, al-Zubaydī’s position may deny something that is true in the process 
136 Dar ±, 1:65–72. Minhāj, 3:36/1:271, 3:245–8/2:51; Irāda, MF 8:131–2; Kasb, MF 
8:395; Sa≠āda, MF 8:294; Jabr, MF 8:361–2; A ≠lā, MF 16:141–2; and Shams, MF 16:237 
contain similar but briefer and less precise discussions. See H. Laoust, “al-Khallāl,” EI2 
4:989–990, for a discussion of al-Khallāl’s works.
137 Dar ±, 1:66–7.
138 Dar ±, 1:66–7. Still drawing on al-Khallāl, Ibn Taymiyya notes that Sufyān al-Th awrī 
also denies compulsion and says that God “naturally disposes ( jabala)” people. In response, 
the hadith specialist Abū Bakr al-Marwazī (d. 292/905) supposes that al-Th awrī had in mind 
the following hadith: “[Th e Prophet said to Ashajj ≠Abd al-Qays], ‘In you are two charac-
teristics that God loves: gentleness and deliberateness.’ He said, ‘Two characteristics that I 
have aff ected or two characteristics to which I have been naturally disposed ( jubiltu)?’ [Th e 
Prophet said], ‘Of course, two characteristics to which you have been naturally disposed.’ He 
said, ‘Praise be to God who has naturally disposed me with two characteristics God loves.’” 
Th is is as quoted in Dar ±, 1:68, where it is traced to the collection of Muslim. However, very 
little of this hadith appears in Muslim (see e.g. Muslim, 24, 25, Al-Īmān, Al-Amr bi-l-īmān 
bi-Allāh, ta≠ālā . . .). Closer, but not exact, versions appear in Abū Dāwūd, 4548, Al-Adab, 
Fī qublat al-rijl; and A!hmad, 17160, Musnad al-shāmiyyīn, (Hadīth wafd ≠Abd al-Qays ≠an 
al-Nabī. Ibn Taymiyya oft en quotes this hadith, as in Minhāj, 3:247/2:51; Jabr, MF 8:462; 
and A ≠lā, MF 16:142.
139 In Kasb, MF 8:395, Ibn Taymiyya says that Mu!hammad b. Ka≠b was among the most 
excellent of the second generation in Medina.
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of denying what is false, whereas the position of al-Awzā≠ī does not run this 
risk.140 In Minhāj, Ibn Taymiyya also attributes al-Awzā≠ī’s position to Sufyān 
al-Th awrī (d. 161/778) and A!hmad b. (Hanbal.141
In Jabr Ibn Taymiyya elaborates his views more extensively. He explains 
that in ordinary language contexts the term compulsion means coercion 
(ikrāh) of others against their wills. He notes, “It is said, ‘Th e father com-
pelled his daughter to marry, and the judge compelled the man to sell what 
he had to pay his debt’. ”142 Th e shaykh also distinguishes right coercion 
from wrong coercion. Coercion is justifi ed to make a warring unbeliever 
accept Islam or pay the jizya, to return an apostate to Islam and to make 
Muslims perform their religious duties, pay their debts as they are able, and 
so on. However, it is wrong to coerce someone to disbelieve or disobey as in 
rape and coercing someone to drink.143 Whether right or wrong, “Servants 
commit this compulsion, which is coercion, with each other because they 
cannot originate will and free choice in [each others’] hearts or make them 
commit their acts.”144 Humans cannot compel others to will, love and hate. 
Th e most they can do to get others to follow their wills is arouse desire or 
strike terror. Coercion consists in terrorizing someone else to the point that 
the other commits an act he would not otherwise will and choose. Apart 
from cases in which the one coerced has no power to resist—the shaykh gives 
rape as an example—the victim does in fact will and choose to commit the 
act. However, he wills his act only secondarily. His primary intention is to 
avoid the greater evil that might befall him for noncompliance.145
In contrast to human compulsion, which is necessarily coercive, Ibn 
Taymiyya asserts in Jabr that God’s compulsion is not coercive, because 
He has the power to create the will and the free choice by which humans 
commit their acts. God makes humans will and love what they do. He can 
even make humans will something that they hate: “He is able to make [the 
servant] do something despite his hatred of it. He wills it to the point that 
he does it despite his loathing of it. For example, an ill person may drink 
medicine despite his hatred of it.”146 Th e shaykh adds that God moreover 
creates this hatred (karāha). He illustrates this with two quranic verses, “To 
140 Dar ±, 1:69.
141 Minhāj, 3:242/2:51.
142 Jabr, MF 8:462–3.
143 Jabr, MF 8:464, 502–4.
144 Jabr, MF 8:463–4.
145 Jabr, MF 8:501–2.
146 Jabr, MF 8:464.
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God prostrates whosoever is in the heavens and the earth obediently or with 
hatred (karhan)” (Q. 13:15), and, “To Him has submitted whosoever is in 
the heavens and the earth obediently or with hatred” (Q. 3:83).147 Speak-
ing of God’s name “Compeller,” Ibn Taymiyya explains that it is “from His 
compulsion, His subjugation and His power that He makes servants willing 
to do what He wills from them.”148 He also clarifi es that all that God does 
is wise and just, while the compulsion that creatures commit may be unjust, 
ignorant and foolish.149
Despite denying coercion on the part of God in the above discussion, 
Ibn Taymiyya adds confusion in Jabr by also attributing right coercion 
to God when he asserts, “God—Exalted is He—does not coerce anyone 
except in truth.”150 Th is inconsistency aside, the shaykh’s primary concern 
is to underline that God’s compulsion, if the term be permitted, consists in 
creating human free choice and will directly with wise purpose in a way that 
is impossible for humans to create in each other. Even with this clarifi cation, 
Ibn Taymiyya is reticent to use the word. In Kasb, for example, he argues 
against direct divine compulsion of human acts on the basis of an intuitive 
diff erence between involuntary and voluntary acts. Th ere is a rational and 
intuitive diff erence between the shivering of the feverish on the one hand and 
sitting, praying or stealing on the other. In the latter case, human beings are 
willing, choosing and able to commit their acts while in the former they are 
not. Ibn Taymiyya maintains that it is still God who creates the human will 
that necessitates human acts, and he admits that this is “compulsion by means 
of will ( jabr bi-tawassu$t al-irāda).”151 Yet, he will not break with tradition 
and call himself a Jabrī as did al-Rāzī who holds essentially the same view. 
He argues that it is better not to speak of compulsion lest it be confused 
with that which humans impose on each other.152 As with purpose (ghara#d ) 
and passionate love (≠ishq), which were discussed in Chapter Two above, it 
is a matter of the ordinary language meaning of compulsion suff ering too 
many negative connotations for use in theological discourse.
147 Jabr, MF 8:464.
148 Jabr, MF 8:465.
149 Jabr, MF 8:465.
150 Jabr, MF 8:505.
151 Kasb, MF 8:394.
152 Kasb, MF 8:395.
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Ibn Taymiyya’s Compatibilism as the Golden Mean (wasa$t)
It remains to note that what I have been calling Ibn Taymiyya’s compatibil-
ism—his conviction that God’s all-encompassing power is compatible with 
real human will and action—is perhaps better expressed in his own quranic 
idiom as the golden mean (wasa $t), the balanced intermediate position that 
avoids extremes (cf. Q. 2:143). In a number of places, the shaykh explains 
that the People of the Sunna (ahl al-sunna) stand in an intermediate posi-
tion between the various Muslim sects and diverse religions on numerous 
religious issues.153 For example, on the question of God’s attributes they 
take the golden mean between stripping God of His attributes (ta≠ $tīl ) and 
assimilating God to creatures (tashbīh), and on the issue of the Compan-
ions of the Prophet they take the middle course between the Shī≠īs and the 
Khārijīs. Among other things, Ibn Taymiyya charges Shī≠īs with preferring 
≠Alī over the fi rst two Sunnī caliphs Abū Bakr and ≠Umar, and he accuses 
the Khārijīs of calling the third Sunnī caliph ≠Uthmān an unbeliever and 
rejecting ≠Alī’s caliphate.154
With respect to God’s creation of human acts, Ibn Taymiyya states tersely 
in Wāsi $tiyya, “[Th e People of the Sunna and the Community follow] a 
golden mean concerning the subject of God’s acts—Exalted is He—between 
the Qadarīs and the Jabrīs.”155 He outlines his view more fully in another 
text translated below. Although there is nothing substantially new here, 
this passage does show Ibn Taymiyya employing the notion found in Ibn 
Sīnā, al-Rāzī and others that God necessitates or compels the human being 
to choose freely more clearly than we have seen above. However, he uses 
the quranic terms ‘make’ ( ja≠ala) and ‘create’ in lieu of the linguistically 
unredeemable ‘compel’.
Concerning the subject of [God’s] creation and His command, [the People 
of the Sunna follow] a golden mean between those who belie the power of 
God, who do not believe in His perfect power, His all-inclusive will and His 
creation of everything, and between those who corrupt the religion of God, 
who take the servant not to have a will, a power or a deed. Th ey strip away 
the command and the prohibition, the reward and the punishment, and they 
become equivalent to those associationists who said, “If God had willed, we 
153 Minhāj, 3:468–9/2:105; Minhāj, 5:168–172/3:42–43; Jawāb, 1:69–75; Wāsi$tiyya, MF 
3:141; Qubru$siyya, MF 28: 613–615; and Wa$siyya kubrā, MF 3:369–375, which is trans-
lated in Yahya Michot, “Pages spirituelles d’Ibn Taymiyya: II. La religion du milieu,” Action 
(Mauritius) (December 1999), 22–23, 30. See also Laoust, Essai, 220–225.
154 Wa$siyya kubrā, MF 3:373, 375.
155 Wāsi$tiyya, MF 3:141.
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would not have given associates, nor would have our fathers, and we would 
not have forbidden anything [against His will]” (Q. 6:148).
Th e People of the Sunna believe that God is powerful over everything—He 
is thus able to guide servants and turn their hearts—that what God wills is 
and what He does not will is not—Th ere is nothing in His sovereignty that 
He does not will, and He is not incapable of executing His will—and that 
He is Creator of everything with respect to concrete entities, attributes and 
movements.
And they believe that the servant has a power, a will and a deed and that 
he is freely choosing (mukhtār). Th ey do not call him compelled (majbūr), 
given that one who is compelled is coerced [to act] diff erently from his free 
choice. God—Glory be to Him—made ( ja≠ala) the servant someone who 
freely chooses what he does. He is thus someone who freely chooses and wills. 
God is his Creator and the Creator of his choice.156
Conclusion
Th is chapter has shown that Ibn Taymiyya uses several diff erent terms to 
set out a view of God’s creation of human agency that is essentially that of 
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in its metaphysical structure and that has its roots in 
the causal language of philosophers like Ibn Sīnā. Ibn Taymiyya speaks of the 
complete necessitating cause with which God creates all human acts directly 
using terms such as origination, preponderance, decisive human will, complete 
human power and potency, determining power, and conjoined capability. In 
order to provide a basis for human accountability to God’s command, the 
shaykh identifi es an anterior and legislative power that denotes the bodily 
soundness of the human agent for undertaking acts. Ibn Taymiyya also dis-
cusses the created world and human agency in terms of secondary causes, 
which are the instruments and raw materials with which God creates, and 
which, from the human perspective, form a world of natural cause and eff ect. 
Among the secondary causes that are relevant to human voluntary action, 
and which God uses to originate human acts, are human power and will, as 
well as God’s command.
Ibn Taymiyya insists on the compatibility of God’s creation of human acts 
alongside real human agency and responsibility, and, unlike al-Rāzī in his 
Tafsīr, the shaykh does not acknowledge rational diffi  culty in upholding the 
two simultaneously. He maintains that human agency is real insofar as it is 
156 Wa$siyya kubrā, MF 3:373–4.
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something that God creates, but he does not affi  rm human freedom in the 
libertarian sense. Th e shaykh argues that God is just to reward and punish 
deeds that He creates because He creates them in a substrate that is separate 
from Himself, that is, in the human being. By virtue of this substrate prin-
ciple, God is not qualifi ed with the human acts that he creates just as he is 
not qualifi ed with their attributes, such as blackness or tallness.
Ibn Taymiyya’s view of God’s creation of human agency may be compared 
to a marionette show in which God is wisely directing the performance in all 
its detail in order to tell a good story. God cannot be charged with injustice 
in creating this or that misdeed of a particular marionette because it is neces-
sary to the wise purpose of forwarding the narrative plot. Th e marionettes 
perceive themselves to be free agents involved in a drama of obedience and 
disobedience to the divine command that God has interjected into the 
story, but God is Author and Creator of the drama as a whole. Th is gives 
full scope to God’s power, will and wise purpose, while also affi  rming the 
reality of human choice and activity.
When faced directly with the contradiction between God the determiner 
of human acts and human free choice and responsibility, Ibn Taymiyya 
sometimes switches from God’s perspective to the human. Th is occurs in 
his use of the image of an author writing with a pen to illustrate how God 
creates acts in the human. When faced with the absurdity of pens being 
punished for what they write, the shaykh evades the problem by dropping 
the pen image and asserting that human beings do have a will and are agents 
in reality. He then appeals to intuitive knowledge of the diff erence between 
voluntary and involuntary acts to complete his switch to the plane of human 
rationality. Something similar happens when Ibn Taymiyya broaches Fakhr 
al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s claim that Abū Lahab could never have believed because 
God’s eternal foreknowledge made his belief impossible. Without notice, the 
shaykh shift s from God’s perspective from which this claim is made to the 
historical human perspective and explains that Abū Lahab was never put in 
the predicament of having to believe the revelation of God’s foreknowledge 
that he would not believe.
Ibn Taymiyya does admit that his theology involves divine compulsion 
( jabr) of human acts by the intermediaries of human will and power. Al-Rāzī 
holds essentially the same view, but, unlike al-Rāzī, the shaykh does not allow 
this position to be called ‘compulsion’ lest it be confused with direct divine 
compulsion and evoke negative connotations concerning God. Th is, along 
with his insistence on human responsibility and his unannounced perspective 
switching to avoid mentioning contradiction in God’s economy, refl ects his 
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concern to speak of God according to the highest similitude. Open admission 
of contradiction would detract from God’s perfection and praiseworthiness, 
and it would open the door to the Iblīsī style irrationality and ethical lax-
ity that he seeks to stem. Rather, Ibn Taymiyya portrays his compatibilism 
positively as the golden mean between the extremes of the Jabrīs and the 
Qadarīs, between hard determinism and libertarian freedom.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE WISE PURPOSE AND ORIGIN OF EVIL
Ibn Taymiyya and the Explanation of Evil in Islamic Th eodicies
Th e question of evil (sharr) in Ibn Taymiyya’s writings has not received seri-
ous study. Before examining the pertinent texts, it will prove useful to fi ll 
in some background on how the preceding Islamic tradition explains evil. 
A common theme is the educational and disciplinary role of evil in advanc-
ing the religious life. Already noted in the Introduction were al-Māturīdī’s 
view that evil is a tool of God’s wisdom to lead humankind to knowledge of 
God’s existence and the Sufi  notion that evil and suff ering are instruments of 
God’s discipline on the spiritual path. Similar ideas are found in the free-will 
theodicy of the Mu≠tazilī ≠Abd al-Jabbār who maintains that God infl icts 
pain not only as punishment for sins but also for the purposes of testing, 
warning and deterring.1
In the best-of-all-possible-worlds theodicy of Ibn Sīnā, all things are good 
from the vantage point of the whole. Pure or absolute evil does not exist, but 
relative or partial evil does and is inherent in the perfection of the created 
order. In the section on providence in al-Shifā±, Ibn Sīnā explains that evil, 
which he understands metaphysically as imperfection (naq$s) and ≠adam—a 
term that I will translate variously as “nonexistence,” “privation” or “lack”—is 
necessary to some things for them to be what they are. By way of example, 
he argues that burning is necessary to the perfection of fi re even if fi re occa-
sionally burns someone. If such things did not involve evil, they would in 
fact be something else, but they must exist as they are for the maintenance 
of the universal order. In addition to the nonexistence of absolute evil and 
the necessity of relative evil to the perfection of things, Ibn Sīnā also speaks 
quantitatively about evil. He affi  rms that the amount of evil in the universe 
is very small compared to the great amount of good.2
1 Heemskerk, Suff ering in Mu≠tazilite Th eology, 151–6.
2 Ibn Sīnā, Al-Shifā±: Al-Ilāhiyyāt (2), 414–422. Ibn Sīnā, “Al-Risāla al-≠arshiyya,” 16, 
also attributes wise purpose (!hikma) to evils. For further analysis of metaphysical evil in the 
thought of Ibn Sīnā, see Abū Zayd, Mafh ūm al-khayr, 112–118, 152–159; and Inati, Th e 
Problem of Evil, 65–101.
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Other parts of the Islamic tradition elaborate further answers as to why 
evil is necessary for the best possible order. In I!hyā± ≠ulūm al-dīn, al-Ghazālī 
roots the necessity of evil in the principle that things cannot be known except 
by their opposites. Health is not enjoyed without illness; the blessed in Para-
dise would not know their blessedness without Hell; and perfection is not 
known without imperfection.3 Ibn ≠Arabī employs an additional explanation 
for evil, what Arthur Lovejoy in his classic Th e Great Chain of Being calls 
the “principle of plenitude,” which locates the good in the greatest possible 
variety.4 For Ibn ≠Arabī, God bestows existence on the cosmos for the great 
good of making Himself known. Evil and imperfection, which are paradoxi-
cally no more than privation and otherness from the sole reality of God and 
yet real in that they thwart God’s Law and human purposes, are necessary 
in order to aff ord God the possibility to manifest the infi nite diversity, the 
great plenitude, of His names. Everything in existence refl ects a divine name 
such as All-Merciful, Giver of Life, Giver of Death, Honorer, Humiliator and 
so forth. Th ese names extend in number beyond the traditional ninety-nine 
to infi nity. Nonetheless, Ibn ≠Arabī maintains that, out of courtesy for God, 
we should address God only with names that He has revealed. We should 
not, for example, call God Liar or Ignorant.5
Th e principle of plenitude and the idea that things are known only by 
their opposites do not appear explicitly in Ibn Taymiyya’s thought on evil, 
but he does speak of evil’s educational qualities, its logical necessity in the 
nature of the world, its relativity and its quantitative insignifi cance. How-
ever, congruent with his juridical concern to speak well of God, the shaykh’s 
primary interest is fi nding ways not to attribute evil to God even though 
it is God who is ultimately responsible for the world being the way it is. In 
the end his refuge is God’s wise purpose.
Th e fi rst section below examines Ibn Taymiyya’s three-fold typology for 
attributing evil. Th is includes discussion of his views on God’s names. Th e 
second section investigates the degree to which he believes that God’s wise 
3 Al-Ghazālī, I!hyā± ≠ulūm al-dīn, 4:258–9 (at the end of “Kitāb al-taw!hīd wa al-tawakkul”). 
Ormsby, Th eodicy, 40 and 64–9, provides a translation and analysis of this text. Th e idea that 
things are known through their opposites is also found in al-(Hallāj and others, especially in 
refl ection on the fate of Iblīs. On this, see Awn, Satan’s Tragedy and Redemption, 122–150.
4 Arthur O. Lovejoy, Th e Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936), 52ff .
5 Chittick, Th e Sufi  Path of Knowledge, 33–44, 289–297. For briefer treatment of these 
themes, see William C. Chittick, Imaginal Worlds: Ibn al-≠Arabī and the Problem of Religious 
Diversity (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), especially Chapters 2, 3 
and 8.
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purposes may be known and his few suggestions as to what they are. Th e 
third section shows how Ibn Taymiyya employs the metaphysical concept of 
evil as nonexistence for moral and religious ends in (Hasana and Fāti!ha.
Ibn Taymiyya’s Evil Attribution Typology
Attributing Evil to the Generality, the Secondary Cause or the Elided Agent
In Minhāj, Irāda, Kasb, Jabr, (Hasana and a few other texts Ibn Taymiyya 
asserts that evil must not be attributed directly to God but rather in one of 
three other ways, which he presents in a recurring typological form.6 Th is 
three-fold typology appears in diverse contexts with varying degrees of full-
ness. Occasionally, it appears as a hermeneutic grid comprehending the ways 
that evil is attributed in the Qur±an or in both the Qur±an and the Sunna.7 
Most oft en, however, the shaykh cites it as a general statement of how evil 
is attributed. In the fi rst type evil “falls within the compass of the generality 
(≠umūm) of created things,” or “falls within the compass of the generality,” 
or, more tersely, is attributed “by way of the generality.” In the second type, 
evil is attributed to its secondary cause (sabab), its agent cause (al-sabab al-
fā≠il ) or the creature (makhlūq). In the third type, evil is mentioned without 
reference to its agent.
Th e Attribution of Evil in the Qur ±an
Although Ibn Taymiyya gives very little direct explanation of the three types 
in the evil attribution typology itself, he usually supplies examples of each 
from the Qur±an. As an example of the fi rst type in which evil is attributed 
to the “generality,” the shaykh customarily cites, “God is the Creator of 
everything” (Q. 13:16, 39:62), or, “He has created everything” (Q. 25:2). 
Th ese verses do not explain what it means for evil to fall “within the com-
pass of the generality” except to direct attention away from God’s creation 
of evil specifi cally and to His creation of all things in general. More will be 
said about the interpretation of this type below. Th e attribution of evil to its 
6 Irāda, MF 8:93–7; Kasb, MF 8:400–1; Tā≠a, MF 8:446–7; Jabr, MF 8:511–2; Fāti!ha, 
MF 14:21; (Hasana, MF 14:265–6; Th ulth, MF 17:94–6, 99; and Minhāj, 3:142–5/2:25–6, 
5:408–411/3:102.
7 In the Qur±an in Tā≠a, MF 8:447, and in both the Qur±an and the Sunna in Irāda, MF 
8:94; and Jabr, 8:511.
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secondary cause, that is, the creature, is more obvious, and, as an example, 
Ibn Taymiyya oft en cites, “Say, ‘I seek refuge with the Lord of the daybreak 
from the evil of what He has created’” (Q. 113:1–2), that is, from the evil 
instigated by God’s creatures. Th e shaykh’s standard example of the third 
type is the quranic statement about the jinn: “We do not know whether 
evil is willed for those in the earth or whether their Lord wills rectitude for 
them” (Q. 72:10). Here, the agent willing evil, presumably God, has been 
elided and the verb “to will” put in the passive voice.
In the two instances of the typology in Minhāj, Ibn Taymiyya observes 
that all three types are found in the fi rst chapter of the Qur±an: “Guide us 
in the Straight Path, the path of those whom You have blessed, not those 
upon whom is anger, and not those who went astray” (Q. 1:6–7).8 In these 
verses, God is the agent ( fā≠il ) of blessing (fi rst type). Th e agent of anger 
has been elided (third type), and the evil of going astray is attributed to 
creatures themselves (second type). Th e shaykh also gives this illustration 
in Jabr, but he presents the earlier verse, “Praise be to God, Lord of the 
worlds” (Q. 1:2), as the example of the fi rst type.9 Ibn Taymiyya provides 
no additional quranic examples of the fi rst and third types. Moreover, the 
third type receives no further discussion at all. Elision of the agent of evil is 
no more than a rhetorical device or form of courtesy that the shaykh fi nds 
the Qur±an using to avoid attributing evil to God.
In Irāda the shaykh gives several more quranic examples of attributing 
evil to human secondary causes: “Our Lord, we have wronged ourselves” 
(Q. 7:23); “When an affl  iction comes to you, even aft er having dealt one 
out twice as great, you say, ‘From where does this come?’ Say, ‘It is from 
yourselves’” (Q. 3:165); and “Any good thing that comes to you is from 
God, and any evil thing that comes to you is from yourself ” (Q. 4:79).10 
Elsewhere, he adds Abraham’s attribution of illness to himself but the cure 
to God: “And when I am ill, He cures me” (Q. 26:80).11 Ibn Taymiyya also 
illustrates the attribution of evil to its secondary cause with brief quotations 
 8 Minhāj, 3:143/2:25 and 5:410/3:102. English translations of ghayr al-magh#dūb ≠alayhim 
as “not (the way) of those who have earned Your Anger” ((Hilālī and Khān), “not of those 
against whom Th ou art wrathful” (Arberry) or “Not (the path) of those who earn Th ine 
anger” (Pickthall) do not accurately translate the Arabic by obscuring the fact that no agent 
of anger is mentioned in the text.
 9 Jabr, MF 8:511. Ibn Taymiyya also mentions in (Hasana, MF 14:272, that the threefold 
evil attribution typology is found in the fi rst chapter of the Qur±an, but he does not explain 
beyond the fi rst type.
10 Irāda, MF 8:95.
11 Jabr, MF 8:511; Kasb, MF 8:401; and Minhāj, 3:143/2:25, 5:410/3:102.
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from the quranic story of the guide who led Moses through three ordeals 
(Q. 18:60–82).12 When explaining the reasons for his puzzling actions, 
the guide, whom Ibn Taymiyya takes to be the mythical Khi#dr, attributes 
his prima facie evil acts of sinking a boat and killing a boy to himself but 
attributes his good act of straightening a leaning wall to God. Th ese verses 
concerning Abraham and Khi #dr show not only that evil is attributed to 
creatures but also that good comes from God. Th e human agent gets sick, 
sinks a boat and kills, but God rights a leaning wall and cures the sick.
Evil Is Good in God’s Wise Purpose, and Good Far Exceeds Evil
As mentioned above, Ibn Taymiyya does not clearly specify what he means 
in the fi rst type of the evil attribution typology by evil falling “within the 
compass of the generality of created things.”13 However, the contexts of 
these typologies elaborate this in three diff erent ways that echo Ibn Sīnā. 
First, from God’s perspective, the generality of what God creates is wholly 
good; evil is relative and exists only from the perspective of creatures. Sec-
ond, evil is a necessary concomitant of the perfection of the created order. 
Th ird, from the human perspective, the generality of good is far greater in 
quantity than evil.
In the fi rst of these three ways, Ibn Taymiyya maintains that what crea-
tures regard as evil is good by virtue of God’s wise purpose. Th e following 
from Minhāj is typical: “If God—Exalted is He—is Creator of everything, 
He creates good (khayr) and evil (sharr) on account of the wise purpose 
that He has in that by virtue of which His act is good (!hasan) and perfect 
(mutqin).”14 A nearby passage extends this to more unseemly things: “God 
is Creator of illnesses, aches, hateful odors, ugly forms and noxious bodies 
like snakes and human excrement on account of a profound wise purpose 
in them.”15 In (Hasana, the shaykh underscores that what makes all God’s 
12 Jabr, MF 8:512; and Irāda, MF 8:95.
13 Irāda, MF 8:94.
14 Minhāj, 3:142/2:25.
15 Minhāj, 3:144/2:25. Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj, 3:144–5/2:25, clarifi es that these things, 
as with everything else that God creates, come neither from God’s essence nor from His 
command. In the same passage the shaykh tersely explains that everything that God creates 
is good “according to the two doctrines of ‘delegation’ and ‘causality’ (≠alā qawlay al-tafwī#d 
wa al-ta≠līl ).” I understand this to mean that God’s creation of evil is not evil on His part 
because of His delegation of it to a creature or secondary cause and by virtue of the fi nal 
causality in His will, that is, His wise purpose in creating it.
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deeds good is wise purpose while what makes human evil deeds evil is a lack 
of wise purpose.16
Ibn Taymiyya grounds the doctrine of God’s wise purpose in quranic texts 
showing that all God’s creative acts are good and true. Most commonly, he 
cites, “Th e handiwork of God who perfected everything” (Q. 27:88), and, 
“Who made good everything He created” (Q. 32:7).17 In Fāti !ha he adds, 
“We did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them 
except with truth” (Q. 15:85), and, “[Th ose who] refl ect on the creation 
of the heavens and the earth, [saying], ‘Our Lord! You have not created 
this in vain’” (Q. 3:191).18 Th ese last two verses and several others denying 
aimlessness and vanity in God’s creative work are given in Th ulth, a com-
mentary on Surat al-Ikhlā $s (Q. 112) that will be discussed at greater length 
below.19 In several places, the shaykh also quotes the hadith, “Good is in 
Your hands, and evil is not [attributed] to You,” to affi  rm the goodness of 
all that God does.20
In view of the complete goodness of the evil that God creates, Ibn Taymi-
yya notes in the contexts of the evil attribution typology in Irāda, Jabr, 
(Hasana and Fāti!ha that God does not create evil that is absolute (mu$tlaq), 
general (≠āmm), total (kullī) or pure (ma!hd ). Rather, the evil that God cre-
ates is relative (i#dāfī), particular (khā$s$s), partial ( juz±ī), accidental (≠āri&d ) or 
restricted (muqayyad).21 Evil is thus evil relative only to those who commit it 
or suff er its harm. Th e following passage from (Hasana gives concise expres-
16 Th e text in (Hasana, MF 14:275, reads: “[God] created [an evil deed] only for a wise 
purpose. It is not attributed to Him in respect to its being an evil deed (sayyi±a). Rather, it 
is attributed to the person (nafs) who commits evil (sharr) by it without wise purpose. She 
deserves to have evil and an evil thing attributed to her. In what she commits of sins, she 
does not aim at a good on behalf of which committing it is preponderant. On the contrary 
what is like this is in the category of good things. Th erefore, the act of God is good (!hasan). 
He never does a bad thing (qabī&h) or an evil deed.”
17 Minhāj, 3:142/2:25, 5:409/3:102; Irāda, MF 8:94; Jabr, MF 8:512; and Fāti!ha, MF 
14:21.
18 Fāti!ha, MF 14:21.
19 Th ulth, MF 17:95–6, 99. Th e additional references are Q. 6:73, 15:85–6, 21:16–7, 
23:115, 38:27, 44:39 and 75:36.
20 Kasb, MF 8:400; Jabr, MF 8:511; Fāti!ha, MF 14:18; (Hasana, MF 14:266; Th ulth, MF 
17:94; and Minhāj, 5:409/3:102. Th e hadith is found in Muslim, 1290, !Salāt al-musāfi rīn wa 
qa$sruhā, Al-Du≠ā± fī $salāt al-layl wa qiyāmihi. Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj 5:409/3:102, notes that 
the latter part of this saying, wa al-sharr laysa ilayk, is subject to more than one interpreta-
tion. It has been understood to mean either that one cannot draw close to God with evil 
deeds or that evil is not attributed to God. In Th ulth, MF 17:94, he also adds the possibility 
that it means “evil is nonexistence (≠adam) or among the concomitants of nonexistence.” 
Th e shaykh does not rule out any of these interpretations, but I have chosen to translate the 
saying as denying evil’s attribution to God because that befi ts the context.
21 Irāda, MF 8:94; Jabr, MF 8:512; (Hasana, MF 14:266, 270; and Fāti!ha, MF 14:20–1.
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sion to these ideas using several of the aforementioned terms: “[God] does 
not create pure evil. Rather, in everything that He creates is a wise purpose 
by virtue of which it is good. However, there may be some evil in it for some 
people, and this is partial, relative evil. As for total evil or absolute evil, the 
Lord is exonerated of that.”22
In Fāti!ha the shaykh employs the relativity of evil to interpret exhortations 
to believe in both the good and evil of God’s determination. He relates, for 
example, a hadith transmitted by Abū Dāwūd, “If you had disbursed [in 
alms] a whole earth full of gold, [God] would not have accepted it from 
you until you had believed in determination, its good and its evil.”23 Ibn 
Taymiyya explains that the evil mentioned here is only evil for the person who 
suff ers pain under it and that what is evil for one may in fact be a blessing 
for another: “When evil affl  icts the servant, the heart of his enemy is glad. 
It is good for the one and evil for the other. Th ere is no good and no evil 
with respect to one who has no friend and no enemy.”24 In this view, evil is 
associated with pain and disadvantage to a particular individual, whereas, 
from God’s perspective, everything is good.
In (Hasana Ibn Taymiyya links Aristotelian causal terminology to the 
fi rst two types in his three-fold evil attribution typology. Th is further illus-
trates how he folds evil into God’s general and complete goodness: “[Evil] 
is not attributed simply to God—Exalted is He—[but it is attributed] in 
two respects: in respect to its fi nal cause (al-≠illa al-ghā±iyya) and in respect 
to its secondary cause (sabab) and agent cause (al-≠illa al-fā≠iliyya).”25 Ibn 
Taymiyya then equates the philosophical term fi nal cause with wise purpose, 
and he asserts that God does not create pure evil in which there is no wise 
purpose or mercy. He explains that mentioning evil with respect to God’s 
activity must always be done in the proper context of God’s more general wise 
22 (Hasana, MF 14:266. Cf. (Hasana, MF 14:268. In Jabr, MF 8:512, the shaykh makes 
the same point: “Th e created thing is good and wise by virtue of the wise purpose for which 
it was created even if there is evil in it in another respect. Th is is something accidental and 
partial that is not pure evil. Rather, evil through which preponderant good is intended is good 
coming from the Wise Agent, even if it is evil for the one in whom it subsists.” In Fāti!ha, MF 
14:21, Ibn Taymiyya explains: “God did not create anything except for a wise purpose. Th is 
wise purpose is its aspect of goodness ( !husn) and good (khayr). In created things, there is no 
pure evil in which there is no good and in which there is no advantage in any respect.”
23 Fāti !ha, MF 14:20. Th e hadith is found in approximately this form in Abū Dāwūd, 
4077, Al-Sunna, Fī al-qadar.
24 Fāti!ha, MF 14:21.
25 (Hasana, MF 14:299. Ibn Taymiyya structures a major portion of (Hasana around these 
two causes: MF 14:299–315 is headed by discussion of the fi nal cause, and MF 14:315–331 
begins with the agent or secondary cause. However, the text meanders, and the shaykh does 
not confi ne himself to direct exposition of these two causes in the course of these pages.
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purpose. For example, he argues that it is wrong merely to say, “Mu!hammad 
and his nation spill blood and spread corruption in the earth,” because this 
is subjecting them to blame. Rather, one should say, “Th ey undertake jihad 
in the way of God in order that the word of God be highest and all religion 
be for God, and they kill whoever obstructs them from that.”26 Likewise, 
it is erroneous to say that God creates evil that is of no profi t to anyone. 
Instead, one should affi  rm that God in His wisdom has created everything 
good and that “He has in what He creates of pain or blameworthy deeds in 
living beings a great wise purpose and a momentous blessing.”27 By placing 
the focus on God’s goodness and wise purpose fi rst, any accompanying evil 
fi nds its place as evil relative only to particular creatures. Moreover, this 
relative evil is wholly good by virtue of God’s wise purpose.
In a discussion linked to the evil attribution typology in (Hasana, Ibn 
Taymiyya complains that two groups go astray on this issue. Th e fi rst group, 
seeking to protect God from doing bad deeds, denies that God wills all 
things or creates human acts, while the second group asserts that God may 
create evil without a wise purpose.28 Although unnamed, the two groups are 
obviously the Mu≠tazilīs and the Ash≠arīs, respectively. Ibn Taymiyya observes 
that both groups do not adequately distinguish particular evil from general 
evil or relative evil from absolute evil. Th ey conceive evil solely in an absolute 
sense that applies equally to creatures and the Creator but fail to grasp that 
evil is only evil relative to creatures. He gives the case of lying prophets as 
further evidence that God does not create general evil. In His wise purpose, 
God may lead some people astray, but His wise purpose precludes confi rm-
ing lying prophets with miracles because that would show God to be weak 
and unable to diff erentiate truth-tellers from liars. For God to support a 
lying Prophet with the same miracles with which He supports truth-telling 
prophets would be a general evil.29
Ibn Taymiyya’s second way of making sense of what it means for evil to 
fall under the generality of created things is to argue that evil is logically 
necessary to the perfection of creation. Th e shaykh does not elaborate on 
this extensively, but in Jabr he does broach the question why God’s wise 
purpose could not have been achieved apart from any evil whatsoever. He 
explains that the question reveals a lack of knowledge of the reality and 
26 (Hasana, MF 14:300.
27 (Hasana, MF 14:300.
28 (Hasana, MF 14:266–7.
29 (Hasana, MF 14:268, 270–1.
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interconnectedness (irtibā $t) of things. Much in the fashion of Ibn Sīnā, 
Ibn Taymiyya argues that God is bound by logical constraints: “When God 
creates something, He must inevitably create its necessary concomitants.”30 
God cannot join two contraries at one time, and He cannot create what 
is impossible. God cannot, for example, make someone simultaneously a 
believer and an unbeliever, even if He can join together a measure of belief 
and hypocrisy in the same person. Ibn Taymiyya adds that God’s attributes 
of knowledge, power, wisdom and mercy are of the utmost in perfection and 
that such perfection is necessary for the Lord.31 Th e implication is that this 
world with its relative evil is the best possible in the divine perfection and 
that evil is necessary to the achievement of God’s purpose. Ibn Taymiyya 
affi  rms that this is the best possible world explicitly in ≠Ādil, which will be 
discussed in Chapter Six.
Ibn Taymiyya’s third way of elaborating the sense in which evil is attributed 
by way of the generality is illustrated in a text from Fāti!ha. Here, even from 
the human perspective, evil is minimal in comparison to the great amount 
of good that God creates:
In the things that God creates there is nothing that always infl icts pain on all 
creatures, and there is nothing that always infl icts pain on most of them. On 
the contrary, the things that He creates bless them, or most of them, most of 
the time, like the sun and health. Th ere is nothing among the existent things 
which God creates that is evil absolutely [and] generally. It is known that 
created, existent evil is restricted, particular evil. Th ere is another aspect by 
which it is good and a good thing and which is the preponderant of the two 
aspects.32
Quantitative analysis of evil on the creaturely plane is also found in Irāda, 
where Ibn Taymiyya opens a discussion of evil by affi  rming that God has a 
wise purpose in the generality of what He creates: “Th e general things that 
[God] does are for a general wise purpose and general mercy, as, for example, 
the sending of Mu !hammad—God bless him and give him peace.”33 Th en 
the shaykh broaches a peculiar problem of evil involving the Messenger and 
provides two quantitative responses:
30 Jabr, MF 8:512.
31 Jabr, MF 8:512–3.
32 Fāti!ha, MF 14:21.
33 Irāda, MF 8:93. Ibn Taymiyya backs this up with several quranic references: “We have 
not sent you except as a mercy to the worlds” (Q. 21:107) and Q. 3:144, 3:164, 6:53 and 
14:28.
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When someone says, “A group of people like those from among the association-
ists and the People of the Book who considered [the Messenger] a liar were 
harmed by his message,” there are two answers to this.34
Th e fi rst of them is that he profi ted them to the extent possible. He weak-
ened their evil that they were committing. [What would have happened] had 
it not been for the message with the manifestation of arguments and signs 
that made what was in their hearts tremor and with jihad and the poll tax that 
frightened them and humiliated them until their evil decreased? Whomever he 
killed among them died before his life grew long in unbelief and his unbelief 
became greater. Th us, this was a reduction of his evil. Th e messengers—God 
bless them—were raised up to obtain benefi ts and perfect them and to strip 
away detriments and reduce them to the extent possible.
Th e second answer is that whatever harm occurred is a minuscule thing 
beside whatever profi t occurred. An example is the rain whose profi t is gen-
eral even if some houses are destroyed by it and some travelers and laborers, 
like the fullers and their like, are held up by it. Something whose profi t and 
benefi t is general is an intended good and beloved mercy even if some people 
are harmed by it. Certain groups of the Muslims, the Kalām theologians, the 
jurists and others among the (Hanafīs, the (Hanbalīs and others, and among 
the Karrāmīs and the Sufi s give this answer, and it is the answer of many of 
the philosophers.35
In this text, Ibn Taymiyya’s fi rst argues that the Prophet reduced evil to the 
extent possible and even cut short the lives of unbelievers for their own good. 
Th e shaykh argues similarly in (Hasana that the great good and happiness 
rendered by Mu!hammad’s message bear no relation to the limited misery and 
partial evil suff ered by the Arab associationists and the unbelieving People 
of the Book.36 Th e second answer in the above passage explains that the evil 
incurred by rain is a small price to pay for the much greater good obtained 
through it. Both answers appeal to the quantitative insignifi cance of evil on 
the plane of human aff airs.
Th e Relation of God’s Names to Evil
An illustrative component accompanying several instances of the evil attribu-
tion typology is consideration of God’s names. Following the pattern of the 
second type, Ibn Taymiyya sometimes excludes evil from God’s names entirely 
and locates it in created things. Th e following from Irāda is typical: “Th ere 
34 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī also takes up this question in his Tafsīr, 22:230–1, on Q. 
21:107.
35 Irāda, MF 8:93–4. See also (Hasana, MF 14:268, for the claims that rain and the sending 
of a messenger are general goods.
36 (Hasana, MF 14:276–7.
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is no name among the most beautiful names of God that entails evil. Evil is 
only mentioned in the things that He enacts (maf ≠ūlātihi).”37 Th e shaykh 
supports this with several quranic verses in which the evils of punishment and 
chastisement are clearly distinguished from God’s names: “Tell My servants 
that I am the Forgiving, the Compassionate and that My chastisement is 
the painful chastisement” (Q. 15:49–50); “Your Lord is swift  in punish-
ment, and He is the Forgiving, the Compassionate” (Q. 6:165); “Know that 
God is severe in punishment and that God is Forgiving, Compassionate” 
(Q. 5:98); “Truly, the grip of your Lord is severe. Truly, He it is Who begins 
and returns, and He is the Forgiving, the Loving” (Q. 85:12–4).38 In Th ulth 
Ibn Taymiyya provides additional interpretation: “[God] regarded forgiveness 
and mercy to be among the meanings of His beautiful names with which 
He names Himself . . . As for the punishment that connects to servants, this 
is a creation of His, and it is this which is painful. He did not say, ‘Truly, 
I am the Chastiser’.”39
In both Irāda and Th ulth, Ibn Taymiyya takes up the name Avenger (al-
Muntaqim) because it contradicts his claim that God’s names involve no 
mention of evil. Although this name appears in the Qur±an, Ibn Taymiyya 
explains that it is qualifi ed (muqayyad ) by something in the immediate 
quranic context: “From the criminals We are avenging (muntaqimūn)” (Q. 
32:22); and “God is All-Mighty, possessor of vengeance (dhū intiqām)” (Q. 
3:4).40 Th e shaykh does not clarify what these qualifying elements are, but the 
reader is left  to assume that God’s vengeance is limited to “the criminals” in 
the fi rst example and subsumed under God’s name All-Mighty in the second. 
Ibn Taymiyya also argues that Avenger is not one of the established beautiful 
names of God and that the hadith in the collection of al-Tirmidhī41 listing 
Avenger as an independent and unqualifi ed name of God does not come 
from the Prophet himself.42
Even though Ibn Taymiyya excludes evil completely from God’s names 
in some passages, he explains in other places that evil is suggested in the 
37 Irāda, MF 8:96. Cf. Tā≠a, MF 8:447; Th ulth, MF 17:94; and Minhāj, 3:143/25:2.
38 Irāda, MF 8:96.
39 Th ulth, MF 17:94–5.
40 Ibn Taymiyya also mentions that Avenger is a qualifi ed name in (Hasana, MF 14:276.
41 Tirmidhī, 3429, Al-Da≠awāt ≠an rasūl Allāh, Mā jā±a fī ≠aqd al-tasbī!h bi-l-yad.
42 Irāda, MF 8:96–7; and Th ulth, MF 17:95. Ibn Taymiyya, Irāda MF 8:97, adds that the 
only other hadith listing the ninety-nine names of God, that of Ibn Māja, 3851, Al-Du≠ā±, 
Asmā± Allāh ≠azza wa jalla, has a weak chain of transmission. Elsewhere, the shaykh, MF 
22:481–6, explains that “ninety-nine” is simply a large number and does not actually indicate 
the exact number of God’s names. In his view, the Qur±an and the Sunna supply more names 
than those listed in the two hadiths transmitted by Tirmidhī and Ibn Māja.
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mention of some of the names but that these names are then conjoined 
with other names having positive signifi cance. Ibn Taymiyya usually takes 
up the conjoined names under the rubric of the fi rst type in the evil attribu-
tion typology. An excerpt from Minhāj provides one of the shaykh’s fuller 
explanations of this:
If [God] is mentioned by His particular (khā$s$s) name, it is conjoined with the 
good, as He says in His most beautiful names: the Harmer/the Profi ter (al-*Dārr 
al-Nāfi ≠), the Giver/the Impeder (al-Mu≠tī al-Māni≠), the Abaser/the Exalter 
(al-Khāfi #d al-Rāfi ≠), and the Honorer/the Humiliator (al-Mu≠izz al-Mudhill). 
He combines the two names because of the generality and inclusiveness in this, 
which indicates His unity.43
Apparently reticent to implicate the names Harmer, Impeder, Abaser and 
Humiliator in evil directly, Ibn Taymiyya instead labels them “particular” 
names. Th ese are then conjoined to Profi ter, Giver, Exalter and Honorer, 
respectively, to mitigate their severity and point to the general and all-inclu-
sive creative work of God. A brief explanation of the conjoined names in 
Irāda concurs with this interpretation: “Neither the name Impeder is isolated 
from its conjoint nor Harmer from its conjoint because their conjunction 
indicates the generality.”44
There is tension in Ibn Taymiyya’s thought on the conjoined names 
between affi  rming that God in His various names relates to everything in 
existence, including evil, and maintaining that all of God’s names imply only 
good. Th is comes out clearly in accompanying discussions of God’s grace 
and justice in Irāda, Minhāj and Th ulth.45 Only the fullest treatment, that 
in Th ulth, will be discussed here. Ibn Taymiyya argues in Th ulth that one 
part of God’s Word, namely, Surat al-Ikhlā$s (Q. 112), which is said to be 
equivalent to one-third of the Qur±an, can be better than another. To support 
his point, he notes that some of God’s attributes are preferable to others, as 
in the divine saying, “My mercy precedes My anger.”46 Ibn Taymiyya then 
extends the principle of preference to God’s hands. While there are hadiths 
which say, “Both of His hands are right [hands],”47 because “left ” implies 
defi ciency and there is no defi ciency in the hands of God, there is another 
43 Minhāj, 5:410/3:102. Th ree of these pairs of conjoined names are also mentioned in 
(Hasana, MF 14:276.
44 Irāda, MF 8:95.
45 Irāda, MF 8:95; Minhāj, 5:410–1; and Th ulth, 17:91–4.
46 Bukhārī, 6998, Al-Taw !hīd, Qawl Allāh ta≠ālā bal huwa Qur±ān majīd fī law !h ma!hfū)z; 
Muslim, 4940.
47 Muslim, 3406, Al-Īmān, Fa#dīlat al-imām al-≠ādil wa ≠uqubāt al-jā±ir . . .; A!hmad, 6204.
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hadith which indicates that one of God’s hands is preferable to the other: 
“Th e right hand of God is full, and spending liberally day and night would 
not diminish it. Have you not seen what He has spent since the creation of 
the heaven and the earth? What is in His right hand has not diminished. In 
His other hand is justice; He abases and exalts.”48 Ibn Taymiyya understands 
this to mean that grace is in God’s right hand and justice is in His other, and 
he adds that it is known that grace is preferable to justice. Yet, in the event 
that God’s justice should suggest that God commits evil, the shaykh quickly 
shift s from God’s perspective to that of creatures and adds, “Evil does not 
appear in His names. It appears only in the things that He enacts,” and he 
then sets out the evil attribution typology: “[Evil] is not attributed to Him 
except by way of the generality, by its attribution to the created cause or by 
the elision of its agent.”49
In sum Ibn Taymiyya fl uctuates between the fi rst and second types of 
evil attribution when discussing God’s names. Sometimes, he treats the 
names according to the fi rst type, allowing that some of the names imply 
evil and asserting that these must be conjoined to, that is, subsumed under 
the generality of names carrying positive connotations. At other times, he 
completely denies any implication of evil in God’s names and attributes 
evil solely to what God creates in creatures. As just observed from Th ulth, 
he also switches easily from the fi rst to the second type for the sake of the 
rhetorical propriety of speaking only of God’s goodness.
Although Ibn Taymiyya resembles Ibn ≠Arabī in suggesting that creation 
refl ects the diversity of God’s names, the shaykh’s ideas are far less developed. 
More importantly, Ibn Taymiyya does not follow Ibn ≠Arabī and his devotees 
in employing the image of God’s two hands to elaborate a yang/yin dialectic 
in God’s names or between God and creation.50 While Ibn Taymiyya similarly 
links God’s names to good and evil in created reality, he does not mention 
that this relationship is in any way paradoxical. His primary concern is to 
avoid attributing evil to God by classifying the diverse data of revelation into 
the categories of his evil attribution typology. Yet, the fact that his typology 
is a typology and not a rational resolution implicitly acknowledges a duality 
of perspective. God’s perspective of the generality and wise purpose does not 
48 Muslim, 1659, Al-Zakāh; Al- (Hathth ≠alā nafaqa . . . (Th e text is not identical); Bukhārī, 
6869. Cf. Q. 5:64.
49 Th ulth, MF 17:91–4.
50 On the dialectical or yang/yin interplay of God’s two hands in Ibn ≠Arabī and his 
disciples, see Sachiko Murata, Th e Tao of Islam (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1992), 88–114.
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negate that evil is still evil relative to creatures, and the evil perpetrated and 
experienced by creatures at the level of secondary causes does not nullify 
the goodness of God. Th e one perspective cannot be reduced to the other. 
Th e following two sections examine how Ibn Taymiyya fi lls out these two 
perspectives, fi rst, by articulating God’s wise purposes in creation and, second, 
by seeking to root the cause of evil in humans.
Ibn Taymiyya on God’s Wise Purposes in the Creation of Evil
Ibn Taymiyya consistently argues that God has wise purposes in all that 
He creates, but he does not often ask what those purposes are, and he 
sometimes presents little hope that human beings can discover them. In 
Kasb, for example, he indicates that God has a well-guarded secret in His 
determination. It is enough to know that God is knowing, wise and merci-
ful.51 In Irāda Ibn Taymiyya says that it is suffi  cient for people to know in 
general (min haythu jumla) that God has a great wise purpose in both His 
creation and His command. Yet, he also promises deeper insight for those 
who grow in faith. Th e function of this insight is to confi rm God’s revela-
tion and God’s reality:
Each time [the servant] increases in knowledge and faith, some of God’s wisdom 
and His mercy will appear to him that will dazzle his intellect. Th is will make 
evident to him to count as true that about which God has informed in His 
Book, “We will show them Our signs on the horizons and in themselves until 
it becomes evident to them that He is the Real” (Q. 41:53).52
In Minhāj the shaykh’s attitude varies from exhortation against asking ques-
tions to suggesting reasons for God’s creation of illness and oppression. At 
one point, he says that it is not for us to ask God “Why?” and he quotes the 
verse, “God is not questioned as to what He does, but they are questioned” 
(Q. 21:23).53 At another place, he states without further comment that some 
people may know the wise purposes while others may not.54 A third passage 
in Minhāj illumines the human relationship to God’s wisdom by comparing 
our knowledge of God’s wise purpose to the ordinary person’s awareness of 
a specialist’s knowledge. A non-specialist can recognize that someone is an 
51 Kasb, MF 8:399.
52 Irāda, MF 8:97.
53 Minhāj, 3:67–8/2:5.
54 Minhāj, 1:146/1:35.
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expert in grammar, mathematics, jurisprudence or medicine without being 
able to understand everything the expert says. Likewise, God’s wisdom and 
mercy can dazzle minds and lead human beings to accept that God is wise 
and merciful without their understanding God’s wise purpose.55 Despite 
this, another passage from Minhāj already noted in Chapter Th ree reveals 
more. Ibn Taymiyya says that one cannot know the detail of God’s wise 
purpose, but he does note that, generally speaking, God’s creation of illness 
and oppression leads to humility, repentance from sins and other religious 
virtues that cannot be attained except by way of diffi  culty. Th ese evils are 
preconditions to greater goods that could not otherwise exist.56
In Jabr, when leading into a mention of the evil attribution typology, the 
shaykh asserts, “‘[God] is not questioned as to what He does’ (Q. 38:27). 
[Th is is] because of the perfection of His wise purpose, His mercy and His 
justice, not merely because of His subjugation and His power, as Jahm and 
his followers say.”57 Th e exhortation not to question God would appear to 
bar any knowledge of God’s wise purpose. However, very soon thereaft er, 
Ibn Taymiyya turns quite gnostic, opening the door to knowledge of God’s 
wise purposes for certain spiritually sensitive people:
Some servants may know some of [God’s] wise purpose, and what is hidden of 
it may be hidden from them. People are favored over others in knowledge of 
His wise purpose, His mercy and His justice. Each time the servant increases 
in knowledge of the realities of things, he increases in knowledge of God’s wise 
purpose, His justice, His mercy and His power.58
Ibn Taymiyya then explains that what the servant comes to understand is 
that even though God creates and determines all things and that his good 
deeds come from God, his evil deeds still come from the imperfection and 
ignorance of his soul (nafs) and God is just in punishing him. It is not 
clear how this existential knowledge of one’s place before God represents 
knowledge of His wise purpose except possibly that God’s wise purpose is 
that one comes to this particular understanding. In Jabr the shaykh goes 
on to note that most people are unable to know the detail of God’s wise 
purpose. He adds that even the angels could not discover God’s purpose in 
creating human beings who would shed blood (Q. 2:30). Th e angels had to 
be content with general knowledge and belief.59
55 Minhāj, 5:416/3:104.
56 Minhāj, 3:176–7/2:33.
57 Jabr, MF 8:511.
58 Jabr, MF 8:513.
59 Jabr, MF 8:513–4.
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Th e shaykh says much the same thing about angelic knowledge of human 
nature in (Hasana. In God’s great wise purpose and mercy, He created evil to 
be an inevitable constituent of humanity. Reminiscent of Ibn Sīnā’s assertion 
that fi re would not be fi re without burning, Ibn Taymiyya maintains that 
human beings would not be human had God created them diff erently and 
God’s wise purpose would not have been realized. Yet, not even the angels, 
much less humans, know why this is so.60 Despite the shaykh’s agnosticism 
concerning God’s wise purpose in this particular passage, he provides more 
indications in (Hasana than I have found elsewhere as to what he believes 
God’s wise purposes in the creation of evil to be. He also tells his readers 
in (Hasana that he has expounded the wise purpose and mercy in God’s 
creation of Iblīs and Hell in another place, but I have failed to locate this 
in the shaykh’s works.61
In (Hasana Ibn Taymiyya gives relative evil the educational function of 
deterrence and guidance away from the wrong path. God’s destruction of 
Pharaoh and his people was evil relative to them, but it served the universal 
good as a lesson from which future generations might profi t. In this regard, 
the shaykh quotes quranic verses dealing with Pharaoh and his people, “So, 
when they angered Us, We took vengeance on them and We drowned them 
all together. We set them as a precedent and an example to later generations” 
(Q. 43:55–6); and, “Truly, in this is a lesson for those who fear” (Q. 79:26).62 
Other quranic stories also promote human benefi t in that they provide les-
sons upon which we may refl ect and recognize in ourselves something of the 
disbelief that plagued earlier generations.63 Human sin in general serves as 
a lesson to others by evoking refl ection, guidance, and belief. However, the 
shaykh adds that we should ask God not to make us into an object lesson 
of this kind.64
Ibn Taymiyya also notes that God sends prosperity and adversity, as well 
as tumult or earthquake (zalzāl ), to test believers, purify them from evil, 
expiate their sins and increase their reward through patience. Th e blessing of 
prosperity may in fact be a greater trial than adversity.65 In support of these 
notions, he quotes the following texts among others: “Th at God might try 
what was in your breasts and that He might purify what was in your hearts” 
60 (Hasana, MF 14:315.
61 (Hasana, MF 14:300–1.
62 (Hasana, MF 14:276.
63 (Hasana, MF 14:321–2.
64 (Hasana, MF 14:307.
65 (Hasana, MF 14:254–5 and 304–5.
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(Q. 3:154);66 “It may be that you hate something that is good for you, and 
it may be that you love something that is evil for you. God knows, but you 
do not know” (Q. 2:216);67 and the hadith, “I seek refuge in You from the 
trial of poverty and the evil of the trial of wealth.”68 Also, when discussing 
God’s use of an unjust ruler to ward off  even greater injustice, Ibn Taymi-
yya explains that this injustice expiates the sins of those affl  icted by it and 
increases their reward. He adds, “In [affl  ictions] they return to God, ask His 
forgiveness and turn to Him in repentance.”69
In (Hasana Ibn Taymiyya argues, as he does in Minhāj, that evil deeds 
are a precondition to the virtues of humility and repentance. He makes 
this point when taking up the hadith, “God did not decree anything for 
the believer except what is good for him.”70 How could God’s decree of evil 
deeds inducing punishment be good for the believer? Th e shaykh fi rst asserts 
that the hadith appears to be referring to blessings and affl  ictions and to 
prosperity and adversity, not to human deeds. However, he then considers 
the possibility that the hadith encompasses God’s decree of human sins as 
well. He explains that this is good for the believer because it leads to the 
further good of repentance that could not otherwise occur. Th e believer is 
not one who avoids sins entirely, but one who does not persist in them and 
repents to his own greater good:
Th e believer is he who does not persist in a sin but repents from it. Th us, it 
becomes a good deed. . . . He does not cease repenting from it until he enters 
Paradise by means of his repentance from it. A sin necessitates a servant’s 
humility, his subjection, invocation of God, his asking Him for forgiveness 
and his bearing witness to his poverty and to his need for Him and that no 
one can forgive sins except Him. Because of the sin, good things happen to 
the believer that would not have happened without this. Th erefore, this decree 
is good for him.71
66 (Hasana, MF 14:255.
67 (Hasana, MF 14:304.
68 Bukhārī, 5899, Al-Da≠awāt, Al-Isti≠ādha min fi tnat al-ghinā, in (Hasana, MF 14:305.
69 (Hasana, MF 14:269.
70 A!hmad, 12439, Bāqī musnad al-mukaththirīn, Musnad Anas b. Mālik. Ibn Taymiyya, 
Ma!habba 156, also discusses this hadith in the context of God trying believers with both 
prosperity and adversity.
71 (Hasana, MF 14:318–9. Th is focus on the goodness of sin with repentance in (Hasana 
correlates with the fi ndings of Shahab Ahmed, “Ibn Taymiyyah and the Satanic verses,” 
86–7 and 90–100, concerning Ibn Taymiyya’s view of prophetic protection (≠isma) and the 
exemplary repentance of the prophets. According to Ahmed, the shaykh regards prophetic 
≠i $sma not as complete protection from committing sins (the widespread Sunnī belief in 
medieval and modern times) but as protection from persisting in sins already committed. 
In Ibn Taymiyya’s view, the prophets, including the Prophet Mu!hammad, sinned, but they 
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Here, as in other brief notes on the good of evil examined above from 
(Hasana and Minhāj, the good in evil and one’s own adversity and sin is the 
opportunity aff orded to advance in the religious life. Elsewhere, Ibn Taymiyya 
notes as well that the unbelief of unbelievers is a blessing for believers in 
that it gives them occasion for jihād and moral exhortation. Similarly, the 
existence of satans provides believers opportunity to gain the highest rewards 
and spiritual levels through striving, showing enmity and resisting caprice.72 
However, Ibn Taymiyya does not go on in (Hasana or any other text to my 
knowledge to note the implications for God in the fashion of his close 
disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, who explains that sins and disobedience 
aff ord God Himself the occasion to demonstrate His mercy and forgiveness 
and that God’s joy in repentance depends upon there being something from 
which human beings repent.73 Concern to protect God’s self-suffi  ciency is 
probably what prevents Ibn Taymiyya from speaking of the vicissitudes of 
creatures giving God opportunity to exercise His attributes.
Whatever be the case, the shaykh does maintain in (Hasana that everything 
that God creates is a blessing to His servants revealing His wisdom, mercy 
and power. He adds, “In everything that God creates is benefi cence to His 
servants for which He is praised with the praise of thanksgiving. And in it 
He has a wise purpose that returns to Him because of which He has a right 
to be praised for it with a praise to which He has a right in His essence.”74 A 
little later in (Hasana, Ibn Taymiyya complements this with, “In everything 
that He creates, He has a wise purpose, and He is praised for [what He cre-
ates] in consideration of that wise purpose.”75 Although the shaykh does not 
put it so simply, it seems clear enough that God is praised not only for His 
benefi cence to creatures but also for His essence in which wisdom is inherent. 
Ibn Taymiyya then criticizes the Qadarīs (i.e. Mu≠tazilīs) for asserting that 
immediately repented from their sins and did not remain in them. Th rough sin and repentance, 
the prophets attained greater perfection (kamāl ) than they could otherwise have attained. 
Th is pattern of immediate repentance from sins then serves as an example for all believers 
to follow, and it nurtures the devotional virtues of repentance and asking for forgiveness. It 
might be thought that Ibn Taymiyya encourages sinning in order to gain the greater good of 
repentance. However, Ahmed, 93 n. 64, highlights, but does not translate, a text in Minhāj, 
2:400/1:227, where Ibn Taymiyya cautions against this. Th e passage reads, “Th ere is no doubt 
that evil deeds are not commanded, and it is not for the servant to commit them in order 
thereby to repent from them. . . . [Th is is] like someone who wants to eat poison and then 
drink the antidote. Th is is ignorance.”
72 Ma!habba, 160.
73 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifā± al-≠alīl, 486.
74 (Hasana, MF 14:301–315 (quote on 302).
75 (Hasana, MF 14:309.
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God creates with wise purpose to the profi t of creatures but without return 
to Himself. With such a God, praise is nothing more than thanksgiving for 
profi t gained, and consideration is given neither to His sovereignty nor to 
confessing His exclusive divinity (taw!hīd al-ilāhiyya), that is, His right to 
worship in His essence. Additionally, Ibn Taymiyya condemns the Jahmīs 
(i.e. Ash≠arīs) for holding to God’s sovereignty and exclusive lordship (taw!hi#d 
al-rubūbiyya) without confessing His wisdom or exclusive divinity. Th e 
Jahmī God who creates pure evil devoid of wise purpose, profi t and mercy 
is worthy of blame and has no right to praise or love. Rather, “[Praise] is 
for His blessing, and it is worship of Him for His divinity, which includes 
His wise purpose.”76
This discussion of the (Hasana material has drifted from God’s wise 
purposes in the creation of evil onward to God’s essence and divinity, thus 
refl ecting Ibn Taymiyya’s keenness to affi  rm not only wise purposes in God’s 
acts but also, more profoundly, the wise purpose inherent in God’s essence 
and God’s praiseworthiness in that. For Ibn Taymiyya, God’s right to wor-
ship is essential, and it is from this that His wise purpose fl ows, even to His 
creation of evil, which serves to expiate sin, guide human beings and nurture 
religious virtues such as humility and repentance that lead to recognition 
of His exclusive divinity. In this light, the shaykh’s interpretation of evil 
is very much that of the Sufi s for whom it is God’s tool of discipline for 
spiritual growth.
Ibn Taymiyya’s Location of the Origin of Evil in Nonexistence (≠adam)
In texts examined in Chapter Four, Ibn Taymiyya deems the substrate prin-
ciple a suffi  cient defense of God’s justice in creating and punishing human 
bad deeds. God is not qualifi ed with the bad deeds that He creates and He 
is just to punish these acts because He creates them in a substrate other 
than Himself. In two major theodicean texts— (Hasana and Fāti !ha—Ibn 
 Taymiyya goes beyond the substrate defense of God’s justice and attempts 
to free God entirely from creating gratuitous evil deeds by locating their 
origin in nonexistence. Th e following two sections examine how the shaykh 
employs nonexistence to deal with the origin of evil in (Hasana and Fāti!ha, 
respectively. Rooting evil in nonexistence probably represents a development 
76 (Hasana, MF 14:309–313 (quote on 311).
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in Ibn Taymiyya’s thought, but this cannot be shown defi nitively due to dif-
fi culty in establishing a precise chronology for his theodicean writings.
Exclusive Divine Goodness and the Origin of Evil Deeds in (Hasana
Interpreting Q. 4:78–9: Everything Is fr om God; Evil Is fr om the Soul
Precedents for the notion of evil as privation or nonexistence (≠adam) are 
found in Ibn Sīnā and Ibn ≠Arabī.77 Whereas these thinkers draw on the con-
cept of privation primarily for metaphysical reasons, Ibn Taymiyya employs it 
in (Hasana to address a more typically Mu≠tazilī concern, that of upholding 
God’s order of retribution and absolving God of being the ultimate source 
of moral evil. Some material from (Hasana has already been examined in this 
and previous chapters, but the central problem of the treatise—the origin of 
evil—has yet to be addressed. Much of the text wrestles with an apparent 
contradiction posed by two quranic verses that occur in a context of com-
manding jihad and blaming those who try to evade it (Q. 4:65–104).78 Ibn 
Taymiyya writes:
One group thought that there was in the verses an ambiguity or contradiction 
in the outward sense where [God] says, “Everything is from God” (4:78), and 
then diff erentiates between good things (!hasanāt) and evil things (sayyi±āt). He 
said, “Any good thing that comes to you is from God and any evil thing that 
comes to you is from yourself (min nafsika)” (Q. 4:79). Th is is due to their 
insuffi  cient understanding and their not meditating on the verses. In these 
verses is no contradiction (tanāqū#d ).79
If God is the source of all things, do not evil things also come from Him 
and not from creatures? Ibn Taymiyya does not specify the group posing 
this contradiction, but he does mention earlier Kalām attempts to resolve 
it. Th e shaykh cites a Mu≠tazilī proposal that Q. 4:79 refers to God’s com-
mand. On this reading all good comes from God only in the sense that 
He commands it. He does not necessarily create it. Th e nafs, which I will 
translate variously as “self,” “soul” or “person,” creates both obedience and 
disobedience and is thus the source of evil things. Ibn Taymiyya rejects this 
77 For references in Ibn Sīnā and Ibn ≠Arabī, see  above at the beginning of this Chapter. 
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī also elaborates on evil as nonexistence in one of his works, his philo-
sophical al-Mabā !hih al-mashriqiyya, 2:519–523. Al-Julaynad, Qa#diyyat al-khayr wa al-sharr, 
161–4, explains that al-Rāzī’s departs from Ash≠arī tradition with these ideas.
78 Ibn Taymiyya, (Hasana, MF 14:229–233, surveys the context that these verses constitute 
for Q. 4:78–9.
79 (Hasana, MF 14:248–9.
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interpretation because “Everything is from God” (Q. 4:78) precludes human 
beings creating their own acts.80
Th e shaykh also notes an interpretation that he traces to the Ash≠arī theo-
logian Abū Bakr b. Fūrak (d. 406/1015). In this view, the end of Q. 4:79 
should be read as an interrogative, “Any evil thing that comes to you, is it 
from yourself ?” which must be answered negatively because all things come 
from God. Ibn Taymiyya discards Ibn Fūrak’s interpretation as grammatically 
untenable. Th e shaykh argues instead that the verse refutes any depreciation 
of the human role in acts because it indicates that at least some deeds come 
from the person himself.81
In a brief discussion of these verses in Irāda, Ibn Taymiyya interprets good 
things and evil things as strictly blessings and affl  ictions. Th e evils of affl  iction 
are only from the person in the sense that God sends them as punishment for 
sins that God also creates. Th e shaykh states clearly that good things and evil 
things are not acts of obedience and acts of disobedience, respectively, such 
that God could be said to create the former but not the latter.82 In (Hasana, 
however, he locates the ultimate source of disobedient acts more fi rmly in 
human beings. While !hasanāt and sayyi±āt, which I have been translating 
“good things” and “evil things” respectively, do refer to blessings and affl  ic-
tions, Ibn Taymiyya argues that they may also be said to include obedience 
and disobedience. For this reason, I will sometimes translate !hasanāt and 
sayyi±āt as “good deeds” and “evil deeds.” In this light, the shaykh reads Q. 
4:79 to mean that obedience is a blessing that comes to a person from God 
while disobedience is an affl  iction that comes to him because he himself, in 
some sense, does it.83
Ibn Taymiyya explains this interpretation by drawing a distinction between 
a deed and its recompense ( jazā±) of punishment or reward. God may punish 
a fi rst act of disobedience with a second act of disobedience, and He may 
reward a fi rst good deed with a second good deed. Th e shaykh illustrates 
this from the Qur±an at length. Th ree of his quotations will suffi  ce here: 
“By [the Book], God guides whoever follows His good-pleasure in the ways 
80 (Hasana, MF 14:246–7, 258–9. Gimaret, Th éories de l’acte humain en théologie musul-
mane, 347–352, surveys this and other interpretations of 4:78–9 found in the classical Kalām 
and tafsīr literature.
81 (Hasana, MF 14:247, 421–4.
82 Irāda, MF 8:114–7.
83 (Hasana, MF 14:234–9. Similar interpretations of 4:78–9 may be found in the com-
mentaries of al-+Tabarī, Tafsīr al-+Tabarī: Jāmi ≠ al-bayān ≠an ta±wīl āyy al-Qur ±ān, ed. Ma!hmūd 
Mu!hammad Shākir (Cairo: Dār al-Ma≠ārif bi-mi $sr, n.d.), 8:555–560; and Abū al-Qāsim Jār 
Allāh al-Zamakhsharī, Al-Kashshāf (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-≠ilmiyya, 1415/1995), 4:527.
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of peace” (Q. 5:16); “Th en the unbeliever was confounded. God does not 
guide people who are unjust” (Q. 2:258); and, “We shall turn their hearts 
and their eyes, as they did not believe in it the fi rst time, and We shall leave 
them in their insolence to wander blindly” (Q. 6:110). From this evidence 
that God rewards and punishes deeds with other deeds similar in kind, the 
shaykh concludes that the key phrase at the end of Q. 4:79, “from yourself,” 
encompasses both sins gratuitously perpetrated and God’s creation of evil 
deeds as punishment. As for good deeds, however, God creates both the 
acts and their recompense in keeping with “Any good thing that comes to 
you is from God.”84
Having established that evil things originate only in the very person 
affl  icted, Ibn Taymiyya refutes a charge that the Prophet and his message 
are sources of evils and affl  ictions, as in Q. 4:78: “If a good thing comes to 
them, they say, ‘Th is is from God’, and if an evil thing comes to them, they 
say, ‘Th is is from you [Mu !hammad]’. Say, ‘Everything is from God’.” Th e 
shaykh invokes the context of this verse in the Muslim setback at the Battle 
of U!hud and places the blame for its affl  ictions not on the Prophet but on 
the sins of the Muslims.85
All Good Comes fr om God’s Unmerited Blessing
Even though Ibn Taymiyya imbues “Any evil thing that comes to you is from 
yourself ” with a strong sense of retributive punishment in (Hasana, it is dif-
fi cult to see how this fi ts with his conviction that both good and evil deeds 
are created and predetermined by God. What is the sense in which human 
beings are the sources of their evil deeds? Th e shaykh himself presents the 
problem clearly:
If acts of obedience and acts of disobedience are predetermined (muqaddar) 
and blessings and affl  ictions are predetermined, then what is the diff erence 
between good things, which are blessings, and evil things, which are affl  ictions, 
so as to deem the one from God and the other from the human soul?86
In response, Ibn Taymiyya elaborates a series of eight “diff erences ( furūq)” 
between good things and evil things.87 Th e fourth and eighth diff erences 
do not address the question directly and may be summarized briefl y. Th e 
84 (Hasana, MF 14:239–247.
85 (Hasana, MF 14:248–254, 342. Cf. (Hasana, MF 14:373–5.
86 (Hasana, MF 14:259.
87 Th ese eight diff erences vary in length from one paragraph to fi ft y-four pages in the 
printed text. Th e one-paragraph discussions are the fi rst (MF 14:260) and the third (MF 
14:265). Th e fi ft h is the longest (MF 14:277–331). Th e eight discussions together take 
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fourth observes that evil is relative and provides a three-fold evil attribution 
typology along lines examined earlier in this chapter.88 Th e eighth diff erence 
says simply that disgusting circumstances are appropriate for those who do 
disgusting things (khabā±ith). It is not fi tting for such people to reside in 
Paradise as Paradise is only appropriate for those who have been purifi ed 
from their sins.89
Th e remaining diff erences work toward resolving the contradiction. In the 
fi rst three and the seventh, Ibn Taymiyya underscores God’s great benefi cence. 
God distributes blessings (sg. ni≠ma) and grace ( fa#dl ), such as health, guid-
ance, belief and good deeds, apart from consideration of human worthiness, 
and God brings people into Paradise out of pure grace without respect to 
their deeds. With respect to evil deeds, moreover, God limits His punish-
ment strictly to what retribution requires.90 Th e following passage from the 
second diff erence epitomizes this perspective:
All that intelligent beings enjoy of the two goods of this world and the hereaf-
ter is pure blessing from Him without a preceding cause making it their right. 
Th ey have neither might nor strength from themselves except through Him. 
He is Creator of their souls, Creator of their righteous deeds and Creator of 
recompense. So, His statement, “Any good thing that comes to you is from God” 
(Q. 4:79), is true in every respect, in the outward sense and the inward sense, 
according to the doctrine of the Sunnīs. As for an evil thing, it is only from 
the sin of the servant, and the sin is from himself. [God] did not say, “Truly, 
I did not predetermine this, and I did not create it.” Instead, He mentioned 
to human beings what profi ts them.91
According to Ibn Taymiyya, the profi table thing that God has mentioned is 
the latter part of Q. 4:79: “Any evil thing that comes to you is from yourself.” 
“From yourself ” benefi ts humankind by prompting repentance and entreaty 
for forgiveness of sins. With this in mind, the shaykh interprets “Everything 
is from God” (Q. 4:78) to mean that blessings, affl  ictions and acts of obedi-
ence and disobedience are all from God. Th e second verse (Q. 4:79) then 
diff erentiates between blessings and evil in order to motivate thanksgiving to 
God for the former and seeking forgiveness from Him for the latter.92 Th is 
interpretation involves a shift  from a retributive scheme of reward for good 
up just under half of (Hasana, specifi cally 87 out of 197 pages in the printed text (MF 
14:259–346).
88 (Hasana, MF 14:266–277.
89 (Hasana, MF 14:343–6.
90 (Hasana, MF 14:260–5, 339–342.
91 (Hasana, MF 14:261.
92 (Hasana, MF 14:261–5. A similar argument is made in (Hasana, MF 14:319–320.
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deeds to a logic of pure grace and blessing in which God is the sole source 
of all good. Th e substrate principle noted in Chapter Four above no longer 
applies in good deeds. Good deeds are not attributed to the human in whom 
God creates them to subsist but to God’s unmerited blessing. Retribution 
is left  to operate strictly on the level of evil deeds. Th is interpretation of 
Q. 4:78–9 may nurture a reverent attitude toward the goodness of God, but 
it does not explain how pure grace in good deeds coexists with retribution 
in evil deeds.
Th e Source of Evil Deeds Is Ignorance, which Is Nonexistent
Ibn Taymiyya grapples with the logic of reward and punishment more 
extensively in the fi ft h and sixth diff erences in (Hasana, vacillating at fi rst 
between retributive based and blessing based approaches to reward before 
concentrating on a retributive scheme in punishment. At the beginning of 
the fi ft h diff erence, the shaykh explains that all good deeds with which God 
blesses human beings are existing things (umūr wujūdiyya). Furthermore, 
omission (tark) of what is prohibited is just as existent as obedience to a 
command. Omission of a prohibited act is existent because it involves a 
person’s “knowledge that it is a bad sin and that it is a cause of chastisement, 
his loathing and his hatred of it, and his restraint of himself from it when 
he desires it, craves it and seeks it.”93 Ibn Taymiyya then speaks retributively, 
noting that human beings are only rewarded for good deeds if they under-
take them with explicit intention and love for God. Similarly, they are only 
rewarded for omitting evil deeds if they omit them out of hatred for them 
and loathing for worship of any apart from God. Moreover, there is no 
reward for omitting a forbidden deed that one never thought to commit, 
and there is no punishment for omitting to do what is commanded unless 
there is a perverse refusal to obey. Reward and punishment apply only to 
the existent—or we might say intentional—commission of good deeds and 
evil deeds, respectively. Th ere is neither reward nor punishment for someone 
who does not know that his deeds are good or evil. Such a person is in a state 
of unaccountability similar to that of children and the insane. Th e shaykh 
ends this part of his discussion by turning from the retributive perspective 
to that of God’s unmerited blessing. All rewarded good deeds are existent 
and a blessing from God: “It is He who makes belief beloved to the believers 
93 (Hasana, MF 14:278.
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and adorns it in their hearts, and [it is He] who makes disbelief, iniquity 
and disobedience hateful to them.”94
Ibn Taymiyya returns to retribution in the fi ft h diff erence by tracing evil 
deeds variously to injustice, heedlessness (ghafl a), craving (shahwa), caprice 
(hawā), Satan and the soul’s hatred for what is obligatory. However, he roots 
evil deeds ultimately in ignorance or the lack of knowledge. God has created 
humans in their natural constitution ( fi $tra) to love knowledge and to gain 
what profi ts them and gives them pleasure. Moreover, God has given His 
guidance: “God—Exalted is He—has guided humanity with general guidance 
by the knowledge and the means of knowledge that He put in the natural 
constitution and by the books He sent down to them and the messengers He 
sent to them.”95 Moreover this guidance and knowledge will restrain from 
evil. Human beings will decide to perform good deeds and avoid evil deeds 
if they are adequately aware of the profi t entailed in doing so: “Th e root of 
what makes people fall into evil deeds is ignorance and not knowing that 
they will harm them with preponderant harm, or thinking that they will 
profi t them with preponderant profi t.”96 Th e shaykh argues that a thief will 
not steal if sure of getting caught and an adulterer will not commit adultery 
if certain of being stoned. Wine drinkers, however, present a more diffi  cult 
problem. Ibn Taymiyya observes that punishment does not necessarily stop 
them from drinking. However, he does not explore why this is so; instead, he 
notes that the death penalty may be necessary for the inveterate drinker.97
It is diffi  cult to reconcile Ibn Taymiyya’s view of ignorance as the source of 
evil with his notion that only perverse and existent disobedience is punished 
retributively. On the one hand, and as noted in the preceding paragraph, he 
argues that human beings given proper guidance will necessarily do what 
they should since this will be the course of action most profi table for them. 
He believes that they will never perversely disobey God in full awareness 
of the consequences, and he does not allow the observation of incorrigible 
wine drinkers to disturb this conviction. No one will disobey knowing full 
well that it will lead to his own ruin. Perversity is therefore impossible. 
On the other hand, Ibn Taymiyya explains that punishment is due only 
for the existent omission of obligatory deeds, that is, for disobedience that 
is perverse and intentional. Now the diffi  culty is this: If a knowledgeable 
person will not disobey, and if a person who disobeys does so only for lack 
94 (Hasana, MF 14: 277–287 (quote on 287).
95 (Hasana, MF 14:296.
96 (Hasana, MF 14:290.
97 (Hasana, MF 14:287–294.
202 chapter five
of knowledge and proper guidance, then there will be no justly administered 
retributive punishment because no act of disobedience is truly perverse.98 Th e 
disobedient is always ignorant and therefore unaccountable. Th e notion that 
lack of knowledge is the fundamental root of evil deeds renders a retributive 
scheme that punishes only existent or perverse deeds superfl uous. Punish-
ment, however, may be administered for other than retributive reasons, such 
as deterrence and education, which make evil deeds and their consequences 
known for what they are: harmful to the human soul. As observed above, 
Ibn Taymiyya does indeed supply these kinds of reasons in (Hasana.
Th e evident reason that Ibn Taymiyya locates evil deeds in ignorance and 
lack of knowledge is to clear God of being the source of evil. Continuing in 
the fi ft h diff erence, he argues that the nonexistence that is ignorance and 
lack of knowledge is nothing at all. It has no agent and therefore cannot be 
attributed to God. God is the source only of existent things, not of igno-
rance.99 In the same context, the shaykh explains that God creates the soul 
constantly willing and moving. When it does not turn toward God in its 
ignorance, it necessarily turns away from Him and worships something else. 
Such a person suff ers recompense through not “living the profi table life for 
which he was created.”100 Yet, it remains unclear how the God who creates 
all human acts can hold human beings responsible for their ignorance, and 
it is not apparent why human beings lack adequate knowledge in the fi rst 
place. Ibn Taymiyya concludes the fi ft h diff erence in (Hasana by discussing 
the attribution of evil to its fi nal cause, that is, to wise purpose, and to its 
agent or secondary cause, as was noted above. With this, the shaykh looks 
away from the origin of evil to God’s wise purpose in all created things.
Punishment Is for a Lack of the Deeds for which One Was Created
In the sixth diff erence, Ibn Taymiyya returns to the problem of evil’s ulti-
mate source and makes his fi nal and fullest attempt in (Hasana to explain 
how God is just to punish human sins retributively. Substantial portions of 
this discussion are translated below. Ibn Taymiyya begins, “Th e existent sins 
(al-dhunūb al-wujūdiyya) by which the servant is tried—even if they are a 
creation of God—are his punishment for his not doing what God created 
 98 Aspects of the problem outlined here are not unique to Ibn Taymiyya. According to 
Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 92–7, the Mu≠tazilī theologian ≠Abd al-Jabbār argues that 
humans will not do bad deeds if they know both that such deeds are evil and that there is 
no advantage to be gained in doing them.
 99 (Hasana, MF 14:294.
100 (Hasana, MF 14:297.
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him to do and what He constituted him naturally to do.”101 Th e fundamental 
problem is the failure of human beings to commit the good deeds for which 
they were created and the deeds that humans should know to do through the 
guidance of their natural constitutions. In order to free God from responsi-
bility for having created this failure and to render Him just in punishing it 
retributively, Ibn Taymiyya calls it a nonexistent that God does not create. 
Th is nonexistent is not punished with the complete punishment of the Fire, 
but it is punished by God’s creation of evil deeds. Th e shaykh explains that 
this is a middle position between complete punishment for a pure lack of 
good deeds, a view he attributes to the Mu≠tazilī Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā±ī 
(d. 321/933), and complete punishment of only existing evil deeds such as 
the intentional omission of good deeds.102 He elaborates:
What has been mentioned in this respect is a median position (amr wasa$t). 
Th at is, [God] punishes [the servant] for this lack [of good deeds] with his 
commission of evil deeds, not with [complete] punishment of them. He does 
not punish him for them until He sends His messenger. When he disobeys 
the messenger, at that moment he deserves complete punishment. At fi rst, he 
is only punished by that from whose evil he can be saved by repenting or by 
not being held accountable. He is like a boy who does not occupy himself 
with what profi ts him but with what is a cause of his harm. However, the pen 
of sinful things will not write anything against him until he reaches the age 
of accountability. When he reaches the age of accountability, he will be pun-
ished. Th en, the evil deeds to which he has grown accustomed may be a cause 
of his disobedience aft er reaching the age of accountability. He has not been 
punished except for his sin, but he only deserves the conventional punishment 
aft er being made accountable. As for his preoccupation with evil deeds, this is 
punishment for his not committing good deeds.
Hence, evil is not [attributed] to God in any respect. Even if God is the 
Creator of the servants’ acts—His creation of obedient acts is blessing and 
mercy, and He has a wise purpose and mercy in His creation of evil deeds—this 
is nonetheless just of Him. He is not unjust to humans at all, but humans are 
unjust to themselves. Th eir injustice to themselves is of two kinds: their not 
committing good deeds—this is not attributed to Him—and their commission 
of evil deeds—He creates them as their punishment for omitting to commit 
101 (Hasana, MF 14:331.
102 (Hasana, MF 14:333. Ibn Taymiyya, (Hasana, MF 14:281–2, takes an explicit position 
against Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā±ī who says that failure to fulfi ll an obligation is not an act 
at all. Abū Hāshim’s father Abū ≠Alī took the opposite position (i.e. that adopted by Ibn 
Taymiyya), saying that omission of a duty is in itself a real act. Both father and son agree, 
however, that God punishes failure to fulfi ll duties. For a brief description of the controversy, 
see Martin J. McDermott, Th e Th eology of al-Shaikh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022) (Beirut: Dar 
el-Machreq, 1978), 157–9.
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the good deeds for which He created them and which He commanded them. 
Every blessing from Him is grace, and every vengeance from Him is just.
It will become clear to whoever meditates on the Qur±an that, generally, 
God makes whatever He mentions in the way of creating unbelief and acts of 
disobedience as a recompense for these deeds. [Th is is] as in His statement—
Exalted is He—“Whomever God wills to guide, He opens his breast to Islam. 
Whomever He wills to misguide, He makes his breast narrow and tight as if 
he were climbing up to the sky. In this way, God makes an atrocity for those 
who do not believe” (Q. 6:125). And He—Exalted is He—says, “So, when they 
turned away, God turned their hearts away” (Q. 61:5). And He—Exalted is 
He—says, “As for him who is a miser and self-suffi  cient and belies goodness, 
We will ease his way into hardship” (Q. 92:8–10). In this and similar examples 
they executed deeds by which He punished them for committing what was 
forbidden and omitting what was commanded. Th ese things were only from 
them and created in them because they did not do that for which they were 
created. Th ey must inevitably have motion and a will. When they were not 
active with good deeds, they were active with evil deeds out of God’s justice 
since He put this in its place, in its substrate, which is susceptible to it, namely, 
the heart, which is not [existent] except [as] committing deeds. If it does not 
commit a good deed, it will be employed in committing an evil deed. As it was 
said, “As for your soul, if you do not occupy it, it will occupy you.”103
Following this, Ibn Taymiyya briefl y notes that Jabrīs assert that God could 
punish unbelief and disobedience that He creates without wise purpose and 
that Qadarīs maintain that humans create their own acts. He also mentions 
that many Qadarīs allow God to create sins in recompense but do not per-
mit God to create the fi rst sin that a person commits lest God be unjust to 
punish it.104 Ibn Taymiyya likewise excludes the fi rst sin from the realm of 
God’s creation, but, unlike the Qadarī, he also does not attribute its creation 
to the human. He maintains that it is not created by anyone because it is not 
an existent. Rather, it is the nonexistence of the good deeds for which the 
human was created. Th e fi rst sin in the life of each individual human being 
is a passive failure to cooperate with God’s intention for him. It is a priva-
tion of what God meant human beings to do and be, and this privation has 
neither a divine nor a human agent. In the following passage from the sixth 
diff erence in (Hasana, the shaykh elaborates this and then briefl y addresses 
why humans do not do that for which they were created in the fi rst place:
What we have mentioned necessitates that God is Creator of everything. 
Nothing originates except by His will and power. Nevertheless, the fi rst of the 
existing sins is the [one] created, and this is a punishment for the servant’s not 
103 (Hasana, MF 14:333–5.
104 (Hasana, MF 14:335–6.
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doing that for which he has been created and that which he is supposed to do. 
It is not permissible to attribute this lack to God. It is not anything so that it 
would enter into our statement, “God is the Creator of everything.” Th e fi rst 
of the existent sins that He originates is a punishment of the servant for this 
lack. Th e rest [of the sins] may either be a punishment of the servant for what 
exists or they may be a punishment for his continuation in [this] lack. As long 
as he does not consecrate deeds to God, he is still an associationist, and Satan 
still has authority over him.
Th en, His specifi cation (takh$sī$s)—Glory be to Him—of whom He guides—
to employ him from the beginning in that for which he was created and not so 
to employ another—is a specifi cation of His by His grace and mercy. Th erefore, 
God says, “And God chooses whomever He wills for His mercy. God is the 
owner of abounding grace” (Q. 2:105). In this is wise purpose and mercy about 
which He knows better, as when He specifi es some bodies (abdān) to have 
strengths not found in others. Because of the lack of strength, [a body] might 
suff er diseases that are existent and other than that in His wise purpose. By 
verifying this, [the servant] wards off  the obscurities of this subject, and God 
knows better what is correct.105
Locating the origin of evil in the nonexistent failure of human beings to do 
that for which they were created may succeed in granting some semblance of 
libertarian freedom and establishing a basis upon which to mete out retribu-
tive punishment. However, making nonexistence the origin of this failure does 
not explain convincingly why human beings fall passively into their initial 
sins. In the passage above, the shaykh appears to sense these problems, and 
he turns away from arguing on the plane of retribution and shift s back to 
God’s grace and wise purpose. Ultimately, there is no explanation for human 
weakness but God’s wise purpose and mercy. Ibn Taymiyya’s attempt to fi nd a 
basis for retributive judgment in nonexistence still has its further grounding 
in God’s wise purpose in setting up the creation as He has and in creating 
some human beings to dissipate their energies in unprofi table deeds.
Call on God Alone Because He Is the Sole Source of Good
Summing up the previous subsections, Ibn Taymiyya’s dominant viewpoint 
on God’s recompense in (Hasana diff ers substantially from that of the sub-
strate principle in which the good and bad deeds that God creates are both 
attributed to human beings. With the substrate principle, retributive justice 
operates in both good and bad deeds from the human perspective, while God 
from the divine perspective creates everything according to His wise purpose. 
In (Hasana, however, the shaykh oft en maintains that humans should take 
105 (Hasana, MF 14:336–7.
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the perspective of God’s all-comprehensive goodness in blessings and good 
deeds but the human retributive perspective in evil deeds and affl  ictions. 
Good things point to God alone, not to human achievement, while evil 
things always point to lack and failure in the individual affl  icted. Neither 
God nor human beings create this failure; it has no agent. Yet, human beings 
are responsible for allowing this failure to occur to them, and they suff er the 
punishment of God creating evil deeds in them as retribution.
Th e shift  from the substrate principle to God as the unique source of all 
human good deeds also carries ethical and spiritual import for Ibn Taymi-
yya in (Hasana. Noted above was his claim that Q. 4:79 indicates what is 
profi table for human beings: the conviction that all blessings come from 
God evokes thanksgiving, while knowledge that evil deeds come only from 
the soul promotes seeking forgiveness. In the latter parts of (Hasana, he also 
contends that no intercession (shafā≠a) should be sought except from those to 
whom God gives authority to intercede before Him, and he criticizes beliefs 
and practices that he believes violate God’s Law and detract from calling on 
God alone. While God has a right to worship in His very essence, it is also 
the case that, as the sole source of all good things, He should be the sole 
object of complete trust, hope, praise and invocation.106
Th e Origin of Evil in Human Imperfection and Lack in Fāti!ha
Whereas the shaykh introduces the notion of evil as nonexistence in (Hasana 
primarily to solve a rational diffi  culty dealing with retribution, he elaborates 
it in Fāti!ha with much greater philosophical detail and analysis to make a 
religious argument. Fāti!ha opens with a full treatment of complete trust in 
God and God’s exclusive and essential right to worship. Th is constituted a key 
source for my discussion of “worship” and “asking for help” found above in 
Chapter One.107 Following this, Ibn Taymiyya takes up evil in order to argue 
that, since no good comes from creatures, appealing to them for help is like 
seeking aid from nothing at all. Th us, human weakness, imperfection, and 
ultimately nonexistence show that God alone should be sought for help.108
Ibn Taymiyya begins the part of Fāti!ha on evil by affi  rming that God is 
Creator of all existent things. Th e human soul contributes only nonexistence, 
which is nothing at all and requires no agent. Now, according to the shaykh, 
106 (Hasana, MF 14:314–5, 341, 359–421.
107 Fāti!ha, MF 14:4–15.
108 Fāti!ha, MF 14:15, 29.
 the wise purpose and origin of evil 207
the nonexistence of something may be due to the lack of an entailing factor 
(muqta#dī) or the existence of an impediment (māni≠). However, God’s will 
(mashī±a) is always decisive in necessitating the existence of something: “Th e 
will of [God] is the perfect cause (al-sabab al-kāmil). With its existence there 
is no impediment, and with its nonexistence there is no entailing factor.” 
With these metaphysical bases in place, the shaykh explains that all good 
comes from God and that no good comes from the soul.109
Ibn Taymiyya then identifi es two kinds of evil: the nonexistent and the 
existent.110 He explains that a nonexistent evil may be the nonexistence of an 
essence, the privation of an attribute of perfection such as life, knowledge, 
speech and the like, or a lack of good deeds such as loving and turning to God. 
Th e existence of such things is good, and their privation is evil. However, 
this privation has no agent or creator. Th us, it is not attributed to God but 
to the soul as a concomitant of the way God created it. In other words, evil, 
imperfection and privation are essential elements of human nature:
[Th is privation] is only from the necessary concomitants of the soul, which is 
the reality of the human being, before it is created and aft er it has been cre-
ated. Before it is created, it is nonexistent, which makes this privation follow 
necessarily. Aft er it has been created—it having been created weak and imper-
fect—there is imperfection, weakness and impotence in it, and these things 
are nonexistent. Th ey have been attributed to the soul as the attribution of the 
nonexistence of the eff ect to the nonexistence of its cause.111
Following this, Ibn Taymiyya again notes that the nonexistence of something 
may be due either to the lack of its agent or to an impediment, and, as 
before, he mentions that no impediment can impede God’s will. However, 
he adds that God may create one thing to be a secondary cause (sabab), 
another thing an entailing factor, and yet another thing an impediment. 
In this case, the impediment impedes the cause until God makes the cause 
complete (tāmm). With this in view, the shaykh explains, “Th ese nonexistent 
evil deeds are only attributed to the servant, sometimes due to the lack of a 
cause from him, and at other times due to the existence of an impediment 
from him.” Th e lack of a cause consists in servants having no strength and 
good in themselves. Impediments include impotence and preoccupation 
with deeds that logically preclude other better deeds.112
109 Fāti!ha, MF 14:15–7 (quote on 17).
110 Fāti!ha, MF 14:18–24.
111 Fāti!ha, MF 14:18.
112 Fāti!ha, MF 14:19–20 (quote on 19).
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Some discussion of the second kind of evil in Fāti!ha—existent evil—has 
already been given earlier in this chapter. Th is evil is not absolute, and, from 
God’s perspective, it is wholly good by virtue of God’s wise purpose. Follow-
ing the three-fold evil attribution typology, however, it is also attributed to 
its secondary cause, and, “Th e secondary cause of this existent, particular, 
restricted evil is either nonexistent or existent.”113 As examples of the non-
existent type of secondary cause, Ibn Taymiyya notes the lack of a condi-
tion or the lack of part of a cause. Th is is as when a cause of pleasure and 
good is fully present, but the condition is lacking, which causes pain. More 
concretely, the lack of hearing causes the pain of deafness; the lack of health 
causes pain and illness; and so on. Th e shaykh clarifi es furthermore that the 
servant commits forbidden acts and suff ers their harm only out of ignorance 
and need which arise out of nonexistence, specifi cally, the nonexistence of 
knowledge and the nonexistence of suffi  ciency ( ghinā), respectively. As 
examples of existent secondary causes of existent evil, Ibn Taymiyya cites 
commission of forbidden deeds leading to punishment and blame, eating 
harmful foods and forceful movements inducing pain. Th ese existents are 
imperfect because they do not cause pure good, and the shaykh traces them 
back to other lacks such as the lack of complete examination and listening, 
which themselves go back to either pure nonexistence or the impediments 
of pride and envy. Pride results from a vain imagination that arises out of the 
soul’s lack of suffi  ciency in the Real, and envy originates in a lack of the level 
of blessing that would bring the envious on a par with the envied. Similarly, 
murder and adultery occur because someone cannot fulfi ll his need in some 
other way, and the source of this need is nonexistence.114 Th e distinction 
between nonexistent and existent causes of existent evil dissolves in the 
fi nal analysis to nonexistence because the existent causes of evil are always 
imperfect, and imperfection itself is rooted in nonexistence.
Ibn Taymiyya elaborates further in Fāti!ha that pure nonexistence cannot 
cause existence and that existence is not a cause of nonexistence because 
nonexistence does not need an existent cause. He again notes that pure 
existence is completely good, and he then divides evil into pain on the one 
hand and causes of pain on the other. As an example of a cause of pain, he 
notes evil deeds leading to chastisement. Pain results from a privation, as 
in the separation of something that should be connected. Sins that cause 
pain arise initially from not meeting obligations, which opens the door to 
113 Fāti!ha, MF 14:22.
114 Fāti!ha, MF 14:23–4.
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committing forbidden acts. Th e shaykh ends the section on evil in Fāti!ha by 
explaining that human beings should seek refuge in God from both the evil 
deeds they commit and the pain and punishment that these deeds bring.115 
In the remainder of the treatise, he expands on the human need for God to 
be the object of his worship Whom he loves for His essence and on the need 
to rely totally on the God from Whom all blessing and help come.116
Conclusion
In the evil attribution typology presented at the beginning of this chapter, 
Ibn Taymiyya identifi es three ways of speaking about evil. Reviewing these in 
reverse order, the third type consists in eliding the agent of evil, presumably 
God, and giving the respective verb in the passive voice. Th is is a rhetorical 
courtesy, which the shaykh does not elaborate further except to cite a few 
examples from the Qur±an. Th e second type diverts attention from the Cre-
ator and attributes evil solely to its secondary cause, that is, to the creature 
that commits it. Th e fi rst type attributes evil to the generality of what God 
creates. Th is type is interpreted along Avicennan lines in three ways: evil is a 
necessary concomitant of God’s creative activity; evil is harmful only relative 
to particular persons but wholly good by virtue of God’s wise purpose in 
creating it; and evil is minuscule compared to the great quantity of good.
Ibn Taymiyya is oft en reticent to speculate on the specifi cs of God’s wise 
purposes in the creation of evil, and he sometimes notes that it is suffi  cient 
to believe simply that God has a wise purpose in all that He does. In a few 
places, however, and especially in (Hasana, the shaykh explains that evil has 
the educational function of deterring others from bad deeds and the religious 
functions of purifying through testing, expiating sins, providing opportunity 
to earn reward and developing virtues such as repentance, humility and devo-
tion to God. In assigning evil these educational and spiritually nurturing roles, 
the shaykh adopts ideas found also among the Mu≠tazilīs and the Sufi s.
Th e fi rst two types in Ibn Taymiyya’s evil attribution typology formalize a 
dichotomy between the divine and human perspectives. However, the shaykh 
does not explicate this paradoxically in the spirit of Ibn ≠Arabī. Instead, he 
attempts to resolve the attendant rational diffi  culties. His interpretation of 
Q. 4:78–9 in (Hasana provides a prime example of this. Ibn Taymiyya denies 
115 Fāti!ha, MF 14:24–8.
116 Fāti!ha, MF 14:29–36.
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that there is a contradiction in these verses’ claims that all is from God and 
that every evil thing is from the individual person affl  icted. He resolves this 
most fully by locating the ultimate source of evil in the nonexistence or lack 
of the good deeds for which God created human beings. Th is lack cannot be 
attributed to the creative activity of God because a nonexistent has no agent, 
but God punishes people in whom this lack is found by creating evil deeds 
that preoccupy them from doing good deeds. However, there remains the 
question of why some people fall into a lack of good deeds. Here the shaykh 
implicitly acknowledges diffi  culty by switching back to the divine perspective 
and explaining that God chooses to employ some, but not others, in good 
deeds according to His mercy and wise purpose, just as He creates some to 
be stronger than others. Despite Ibn Taymiyya’s denial of contradiction in 
Q. 4:78–9, his interpretation does not eliminate the contradiction in his 
doctrine between retribution on the one hand and God’s mercy and wise 
purpose on the other.
A similar problem arises in Ibn Taymiyya’s discussion of the basis for 
reward in (Hasana. At some points, he grounds reward retributively in good 
deeds, but, at other points, he shift s this ground to God’s unmerited grace in 
creating only blessings and good deeds. He then argues that God is the sole 
source of good and therefore the only worthy object of trust and worship. 
Th e same ideas are articulated more philosophically in Fāti!ha. Th e upshot is 
that piety and probably the concomitant injunction to give God the highest 
similitude nudge Ibn Taymiyya gently but fi rmly away from a retributive 
conception of good deeds. As a result, he limits retribution to evil deeds 
and grounds good deeds solely in God’s grace and blessing. Perhaps as well 
the shaykh is simply working out the inherent logic of optimism.
CHAPTER SIX
THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE BEST OF ALL 
POSSIBLE WORLDS
Introduction
Th e question of God’s justice in rewarding and punishing humanity permeates 
the texts analyzed in the previous three chapters even though ≠adl, the Arabic 
term translated “justice,” appears infrequently. However, Ibn Taymiyya does 
comment explicitly on the meaning of ≠adl and its opposite )zulm (injustice) 
in a number of places, especially in Minhāj, Abū Dharr and ≠Ādil.1 In these 
discussions of justice, Ibn Taymiyya maintains that all Muslims and people 
of other faiths agree that God is just and exonerated of injustice, but he 
notes that people have diff erent understandings of these terms.2 He identifi es 
three basic types of interpretation, which will be surveyed in the fi rst part 
of this chapter. Th e fi rst type is the Mu≠tazilī conception of God’s justice as 
retributive. Th e second is the voluntaristic, Ash≠arī notion of God’s justice. 
Th e third type, Ibn Taymiyya’s own position, defi nes God’s justice as putting 
things in their proper places. Th e shaykh also devotes considerable attention 
in his justice discussions to the question of whether optimism endangers 
God’s power and freedom. Th is will be taken up in the latter part of the 
chapter which also assesses the shaykh’s few comments on al-Ghazālī’s claim 
that there is nothing in possibility more wonderful than this world. In what 
is probably the latest of these comments, Ibn Taymiyya affi  rms that this is 
the best of all possible worlds.
1 The main passages are ≠Ādil, JR 121–6, 126–130; Minhāj, 1:134–141/1:33–4, 
1:451–4/1:125–6, 2:304–313/214–5, 3:20–3/267–8; Jabr, MF 8:505–510; Abū Dharr, 
MF 18:137–156; and Nubuwwāt, 143–7.
2 ≠Ādil, JR 121, 125; Minhāj, 1:133–4/1:32–3, 3:151/2:27; and Jabr, MF 8:505. Cf. 
Minhāj, 1:134/1:33, 1:453/1:125, where Ibn Taymiyya also says that no Sunnī Muslim states 
that God does bad or fails to keep obligations.
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Ibn Taymiyya’s Th ree-fold Typology on God’s Justice (≠adl)
Ibn Taymiyya’s discussions of the three basic types or ways of understanding 
God’s justice in the Islamic tradition vary widely in completeness and length. 
At times, the shaykh focuses more on polemic against the Mu≠tazilīs or the 
Ash≠arīs. At other times, he devotes more attention to explaining his own 
view. Th ere is no one passage that suffi  ciently comprehends what is found 
in the others to serve as a basis for exposition. However, the views presented 
in the various texts are consistent, and this justifi es a composite account for 
the sake of avoiding excessive repetition.
Mu≠tazilīs: God’s Obligation to Retributive Justice
Under the rubric of his fi rst type, Ibn Taymiyya does not typically mention 
names of individual Mu≠tazilīs, and he frequently calls them simply Qadarīs.3 
However, he does speak in Minhāj of the “moderns (muta±akhkhirūn) of the 
Imāmīs” who follow the Mu≠tazilīs in theology.4 Th is appellation is aimed 
chiefl y at Twelver Shī≠ī al-(Hillī, who wrote the anti-Sunnī tract that Minhāj 
refutes.
Th e shaykh also reviews basic elements of the Mu≠tazilī theodicy. God’s 
justice is retributive in the sense that God metes out reward and punishment 
in due proportion for good and bad deeds, respectively. According to the 
shaykh, the Mu≠tazilī God does not will or create human acts of disobedience, 
iniquity and unbelief. Instead, humans create their own acts, and so God 
is just to punish those who disobey His command.5 If God were to create 
injustice directly in humans, He would be unjust to punish it, and if God 
were to chastise sins that He created, that would be unjust and undeserved 
harm.6 Moreover, Ibn Taymiyya reports, the Mu≠tazilī God must provide 
all possible help to His servants to carry out His commands, and He must 
help everyone equally.7 If God singled out one person over another for His 
mercy and bounty ( fa #dl ), that would be unjust.8 Th e shaykh also mentions 
the Mu≠tazilī view that God must do what is best (a$sla !h) for His servants, at 
3 Exceptions include Ibn Taymiyya’s mention of the early Mu≠tazilī al-Na)z)zām in ≠Ādil, JR 
129, and al-Jubbā±ī in the story of the three brothers quoted below.
4 Minhāj, 1:134/1:33.
5 ≠Ādil, JR 123.
6 Abū Dharr, MF 18:138, 152; and ≠Ādil, JR 127. See also Abū Dharr, MF 18:145, for 
the defi nition of injustice as undeserved harm (i#drār ghayr musta !hiqq).
7 Abū Dharr, MF 18:138.
8 Irāda, MF 8:92.
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least in matters of religion (Ba$sran Mu≠tazilīs), or in worldly matters as well 
(Baghdādī Mu≠tazilīs),9 and he cites the Mu≠tazilī doctrine that God’s reason 
for creating human beings was to benefi t them and subject them to the pos-
sibility of earning reward.10 Th e main Mu≠tazilī doctrine that Ibn Taymiyya 
fails to highlight is their doctrine that God must provide compensations 
(≠iwa#d ) to all creatures who suff er unjustly.11
Ibn Taymiyya rejects the Mu≠tazilī free-will theodicy outright because it 
posits humans creating their own acts.12 Also, drawing on arguments devel-
oped by the Ash≠arī tradition, he takes the Mu≠tazilīs to task for insisting that 
God adhere to human standards of retribution and even for turning God into 
a fool. As the shaykh sees it, the trouble begins when the Mu≠tazilīs ground 
God’s justice in the rational discernment of moral value. Th ey maintain that 
reason knows acts to be objectively good or bad by virtue of attributes inher-
ent in the acts, and then they argue that God must be exonerated of acts 
that reason deems bad. Ibn Taymiyya counters that reason does not dictate 
that creatures and the Creator are subject to identical standards of good 
and bad.13 He accuses the Mu≠tazilīs of likening (tamthīl ) and assimilating 
(tashbīh) God’s acts to human acts and drawing an analogy from human acts 
to God’s acts. In eff ect, he claims, the Mu≠tazilīs set down a law for God, 
obligating Him to adhere to human standards of justice and forbidding 
Him from human notions of injustice, which, according to Ibn Taymiyya, 
violates God’s complete unlikeness.14 He explains that the Mu≠tazilīs and 
like-minded Shī≠īs, such as al-(Hillī, apply their “law” polemically to the God 
of the Ash≠arīs, Who is by defi nition outside the sphere of human morality. 
Th e Ash≠arī God does not meet the Mu≠tazilī standard of justice, and so, the 
Mu≠tazilīs conclude, this God commits bad deeds and fails to fulfi ll obliga-
tions.15 Ibn Taymiyya complains that the Mu≠tazilīs “propounded similitudes 
(amthāl ) for God but did not give Him the highest similitude.”16 It is not 
 9 Minhāj, 3:198/2:39; and Irāda, MF 8:92.
10 ≠Ādil, JR 128; Jabr, MF 8:506; and Minhāj, 3:152–3/2:27–8.
11 For compensation in the thought of ≠Abd al-Jabbār, see Heemskerk, Suffering in 
Mu≠tazilite Th eology, 142–191. Cf. Schmidtke, Th eology, 117–124.
12 Abū Dharr, MF 18:138, 148; and ≠Ādil, JR 129.
13 Abū Dharr, MF 18:147.
14 Minhāj, 1:447–8/1:124, 3:39–40/1:272, 3:153/2:28; Jabr, MF 8:505–6; Abū Dharr, 
MF 18:138, 147; Ta!hsīn al-≠aql, MF 8:431–2; and ≠Ādil, JR 128. For ≠Abd al-Jabbār’s univocal 
use of analogy from the visible world to the invisible world (qiyās al-ghā±ib ≠alā al-shāhid ) 
in God’s acts, see Daniel Gimaret, Th éories de l’acte humain en théologie musulmane, 281–3; 
and Heemskerk, Suff ering in Mu≠tazilite Th eology, 112–3.
15 Minhāj, 1:453–4/1:125–6.
16 Abū Dharr, MF 18:138.
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just a matter of the Mu≠tazilīs likening God to creatures. It is also that when 
they do they arrive at an inadequate view of God.
To explain further how he believes analogy and assimilation fail the 
Mu≠tazilīs, Ibn Taymiyya juxtaposes the Muslim obligation to command the 
right and forbid the wrong with the Mu≠tazilī view of libertarian freedom.17 
In Jabr he gives the following argument: If someone were able to stop oth-
ers from being unjust to one another but did not prevent them, he himself 
would be unjust. Implied here is that God should stop injustice if indeed 
He is subject to human standards. In reply the Mu≠tazilīs assert that God 
gives humans free choice and provides opportunity for reward if they obey 
and punishment if they do not. If God were to force someone not to do 
something, the opportunity for reward provided by obligation would fall 
away. Ibn Taymiyya responds that most people would reply that someone 
who acts like this—knowing full well that his servants will not obey his 
command—is neither wise nor just. Such behavior would be praiseworthy 
only in someone who did not know what was going to happen or could 
not prevent it. God however is all-powerful and knows future events, and 
someone who can prevent injustice must do so by force (iljā±).18 Ibn Taymi-
yya mocks the Mu≠tazilīs in Minhaj for implying that God creates power in 
humans by which they can lie and commit iniquity and injustice, knowing 
full well that they will commit such acts. Th is implies even that God helps 
them to commit these deeds. Th e shaykh compares this to one person giving 
another a sword to fi ght unbelievers knowing full well that he will misuse it 
to kill a prophet. Th e shaykh says that this is foolish on the human level and 
that God as well is exonerated of this. He adds that God’s acts are judged 
diff erently from ours and that He has a wise purpose in what He creates.19
In Minhāj Ibn Taymiyya cites the famous Ash≠arī story of the three broth-
ers to show that the Mu≠tazilī doctrine of the best (a$sla !h) falls into contra-
diction because it is based on assimilation of God to creatures. Rosalind 
Gwynne has shown that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī was probably the fi rst to link 
this story to al-Ash≠arī’s break with his Mu≠tazilī master Abū ≠Alī al-Jubbā±ī 
17 For an extensive discussion of this obligation in the Islamic tradition, see Michael Cook, 
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Th ought (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000).
18 Jabr, MF 8:506.
19 Minhāj, 3:220–1/2:44. For additional arguments of this sort, see Minhāj, 3:151–3/2:27–8: 
it would be foolish for a man to give his son money if he knew the son was going to use it to 
buy poison to eat; and ≠Ādil, JR 128: it would be unjust for a master to let his slaves commit 
injustice if he could stop it. Cf. Minhāj, 2:312–3/1:215.
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(d. 303/916).20 Be that as it may, Ibn Taymiyya simply accepts the account 
as historical:
[Al-Ash≠arī] said to [al-Jubbā±ī]: When God created three brothers, one of them 
died young, and the other two reached the age of accountability. One of the 
[latter] two believed, and the other disbelieved. [God] brought the believer 
into Paradise and raised his rank. He brought the young one into Paradise 
and made his level below [the other brother]. Th e young one said to Him, “O 
Lord! Raise me to the rank of my brother.” He said, “You are not like him. 
He believed and committed righteous deeds. You are young, and you did not 
commit the deeds he did.” He said, “O Lord! You made me die. If you had 
kept me [alive], I would have done the like of his deeds.” He said, “I did what 
was to your benefi t (ma$sla!ha) because I knew that if you had reached the age 
of accountability you would have disbelieved. Th erefore, I carried you away to 
death.” Th en, the third [brother] cried out from the depths of the Fire, and he 
said, “O Lord! Why did you not carry me away to death before reaching the 
age of accountability as you carried my young brother away to death? For this 
would have been of benefi t to me also.” It is said that when this was brought 
against [al-Jubbā±ī], he stopped. Th is is because [the Mu≠tazilīs] obligate Him 
to be just between two likes and to do what is best (a$sla!h) to each one of them. 
Here, He did what was best, according to them, to one of the two but not to 
the other. Th is is not the place to elaborate on this. If the matter is like this, 
their assimilation of God to His creatures is vain.21
In addition to showing the absurdity to which he believes the Mu≠tazilī sense 
of God’s rigorous fairness leads, Ibn Taymiyya in Minhāj also explains his 
own view that God is not unjust to single out some for special blessings over 
others. God bestows the special grace of guidance upon some people so that 
they believe while upon others He does not. Likewise, He gives some more 
knowledge, health, strength and beauty than others. To support his point, 
the shaykh quotes the quranic verse: “Is it they who divide out the mercy of 
your Lord? It is We who divide out between them their livelihood in this 
world, and We have raised some of them above others in ranks so that some 
may take others into subjection” (Q. 32:43).22
In Minhāj the shaykh also argues that an odious consequence of al-(Hillī’s 
Mu≠tazilism is that God cannot be thanked because He is doing no more 
than fulfi lling His obligations. Th is argument rests on the presupposition that 
gratitude is due only for blessings that exceed obligations. God, in al-(Hillī’s 
20 Rosalind W. Gwynne, “Al-Jubbā±ī, al-Ash≠arī and the Th ree Brothers: Th e Uses of Fic-




view, is obligated to provide both worldly and religious blessings.23 Moreover, 
God cannot make someone a believer, and, so, He cannot be thanked for 
that either. God’s blessings in the hereaft er consist in obligatory recompense 
just as an employer must pay an employee his wage or a debtor must pay 
off  his debt. Th us, all is obligation for God, and He is not worthy of thanks 
for anything. Additionally, Ibn Taymiyya reads al- (Hillī to say that humans 
are not worthy of praise, thanks or blame if God makes them do good or 
evil. Conversely, one cannot say that God is blessing or testing when human 
authorities act justly or unjustly, respectively, because God is not control-
ling their actions. Th is, the shaykh argues, undermines the proper attitude 
of thankfulness both to God and to other people that befi ts believers in all 
circumstances. Rather, the shaykh asserts, human beings have been naturally 
constituted to praise someone who does good and to blame one who does 
evil even if these acts are determined and created by God. God makes one 
person deserving of praise and reward and another deserving of punishment 
and blame according to His wise purpose.24
In sum Ibn Taymiyya is unsympathetic to the sober Mu≠tazilī free-will 
theodicy in which God treats human beings with rigorous equality as they 
freely choose their response to God’s command and earn their just deserts. 
He attacks the Mu≠tazilīs both for obligating God to act according to a 
retributive ethic and for misconceiving the divine economy in such a way 
that makes God look foolish and undermines thankfulness to Him.25
Ash≠arīs: God’s Voluntaristic Justice
In the second of Ibn Taymiyya’s three types, God’s justice is voluntaristic. 
Whatever God wills is just by virtue of the fact that it is God who wills it. 
Ibn Taymiyya attributes this view to the Jahmīs, the followers of Jahm b. 
!Safwān, al-Ash≠arī and the Ash≠arīs including al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī, 
the (Hanbalīs Abū Ya≠lā, Ibn al-Zāghūnī and Ibn al-Jawzī, the Mālikī Abū 
al-Walīd al-Bājī (d. 474/1081), and other members of all four of the Sunnī 
schools of law.26 He also attributes it to the “moderns (muta±akhkhirūn) of 
the Jahmīs”27 and “the moderns among the Kalām theologians who establish 
23 On this view in al- (Hillī’s thought, see Schmidtke, Th eology, 109–115.
24 Minhāj, 3:131–7/2:22–4.
25 Most of the arguments above may be found in Ash≠arī Kalām handbooks. See for example 
al-Shahrastānī, Kitāb nihāyatu, 397–411 (Arabic), 126–131 (English).
26 Minhāj, 3:20/1:267; and ≠Ādil, JR 122–3, 127.
27 Jabr, MF 8:506.
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determination,” both of which probably refer to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and 
possibly al-Āmidī.28
In the Ash≠arī view, according to the shaykh, injustice is inherently impos-
sible for God in the same way that it is impossible to combine two contra-
dictories or put one body in two places at once. God would be just to do 
anything imaginable whose existence is possible, and He is not under external 
obligation of any kind. God would not be unjust to chastise the obedient 
or reward the disobedient. He may punish the children of unbelievers and 
the insane even if they have not sinned. He would not be unjust to punish 
someone even for his color or height. Ibn Taymiyya cites two Ash≠arī argu-
ments for this doctrine. First, injustice means acting freely in someone else’s 
property. Since everything is God’s property, it is by defi nition impossible for 
Him to be unjust. Second, injustice means opposing a command that must 
be obeyed. Since God is not subject to the command of any other, injustice 
cannot be ascribed to God.29
With respect to the fi rst argument, Ibn Taymiyya rejects defi ning justice 
as freely acting in someone else’s property. He counters, “A human being 
may rightly act freely in the property of another and not be unjust, and 
he may wrongly act freely in his [own] property and be unjust. Injustice 
of the servant against himself is frequent in the Qur±an.”30 Th e shaykh also 
traces the Ash≠arī defi nition of injustice to an alleged misunderstanding. 
He observes that Iyās b. Mu≠āwiyya (d. 122/740) is reported to have said, 
“I have not disputed with anyone with my whole mind except the Qadarīs. 
I said to them, ‘What is injustice?’ Th ey said, ‘Th at you take what is not 
yours’, or ‘Th at you act freely in what is not yours’. I said, ‘To God belongs 
everything’.”31 Iyās, the shaykh explains, did not intend to defi ne God’s 
justice. He sought only to show that the Qadarīs were wrong and to avoid 
going into further details.32
With respect to the second argument, which is based on the premise that 
God is not subject to commands, Ibn Taymiyya counters that God has in 
fact subjected Himself to His own writing and forbidding: “God—Glory be 
28 Abū Dharr, MF 18:138.
29 Minhāj, 1:134/1:33, 1:452/1:125, 2:305–6/1:214–5, 3:20–2/1:267–8, 3:40/1:272; 
≠Ādil, JR 121, 125, 127; Jabr, MF 8:506–7; Abū Dharr, MF 18:139, 152; and Nubuwwāt, 
143–5.
30 Abū Dharr, MF 18:145.
31 Th e version of this dictum translated here is that found in Abū Dharr, MF 18:139. 
It is also found with slight variations in Minhāj, 1:304–5/1:214, 3:22/1:268, and in ≠Ādil, 
JR 122.
32 Abū Dharr, MF 18:139–140.
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to Him—has written mercy for Himself and forbidden injustice to Himself. 
He does not act in opposition to what He has written, and He does not do 
what He has forbidden.”33 All well and good, but the God of Ash≠arism may 
not necessarily be as capricious as Ibn Taymiyya makes Him out to be. Th e 
shaykh also reports the Ash≠arī view that God will not do everything that 
is permissible for Him because God has said that He will not and because 
this information corresponds to His knowledge of what He will and will not 
do. God will not in fact punish children without sin and bring unbelievers 
into Paradise even though it would not be unjust of Him to do so. God will 
keep His promises given in revelation.34
Ibn Taymiyya does not always explain why he fi nds this Ash≠arī qualifi ca-
tion inadequate to guarantee God’s reliability.35 In Nubuwwāt, however, he 
argues that a God who has arbitrary choice in possibility, if not in actuality, 
cannot be known to be reliable in the information that He gives. He retorts 
that the Ash≠arīs allow that God could send anyone with whatever message 
He wills, even someone who commits grave sins.36 Ibn Taymiyya then turns 
the Ash≠arīs’ denial of God’s purposive activity against them to undermine 
their foundations for prophetic reliability. He cites al-Ash≠arī, al-Bāqillānī, 
Ibn Fūrak and the (Hanbalī Abū Ya≠lā as arguing that a God who is powerful 
must confi rm the truthfulness of His prophets and that this can be done only 
through miracles. Th e shaykh says that this contradicts the Ash≠arī conten-
tion that God may do whatever He wills. Moreover, God cannot establish 
a miracle as a sign of the truthfulness of a messenger if He does not do one 
thing on account of another, that is, if He does not act for purposes. Ibn 
Taymiyya reports as well that al-Juwaynī adopted a diff erent strategy, claiming 
that knowledge of the truthfulness of prophets to whom God gives a miracle 
is necessary. Th e shaykh replies that this argument works only if it is known 
33 Abū Dharr, MF 18:145.
34 Abū Dharr, MF 18:148; Nubuwwāt, 143; and Minhāj, 1:451–2/1:125. Th e basics 
of this view are found in al-Ash≠arī’s Kitāb al-luma≠. In response to the question, “Is it for 
God—Exalted is He—to infl ict pain on children in the hereaft er?” al-Ash≠arī writes, “It is 
for God [to do] that, and He would be just if He did that. Similarly, whenever He infl icts 
an infi nite punishment for a fi nite crime, subjects some living beings to others, blesses some 
apart from others, and creates them knowing that they will disbelieve, all of this is justice on 
His part. It would not be bad on the part of God if He were to bring them forth in painful 
chastisement and make it perpetual. It would not be bad on His part to chastise the believers 
and bring the unbelievers into Paradise. We only say that He will not do that because He has 
informed us that He will punish the unbelievers, and it is not permissible for Him to lie in 
His informing.” Th is translation has been adapted from that of McCarthy in Th e Th eology 
of al-Ash≠arī, 71 (Arabic) and 169 (trans.).
35 As in Abū Dharr, MF 18:148; and Minhāj, 1:451–2/1:125.
36 Nubuwwāt, 145–6.
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that God is one who does things for wise purposes. Otherwise, there is no 
way of knowing that God has done something to indicate something else. 
It must be known necessarily that God does things for wise purposes before 
one can recognize necessarily that God confi rms His messengers through 
miracles.37 In Nubuwwāt Ibn Taymiyya himself establishes the reliability of 
prophets on the basis of necessary knowledge that God acts for wise pur-
poses. God’s wise purpose, justice and mercy are known by reason.38 Rational 
proof of God’s wise purpose is found in the dazzling divine wisdom that is 
evident in all created things, as for example in the perfect placement of the 
body parts.39 God must act according to His wise purpose, and, “His wise 
purpose necessitates that He make the truthfulness of the prophets obvious 
and support them.”40
In short Ibn Taymiyya’s critique of the Ash≠arīs’ view of justice reduces to 
upbraiding them for denying that God’s justice entails some kind of rational-
ity. A capricious God who could so radically violate the order of retribution 
as to punish believers for their belief or make liars into prophets and still be 
called just cannot by His very nature establish a relationship with humankind 
based on promise and trust.
Much as was observed when discussing Shams in Chapter Th ree, Ibn 
Taymiyya’s polemic here against the Mu≠tazilīs and the Ash≠arīs appears con-
tradictory. On the one hand, he attacks the Mu≠tazilīs for applying analogical 
reasoning to God and assimilating God to creatures. On the other, he appears 
to fall into this very error when criticizing both the Mu≠tazilīs for making 
God foolish and the Ash≠arīs for rendering God capricious. Unfortunately, 
Ibn Taymiyya does not elaborate his theological principles adequately enough 
37 Nubuwwāt, 148–9, 361–2, 371–3.
38 Nubuwwāt, 349–353, 361.
39 Nubuwwāt, 356–7.
40 Nubuwwāt, 349. For this point, see also (Hasana, MF 14:271; and Minhāj, 3:91–9/2:12–
4, 3:226–8/2:46. In Minhāj, 3:97/2:12, Ibn Taymiyya adds that it would be an attribute 
of imperfection for God to confi rm a liar. For more on Ash≠arī diffi  culties in prophecy, 
see Gardet, Dieu et la destinée de l’homme, 200–1. Also, Ibn Taymiyya, Nubuwwāt, 364–5, 
notes that al-Ghazālī saw the diffi  culties in traditional Ash≠arī views and turned to the view 
of the philosophers that prophecy is a genus of dreams (manāmāt), and he reports that 
al-Rāzī vacillates concerning prophecy between the Ash≠arīs and the philosophers. Ceylan, 
Th eology and Tafsīr, 167–172, also recounts al-Rāzī’s diffi  culties on prophecy. Frank Griff el, 
“Al-Ġazālī’s Concept of Prophecy: Th e Introduction of Avicennan Psychology Into Aš≠arite 
Th eology,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004): 101–144, explains that al-Ghazālī and 
al-Rāzī recognize diffi  culties in the early Ash≠arī view that miracles authenticate prophets and 
so ground evaluation of prophetic claims psychologically in necessary knowledge of what 
constitutes prophetic truthfulness. See now Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, 129–142, for a more 
comprehensive discussion of al-Rāzī’s thought on the authentication of prophetic claims.
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in his justice texts to make full sense of his argumentation, but the contra-
diction may be resolved by reference to his juristic methodology pertaining 
to theological matters surveyed in Chapter One. On the one hand, as will 
also become clear below, God must be envisioned according to the highest 
humanly imaginable perfection on both rational and quranic grounds. On 
the other, God’s perfection requires that He be wholly unlike creatures and 
subject to no analogy. Th us, the shaykh’s discourse on God’s justice does 
not purport to inform about its modality but simply how to speak of God’s 
justice with the highest praise.
Ibn Taymiyya: God’s Justice as Putting Th ings in their Places
Th e third type in Ibn Taymiyya’s justice typology sets out his own view, and 
here his optimism becomes readily apparent. He sometimes begins by defi ning 
injustice rather than justice. Injustice ()zulm) is putting something in other 
than its place. He sometimes traces this defi nition to the linguist Abū Bakr 
b. al-Anbārī (328/940), and he attributes this view to “many of the Sunnīs, 
hadith scholars and people of rational thought (ahl al-nu )zār).”41 Beyond 
this, he gives no names, but justice defi ned as putting things in their places 
is common in the tradition. Al-Ghazālī, for example, defi nes justice in this 
fashion when outlining the wise placement of the body parts as a sign of 
the orderliness of God’s creation in al-Maq$sad al-asnā.42 For al-Māturīdī as 
well, justice is putting a thing in its place, and al-Shahrastānī says that this 
is orthodox doctrine.43
Ibn Taymiyya does not clearly defi ne what it means to put things in their 
places. In a context beyond his justice typologies, he characterizes God’s 
justice as “benefi cence (i!hsān) to His creatures.”44 Th is gives no specifi c con-
tent to God’s justice except to identify it with God’s goodness. In his justice 
typologies, however, he oft en gives justice connotations of retribution. Fol-
lowing is one of his more extended defi nitions, which comes from ≠Ādil:
41 Jabr, MF 8:507. Cf. Minhāj, 1:139/1:34; and Abū Dharr, MF 18:145. For the connec-
tion to Ibn al-Anbārī, see ≠Ādil, JR 124, 129.
42 Al-Ghazālī, Al-Maq $sad al-asnā fī shar !h ma≠ānī asmā± Allāh al- !husnā, ed. Fadlou A. 
Shehadi (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1982), 105–9 (on God’s name al-≠Adl). See Frank, Creation 
and the Cosmic System, 64–6, for further analysis of al-Ghazālī on God’s justice.
43 Pessagno, “Th e uses of Evil in Maturidian Th ought,” 68–9; Abū Man$sūr al-Māturīdī, 
Kitāb al-taw !hīd, ed. Fat !h Allāh Khulayf (Alexandria: Dār al-jāmi≠āt al-mi $sriyya, n.d.), 97; 
Al-Shahrastānī, Al-Milal wa al-ni!hal, 37.
44 Qudra, MF 8:31.
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Injustice is putting something in other than its place (wa#d ≠ al-shay± fī ghayr 
maw#di ≠ihi). Justice is putting everything in its place. He—Glory be to Him—is 
a wise arbiter and just, putting things in their places. He does not put any-
thing except in its place, which corresponds to it and which wise purpose and 
justice require. He does not diff erentiate between two likes, and He does not 
equate two diff erent things. He punishes only whoever deserves punishment 
and puts [the punishment] in its place on account of the wise purpose and 
justice in that. As for the people of righteousness and piety (taqwā), He does 
not punish them at all.45
Apart from the tautology of defi ning “justice” as putting something in its 
place as “wise purpose and justice require,” the text carries an appeal to an 
intuitive sense of retribution. Elsewhere, the shaykh claims that it is known 
by the natural constitution that it is not permissible for God in His justice, 
wisdom and mercy to punish those who do good works and raise the iniqui-
tous to the highest rank.46 Similarly, he quotes, “Whoever does deeds of righ-
teousness and is a believer will not fear injustice or curtailment (ha #dman)” 
(Q. 20:112), and he explains that “curtailment” is reducing one’s good deeds, 
and “injustice” is making one responsible for the evil deeds of another. Only 
those who sin will be punished in the hereaft er even though God may also 
pardon some.47 Other verses he quotes along these lines include: “Indeed, 
God is not unjust to so much as the weight of an ant” (Q. 4:40); “Th at no 
one burdened bear the burden of another, and that the human has only that 
for which he has made an eff ort” (Q. 53:38–9); and, “Whoever does good 
equal to the weight of a small ant will see it, and whoever does evil equal 
to the weight of a small ant will see it” (Q. 99:7–8).48 Th ese last two verses 
suggest a rigorous standard of retribution. However, Ibn Taymiyya adds that 
God is also merciful to many people without regard to their deeds and that 
profi t may accrue to a person from God’s grace and mercy as well as from 
the invocation and deeds of others.49
Th e upshot of these comments is that justice for Ibn Taymiyya means 
putting reward and punishment in their proper places, where the “place” 
of something is not clearly defi ned. For the most part, however, it appears 
45 ≠Ādil, JR 123–4.
46 Nubuwwāt, 145. Cf. ≠Ādil, JR 125, 128; and Minhāj, 1:139/1:34. Ibn Taymiyya, 
Nubuwwāt, 42–3, also explains that God grants recompense in this world in accord with 
wise purpose and benefi t and that God punishes each disobedient people according to His 
wise purpose and what is fi tting for them.
47 Jabr, MF 8:507; Abū Dharr, MF 18:141–4, 146; and Nubuwwāt, 144.
48 ≠Ādil, JR 126; Jabr, MF 8:507; Abū Dharr, 18:142; and Minhāj, 1:135–8/1:33–4. Th ese 
references include additional quranic verses of this kind.
49 ≠Ādil, JR 126; and Abū Dharr, 18:142–3.
222 chapter six
that the wicked are punished while the righteous are not. Yet, retribution is 
not absolute and some other rationality—that of God’s mercy—sometimes 
comes into play such that punishment for bad deeds does not always ensue. 
Even though Ibn Taymiyya does not specify the rationality to which God’s 
justice conforms, he optimistically believes that human beings will recognize 
it when they see it.
Now in view of Ibn Taymiyya’s conviction that God creates all things, it 
might be asked how some people become fi tting places for punishment. How 
is it that human beings end up in the quandary of needing to be punished? 
Th e shaykh’s justice passages generally do not broach this question, but he 
does attribute God’s creation of evil deeds to an unspecifi ed divine wise 
purpose in ≠Ādil. ≠Ādil opens with two consecutive versions of his justice 
typology and then shift s to a defense of God against the charge that He 
commits bad and evil deeds. Th e wordy argument focuses very little on the 
causes of evil, but it extols the goodness of what God does at length. Only 
the central points of this defense will be given here.
To begin, Ibn Taymiyya explains that God makes humans commit evil and 
unjust acts for a wise purpose. He does not explain what this wise purpose 
is but observes instead that this is a matter of God justly putting things in 
their places.50 Th e shaykh supports his point by noting that human artisans 
do the same thing in placing defective raw materials in places properly 
befi tting them:
When the artisan takes a crooked board, a broken stone and an imperfect 
brick, he puts them in a place befi tting them and becoming of them. From 
him this is just, upright and correct. He is praiseworthy even if there is a crook 
and a fault in them by virtue of which they are blameworthy. Whoever takes 
disgusting things (khabā±ith) and puts them in the place that befi ts them, this 
is wise and just. Foolishness and injustice are only that he places them in other 
than their place. Whoever places a turban on the head and sandals on the feet 
has placed each thing in its place. He has not been unjust to the sandals since 
this is their place becoming of them. Th us, He—Glory be to Him—places a 
thing only in its place. Th is is only just, and He does only good. He is only 
benefi cent, liberal and merciful.51
50 ≠Ādil, JR 130.
51 ≠Ādil, JR 130. Ormbsy, Th eodicy, 228, translates an almost identical passage from a 
brief treatise on evil by the Ottoman scholar Ibn Kamāl Pasha (d. 940/1534), “Fī bayān al-
!hikma li-≠adam nisbat al-sharr ilayhi ta≠ālā,” in Rasā±il Ibn Kamāl (Istanbul: Ma $taba≠at Iqdām, 
1316/1898–9), 1:125–130 (passage on 126). In view of the fact that Ibn Taymiyya’s and Ibn 
Kamāl’s texts are otherwise dissimilar, it seems likely that Ibn Kamāl is not dependent on Ibn 
Taymiyya for this passage but that both are dependent on a common earlier source.
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Following this affi  rmation of the justice in everything that God does, Ibn 
Taymiyya states that God in His religious, legislative will has commanded 
what He loves and what is best and most benefi cial and that what God has 
created is better than what He has not created. God creates only good, which 
is defi ned as “that whose existence is better than its nonexistence.”52 God 
does not will and create evil, which is “the existence of everything whose 
nonexistence is better than its existence.”53 Th e shaykh explains that the terms 
good (khayr) and evil (sharr) are used most commonly in their comparative 
senses: “Good is what is better than something else, and evil is what is more 
evil than something else. Good and evil are in degrees (darajāt).”54 He then 
notes that the evil that God creates is good by virtue of God’s wise purpose 
and that its existence in general is better than its nonexistence. Created 
evil is only perceived to be evil when compared to something else, and it is 
harmful only to some people.55
Ibn Taymiyya affi  rms at some length in ≠Ādil that God is just and wise 
in that He chastises and punishes human beings only for the sins that they 
commit. The shaykh explains that God does not recompense, chastise, 
destroy, withdraw blessing and take vengeance except on account of sins and 
evil deeds. He adds, moreover, that the aim of God’s chastisement in some 
cases is to bring about humility and repentance, as in the verse, “Indeed We 
seized them with chastisement, but they did not abase themselves before 
their Lord, and they were not humble” (Q. 23:76).56 Th e shaykh leaves off  
discussion of God’s retribution without addressing the fundamental reasons 
for human disobedience. Instead, he states that his objective is to emphasize 
that God always does what is best: “Th e point here is that the existence of 
everything that the Lord does and creates is better than its nonexistence. It 
also is better than something else, that is, [better] than an existent other than 
it that could be supposed to be existent instead of it.”57 A few lines later in 
≠Ādil, Ibn Taymiyya reaches a climax in his argument:
To the Lord—Exalted is He—is the highest similitude (cf. Q. 16:60). He 
is higher than any other, having a greater right to praise and laudation than 
everything other than Him, most worthy of the attributes of perfection and the 
farthest from the attributes of imperfection. It is impossible that the creature 
52 ≠Ādil, JR 130–1 (quote on 131).
53 ≠Ādil, JR 131.
54 ≠Ādil, JR 133.
55 ≠Ādil, JR 134.
56 ≠Ādil, JR 134–6.
57 ≠Ādil, JR 136.
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be qualifi ed with a perfection in which there is no imperfection. Th e Lord is 
qualifi ed only with the perfection in which there is no imperfection. When 
He commands His servant to do the fi nest (al-a!hsan) and the best (al-khayr), 
it is impossible that He Himself do [anything] but the fi nest and the best. 
Doing the fi nest and the best is praised and is a perfection in which there is 
no imperfection. He has a greater right to praise and perfection in which there 
is no imperfection than any other.58
In this passage, Ibn Taymiyya grounds God’s doing the best both in the 
quranic injunction to ascribe the highest similitude to God and in God’s 
rational a fortiori right to praise and the highest humanly conceivable perfec-
tion. Moreover, he argues, if God commands human beings to do what is 
best, it is impossible that God Himself should do anything less. Th at God 
does what is best does not arise from empirical consideration of the actual 
world; it is instead rooted in a priori convictions—whether scriptural or 
rational—about what the perfection of God entails.
Ibn Taymiyya on God’s Power and al-Ghazālī’s Best of All 
Possible Worlds
A major diffi  culty with Ibn Taymiyya’s optimism, with the conviction that 
God does only what is best, is that it endangers God’s power. Th e necessity 
that God in His perfection and justice create the best possible world easily 
implies that God could not have created any world other than this. While 
not openly admitting the problem, the shaykh does in his various three-fold 
justice typologies expend considerable eff ort defending God’s power and 
freedom to do other than what God does in fact do. To make the point, he 
insists that God has power to commit injustice even if God does not actually 
do so: “[God] has put everything in its place despite His power to do the 
opposite of that. He—Glory be to Him—acts by His free choice and His 
will. He has a right to praise and laudation for being just and not unjust.”59 
Whereas the Ash≠arīs say that injustice is inherently impossible for God, Ibn 
58 ≠Ādil, JR 136. Following these rational arguments, the shaykh also supports his claim 
that God necessarily does what is best with several quranic references, including, “In Your 
hand is the good (khayr). Truly, You are Powerful over everything” (Q. 3:26), “God has sent 
down the best discourse (a!hsan al-!hadīth)” (Q. 39:23), and “Who made good everything He 
created” (Q. 32:7). A little later, he reasserts that it is impossible for the creature to be more 
perfect than the Creator, and thus, “It is necessary that He will by means of [His will] what 
is more worthy, better and preferable” (141).
59 ≠Ādil, JR 129.
 the justice of god and the best of all possible worlds 225
Taymiyya argues that divine injustice is possible (maqdūr and mumkin). God 
could do injustice but chooses not to, and this makes Him praiseworthy 
because praise is due only to one who chooses not to do injustice, not to 
one for whom it is inherently impossible.60
In another strategy to avoid the necessitarianism of optimism and retain 
God’s freedom, Ibn Taymiyya speaks of God’s self-obligation not to commit 
injustice. He bases this on a divine saying in the collection of Muslim, “O My 
servants! I have forbidden injustice to Myself.”61 According to the shaykh, 
this hadith necessarily implies that injustice is possible for God. If God has 
forbidden something to Himself, it must have been possible beforehand. 
Otherwise, the hadith would mean, “I have informed about Myself that 
what is not possible is not from Me.”62 Th is is a useless interpretation in the 
shaykh’s opinion and does not elicit praise.63
Ibn Taymiyya also demonstrates concern to uphold God’s power and 
freedom in three comments on the dictum, “Th ere is nothing in possibility 
more wonderful than what is (laysa fī al-imkān abda≠ mimmā kān).” Th is 
saying goes back to the theosophical “Kitāb al-taw!hīd wa al-tawakkul” of 
al-Ghazālī’s I!hyā± ≠ulūm al-dīn,64 and its evident antecedent is the optimism 
of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of providence. In Th eodicy in Islamic Th ought, Eric 
Ormsby provides a history and analysis of the controversy that ensued from 
this dictum, and a brief look at Ormsby’s study is relevant here in order to 
assess the historical signifi cance of Ibn Taymiyya’s comments.65
After examining the origins of this dictum in al-Ghazālī’s writings, 
Ormsby’s second chapter surveys its various commentators from the time 
of al-Ghazālī down to the thirteenth/nineteenth century. Th e relatively few 
scholars who commented on the dictum up to the mid-eighth/fourteenth 
century usually objected to it on the grounds that, in addition to dabbling 
too much in Sufi sm and philosophy, al-Ghazālī had limited God’s power. In 
this earlier period, the only fi gure that Ormsby cites as approving the saying is 
60 Minhāj, 1:135/1:33; and Abū Dharr, MF 18:146.
61 Muslim, 4674, Al-Birr wa al- $sila wa al-ādāb, Ta!hrīm al- )zulm.
62 Abū Dharr, MF 18:144.
63 Abū Dharr, MF 18:144; Minhāj, 1:135–7/1:33, 1:451–3/1:125; and Jabr, MF 
8:509.
64 In I!hyā± ≠ulūm al-dīn, 4:258, al-Ghazālī writes, “Th ere is nothing in possibility fundamen-
tally better (a!hsan) than [what God divides out], nor more complete, nor more perfect.” In 
Kitāb al-imlā± fī ishkālāt al-I!hyā±, a defense of the I!hyā± ≠ulūm al-dīn, he states, “Th ere is nothing 
in possibility more wonderful (abda≠) than the form of this world, nor better arranged, nor 
more perfectly (akmal ) made” (in Mul!haq al-I!hyā± printed with I!hyā± ≠ulūm al-dīn, 5:13–41, 
at 35). For detailed discussion of these texts, see Ormsby, Th eodicy, 37–81.
65 Itti!hādiyyīn, MF 2:213; Kasb, MF 8:399; and ≠Ādil, JR 142.
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Ibn ≠Arabī. From the mid-eighth/fourteenth century onward, however, there 
was a shift  toward accepting the dictum, and in the ninth/fi ft een century it 
was subjected to major debate.
In the third through fi ft h chapters Ormsby surveys the basic objections 
to al-Ghazālī’s statement—it impinges on God’s power to do anything 
that He might wish; it makes creation a natural necessity (the error of the 
philosophers); and it obligates God to do the best (a$slā !h) (the error of the 
Mu≠tazilīs)—and he explains how al-Ghazālī’s defenders overcame these 
objections. Al-Ghazālī’s defenders argued that even though the world is 
perfect and just at every moment of its existence, it is also contingent. Th ings 
could be other than what they are, but God’s wisdom determines what will 
and will not be. Ormsby points out that the challenge of theodicy “is to assert 
the necessary rightness of things as they are, but to do so in a way that they 
are seen as proceeding from God’s will, wisdom, and power, and not from a 
necessity of His nature.”66 He concludes that necessity fi nally rests in God’s 
wisdom in the theodicy of al-Ghazālī and his defenders.67
Ormsby does not include Ibn Taymiyya as a participant in the above 
debate, and the brevity of the shaykh’s three comments on al-Ghazālī’s 
aphorism indicates that it did not concern him greatly.68 Nonetheless, his 
contribution to the dispute is not insignifi cant. In two of his comments on 
al-Ghazālī’s dictum, Ibn Taymiyya does not refer to al-Ghazālī by name. One 
occurs in a context where he accuses Ibn ≠Arabī of limiting God’s power to 
the power to create only what actually exists. Here, he adds in passing that 
most people deny the dictum, and it is clear that he does so as well.69 Th e 
second comment rejects the dictum as of a piece with the philosophers’ ideas 
that the Creator is necessitating in His essence and that what exists is the 
only thing possible.70 Ibn Taymiyya gives al-Ghazālī’s dictum closer attention 
66 Ormsby, Th eodicy, 264.
67 Ormsby, Th eodicy, 259–264. Ormsby’s analysis focuses on the possibility that God can 
do other than what He does, something that Ibn Taymiyya also affi  rms in his discussions of 
justice. However, al-Ghazālī and his defenders do not appear to understand wisdom in the 
causal and purposive sense of Ibn Taymiyya but rather as God’s eternal knowledge and decree. 
Ormsby does not address this question directly except to note that al-Ghazālī’s detractor al-
Sijilmāsī al-Lama$tī (d. 1156/1743) raises the problem of causality in wisdom only to have it 
dismissed by al-Ghazālī’s later defenders as unworthy of attention (204–7).
68 In passing Ormsby, Th eodicy, 47, mentions with reference to Bell, Love Th eory, 69ff ., 
that Ibn Taymiyya took the Ash≠arīs to task for denying God’s wisdom, but he does not 
examine the shaykh’s critique.
69 Itti!hādiyyīn, MF 2:213.
70 Kasb, MF 8:399.
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at the end of ≠Ādil. Th is remark is probably the latest of the three because 
this treatise dates from the last two years of his life. He explains that some 
scholars reject the saying in order to protect God’s power, and he agrees that 
God certainly has power to create other than this world. However, he notes 
that there is another way to read the dictum:
It could mean that no better (a !hsan) than this [world] or no more perfect 
(akmal ) than this is possible ( yumkin). Th is is not a defamation of power. 
Rather, it has established His power [to do] other than what He has done. 
However, it says, “What He has done is better and more perfect than what He 
has not done.” Th is ascribes to Him—Glory be to Him—generosity, liberal-
ity and benefi cence. He—Glory be to Him—is the most generous. No more 
generous (akram) [being] than He can be conceived.71
Th us, Ibn Taymiyya accepts al-Ghazālī’s statement on the condition that it is 
understood that God could have created other than He did. However, what 
God did create is the best of all possible worlds because He is the most perfect 
and generous being imaginable. With this, Ibn Taymiyya becomes one of 
the earliest scholars aft er Ibn ≠Arabī to accept al-Ghazālī’s dictum before it 
became widely accepted from the mid-eighth/fourteenth century onward. 
Th e degree to which Ibn Taymiyya may have contributed to its eventual 
approval would perhaps be more than one could ascertain.
Conclusion
In various passages dealing with justice (≠adl ) Ibn Taymiyya rejects the 
Mu≠tazilī theodicy for subjecting God to an external and un-praiseworthy 
standard of strict retributive justice, and he denounces the Ash≠arīs for 
rendering God utterly unreliable. Ibn Taymiyya defi nes justice as “putting 
things in their places.” It is apparent that he believes that human beings 
should intuitively recognize that God always puts things in their places, but 
he does not clearly defi ne the rationality governing this justice. Although 
the shaykh speaks oft en of God’s justice retributively, as in God’s locating 
punishment in someone who disobeys, he rejects the strict retributivism 
of the Mu≠tazilīs. Instead, Ibn Taymiyya links God’s justice to God’s wise 
purpose, and, in ≠Ādil, he follows the rational and quranic imperatives to 
ascribe the highest perfection to God on to the conclusion that what God 
71 ≠Ādil, JR 142.
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creates is the best of all possible worlds, the inference likewise of Ibn Sīnā, 
al-Ghazālī and Ibn ≠Arabī. In ≠Ādil and in his other discussions of God’s 
justice, the shaykh concerns himself very little with the origin and purpose 
of evil deeds, and the sphere of the human fades from view. In the fi nal 
analysis, speaking of God’s justice for Ibn Taymiyya is about exalting God’s 
wise and good creation of all things.
CONCLUSION
We are now in position to draw together the main results of this study and 
clarify how Ibn Taymiyya is similar to and diff erent from others in the Islamic 
tradition. What emerges out of the shaykh’s sundry theodicean writings is an 
optimism that is consistent but not always fully worked out. Over against 
Ash≠arī voluntarism and the Mu≠tazilī free-will theodicy, Ibn Taymiyya main-
tains that God in His perfection creates everything in existence, human acts 
included, according to His wise purpose and, ultimately, in the best possible 
way. Th is places Ibn Taymiyya in the company of Ibn Sīnā, al-Ghazālī in his 
I!hyā±, and Ibn ≠Arabī on the central theological question of theodicy, even 
as he diff ers with these fi gures on other key matters.
Ibn Taymiyya’s optimism is readily apparent in discussions linked to the 
fi rst type of his three-fold evil attribution typology examined in Chapter Five. 
To review these three types briefl y, the fi rst attributes evil to the generality 
of God’s creation. Th e second type ascribes evil to the creature or second-
ary cause. Th e third type is the rhetorical courtesy of eliding the agent of 
evil—presumably God—and putting the relevant verb in the passive voice; 
Ibn Taymiyya’s discussion of this type is limited to citing examples from 
the Qur±an.
Attribution of evil to the generality, the fi rst type, is understood in three 
ways in Ibn Taymiyya’s discourse, each clearly echoing Ibn Sīnā. First, evil is 
harmful only to particular persons while being to the greater benefi t of the 
whole. Everything that God creates, both good and evil, is good by virtue of 
His wise purpose. Ibn Taymiyya supports this with quranic verses such as, 
“Who made good everything He created” (Q. 32:7), and “We did not cre-
ate the heavens and the earth and what is between them except with truth” 
(Q. 15:85), and the hadith, “Good is in Your hands, and evil is not [attrib-
uted] to You.” In texts examined in Chapter Six, the shaykh also speaks of 
the goodness of all that God creates in terms of God’s justice (≠adl) that puts 
everything in its place. Justice in this sense does not indicate pure retribution 
but God’s wise purpose and benefi cence in creation.
Second, evil is intrinsic to the perfection of some things. In Jabr Ibn 
Taymiyya explains that God is subject to logical constraints. God cannot 
create the impossible, and God in creating good must also create the evil that 
is necessarily concomitant to it. Th e shaykh then implies that God creates 
the best world that He can with an assertion of the necessary perfection 
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of God’s attributes of wisdom, power and mercy. He makes this optimism 
explicit in ≠Ādil, a text dealing with God’s justice, by rooting God’s creation 
of the best possible world in the exigencies of God’s perfection and gener-
osity and endorsing al-Ghazālī’s aphorism, “Th ere is nothing in possibility 
more wonderful than what is.” Lest this imply limitation to God’s power 
and freedom, Ibn Taymiyya affi  rms that God can do other than what He 
in fact does.
Th ird, and fi nally, attributing evil to the generality means that evil is 
quantitatively insignifi cant. Th e shaykh notes in (Hasana, for example, that 
the Messenger brought great profi t even though some were killed in the 
course of his mission.
At times, Ibn Taymiyya states that God’s wise purpose in the creation 
of evil cannot be known and that it is only important to believe that God 
has a wise purpose in all that He does. At other times, however, he does 
specify that evil has particular educational or religious benefi ts for human 
beings, which echo similar notions in Mu≠tazilism and Sufi sm. Th e un-
belief and destruction of Pharaoh, for example, serve as a lesson and a 
deterrent against tempting the same fate. Illness and sin provide occasions 
for humble turning to God that would not be possible otherwise. Oppres-
sion under an unjust ruler expiates sins and motivates turning to God to 
ask forgiveness.
Even though Ibn Taymiyya supplies educational and religious reasons for 
evil, he does not exploit two other explanations for evil adopted by some 
Muslim optimists. First, unlike al-Ghazālī, Ibn Taymiyya does not explain 
that evil is necessary for knowledge in the sense that things are known only 
by their opposites. For al-Ghazālī, health is known through illness and the 
blessing of Paradise from the punishment of Hell. Second, unlike Ibn ≠Arabī, 
Ibn Taymiyya does not readily invoke the principle of plenitude, which 
maintains that evil is necessary in order for God to display the full diversity 
of His names and attributes. Th e principle of plenitude would seem to be 
inherent in a fully worked out best-of-all-possible-worlds theodicy, and Ibn 
Taymiyya does suggest that creation refl ects the diversity of God’s names. As 
already noted, he even goes so far as to say that sin leads to good things not 
otherwise possible. However, the shaykh does not say explicitly, as does his 
disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, that God is dependent upon the existence 
of human sin and disobedience for the exercise of some of His attributes, 
and he does not explore and elaborate the paradoxical interplay of God’s 
attributes in the fashion of Ibn ≠Arabī. Rather, he is greatly concerned to 
avoid implicating God in evil and so affi  rms the complete goodness of all 
of God’s names and attributes.
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With regard to the second type in Ibn Taymiyya’s evil attribution typol-
ogy—the attribution of evil to the creature—it seems probable that there 
was development in his thinking. In several texts, as in Minhāj for example, 
the shaykh establishes a basis for retribution with the principle that acts are 
attributed not to their Creator but to the human substrate in which they 
are created. With this, God is just to reward and punish the human deeds 
that He creates. Th is way of explaining the origin of sin and evil is more 
at home in the world of Kalām theology than in a full orbed best-of-all-
 possible-worlds theodicy. Also, it implies that God is ultimately responsible 
for bad acts insofar as He creates them.
In (Hasana, which contains Ibn Taymiyya’s fullest discussion of evil, he 
goes beyond the substrate principle to root evil in nonexistence (≠adam)—a 
notion employed by Ibn Sīnā and Ibn ≠Arabī for metaphysical and mystical 
ends, respectively—to strengthen the foundations of retributive punish-
ment by clearing God of responsibility for creating human disobedience. 
Ibn Taymiyya claims in (Hasana that two affi  rmations in Q. 4:78–9 are not 
contradictory: “Everything is from God,” and, “Any evil thing that comes 
to you is from yourself.” To make sense of this, he traces the origin of bad 
human acts back to the failure of humans to do that for which they were 
created. Th is failure is a lack which is by defi nition nonexistent, and so God 
is not responsible for it. Th e evil deeds that God creates are then retribution 
for this initial failure, while good deeds come strictly from God’s unmerited 
grace and blessing, having no ground in human virtue and achievement. 
When faced with the question of why some people are created more prone 
to initial failure than others, the shaykh falls back on God’s wise purpose in 
the creation of all things.
In Fāti !ha, which is likely a later treatise, Ibn Taymiyya similarly upholds 
retributive punishment for evil deeds but drops retributive reward for good 
deeds. He asserts that the blessings of good deeds, their rewards, and entry 
into Paradise have no basis in human merit but occur strictly by the grace 
of God. God is the only source of all good, and, in this case, piety calls 
for acknowledging God’s grace for all good while maintaining full human 
responsibility for all evil, which arises ultimately from nonexistence.
Going beyond the interpretation of good and evil, Ibn Taymiyya uses 
ideas found also in Ibn Sīnā to make sense of God’s self-suffi  ciency. At the 
core of the shaykh’s theodicy is a causal model of God’s wisdom. God acts 
on account of causes, which are His wise purposes. To Ash≠arī Kalām theolo-
gians, this implies that God is perfected by acting on account of a cause and 
was imperfect beforehand. Th is compromises God’s suffi  ciency apart from 
the world. Both Ash≠arī and Mu≠tazilī Kalām theologians seek to avoid this 
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problem with the doctrine of God’s creation of the world in time ex nihilo. 
Th is assures that God is fully God apart from the world by positing a point 
at which the world did not in fact exist. Th e Mu≠tazilīs still try to affi  rm that 
God creates the world for purposes, purposes that benefi t the world only and 
have no impact on God. But the Ash≠arīs—and Ibn Taymiyya—reject the 
Mu≠tazilī solution as irrational. Ibn Taymiyya affi  rms fully that God acts in 
a rationally self-interested sense for the sake of His own wise purpose. Th is 
strongly suggests that God needs creation in order to work out His wise 
purposes and manifest His perfection. To meet this objection, Ibn Taymiyya 
employs the Avicennan notion that God’s love for Himself is essential while 
the world is an accidental and secondary—even if necessary—product of 
God’s self-love. Even though there has always been a world, this does not 
mean that God would be less fully God without it. Ibn Taymiyya argues as 
well that God is suffi  cient apart from the world inasmuch as He needs no 
help in creating all that exists. Creatures have no impact on God since it is 
God Himself who creates their acts.
While both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Sīnā posit God’s origination of the 
world as necessary, they diff er on a key point. For Ibn Sīnā, this world is a 
necessary emanation of the eternal and timeless essence of God. Ibn Taymiyya 
responds that positing the world as the eff ect of a timeless and motionless 
First Cause completely precludes movement in the world, which manifestly 
contradicts our experience of events originating in time. To overcome this 
problem, Ibn Taymiyya rejects the timeless ideal of God’s perfection and 
introduces movement into both God and the world. He also discards Ibn 
Sīnā’s emanation cosmology and replaces it with God’s voluntary, but per-
petual, creativity. For Ibn Taymiyya, it is of the necessary concomitants of 
God’s perfection and essence that He act and create by means of His will and 
power from eternity. Putting it more succinctly, God creates voluntarily by 
necessity. Ibn Taymiyya does not normally speak of time or originating events 
subsisting in God’s essence. Rather he speaks of the perpetual dynamism of 
God in terms of God’s voluntary attributes and acts, whose ongoing exercise 
according to God’s wise purpose brings about their eff ects in the temporally 
created world, and, even though God could do other than what He does, 
what God does create at each point in time is the best possible for that time. 
With respect to creation itself, Ibn Taymiyya denies that anything in the 
world is eternal. Each individual created thing is preceded by nonexistence 
in time. Yet, there have always been created things, and the genus or species 
of created things is eternal.
Ibn Taymiyya’s conciliation between the providentially necessitating God 
of Ibn Sīnā and the dynamic, personal and historically involved God found in 
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his plain language reading of the Qur±an and Hadith is unusual and possibly 
unprecedented in the Islamic tradition. Th e shaykh achieves this conciliation 
by abandoning the ancient Greek philosophical ideal shared by medieval 
Kalām theologians, Muslim philosophers and philosophically-minded Sufi s 
alike that the ultimate perfection of God consists in unchanging and motion-
less eternity. Th e perpetual and voluntary activity that is both necessary and 
essential to God’s perfection is what most fundamentally distinguishes Ibn 
Taymiyya’s optimism from the optimisms of Ibn Sīnā, Ibn ≠Arabī, al-Ghazālī 
and their like.
When Ibn Taymiyya turns his attention to the relation of God’s action 
to human action and accountability, he is most concerned to distinguish 
the two spheres clearly and give each its full due. Th at is, God is Creator of 
all existents including human acts, and human beings freely choose and are 
accountable for the deeds that they commit. Th e shaykh rejects any attempt 
to resolve the tension between these two spheres by limiting God’s power on 
the one hand (Qadarīs and Mu≠tazilīs) or limiting human responsibility on 
the other (Sufi  antinomianism and theologies such as those of al-Juwaynī and 
Ibn ≠Arabī that allegedly undergird it). He also denies that the two spheres 
are contradictory, and he is unsympathetic to Ibn ≠Arabī’s understanding of 
reality as fundamentally paradoxical and ambiguous.
As shown in Chapter Th ree, the shaykh uses his divine action/human 
accountability or creation/command hermeneutic to bring order and sense 
to a wide array of quranic and theological terms. On the side of creation are 
also God’s determination, decree and ontological words, while on the side of 
command are God’s love, good pleasure, and legislative and religious words. 
Parallel to creation and command are also divinity and lordship, inspiration 
and piety/immorality (Q. 91:7–8). In this last set of terms, inspiration indi-
cates creation, and the contrast between piety and immorality corresponds 
to legislation, that is, command and prohibition. Moreover, a number of 
quranic terms such as will, judgment, writing and authorization carry an 
ontological, determinative sense in some instances and a legislative or religious 
sense in others. At times, Ibn Taymiyya fi nds it necessary to clarify that terms 
oft en associated with one sphere may carry senses appropriate to the other, 
as when he specifi es—against Ibn ≠Arabī—that ‘decree’ carries a legislative 
sense in the verse, “Your Lord has decreed that you serve none but Him” 
(Q. 17:23). Th e shaykh’s concern throughout is to undermine interpretations 
that he believes lead to antinomianism, especially al-Juwaynī’s equation of 
God’s love with God’s ontological will.
It is particularly in Minhāj, writing against the Mu≠tazilī polemic of 
the Shī≠ī Ibn al-Mu$tahhar al-(Hillī, that Ibn Taymiyya seeks to defend the 
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plausibility of adhering fully to both creation and command by off ering 
illustrations from human aff airs. In one type of illustration, Ibn Taymiyya 
observes that God may will to create what opposes His command for the 
sake of something else—some wise purpose—that He loves, as when a sick 
person takes medicine to attain health. In another kind of illustration, the 
shaykh distinguishes the will of an agent to perform an act himself (creation) 
and his will that someone else perform an act (command). He observes, 
moreover, that an agent may have a wise purpose in commanding someone 
to do something without helping him to do it, as for example in the quranic 
story of the one who advised Moses to fl ee but did not help Moses in order 
to avoid detriment to himself (Q. 28:20). While Ibn Taymiyya recognizes 
that such examples do not apply perfectly to God, he argues that, if it is 
possible that commanding but not helping is at times wise for creatures, 
such wise intentions are a fortiori possible for God.
Ibn Taymiyya’s creation/command hermeneutic extends as well into his 
treatment of the human act. On the creation side, God creates a power, 
capability, decisive will or some combination thereof in the human being to 
necessitate or preponderate the existence of the human act. Th is view of God’s 
creation of the human act by means of power or will is essentially that of 
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Its roots lie in the preponderance (tarjī!h) terminology 
of the Mu≠tazilīs and in Ibn Sīnā’s language of causality, but neither al-Rāzī 
nor Ibn Taymiyya subscribe to a causal chain theory into which God cannot 
intervene. Both al-Rāzī and Ibn Taymiyya dismiss the early Ash≠arī doctrine 
of acquisition (kasb) as meaningless. Yet, while al-Rāzī openly identifi es his 
view as compulsion ( jabr), the shaykh wishes not to speak of compulsion lest 
it be confused with coercion (ikrāh), which nullifi es human will and choice 
entirely. For Ibn Taymiyya, God cannot be said to coerce because He creates 
the will and free choice by which human beings act voluntarily.
Corresponding to the realm of command is the human power or capability 
that is anterior to God’s creation of the act and constitutes the bodily sound-
ness rendering a human being accountable to God’s legislation. Similarly, 
on the side of command and human action are the secondary causes, which 
include, among other things, God’s guidance and the human will. From this 
perspective, humans live in a predictable world of apparently natural causes 
and conditions, and involuntary human acts are distinguished from voluntary 
acts inasmuch as the latter come into existence by means of the human will. 
However, God can break the natural order of the causes whenever He wills, 
and, from the side of God’s creation, it is God who employs the secondary 
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causes as instruments and raw materials according to His wise purposes to 
originate all that occurs.
Al-Rāzī sometimes maintains the compatibility of God’s preponderance or 
creation of the human act with human accountability, but at least once—in 
his Tafsīr—he rigorously spells out how they contradict one another. By way 
of contrast, Ibn Taymiyya consistently denies contradiction between God’s 
determination of the human act and human free choice, and on occasion 
he presents their compatibility as the golden mean between the extremes of 
compulsion ( jabr) and denying God’s all-comprehensive power. Neverthe-
less, he does encounter rational diffi  culties. In response, he simply affi  rms 
that God has a wise purpose in all that He creates, or he diverts his reader’s 
attention from the divine perspective to the human. A clear example of the 
latter is his response to al-Rāzī’s claim that God obligates humans to do the 
impossible. Al-Rāzī argues that God obligated Abū Lahab to do the impos-
sible when God commanded him to believe because God’s foreknowledge 
necessitated that he not believe. Although Ibn Taymiyya cannot deny that 
this is so metaphysically, he sidesteps al-Rāzī’s conclusion by switching to 
the human ethical perspective in which belief was indeed obligatory for Abū 
Lahab. Moreover, the shaykh argues, God did not inform Abū Lahab that 
He already knew that he would not believe.
From the above, it is apparent that Ibn Taymiyya’s theodicean writings 
constitute a concerted attempt to exegete and rationalize the relevant texts 
in the Qur±an and the Hadith into a consistent perpetual optimism in theo-
dicy and compatibilism in the human act. In order better to understand the 
underpinnings of this, Chapter One sought out texts beyond the theodicean 
writings that provided clues to Ibn Taymiyya’s theological methodology. 
Th is showed that Ibn Taymiyya’s theological work may be characterized as 
a juristic exercise dedicated to fi nding the most praiseworthy way to speak 
about God and that this is part of the shaykh’s wider practical and juristic 
eff ort to ascertain how correctly to worship God in all aspects of life. Basic 
to Ibn Taymiyya’s theological jurisprudence is the principle—grounded both 
in rational considerations of causality and in the quranic verse, “To God 
is the highest similitude” (Q. 16:60)—that God has an a fortiori right to 
ascription with the highest human perfections and to exoneration from all 
imperfections. With this principle in place, Ibn Taymiyya affi  rms the full 
reality of all attributes ascribed to God in the Qur±an and the Hadith, while 
also affi  rming that both God’s perfection and the verse, “Th ere is nothing like 
Him” (Q. 42:11), dictate that the modalities of these attributes be wholly 
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unlike those of creatures. Within this framework, the shaykh explicates the 
signifi cance, coherence and faithfulness to tradition of his plain language 
reading of the theological data in the revealed texts, and he makes and seeks 
to demonstrate the apologetic claim that independent reason rightly exercised 
leads to speaking about God in the same way.
Ibn Taymiyya’s approach to God’s attributes and theological language 
diff ers from a number of others in the Islamic tradition. Unlike the Kalām 
theologians, the shaykh sees no need to reinterpret corporeal attributes 
such as God’s hand and God’s sitting to give them meanings allegedly more 
fi tting to God. He typically tries to interpret God’s attributes according 
to their linguistic and contextual senses and to show how these meanings 
fi t together. He avoids anthropomorphism by maintaining that it is of the 
perfection of God’s perfection that all of God’s attributes be wholly unlike 
their counterparts in creatures, except in name. In contrast to the Muslim 
philosophers and Ibn ≠Arabī, Ibn Taymiyya’s approach is also distinctively 
egalitarian. Unlike the philosophers, he does not draw a distinction between 
a superior intellectual apprehension of the truth by the elite on the one hand 
and the imaginal reports of God’s messengers adapted for easy apprehen-
sion by the inferior masses on the other. And while Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn 
≠Arabī share in rejecting Kalām reinterpretation (ta±wīl ) of God’s corporeal 
attributes, the (Hanbalī jurist distinguishes himself from the Sufi  theorist 
by drawing a sharp line between the Creator and the creature. He affi  rms 
the ontological reality of God’s names and attributes, leaves no room for 
the illumined gnostic to see created things as God’s very acts, and refrains 
from esoteric interpretation. Additionally, Ibn Taymiyya breaks with the 
unrefl ective traditionalism of (Hanbalī forbears such as Ibn Qudāma. Instead, 
he engages in interpretation of the meanings of God’s attributes and makes 
the apologetic claim that his views accord with reason. For Ibn Taymiyya, 
reason and revelation lead to the same truth, and this truth about God is 
equally available to all ordinary people of right mind.
With the basic elements of Ibn Taymiyya’s apologetic theological jurispru-
dence in view, his theodicy provides an important case study in its imple-
mentation. Here, several features of his methodology become apparent. Th e 
quranic and rational imperative to ascribe to God the highest perfection or 
similitude means avoiding terms that may carry negative connotations in 
ordinary speech and/or whose usage is not required by revelation. Th us, Ibn 
Taymiyya speaks not of purpose (ghara#d ) but of wise purpose (!hikma), not 
of compulsion ( jabr) but of creating and making ( ja≠l), and not of originat-
ing events in God’s essence but of God’s voluntary attributes and acts, this 
even though the respective terms mean the same thing metaphysically. More 
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substantively, giving God the highest similitude involves Ibn Taymiyya in 
clarifying the characteristics of God’s perfection and identifying why compet-
ing theodicies are wrong. With reason and the revealed tradition interpreted 
by the Salaf as his stated authorities, the shaykh takes God’s perfection to 
consist in willing and creating things in the world for wise purposes from 
eternity in the best possible way. He criticizes the Mu≠tazilīs and the Ash≠arīs 
for failing, each in their own way, to ascribe to God the highest similitude 
or perfection. Th e imperative to ascribe perfection to God also entails a 
rationalism for Ibn Taymiyya that seeks to resolve or at least fi nd plausible 
ways to understand rational diffi  culties such as the origin of evil and the 
conundrum of creation and command.
In the end, Ibn Taymiyya’s best-of-all-possible-worlds theodicy is testimony 
to a deep conviction that proper worship of God requires making laudable 
sense out of the revealed tradition and showing that this accords with rea-
son. His perpetual optimism constitutes an apologetic rationalization of a 
close ordinary language reading of what Islam’s foundational texts say about 
God’s moral relationship to the world. Th e present study has been devoted 
primarily to elucidating the contours of this apologetic rationalization and 
showing how it works. Th is hopefully sets the stage for further exploration 
in three directions. First, other aspects of Ibn Taymiyya’s theology await more 
detailed exposition and analysis, especially his doctrine of God’s attributes 
surveyed in Chapter One. Second, much work remains to clarify how Ibn 
Taymiyya appropriated the thought of those he read, especially Ibn Sīnā, Ibn 
≠Arabī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, as well as Ibn Rushd and Abū al-Barakāt 
al-Baghdādī. Th e latter two fi gures have received comparatively little atten-
tion in this study, but they may well be no less important to Ibn Taymiyya’s 
intellectual formation. Th ird, the strong modern interest in Ibn Taymiyya 
warrants extensive research into how and why his theodicy, and his theology 
more generally, have been appropriated by successors, both late-medieval 
and modern. It seems likely that Ibn Taymiyya’s egalitarian and non-esoteric 
approach to interpretation combined with his rationalization of the theologi-
cal evidence in Islam’s source texts is one reason many Muslims have been 
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the respective concepts; for his interaction 
with others, see the respective groups and 
persons. See also the respective short titles 
of his works and translations of Ibn 
Taymiyya’s texts.
ibtilā± (trial) 38, 192, 193 n. 70, 202
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idhn (authorization) 15, 123, 125 n. 99
i#dlāl (misguidance) 115–6, 121, 124, 
204
idolatry (see associationism)
ignorance ( jahl ) 43, 191, 200–2, 208
i#hsān (see benefi cence)
I#hyā± ≠ulūm al-dīn (al-Ghazālī) 139, 178, 
225
Ījī (al-), ≠A#dud al-Dīn (d. 756/1355) 140
ikhtiyār (free choice) 87, 139, 143–5, 
155, 171–4, 224
ikhtiyārī (see voluntary)
Ikhtiyāriyya (Ibn Taymiyya) 21–4
ikrāh (coercion) 171–2, 174
ilāhiyya (see divinity)
ilhām (inspiration) 41, 99, 115, 119
Īlkhānid Empire 10
≠illa (see cause)




immorality ( fujūr) 120, 124; opposite 
piety 115, 119
impediment (māni ≠) 41, 157, 162–4, 
207–8
imperfection (naq$s) punishment of 38; 
evil 177–8, 191, 206–8. See also 
perfection.
impossibility (imtinā ≠) of two contraries 
at one time and place 32, 185; of 
opposing God’s foreknowledge 169. 
See also possible; possibility; 
preponderance.
≠Imrān (Ibn Taymiyya) 21–2, 24
≠Imrān, ≠Alī b. Mu#hammad 6 n. 14
imti#hān (test) 192
imtinā ≠ (see impossibility)
Inati, Shams 138 n. 9
≠ināya (providence) 2, 4, 71, 177, 225. 
See also wise purpose; justice.
incomparability (tanzīh) 46–50, 57
independence of God (see suffi  ciency)
India 111
infallibility of prophets (≠i$sma) 193 n. 71
infi nite regress, endless chain 
(tasalsul ) 74, 77–81, 86, 91–6, 146
injustice, oppression (!zulm) as 
undeserved harm 212; as acting freely in 
someone else’s property 217; as opposing 
a command 217–8; God’s self-forbidding 
218, 225; as putting something in 
other than its place 220–2; as hateful 42, 
64; God’s power to commit 
224–5; compensation for 213; human 
37, 109, 132, 154, 158, 190–3, 201; 
and purpose (ghara#d ) 74–5. See also 
justice.
inspiration (ilhām) 41, 99, 115, 119
intercession (shafā ≠a) 125 n. 99, 158, 206
interpretation (tafsīr) 54–5. See also 
reinterpretation.
invocation (du≠ā±) 99, 132, 138 n. 9, 158, 
193, 206, 221
≠iqāb (see punishment)
Irāda (Ibn Taymiyya) described 12–13; 
wise purpose and perpetual activity 
75–80, 97–101; secondary causality 
159–160; attribution of evil 179–182, 
185–190, 197; Iblīs on God’s wisdom 
113–4. See also translations.
irāda (see will)
Iraq 10
irrational, irrationality 32, 69, 114, 
129–132, 160, 166, 176; of Mu≠tazilī 
view of God’s purpose 75, 78, 98




Ishrāqīs 31 n. 41
≠i$sma (protection of prophets from 
sins) 193 n. 71
isti ≠āna (see asking for help)
isti $tā ≠a (capability) 147–151, 167–8
Isti$tā ≠a (Ibn Taymiyya) 148–9, 152–3. 
See also translations.
istiwā± (sitting) 46, 54–5
itti #hādīs (Unifi cationalists) 110
≠iwa!d (compensations) 213
Iyās b. Mu≠āwiyya (d. 122/740) 217
Jabbār (Compeller) 170–2 
Jabr (Ibn Taymiyya) described 13–14; 
compulsion 171–2; obligation of what 
one is not able 168–9; attribution of evil 
179–185, 191; mentioned 108, 214. 
See also translations.
jabr (see compulsion)
Jabrīs defi ned 110–1; human act 106, 
110–1, 114–8, 130, 142–5, 152–4, 166, 
170–3; analogy and ethical value 
115–8; reconciliation with Qadarīs 
152–4; denial of wise purpose 120, 
204; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī as 111, 
143–5, 172
Jackson, Sherman 53
Jahd (Ibn Taymiyya) 57–8
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jahl (ignorance) 43, 191, 200–2, 208
Jahm b. %Safwān, Jahmīs rational inquiry 
(na!zar) as initial obligation 33; 
attributes 59 n. 150, 84, 95, 111 n. 46, 
128; denial of wise purpose/causality 
77, 111–2, 191, 195, 216; human acts 
110–111, 138–9, 154–5, 166, 169
jazā± (see recompense)
Jews 41, 43, 87
jihad 7, 133, 184, 186, 194, 196
Jilānī (al-), ≠Abd al-Qādir (d. 561/1166) 
110
Jubbā±ī (al-), Abū ≠Alī (d. 303/916) 142 
n. 21, 203 n. 102, 214–5
Jubbā±ī (al-), Abū Hāshim (d. 321/933) 
142 n. 21, 166, 203
judgment (#hukm) ontological and 
legislative 120–4, 130; returning to 
God 77, 79, 98; in analogy 59; names 
and 105
Julaynad (al-), Mu #hammad al-Sayyid 6, 
143 n. 22
Junayd (al-) (d. 298/910) 109
jurisprudence (see theological 
jurisprudence)
justice (≠adl ) typology of views on 
injustice ( !zulm) and 212–224; 
retributive 156, 191, 202–6, 212–6, 222; 
voluntarist 216–220; as putting things 
in their places 220–4; as benefi cence 
220; parallel to wise purpose 105, 
111–4, 117–8, 172, 191, 205, 221–3; 
parallel to mercy (see mercy); entailing 
the best possible world 224–8; and 
creation of human acts 107, 154–6, 164, 
195, 202–6; and God’s power 224–5; 
and analogy 213–6; as beloved 42; in 
one hand of God 189; Jahmī denial of 
111; Iblīsī denial of 105, 112–8; human 
34, 44, 132
Juwaynī (al-) (d. 478/1085) 33 n. 52, 36, 
93–4, 216, 218; love and will 73, 127–9; 
human acts 136, 140, 152
Kalābādhī (al-) (d. 380/990 or 
384/994) 155
Kalām theologians (mutakallimūn) 
method critiqued 21–2, 25, 31, 57, 
69, 118; reason 32–3; reinterpretation 
(ta±wīl ) 47, 50–5, 64; timeless eternity 
of God 21, 24, 68, 76, 87–8, 96; 
creation ex nihilo 80–5, 91–5. See also 
Ash≠arīs; Mu≠tazilīs; Māturīdīs; Jabrīs; 
Qadarīs.
kalimāt (words), ontological and 
religious 122–4, 149
kamāl (see perfection)
Karrāmīs 77, 84, 95, 128, 152, 186
Kasb (Ibn Taymiyya) described 13–14; 
human acts 151, 165, 172; secondary 
causality 157, 160–4; attribution of evil 
179, 190. See also translations.
kayf (see modality)
khabā±ith (disgusting things) 37, 199, 
222
Khalidi, Tarif 11 n. 23




Khaw%d (Ibn Taymiyya) 20–1




Kindī (al-) (d. ca. 252/866) 92
kitāb (writing) of God 105, 119, 124, 
217
Kitāb al-irshād (al-Juwaynī) 93




Lama $tī (al-), A#hmad b. Mubārak 
al-Sijilmāsī (d. 1156/1743) 226 n. 67
Laoust, Henri 3–5, 11, 13 n. 32, 22–4, 
30 n. 39, 50 n. 126, 72, 120 n. 79, 136, 
165
law (sharī ≠a, shar ≠) and theology 24–5; 
and reason 36–9; deprecation of 7, 13, 
108–110, 114, 130, 159–160, 206; 
mentioned 43, 46, 72–3, 122, 126, 
130, 161 n. 103, 167, 178, 213. 
See also revelation.
lawāzim (see necessary concomitants)
legislative (shar ≠ī) will, words, etc. 
27 n. 28, 73, 122–9, 148–9, 223
libertarian freedom defi ned 138; 
mentioned 131, 139, 141, 144–5, 154, 
205, 214
likening (tamthīl ) 48–52, 117, 213–4
linguistic explanation (tafsīr) 54–5. 
See also ordinary language; 
connotations.
literalism 22, 52
logic Aristotelian 19, 57; rules of 32, 40, 
133
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lordship (rubūbiyya, rabbāniyya) 
explained 27–9, 120–2; mentioned 
31, 59, 67, 117, 126, 130 n. 127, 
195
love
(ma#habba): parallel to good pleasure/
command/legislative will, opposite 
hate 51–2, 73, 115, 118–129, 223; 
Kalām and Sufi  views of will and 
51–2, 72–3, 127–9; of wise purpose 
(in creating what is hated) 73, 80, 
97, 133–5; God’s suffi  ciency and 
self- 75–6, 97–100; as fi nal cause 
of existence 100 n. 118; attribute 
of perfection 64–6; for God (in His 
essence) 27–29, 38, 209; natural 
constitution 35–6, 42–6, 201
(≠ishq): passionate 75, 172; God’s 
self- (Ibn Sīnā) 71–2
Ma≠arrī (al-), Abū al-≠Alā± (d. 449/1058) 
112
Ma≠bad al-Juhanī (d. 83/703) 108
Madelung, Wilferd 142–3
Madjid, Nurcholish 39 n. 85
mafsada (detriment) (see benefi t)




Majūs, Majūsīs 104–8, 113 n. 63, 115, 
120
Makari, Victor 136–7, 141
Makdisi, George 7 n. 15, 20 n. 5, 137 
n. 5
Mālik b. Anas (d. 179/795) 54
Mālikīs 216
Mamlūks, Ba #hrī 7, 10
māni ≠ (see impediment)
Manichaeism 107 n. 23, 113 n. 63
Man$tiqiyyīn (Ibn Taymiyya) 57–8. 
See also translations.
Maq$sad asna (al-Ghazālī) 220
mara#d (see illness)
Marātib al-irāda (Ibn Taymiyya) 126
Marmura, Michael 140–1
Marwazī (al-), Abū Bakr (d. 292/905) 
170 n. 138
mashī ±a (see will)
ma≠ $siyya (see disobedience)
ma$sla #ha (see benefi t)
Ma$tālib ≠āliyya (Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī) 
142 n. 19
mathal a≠lā (see highest similitude)
Māturīdī (al-), Abū Man$sūr (d. 333/944), 
Māturīdīs 2, 129 n. 122, 156, 177, 220
Mazdaism 107
Mecca 11
median (wasa $t) 173. See also golden 
mean.
medicine 3, 132–3, 159, 171
mercy (ra #hma) precedes anger 188; 
written by God for Himself 218; parallel 
to wise purpose, justice or goodness 37, 
66, 97, 111, 118, 121, 183–6, 190–2, 
195, 203–5, 212, 219–222; parallel to 
forgiveness or pardon 162, 187, 194, 
221–2; mentioned 31, 38, 52, 163, 215, 
218
Messiah, son of Mary 122
Michel, Th omas 31 n. 41, 32 n. 43, 
136 n. 3
Michot, Yahya [ Jean R.] 11 n. 23, 
20 n. 8, 22, 30, 138 n. 9
Minhāj (Ibn Taymiyya) described 
10–12, 114; wise purpose and perpetual 
activity 22, 74–100; human acts 
146–156, 166, 171; attribution of evil 
179–181, 188; wise purposes in evil 132, 
190–4; use of similitudes 56, 130–5; 
justice 212–6. See also translations.
Minhāj al-karāma (Ibn al-Mu$tahhar 
al-(Hillī) 10–12, 114
misguidance (i!dlāl ) 115–6, 121, 124, 
204
modality (kayf, takyīf ) 48–56, 60 n. 150, 
66, 161, 220
Mongols 7, 10, 122
Moses 50, 125, 131, 181
motive (dā ≠ī) 139, 142–3, 152
Mu#hammad b. Ka≠b (d. 118/736) 170
Mu#hammad the Prophet 44, 122, 144, 
184–6, 193 n. 71, 198
Mu#hassal (Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī) 10
mu#hdith (see originator)
Mujāhid (d. ca. 100–4/718–722) 54
Mujbirīs 106, 111, 113 n. 63. See also 
Jabrīs.
mulā±im (suitable) 34, 36
mumkin (see possible)





Muslim (d. 261/875) 14, 41, 225
Mu≠tabar (Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī) 
85
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mutafalsifa 31 n. 41. See also 
philosophers.
mutakallimūn (see Kalām theologians)
Mu≠tazilīs, Mu≠tazilism free-will 
theodicy 1–2, 177, 213, 216; rational 
inquiry (na!zar) as initial obligation 33; 
objectivist ethics 35–7; assimilation and 
objectivist ethics 116–8, 213–216, 219; 
reinterpretation (ta±wīl ) and denial of 
attributes 54–5, 111 n. 46; purpose, 
suffi  ciency and origination in God 
71, 74–9, 84, 95–8, 100, 194–5, 213; 
human creation of acts 105–8, 114, 
143–5, 149, 157–160, 184, 212–3; 
acts interpreted deterministically 
141–3, 152–4; polemic against 
voluntarism and determinism 113–4, 
130, 133, 154; will and command 124, 
127; purposes in evil 177; retributive 
justice 196, 212–6; purpose of creation 
as human benefi t 75, 77, 97–8, 213, 
215; best (a$sla#h) 212–5, 226; and Shī≠ī 
theology 11, 95, 107, 149; Ba$sran and 
Baghdādī 213. See also Jubbā±ī; ≠Abd 
al-Jabbār; Abū al-(Husayn al-Ba$srī; 
(Hillī.
naf ≠ (see profi t)
nafs (see soul; essence)
names (asmā±) of God affi  rmed without 
modality 47–53, 62, 65–6; essence 
mentioned through 59; manifestation 
of 121, 178, 189; relation to evil 186–9; 
conjoined 188; ninety-nine 178, 187; 
Allāh 27; Jabbār (Compeller) 170–2; 




natural constitution ( fi $tra) explained 
39–44; mentioned 20, 45–6, 57 
n. 146, 62–3, 66, 109, 201–3, 216, 221. 
See also reason.
natural causality 162–4
na!zar (rational inquiry) 33, 43
Na!z!zām (al-) (d. 231/845) 166, 212 n. 3
necessary concomitants (lawāzim) of 
God 67, 70–2, 87, 99 n. 118, 101; evils 
as 181, 182 n. 20, 185, 207; mentioned 
35, 42, 133
need (see suffi  ciency)
negation of God’s attributes (see stripping 
away)
Neoplatonism 31, 75–6, 81 n. 44, 86, 
140–1
ni ≠ma (see blessing)
Noah 92, 168–9
nominalism 50–2, 65
nonexistence, privation, lack (≠adam) and 
evil 177–9, 195–6, 200–8
Nubuwwāt (Ibn Taymiyya) 44, 98, 
218–9. See also translations.
oaths 127
obedience ( $tā ≠a) 12, 23–4, 28, 31–2, 
73, 90, 97, 99, 106, 109, 114, 119–122, 
126–7, 155, 161–2, 172, 196–200, 203, 
214, 217
obligation (taklīf ) of what one is not 
able (mā lā yu$tāq) 165–9; power 
that is the condition for imposing 
149–151; rational inquiry (na!zar) as 
the initial 33–4, 43; mentioned 98, 123, 
214
Oljeitu (d. 716/1316) 10, 11 n. 24
omission (tark) 200–4
omnipotence (see power)
oneness of existence (wa #hdat al-wujūd ) 
23, 110
ontological (kawnī) will, words, etc. 
27 n. 28, 122–7, 149
opposites, good and evil known by 178
oppression (see injustice)
optimism, best-of-all-possible-worlds 
theodicy introduced 1–6; perpetual, 
defi ned 5; as a threat to God’s power 
224–7; summary of Ibn Taymiyya’s 4–5, 
229–237. See also wise purpose; justice; 
Ibn Sīnā; Ibn ≠Arabī; al-Ghazālī.
ordinary language 22, 53, 68, 171–2. 
See also linguistic explanation; 
connotations.
origination ( #hudūth) of events from 
eternity 77–80, 88–95; in God’s 
essence 74, 79, 95–6; God as eternal, 
complete cause precludes 78, 81–3; 
possible from eternity 83–6; and 
secondary causality 160; of human acts 
by God 146, 147 n. 17, 152–4; of acts 
by humans (but not creation) 152–4
originator (mu#hdith) argument for 
God’s existence 33–4, 40; argument 
for God’s creation of human acts 146, 
152–4; prior to originated in perfection 
59, 63 
Ormsby, Eric 3 n. 7, 225–6
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pain (alam) 34–6, 42–4, 183–7, 208–9
paradox 65, 69, 97, 129, 137, 138, 145, 
178, 189
passionate love (≠ishq) 71–2, 75, 172
Pazdawī (al-) (d. 593/1099) 129 n. 122
perfection (kamāl ) as perpetual 
activity 21, 76, 87–8, 91, 94, 96, 99; 
attributes of/ascribing the highest/
exoneration from imperfection 25, 
31, 56–69, 87–8, 132, 156, 161, 169, 
220, 223–4, 227 (see also highest 
similitude); of the created order 177–8, 
181, 184–5, 222, 225 n. 64, 226–7; 
exists only when wise purpose requires 
101; known through imperfection 178, 
185; and God’s self-suffi  ciency/wise 
purpose 78–80, 81 n. 44, 97–101, 
165–6 n. 122; of natural constitution 
44–5; mentioned 34, 70, 150, 165, 
191, 194 n. 71, 207
Perho, Irmeli 5 n. 11, 8
perpetuity (dawām) of causal, voluntary 
and creative activity in God 21, 24, 
76–96, 99, 122; of emanation 82
Persia 10, 107
perspective switching 161, 164, 168–9, 
189, 200, 205; duality of 136, 164, 
189–190, 209
perversity 200–2
Pharaoh 122, 131, 192
Philoponus, John (d. ca. 570) 92–3
philosophers ( falāsifa) 21 n. 10, 34, 
57, 140, 186; identifi ed 31; revelation 
and prophecy 22, 31, 46–7, 50, 69, 
219 n. 40; God and the world 21, 68, 
77–88, 94, 96, 142, 160, 226. See also 
Neoplatonism; Ibn Sīnā; Ibn Rushd.
piety (taqwā) 159, 221; opposite 
immorality 115, 119
Pilgrimage/Hajj 133, 148, 155
Plato 4
pleasure (ladhdha) 34–5, 42–4, 97–8, 
133, 201, 208
plenitude, principle of 178
polytheism (see associationism)
possibility (imkān) of other than what 
is 223–7; of divine injustice 217–8, 
224–5
possible (mumkin) eternal versus 
preceded by nonexistence 88–9; need 
for preponderator or cause to bring into 
existence 33, 40, 83–5; 142–4, 153; the 
Necessary Existent more perfect than 63
potency (quwwa) reason as 32; 
natural constitution as 41; in human acts 
147, 151, 168; mentioned 157, 164
power (qudra)
of God: Qadarī/Mu≠tazilī denial of 
105, 108, 118, 158–9; optimism 
as a threat to 224–7; mentioned 52, 
60, 63–5, 85–7, 119–122, 173–4, 
218
human: reality of 120; Ash≠arī views of 
139–145; determining and legislative 
147–152; as secondary cause 147, 
156–161, 166–9
praise ( #hamd ), praiseworthy ascribing 
to God the highest 25–6, 59, 62–3, 
66–9, 132, 220, 223–5 (see also highest 
similitude); for God in His essence 29, 
66–7, 194–5, 206; God’s self-suffi  ciency 
and self- 75, 97–100; in human acts 36, 
126, 144, 163, 165 n. 122, 214–6, 222. 
See also worship; love.
pre-Aristotelian philosophers 90, 95–6
predestination (see determination)
predetermination (see determination)
preponderance (tarjī#h) principle of 
40–1, 45, 142; in God’s will 45, 84–7, 
91, 94; in creation of human acts 
142–6, 147 n. 37, 149, 152–4; of good 
over evil 182 n. 16, 183 n. 22, 185
principles (u$sūl ) of religion (al-dīn) 
19–20; and branches ( furū≠) 24–5
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Proclus (d. 485) 81 n. 44
profi t (naf ≠) opposite harm (#darar) 
34–8, 42, 45, 52, 97–8, 110, 131, 165, 
186, 201, 203; in acts 74, 126, 130, 
184, 192, 195, 199, 202, 205–6, 221. 
See also benefi t.
prophecy (nubuwwa) 22, 44–6, 111, 184, 
193–4 n. 71, 218–9
Prophet Mu#hammad 44, 122, 144, 
184–6, 193 n. 71, 198
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(≠isma) 193 n. 71
providence (≠ināya) 2, 4, 71, 177, 225. 
See also wise purpose; justice.
punishment (≠iqāb) before and aft er 
guidance 37–8, 200–4; for lack of 
good deeds 204–6; naturalistic 
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116, 155–161, 173, 177, 187, 193, 
197–209, 212–223. See also justice.
purpose ( ghara#d ) 74–75, 172
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and the human act 114–8, 124, 130, 
142, 147, 152–4, 170, 173, 204; denial 
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77
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qiyās al-shumūl (syllogism) 57–9, 62
Qudra (Ibn Taymiyya) 97. See also 
translations.
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43, 49, 54, 58 n. 146, 59–62, 68–9, 
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(Q. 53:38–9) 221; (Q. 57:4) 46, 49, 
54–5; (Q. 59:23) 170; (Q. 59:24) 
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212, 216–7, 221. See also justice.
ri#dā (see good pleasure)
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Salaf (the pious early Muslims) 1, 6, 
20–2, 31, 49, 54, 57–9, 69, 95 n. 103, 
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206
Shāfi ≠īs 77, 144, 155
Shahrastānī (al-) (d. 548/1153) 113, 
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Suhrawārdī (al-) (d. 587/1191) 31 n. 41
suitable (mulā±im) 34, 36
Sulaymān b. Sa#hmān (d. 1349/1930) 6 
n. 13
Sunna (Abū Bakr al-Khallāl) 170
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ta±thīr (effi  cacy) 136, 140–1, 161–7
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al-Fidā± (159) 31; ≠Ādil ( JR 123–4) 221, 
( JR 130) 222, ( JR 133) 223, ( JR 136) 
223, ( JR 136) 223–4, ( JR 142) 227; 
Akmaliyya (MF 6:83) 67, (MF 6:84) 67; 
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(1:371/1:103) 87, (1:397–8/1:111) 166, 
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wise purpose, wisdom (#hikma) in God’s 
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79–80, 95–6; love of 73–5, 80, 97, 
133–5; and divinity and essence 
194–5; and right to praise 66, 195; 
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